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THE 


elemen'ts 


Intelleotcial  Philosophy. 


BY 

REV.  J.  DE   CONCILIO, 

Author  of  ^'■Catholicity  and  Pantheism,"  '^'■Knowledge  of  Mary  ^^  etc. 


'How  charming  is  divine  philosophy! 
Not  harsh  and  crabbed,  as  dull  fools  suppose; 
But  musical  as  is  Apollo's  lute, 
And  a  perpetual  feast  of  iiectar'd  sweets, 
Where  no  crude  surfeit  reigns." 

•  —Milton's  Comut, 


New  York: 

D.  &  J.  SADLIER  &  CO.,  31  BARCLAY  STREET. 

Montreal  :  275  Notre  Dame  Street. 

'  1878. 


Cop)'right, 
D.  &  J.  SADLIER  &  CO., 

1878. 


n.  J.  HKwnr,  mhntek,  97  rosE  street,  new  yosk. 


CONTENTS. 


■* 


PAGE 

Introduction  to  Philosophy 7 


LOGIC. 
Introduction 21 

Part- First. 

CHAPTER 

I.— Matter  of  Reasoning, 25 

II. — Cf  the  Different  Objects  which  a  Universnl  Idea  may 
Represent,  and  of  the  Different  Modes  of  Represent- 
ing them, 44 

III. — Of  the  Expression  of  Ideas  or  of  Terms,  ...       54 

IV. — Proximate  Matter  of  Reasoning  ;  and,  first,  of  the  Na- 
ture of  Judgment  and  Proposition,       ....       59 

V. — Different  Species  and  Properties  of  Propositio  iS,  .        .      65 

VI. — Truth  of  Judgments  and  Propositions,    ....      74 

Part  Second. — Form  of  Reasoning. 

I. — of  the  Essential  vStructure  of  Reasoning,        ...  78 

II. — Different  Species  of  Reasoning, 95 

III. — Of  the  Expression  of  Reasoning, 102 

IV. — Faults  of  Reasoning, 104 

Part  Third. — End  of  Reasoning. 

I. — Of  the  Nature  and  the  Necessity  of  Method,  .        .        .     107 

II. — Elements  and  Means  of  Method, 113 

III. — Division  of  Method — that  is,  of  Method  of  Invention  and 

of  Discipline 120 

m 


24535 


iv  Contents, 


• 


CHAPTER  PACE 

IV. — Of  Science  according  to  its  Strictest  Acceptation,  inas- 
much as  it  is  Knowledge, 125 

V. — Of  Science  in  its  more  Enlarged  Signification,  inasmuch 

as  it  is  a  System  of  Truths, 131 

ONTOLOGY. 

Introduction— Object  of   Metaphysics— Definition  of 
Ontology, 141 

I. — Of  Being,  considered  in  Itself  and   in  a  most  General 

Way, 143 

II. — Of  the  Determinations  of  Being  in  General — Essence 

and  Existence, 152 

III. — Of  the  Manner  in  which  Essence  and  Existence  co-ope- 
rate to  form  a  Real  Being, 161 

IV. — Of  the  Properties  of  Being, 164 

v.— Of  the  Causes  of  Beings, 1S5 

VI. — Division  of  Being,    .        .        .        ,        .,        .        .        .  206 

VII.— Of  the  Use  of  Ontology, 230 

i  '  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

Introduction, 241 

I. — On  the  Nature  of  Man  in  General, 242 

II. — On  the  Principles  from  which  the  Nature  of  Man  Re- 
sults— Soul  and  Body — and,  first,  of  the  Soul,     .        .     252 

III. — Of  the  Human  Body 274 

IV. — Of  the   Manner  according  to  which  the  Soul  and  the 

Body  are  united  together  and  conspire  to  form  Man,  .     276 

.-..A  '  K       ,    ,  .    .     ,    .         ,        ••  ' 


■,>v^    ^'V^ 


PREFACE. 


THE  author  who  should  attempt  to  write  a  book 
on  the  elements  of  intellectual  philosophy 
should  in  our  opinion  strictly  attend  to,  and  be 
guided  by,  the  following  principles,  which  have  re- 
ference to  the  language,  to  the  style,  and  to  the 
matter  of  the  book. 

I.  The  book  should  be  written  in  English.  The 
matter  treated  of  in  philosophy  is  hard  enough  to 
understand,  even  by  the  brightest  intellect  which 
.,  just  comes  from  the  study  of  belles-lettres,  fascinated 
by  the  matchless  beauties  of  the  ancients  clothed 
in  the  finest  language,  to  undertake  to  master  hard, 
dry  things,  without  flesh  and  blood,  but  abstract 
and  immaterial.  Now,  to  present  such  things  in  a 
foreign  language  is  to  render  the  difficulty  of  appre- 
hending them  unnecessarily  greater,  and  to  heighten 
the  aversion  which  young  minds  naturally  feel  for 
abstract  ideas.  It  is  like  covering  a  beautiful  paint- 
ing with  a  double  veil.  For  language,  after  all,  is  a 
veil  which  covers  the  idea.  Now,  if  you  clothe  an 
idea  in  language  foreign  to  the  student,  no  matter 
how  well  he  may  be  supposed  to  know  it,  you  oblige 
him,  in  order  to  look  at  the  idea,   first  to   uncover 


j^  Preface, 

the  veil  of  the  foreign  language  to  make  room  for 
the  veil  of  his  own  native  language,  and  then  to 
catch  the  idea.  In  other  words,  you  oblige  the 
student  first  to  translate  into  his  own  language,  and 
then  to  grasp  the  matter.  In  the  second  place,  to 
write  a  book  on  the  elements  of  philosophy  in  the 
Latin  language  is  to  confine  the  study  of  this  most 
necessary  science  only  to  those  who  have  gone 
through  a  classical  course ;  whereas  we  know  by  sad 
experience  how  necessary  and  how  important  it  is 
for  all  our  young  men  to  be  imbued  with  proper, 
true  philosophical  principles,  to  the  absence  of  which 
we  may  attribute  all  the  errors  and  evils  which  afflict 
society. 

With  regard  to  the  style,  of  course  it  must  be  of 
a  didactic  nature — that  is,  brief  and  concise,  but 
above  all  perfectly  clear.  Nor  would  we  be  averse 
now  and  then,  when  the  occasion  presents  itself, 
from  changing  the  nature  of  the  style  for  one  a 
little  more  pleasing  and  attractive,  so  as  to  lighten 
the  difficulty  and  mix  the  useful  with  the  sweet. 

Finally,  with  regard  to  the  matter,  a  book  of 
elementary  philosophy  should  contain  nothing  but 
the_doctrijifi.,j;eceiveiLJijr_th^^  and_greatest  oJL 

Christian  schools,  the^  (^iM:t|;ine  most  receiveTTn  the 
Churcli^Jhat_iipon^  which  the^Holy  See  h^s_always 
lookedjipon  with  marked  and  never-ceasingpartial- 
ity. 

These  are  the  principles  which  have  guided  us  in 
writing    these    Elements    of    Intellectual   Philosophy. 


I 


Preface,  ^ 

As  to  the  language,  not  only  have  we  written  it  in 
English,  but  we  have  been  most  chary  and  particu- 
lar in  our  choice.  Whenever  we  had  two  words  to 
choose  from,  we  always  preferred  that  which  was  the 
easiest  of  comprehension  and  of  Anglo-Saxon  origin. 
We  have  thought  proper  to  discard,  whenever  it  was 
possible,  all  words  which  may  remind  one  too  much  * 

of  the  schools,  always  translating  into  the  best 
English  we  could  muster,  anything  of  such  a  na- 
ture ;  so  that  in  reading  our  Elements  the  young 
student  will  meet  with  no  hard  word  which  may 
require  the  use  of  the  dictionary,  or  which  may 
stop  him  in  his  endeavor  to  catch  the  idea. 

With  regard  to  the  style,  it  has  been  our  constant 
effort  to  make  it  as  clear  as  possible,  at  the  same  time 
that  we  have  tried  to  be  brief.  There  is  hardly  a 
theory  laid  down  which  is  not  illustrated  by  one  or 
more  examples.  ArA  we  venture  to  assert  that  owing 
to  this  lucidity  of  style  onr  Elemcttts  could  be  studied, 
and  in  great  part  understood,  without  a  teacher  by 
any  young  man  of  parts.  We  have  also,  whenever 
we  possibly  could,  tried  to  illustrate  our  theories  by 
quotations  from  the  poets,  to  loosen  the  tension  of 
the  mind  by  something  pleasing  and  interesting.  At 
the  end  of  Ontology  we  have  shown  by  an  abstract  of 
all  the  natural  sciences  how  they  are  an  application  of 
the  principles  of  Ontology. 

With    regard    to    the    matter,    we   have   followed    Iff 
throughout   the   philosophy   of   the   "Angel    of  the    *  •    • 
Schools,"  in  which  we  were  brought  up  from  our  youth, 


4  Preface, 

and  from  which  we  have  never  swerved  in  our  man- 
hood, experience  and  more  profound  studies  having 
led  us  to  adhere  to  that  philosophy  more  tenaciously 
and  more  ardently.  Every  one  knows  that  all  modern 
errors  have  originated  in  the  abandonment  of  Catholic 
philosophy  as  embodied  in  the  Catholic  schools,  and 
especially  in  that  of  St.  Thomas.  Consequently  the 
only  way  to  put  a  barrier  to  these  errors,  to  refute 
them,  is  to  turn  back  to  that  grand  philosophy  created 
by  geniuses  as  great  as  Plato  or  Aristotle,  and  guided 
by  the  truth  of  God,  which  those  heathen  geniuses 
had  not. 

Of  course,  these  being  only  elements,  we  have  used 
a  great  moderation  in  the  treating  of  all  the  questions 
connected  with  this  science ;  yet  it  will  be  found 
that  nQ_  sijigleimportant  question  has  been^mitted 
of  which  it  is  necessary  for  the  student  to  know 
something. 

Besides  the  usual  parts,  our  Elements  will  close 
with  a  book  on  the  external  and  internal  evidences  of 
Christianity  as  a  complement  of  this  science — that  is 
to  say,  we  shall  in  an  elementary  way,  and  without 
going  too  deeply  into  the  matter,  show  the  philoso- 
phical force  of  the  proofs  of  the  divhiity  of  Chris- 
tian revelation. 

All  this  we  have  attempted  to  do.  Tut  have  we 
succeeded  ?  No  effort  on  our  part  has  been  or  will 
be  spared  to  make  this  book  come  nearer  to  these 
principles  we  laid  down  for  our  guidance.  As  for 
the   rest,  it  is   not  for   us   to   pronounce  judgment, 


Preface,  ft 

but  others,  and  especially  for  the  learned  professors  of 
this  study  scattered  throughout  the  land,  from  whom 
we  shall  thankfully  receive  any  suggestion  or  correc- 
tion which  they  shall  see  fit  to  make. 

At  present  only  Logic,  Ontology,  and  the  first  part 
of  Anthropology  are  published.  Next  year,  if  God 
gives  us  strength,  we  shall  publish  the  rest. 

Jersey  City,  Feast  of  SS.  Peter  and  Paul, 


«  :■'    ■-"  ■:■■'-         l;:^;     \y^K  .<1..,CS  y-it'^<.,  ^ 


-^■V:^^:-.      ;:-!'..   ..^:X^v^.      ..'^it       S-t     jl5.^A 


■5i.    "A    .:i/'y;    ■•'i 


ELEMENTS  OF 

INTELLECTUAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY. 


ARTICLE  I. 

DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


Q.  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  word  philosophy? 

A.  It  means  love  of  wisdom,  and  a  philosopher  is 
a  lover  of  wisdom.  This  word  was  used  for  the  first 
t*me  by  Pythagoras,  who,  on  being  asked  what  art  he 
professed,  answered  that  he  was  a  philosopher. 

Q.  What  did  the  ancients  mean  by  the  science 
of  philosophy  ? 

A.  They  meant  the  knowledge  of  everything. 
This  could  well  be  in  olden  times,  when,  sciences 
being  in  their  infancy,  all  human  knowledge  could  be 
collected  into  one  science.  la  this  sense  philosophy 
was  defined  by  Cicero  the  science  of  all  huinaii  and 
divine  things  and  of  their  causes. 

Q.  Does  it  embrace  the  same  objects  now? 

A.  Sciences  being  so  much  developed  in  our  times, 
it  would  be  utterly  impossible  to  comprehend  them 
all  in  one.  Hence  they  have  been  divided,  a  particu- 
lar object  being  set  apart  for  each  one  ;  therefore  the 
object  of  philosophy  has  been  also  narrowed  down. 

Q.  Explain  the  object  of  philosophy. 

A.  The  better  to  do  so  we  will  premise  a  few 
remarks. 

7 


8.  Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

1st.  Science  consists  in  understanding  the  princi- 
ples from  which  a  thing  is  derived:  Scire  res  per 
causas — to  know  things  by  their  causes. 

2d.  There  are  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  common 
and  scientific.  The  first  is  satisfied  with  merely  know- 
ing the  existence  of  a  thing ;  the  second  goes  beyond 
that,  and  is  not  content  with  merely  apprehending 
the  existence  of  a  thing,  but  wants  to  find  out  why 
the  thing  is  so  and  not  otherwise,  and  what  is  the 
principle  which  causes  it. 

For  instance,  who  had  net  seen,  from  the  time  of 
the  first  man  who  made  a  lamp  and  suspended  it  to 
the  wall  of  his  cottage  or  to  the  roof,  that  when  first 
hung  in  its  place  it  oscillated  for  some  time  from 
side  to  side  until  at  length  it  came  to  a  perpendicu- 
lar? Men  before  Galileo  perceived  this  fact,  and 
passed  on  without  seeing  anything  more  in  it.  This 
is  common  knowledge.  One  day  Galileo,  observing 
this  very  fact,  and  noticing  by  more  accurate  observa- 
tions that  the  oscillations  were  regular,  perceived 
in  this  fact  the  principles  of  the  law  of  gravitation 
and  motion,  and  invented  the  pendulum.  This  is 
scientific  knowledge. 

3d.  We  remark  that  all  the  sciences,  though  dis- 
tinct and  different  from  each  other  according  to  their 
different  objects,  are  yet  connected  together  by  the 
necessary  fact  of  the  dependence  of  one  upon  the 
other.  For  particular  sciences  depend  upon  those 
which  are  less  so,  and  these  in  their  turn  upon  those 
which  are  more  general.  Chemistry,  for  instance,  is  the 
science  of  the  elements  of  bodies  and  of  their  proper- 
ties, but  it  could  not  exist  without  another  less  par- 
ticular science  which  must  precede  it,  called  physics. 
This  latter  science,  which  treats  of  the  phenomena  of 
bodies  and  their  causes,  could   not  exist  without  an- 


.    Introduction  to  Philosophy.  9 

other  science  more  general  which  treats  of  the  nature 
and  properties  of  bodies  and  of  all  the  material  world, 
together  with  their  causes,  and  which  is  called  cos- 
mology. But  the  world  is  a  being,  an  existence,  and 
therefore  it  could  not  be  properly  understood  without 
the  science  of  being  in  general^  its  properties  and  causes, 
which  is  called  ontology.  We  conclude,  therefore, 
that,  as  every  particular  science  depends  upon  another 
science  less  particular  and  more  general,  there  must  be 
a  science  which  investigates  the  most  c  )mmon  princi- 
ples of  being,  and  which  depends  on  no  other,  but  on 
which  all  others  depend.  This  science  is  philosophy. 
The  objects,  therefore,  of  philosophy  are  the  most 
common  principles  of  being. 

Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  the  most  common  prin- 
ciples of  being  ? 

A.  As  St.  Thomas  has  remarked,  the  most  common 
principles  of  being  are  the  first  and  supreme  principles, 
beyond  which  there  can  be  no  other.  Thus  the  last 
end,  being  common  to  all  beings,  is  also  the  first  and 
supreme  end  ;  the  most  common  cause,  being  that 
from  which  all  things  are  originated,  is  the  first  cause, 
upon  which  every  other  cause  depends;  the  idea  of 
being,  as  it  is  the  most  common  idea  and  the  simplest, 
is  also  the  first  idea,  on  which  all  others  depend  and 
from  which  all  others  originate.  Therefore  by  the 
most  common  principles  arc  meant  the  first  and  su- 
preme principles,  from  which  everything  proceeds  and 
draws  its  existence.  And  because  principles  of  this 
kind  are  not  the  property  of  this  or  that  particular 
being,  but  of  all  beings  in  general,  it  follows  that  the 
objects  of  philosophy  are  the  supreme  principles  of 
everything,  and  not  of  this  or  that  particular  thing. 

Q.  Give  the  definition  of  philosophy  according  to 
the  preceding  remarks. 


lO         Ele^nents  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

A.  Philosophy  is  tJiat' science  which  ifwestigates  the 
first  and  supreme  principles  of  being. 

It  is  called  science  because  it  investigates  principles 
and  cause,  and  therefore  is  a  knowledge  of  an  object 
by  its  causes. 

0/  the  first  and  supreme  principles,  because  the 
other  sciences  investigate  this  or  that  principle  and 
cause ;  philosophy  only  investigates  the  supreme  and 
highest  principles. 

Of  being,  because  philosophy  does  not  take  as  its 
object  any  particular  thing,  but  whatever  comes 
under  the  denomination  of  being. 

ARTICLE    II. 

DIVISION    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

Q.  How  is  philosophy  divided  ? 

A.  The  objects  of  philosophy  are  the  supreme  prin- 
ciples of  being.  Therefore  the  parts  of  this  science 
must  be  as  many  as  there  are  natural  divisions  or 
parts  of  being.  Now,  being  may  be  divided  into 
three  parts,  rational,  realy  and  moral.  The  rational 
is  that  which  exists  only  in  the  mind  as  its  own 
work.  The  real  is  that  which  has  true  existence 
outside  and  independent  of  us.  The  moral  is  that 
which  originates  in  the  will  of  man  in  its  relation  with 
moral  law.  The  rational  is  called  logic,  and  has  for 
its  object  the  order  which  our  mind  puts  in  its  ideas. 
The  moral  is  the  science  of  ethics,  and  treats  of  the 
free  actions  of  men  as  directed  and  guided  by  moral 
law.  The  real  is  called  metaphysics,  and  is  subdi- 
vided into  three  parts,  because,  as  St.  Thomas  ob- 
serves, real  being  may  be  classified  under  four  heads. 
It  may  be  either  material  or  separated  from  matter. 
If   separated    from    matter,   this   may  proceed    from 


Introduction  to  Philosophy.    ;-  la 

two  causes.  It  may  be  separated  from  matter,  not 
because  it  is  so  in  reality,  but  because  our  mind, 
in  considering  a  material  object,  may  choose  to  leave 
aside  the  material  part  of  it,  and  fix  its  attention  only 
on  the  interior  nature  of  the  thing,  which  operation 
of  the  mind,  as  we  shall  see,  is  called  abstraction,  and 
the  thing  thus  obtained  an  abstract ;  or  it  may  be 
separated  from  matter  because  it  is  so  in  reality,  as 
spiritual  substances,  of  which  there  are  two,  God  and 
the  human  soul.  The  objects  of  metaphysics  are, 
therefore,  the  material  being,  the  abstract  being,  the 
soul,  and  God.  Hence  there  are  four  parts  of  philo- 
sophy— cosmology,  which  treats  of  the  material  world  ; 
ontology,  which  speaks  of  being  in  common  and  in  the 
abstract ;  anthropology,  which  treats  of  man,  and  of  the 
human  soul  especially  ;  and  theology,  which  treats  of 
God  as  he  can  be  known  from  reason. 

.  ARTICLE  III. 

USE    OF    PHILOSOPHY  ;    OR,   ITS    CONNECTION    WITH 
ALL    THE    SCIENCES    AND    ARTS. 

Q.  What  is  the  use  of  philosophy  ? 

A.  The  use  of  philosophy  cannot  be  fully  pointed 
out  in  this  introduction,  but  will  be  seen  at  the  end 
of  the  course.  Yet,  to  excite  in  the  student  an  ardent 
desire  and  love  for  such  a  study,  we  shall  briefly  point 
out  its  use  and  its  connection  with  all  the  sciences 
and  arts  by  developing  the  following  argument.  All 
the  sciences  and  arts  depend  upon  philosophy  as  to 
their  certainty,  as  to  their  principles,  and  as  to  their 
method.  Therefore  all  the  sciences  and  arts  depend 
upon  philosophy  and  are  impossible  without  it.  And, 
first,  as  to  their  certainty.  Philosophy  has  for  itg 
object  the  supreme   principles  of  everything.     CoQ- 


12        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

sequently  its  objects  are  also  those  supreme  principles 
of  certainty  and  evidence,  those  criteria  of  truth, 
supported  by  which  our  mind  clings  to  tiuth  without 
hesitation  or  fear  of  the  contrary,  and  with  perfect 
assurance  and  satisfaction.  In  this  sense  philosophy 
has  a  character  of  universality  which  subjects  to  it  all 
the  sciences  and  arts.  For  instance,  physical  sciences 
have  for  their  object  everything  which  comes  within 
the  observation  of  the  senses.  But  is  what  falls 
under  the  observation  of  the  senses  a  true  and  ex- 
terior reality,  or  merely  a  sensation  and  a  modifica- 
tion of  our  soul  ?  If  what  falls  under  our  senses  is 
not  an  objective  reality,  but  merely  an  internal  modi- 
fication ;  if  our  souls  perceive  no  more  than  the  im- 
age of  objects,  as  some  of  the  ancient  philosophers 
thought ;  if  odors,  colors,  figures,  and  forms  are  not 
qualities  of  real  bodies ;  if  these  bodies  and  these 
qualities  are  not  the  determining  causes  of  taste,  of 
smell,  of  sight,  etc.,  is  it  not  evident  that  the  base 
of  all  physical  sciences  crumbles  down,  and  that  all 
those  sciences  play  about  mere  fictions  of  our  mind, 
sheer  and  useless  idealities  ?  The  natural  philosopher 
studies  the  body.  But  what  is  a  body?  Is  it  an 
illusion,  a  sheer  appearance,  as  was  pretended  by  the 
Indian  pantheists,  and  as  was  held  by  Berkeley  only  a 
century  ago  ?  And  is  it  not  clear  that  upon  the  solu- 
tion of  all  these  questions  depends  the  certainty  of 
all  physical  sciences  ?  Again,  the  natural  philosophers 
seek  for  the  causes  of  all  the  operations  of  bodies. 
For,  by  examining  a  sufficient  number  of  operations 
and  constant  facts,  they  endeavor  to  explain  the 
causes  of  such  operations  and  assign  laws  by  which 
the  material  world  is  directed.  Now,  if,  as  Hume  pre- 
tends, the  idea  of  cause  is  a  chimera,  the  certainty  of  all 
physical  sciences  is  shaken,  and  we  must  consider  as 


Introduction  to  Philosophy.  13 

dreams  and  visions  all  those  pretended  laws  of  the 
universe  of  which  natural  sciences  endeavor  to  demon- 
strate the  reality,  generality,  and  permanence.  Then 
all  the  relations  of  causality  become  simple  relations 
of  succession  and  time,  all  the  operations  of  nature 
become  isolated  ;  we  have  no  longer  any  co-ordination 
or  union  among  beings,  and  that  magnificent  and  ad- 
mirable connection  which  binds  the  facts  of  the  sensi- 
ble world  to  each  other  and  to  their  universal  princi- 
ple vanishes  from  our  eyes  to  make  room  for  a  com- 
plete chaos.  In  the  second  place,  all  the  sciences  and 
arts  depend  upon  philosophy  for  their  principles, 
because  the  objects  of  philosophy  are  the  supreme 
principles  of  everything.  Thus  physical  sciences  are 
founded  upon  the  idea  of  being,  of  substance,  of 
matter,  of  quality ;  upon  the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect. 
Without  these  ideas  they  could  not  proceed  one  step 
in  these  investigations.  But  what  is  being  ?  What  is 
substance  ?  What  is  matter,  and  what  distinguishes 
it  from  spirit  ?  All  these  ideas  must  be  given  by 
philosophy. 

Mathematical  sciences  depend  upon  it.  Arithmetic 
is  founded  upon  the  idea  of  number,  and  consequently 
upon  the  ideas  of  unity  and  distinction;  algebra  upon 
the  idea  of  signs  representing  known  and  unknown 
quantities;  geometry  upon  the  ideas  of  form  and 
size,  and  consequently  upon  the  idea  of  extension 
and  space  ;  mechanics  upon  the  ideas  of  force,  of  move- 
ment, and  of  weight.  Consequently,  all  mathematical 
sciences  depend  upon  philosophy  for  their  principles. 

Moral  sciences  depend  upon  it,  because  they  depend 
upon  the  ideas  of  the  good  and  the  just.  Now,  to  deter- 
mine what  is  really  good  and  just  depends  absolutely 
upon  a  true  and  correct  system  of  philosophy.  For 
if  we  hold,  with  the  sensists,  that  man  is  but  an  ag- 


14         Elements  of  IntelUobual  Philosophy. 

gregate  of  sensations,  we  shall  have  the  consequence 
that  that  only  is  good  which  is  agreeable  or  which  is 
useful,  and  Jience  the  moral  of  pleasure  and  of  in- 
terest. 

Political  sciences,  legislation,  civil  and  social  right, 
the  right  of  nations,  social  and  domestic  economy, 
public  and  private  education — in  fact,  all  the  sciences 
which  have  more  or  less  connection  with  the  govern- 
ment of  nations,  of  the  family,  and  of  the  individual, 
borrow  from  philosophy  their  principles  and  their 
rules  :  because  none  can  govern  a  man,  a  family,  or  a 
nation  without  having  studied  the  human  soul,  its 
laws  and  its  destiny  ;  without  knowing  its  nature,  its 
faculties,  the  motives  which  can  influence  the  human 
heart  and  the  human  will ;  without  knowing"  the 
objects  which  one  must  propose  to  it  for  its  actions. 
And  are  not  all  these  things  the  essential  province  of 
philosophy  ? 

Medical  sciences  are  closely  allied  to  psychological 
and  moral  sciences.  Our  soul  and  body  are  united 
with  a  bond  too  intimate  to  permit  the  physiologist 
to  Ignore  the  influence  of  the  organism  on  the  soul 
and  of  the  soul  on  the  organism.  The  most  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  organs,  and  of  the  physical  causes 
which  derange  them,  would  be  incomplete  and  almost 
useless,  if  he  who  practises  the  art  of  healing,  directing 
his  attention  exclusively  to  physical  causes,  were  to 
disregard  moral  causes ;  if  a  deep  knowledge  of  the 
passions,  of  habits,  of  their  influence,  could  not  enable 
him  to  combat  the  derangement  of  the  organism  by 
re-establishing  order  and  tranquillity  in  the  thoughts 
and  mental  functions  of  the  patient ;  because  man  is 
not  merely  passive,  and  none  can  determine  how  far 
the  free  development  of  his  activity  may  modify  the 
power  which  he  has  of  imagining  and  of  feeling,  and 


Introduction  to  Philosophy.  15 

in  a  certain    way  change  all  his  different  modes  of 
existence. 

But  does  philosophy  rule  over  the  aesthet'cal  sci- 
ences, over  literature  as  forms  of  our  thought.-,,  over 
arts?  Certainly,  because  it  furnishes  the  idea  of  the 
beautiful,  as  well  as  of  truth  and  goodness.  All 
ideas  depend  on  it,  and  by  the  very  fact  that  it 
seeks  truth  in  all  things  it  is  its  office  to  determine 
what  is  really  beautiful.  And,  first  of  all,  is  not  truth 
eminently  beautiful?  What  strikes  the  intellect  more 
than  the  splendor  of  evidence,  than  the  light  of  com- 
plete knowledge  which  illumines  objects?  What 
more  pleasant  and  more  keenly  delightful  than  that 
which  arises  from  the  contemplation  and  possession 
of  truth? 

Order  also  has  a  secret  charm  for  us  which  entices 
us  and  causes  us  to  reproduce  it  in  all  our  works.  But 
what  is  order?  Order  in  th  >  disposition  of  objects, 
order  in  the  distribution  of  colors,  in  the  reproduction 
of  sounds  and  forms,  is  regularity,  fitness,  and  harmo- 
ny; order  in  the  imagination  is  the  conformity  of  our 
fancy  images  with  the  realities  of  nature  ;  order  in  our 
thoughts  is  their  logical  concatenation  ;  order  in  our 
actions  is  the  accomplishment  of  our  duty,  the  con- 
formity of  the  same  actions  with  moral  law  ;  order 
in  society  is  subordination,  in  the  family  obedience 
and  love,  in  the  individual  is  the  subjection  of  his 
passions  to  his  will,  and  of  the  latter  to  God  ;  order 
in  the  exercise  of  authority  is  the  general  good,  in  the 
exercise  of  the  intellect  is  truth,  in  the  object  of  our 
love  is  perfection.  Now,  all  this  is  assuredly  beautiful 
and  is  taught  by  philosophy ;  and  this  science  does 
not  leave  it  to  the  individual  caprice  to  determine  the 
notion  of  the  beautiful,  but  from  the  constant  expe- 
rience  of  all   that  which  mankind  calls  beautiful  in 


1 6         Elements  of  Intellectua  I  Ph  ilosophy. 

nature  and  art,  in  man  and  in  society,  rises  to  the 
essential  and  universal  idea  of  the  beautiful  and  de- 
termines its  laws.  If  the  idea  of  the  beautiful  were 
something  changeable,  individual,  and  relative  ;  if  its 
essence  could  be  modified  according  to  the  difference 
of  sensations,  of  tastes  and  temperaments,  then  all 
arts  would  be  at  an  end,  because  there  can  be  no  art 
where  science  has  not  discovered  fixed  principles  and 
laws.  All  esthetic  sciences,  therefore,  depend  upon 
philosophy. 

All  industrial  sciences  depend  upon  it  for  its  prin- 
ciples, because  all  these  sciences  have  for  their  object 
that  which  is  useful,  and  that  which  is  useful  is  inse- 
parable f^om  the  true,  the  good,  and  the  beautiful. 
Run  over  all  the  arts  which  are  destined  to  provide 
for  the  wants  of  men,  to  increase  the  sum  of  their  en- 
joyments, and  you  will  not  find  one  which  can  be  con- 
sidered truly  useful  if  it  is  in  opposition  with  the  im- 
mutable ideas  of  the  true,  the  just,  and  the  beautiful. 
Let  human  industry  create  and  multiply  wants  unna- 
tural and  fictitious,  contrary  to  man's  true  nature,  and 
it  will  be  highly  injurious  to  man  ;  let  human  in- 
dustry create  and  multiply  wants  contrary  to  his  intel- 
ligence, to  his  morality,  to  the  physical  laws  of  his 
body,  and  their  usefulness  disappears,  and  they  be- 
come dangerous,  and  sap  the  very  foundation  of 
man's  happiness. 

History  depends  upon  philosophy  ;  for  devoid  of  it, 
it  would  be  a  catalogue  of  facts  and  events  without  any 
connection,  without  cause,  without  any  warrant  of 
authenticity,  if  it  confined  itself  to  gather  up  indiffer- 
ently whatever  is  transmitted  to  it  by  the  memory,  too 
frequently  fallacious,  of  men  and  peoples.  But  history 
becomes  science  when  one  seeks  the  laws  and  the  moral 
causes   of  events,  when  a  sound  criticism  discusses 


•^  Introduction  to  Philosophy.  1 7 

with  seventy  the  proofs  and  motives  of  credibility — 
in  one  word,  when  one  studies  to  reconcile  in  all  the 
annals  of  nations  human  liberty  with  the  providen- 
tial action  of  God,  and  thus  creates  a  philosophy  of 
history. 

Finally,  all  the  sciences  depend  upon  philosophy 
for  their  method.  Man,  in  all  his  investigations,  must 
use  certain  rules  to  discover  truth,  to  prove  it  when 
found,  to  illustrate,  to  defend  it  from  the  attacks  of 
its  enemies,  to  explain  it  to  others.  All  this  is  called 
by  the  general  name  of  method.  And  where  shall  we 
find  the  proper  rules  to  discover  truth,  to  prove  it,  to 
defend  it,  and  to  explain  it  toothers,  if  not  in  philoso- 
phy— in  that  part  which  teaches  the  laws  for  directing 
and  guiding  human  thought  in  its  researches?  And, 
last  of  all,  our  faith,  without  which  we  cannot  attain 
our  eternal  destiny,  depends  in  a  certain  sense  upon 
philosophy,  ist.  Philosophy  must  enable  us  to  find 
out  the  true  Church,  by  examining  the  motives  of  cre- 
dibility upon  which  it  rests  and  recommends  itself  to 
our  minds,  and  by  proving  the  necessity  of  an  infal- 
lible guide  for  the  solution  of  problems  which  it 
cannot  solve,  and  which  it  is  absolutely  important  for 
it  to  know.  When  this  infallible  guide  is  found  and 
accepted,  it  io  true  that  philosophy  must  bow  then 
in  silent  submission  to  the  dogmas  which  the  Church 
proposes  as  the  object  of  its  acceptance  as  solution 
of  philosophy's  own  problems,  and  of  others  far 
greater,  because  the  Church  teaches  the  philosophy  of 
God,  who,  being  infinite,  has  truths  to  tell  far  above  the 
ken  of  human  philosophy ;  but  even  after  accepting 
this  philosophy  of  the  infinite,  this  supreme  science  of 
man  is  eminently  useful  in  putting  these  supernatural 
and  superintelligible  truths  in  scientific  order,  in  illus- 
trating them  by  means  of  created  images  and  simili- 
tudes  which  may  bear   a  faint  impression   of  those 


1 8  Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

truths,  and  which  may  serve  to  recommend  their  ac- 
ceptance to  man,  and  in  defending  them  from  the  at- 
tacks of  their  enemies. 

These  are  in  a  few  words  the  use  of  philosophy,  so 
neglected  and  despised  by  the  ignorant  crowd.  We 
will  conclude  these  remarks  with  the  words  of  the  poet : 

"With  thee,  serene  Philosophy,  with  thee 
And  thy  bright  garland  let  me  crown  my  song, 
Effusive  source  of  evidence  and  truth  ! 
A  lustre  shedding  ovt-r  the  ennobled  mind. 
Stronger  than  summer  noon,  and  pure  as  that 
Whose  mild  vibrations  soothe  the  parted  soul 
New  to  the  dawn  of  celestial  day. 

Hence  through  her  nourished  powers,  enlarged  by  thee, 
She  springs  aloft  with  elevated  pride 
Above  the  tangling  mass  of  low  desires 
That  bind  the  fluttering  crowd,  and,  angel-winged, 
The  height  of  science  and  of  virtue  gains. 
Without  thee  what  were  unenlightened  man  ? 
A  savage  running  through  the  woods  and  wilds 
In  quest  of  prey,  and  with  the  unfashioned  fur 
Rough  clad  ;  devoid  of  every  finer  art 
And  elegance  of  life.     Nor  happiness 
Domestic  mixed  of  tenderness  and  care, 
Nor  moral  excellence,  nor  social  bliss. 
Nor  guardian  law  were  his  ;   nor  various  skill 
To  turn  the  furrow  or  to  guide  the  tool 
Mechanic  ;  nor  the  heaven-conducted  prow 
Of  navigation  bold  that  fearless  braves  '  ,      ' 

The  burning  line  or  dares  the  wintery  pole,  > 

Mother  severe  of  infinite  delights  ! 
Nothing  save  rapine,  indolence,  and  guile, 
And  woes  on  woes,  a  still  revolving  train, 
Whose  horrid  circle  had  made  human  life      -  v 

Than  non-existence  worse  ;  but,  taught  by  thee. 
Ours  are  the  plans  of  policy  and  peace  •,  ^ 

To  live  like  brothers,  and  conjunctive  all 

,  Embellish  life.     While  thus  laborious  crowds  "^  "*• 

Ply  the  tough  car.  Philosophy  directs  "^'^ 

The  ruling  helm  ;  or,  like  the  liberal  breath   ' 

^  '  Of  potent  heaven,  invisible,  the  sail 

'        Swells  out  and  bears  th'  inferior  world  along." 

— Thomson,  Summef. 


LOGIC 


'•  He  that  is  of  reason's  skill  bereft, 

And  wants  the  staff  of  wisdom  him  to  stay, 
Is  like  a  ship  in  the  midst  of  temi)est  left, 
Without  an  helm  or  pilot  her  to  sway." 

— Spenssr. 


it  ,  ■■.  U. 


i^:  >. 


LOGIC. 


JNTROD  UCTION, 


Q.  Give  a  general  idea  of  logic. 

A.  Logic  may  be  generally  understood  as  meaning 
the  right  use  of  those  faculties  which  are  destined  to 
acquire  knowledge. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  logic  are  there? 

A.  Two,  natural  and  scientific.  The  first  is  that 
disposition  of  our  mind  by  which  we  are  enabled  to 
use  rightly  the  faculties  destined  to  acquire  know- 
ledge. Every  one  knows  by  experience  that  men 
without  education  acquire  ideas  of  many  things,  pass 
their  judgment  upon  them,  deduce  one  idea  from 
others,  and  this  they  do  more  or  less  happily  in  pro- 
portion to  the  talent  which  nature  has  given  them. 
This  natural  aptitude  or  facility  to  use  rightly  the  fac- 
ulties destined  to  acquire  knowledge  is  called  natural 
logic.  But  as  natural  aptitudes  are  mostly  imperfect, 
and  must  go  through  a  certain  training  and  discipline 
to  become  perfect,  so  it  is  with  the  natural  faculty  of 
reasoning.  It  must  be  regulated  and  trained  to  dis- 
charge its  office  properly  and  perfectly.  And  as  rea- 
son, reflecting  upon  the  operations  of  other  faculties, 
has  invented  so  many  arts,  so,  reflecting  upon  its  own 
acts,  it  has  given  origin  to  a  science  which  directs  and 
brings  to  perfection  the  natural  ability  for  reasoning. 
This  science  is  called  artificial  or  scientific  logic,  and 
in  this  limited  sense  may  be  defined  :  that  science  or 
part  of  philosophy  which  treats  of  reasoning  in  order 
to  direct  the  mind  in  the  acquisition  of  truth. 

Q.  Explain  the  definition.  *?jt>' 


22         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

A.  It  is  called  science  because  logic  is  neither  art, 
rfor  science  and  art  together,  but  simply  a  science,  since 
a  science  is  a  knowledge  of  a  thing  deduced  from  its 
principles.  Now,  logic  treats  of  reasoning  not  merely 
by  inventing  rules  to  form  it,  but  by  considering  it  in 
the  principles  which  originate  it.  Therefore  logic  is  a 
science  and  not  an  art. 

Q.  What  is  the  exact  difference  between  science 
and  art  ? 

A.  Art  is  that  which  gives  certain  rules  hoiv  to  do  a 
thing.  For  instance,  the  art  of  building  is  that  which 
gives  rules  how  to  build ;  grammar  is  the  art  which 
gives  rules  how  to  write  and  speak  correctly  ;  rhetoric 
the  art  which  gives  rules  how  to  convince  and  to  per- 
suade. Science,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  knowledge  of  a 
certain  object  drawn  from  the  cause  anc'  principles  of 
the  object.  From  this  distinction  it  is  clear  that  sci- 
ence also  may  give  rules  how  to  do  a  thing,  but  it 
draws  them  from  the  principles  constituting  the  thing, 
whereas  art  only  gives  rules  and  knows  nothing  of  the 
principles  from  which  they  are  derived.  A  carpenter 
applying  his  level  carries  out  a  rule  of  his  art  to  see 
if  a  piece  of  wood  is  perfectly  level,  but  he  knows 
not  from  what  principles  that  rule  is  derived.  He 
has  art,  but  not  science  ;  if  he  knew  the  principle 
of  that  rule,  then  he  would  have  science. 

Q.  Continue  the  explanation. 

A.  We  have  said  that  logic  treats  of  reasoning  in 
order  to  state  its  peculiar  object.  For  if  logic  be  a 
science,  it  must  have  an  object  to  treat  aboi^t.  Now, 
this  object  cannot  be  words,  as  some  of  the  ancients 
thought ;  nor  can  it  be  the  acts  of  the  mind,  inasmuch 
as  they  really  exist,  because  real  things  are  the  object 
of  metaphysics ;  therefore  the  object  of  logic  is  that 
order  which  our  reason  puts  in  its  conceptions  to 
form  reasoning.     Finally,  we  have  said  ;  In  order  to 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,        23 

direct  the  mind  in  the  acquisition  of  truth,  to  deter- 
mine tlie  true  nature  oi  logic  ;  because  the  true  na- 
ture of  logic  is  not  to  give  directions  how  to  act  ex- 
ternally, as  moral  sciences,  but  how  to  speculate^  how 
to  enquire  after  truth. 

Q.  How  is  logic  divided  ? 

A.  Philosophers  have  distinguished  three  things  in 
reasoning:  the  materials  of  reason,  called  the  matter ; 
the  combination  and  construction  of  those  materials, 
called  \.\\t  form ;  and  the  purpose  or  object  for  which 
we  reason,  called  the  end.  Take,  for  instance,  this 
rearoning : 

That  which  is  spiritual  is  immortal. 

But  the  soul  is  spiritual. 

Therefore  it  is  immortal. 

In  this  reasoning  the  propositions  and  ideas  are  what 
philosophers  call  the  matter;  the  order  and  the  locat- 
ing of  the  propositions  is  called  the  form ;  the  result 
of  the  reasoning  is  called  the  end.  Now,  in  viev  of 
these  three  elements,  we  shall  divide  logic  into  three 
parts.  The  first  will  treat  of  the  matter  of  reasoning  ; 
the  second  of  the  form,  and  the  third  of  the  end,  oi" 
reasoning.  This  division  is  both  clear  and  accurate, 
because,  to  have  a  scientific  knowledge  of  a  thing,  one 
must  know  its  principles  and  causes.  Now,  there  are 
four  different  causes  for  everything — the  material,  the 
formal,  the  efficient,  and  the  final.  Take,  for  example, 
a  building.  What  is  its  material  cause  ?  Bricks,  mor- 
tar, lumber,  etc.  What  is  its  formal  cause  ?  The  de- 
sign in  the  mind  of  the  architect,  and  which,  carried 
out,  gives  it  shape  and  form.  The  efficient  causes  are 
the  architect  and  all  those  who  construct  it.  The 
final  cause  is  the  object  for  which  the  building  is 
wanted — for  instance,  to  live  in  it  in  comfort  and 
elegance.     Say  the  same  of  reasoning.     The  efficient 


24         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

cause  of  reasoning  is  our  intellect,  of  which  we  shall 
speak  in  anthropology,  or  the  science  of  man  and  his 
faculties.  The  material  cause  of  reasoning  are  ideas 
and  propositions ;  the  formal  cause  is  the  order  and 
location  of  the  propositions;  the  final  cause  is  the 
science  which  we  intend  to  acquire  and  which  results 
from  our  reasoning. 


PART    FIRST. 


CHAPTER  I. 

MATTER  OF  REASONING. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  matter  has  reasoning? 

A.  Two  kinds ;  one  is  called  remote,  the  other 
proximate  or  near.  The  remote  matter  are  ideas  or 
terms,  the  proximate  are  judgments  and  propositions; 
because,  strictly  speaking,  reasoning  results  from  judg- 
,ments  and  propositions,  and  these,  in  their  turn,  from 
terms  and  ideas.  We  shall  speak  first  of  ideas,  and 
then  of  judgments. 

Q.  Of  what  ideas  shall  we  treat  in  logic  ? 

A.  It  has  been  remarked  by  eminent  philosophers 
that  in  logic  we  consider  ideas,  not  inasmuch  as  they 
are  ideas  of. this  or  of  that  particular  object,  bi'*^  in- 
asmuch as  they  can  be  the  object  of  all  sciences. 
Now,  no  other  idea  can  represent  the  object  of  all 
sciences  except  a  universal  idea.  Therefore,  in  logic 
we  treat  of  universal  ideas.  For  instance,  if  in  logic 
we  gave  the  idea  of  a  body  as  an  extended  substance, 
then  this  idea  of  body  could  not  be  applied  to  all  the 
sciences  treating  of  bodies,  but  only  to  geometry, 
which  is  founded  on  extension.  We  must,  therefore, 
in  logic  treat  of  ideas  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  them 
applicable  to  all  sciences ;  and  this  can  be  said  only 
of  universal  ideas. 

We  shall  divide  this  chapter  into  three  articles. 
The  first  will  treat  of  universal  ideas  considered  in 
themselves  ;  the  second  will  treat  of  that  thing  which 

as 


26        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.   : 

universal  ideas  represent ;  the  third  will  treat  of  the 
expression  of  ideas — that  is,  terms  or  words. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

0/  Universal  Ideas  considered  in  themselves  ;  and,  first, 

of  Idea  in  general. 

Q.  What  remarks  rnust  be  made  in  order  to  under- 
stand what  an  idea /^  in  general? 

A.  Reflecting  upon  the   fact  of  our  knowledge,  we 
find  that  we  cannot    know  any  object,  of  whatever 
nature   it   may   be,  unless  the  object  enters  in  some 
way  or  other  into  our  minds,  and  thus  presents  itself 
before  it  ;  because,  on   the  one  hand,  we  know  from 
experience  that  the  operation  of  knowing  takes  place 
within   us,  and   for  that  reason  is  called  an  immanent 
act,  to  distinguish  it  from  those  acts  which  are  called 
transient,  or  passing,  because  they  are  accomplished 
outside  of  us.     On   the   other  hand,  we  cannot  deny 
that,  in  order  to   effect  an  operation,  the  subject  and 
the  object  must  come  in  a  certain  kind  of  contact  wit! 
each  other.     Therefore,  if  the  act  of  knowing  is  accom 
plished  within  us,  and  if  to  do  that  the  intellect  mu^ 
come  in  contact  with  the  object  it  wants  to  know,  it  \ 
absolutely  necessary  that  the  object  should  enter  ii 
some  manner  or  other  into  our  minds.     But  how  cai 
this  be  done?     It  is  certainly  impossible  that  object 
could   enter  as  they  are  in  nature  into  our  intellect. 
for  this  would  be  absurd,  and  we  might  say  with  thi! 
poet:  «'       ,  •  ^:* ,.;_,- .>,;,. 

"  Then  what  vast  body  must  v/e  make  the  mind,  '*< 

..J         Wherein  are  men,  beasts,  trees,  towns,  seas,  and  lands,,  ~ 
.,       And  yet  each  thing  a  proper  place  doth  find, 

And  each  thing  in  the  true  proportion  stands."* 

■  *  Davies' Poems,  *  ',  /' 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        27 

How,  then,  can  the  act  of  knowing  be  accomplished? 
Thus :  As  objects,  to  be  known,  cannot  enter  into  our 
mind  as  they  exist  in  nature,  they  must  enter  therein 
by  means  of  their  image  and  similitude.  This  image, 
as  it  may  be  called,  or  similitude,  or  impression,  of 
the  objects  which  enter  into  our  minds  is  called  idea.'^ 
An  idea,  therefore,  taken  in  this  sense,  may  be  defined, 
the  image  of  the  nature  of  things  existing  in  our  intel- 
lect, by  means  of  which  lue  apprehend  them. 

Q.  What  consequences  can  you  draw  from  said 
definition? 

A.  The  following:  i.  An  idea  is  neither  exclusively 
objective — that  is,  the  object  itself— nor  exclusively 
subjective,  mere  work  of  the  mind,  but  something 
between  the  two.  It  is  objective  inasmuch  as  it  repre- 
sents the  nature  of  things ;  it  is  subjective  inasmuch 
as  it  is  an  image  dwelling  in  the  subject  or  intellect, 
and  is  the  principle  and  cause  of  its  knowledge. 

2.  That,  though  the  image  o  idea  represents  ob- 
jects to  the  intellect,  yet  it  is  not  the  image  that  the 
intellect  apprehends.  The  idea  is  only  a  means  by 
which  objects  enter  in  communication  with  the  intel- 
lect and  present  themselves  before  it  to  be  known. 
Suppose  I  want  to  know  my  own  face,  what  do  I  do  ? 
I  go  before  a  mirror,  and  an  image  of  my  face  is  in- 
stantly reproduced  in  the  glass.  But  is  it  an  image  of 
my  face  which  I  know,  or  my  own  face  by  means  of 
that  image  ?  Surely  my  own  face  through  that  image. 
Or  suppose  I  want  to  see  an  object  at  a  distance  from 
me  which  my  ordinary  power  of  vision  cannot  reach, 
what  do  I  do?  I  use  a  telescope,  which  puts  me  in 
contact  with  the  object  I  want  to  see.  But  is  it  the 
telescope  I  see,  or  the  object  ?     The  object,  certainly ; 

♦  St.  Thomas,  P.P.  qu.  12,  art.  2 ;  qu.  79,  art.  3. 


2  8        Elements  of  Intellectual  Pk  ilosophy. 

the  telescope  is  only  a  means  to  put  me  in  communi- 
cation with  the  object.  Likewise,  the  intellect  cannot 
know  any  object  except  it  comes  in  contact  with  it. 
But  it  cannot  come  in  contact  with  it  as  it  is  in  nature, 
substance  and  modification  together.  Therefore  it 
comes  in  contact  with  it  by  its  similitude.*  But,  this 
done,  is  it  the  idea  I  perceive  or  the  object  ?  Evi- 
dently the  object,  as  the  idea  is  only  a  means  of  con- 
tact. 

3.  The  idea,  strictly  speaking,  resides  in  the  intel- 
lect, and  does  not  represent  anything  else  except  the 
nature  of  the  object,  and,  in  this  sense,  it  differs  from 
the  sensible  image,  which,  as  we  shall  see,  is  also 
necessary  to  render  sensible  knowledge  possible ;  be- 
cause a  sensible  image  is  also  necessary  for  sensitive 
knowledge,  and  is  both  objective  and  subjective. 
When  I  see  a  geranium  or  a  rosebush,  the  image  of 
those  objects  must  enter  into  my  eyes,  else  I  could 
not  see  them.  When  I  touch  a  hard  body,  such  as 
stone  or  iron,  an  impression  of  those  bodies  or  an 
image  must  enter  the  sense  of  touch,  or  I  would  never 
feel  them.  But  a  sensible  image  differs  from  the  idea 
in  this  ;  that  the  former  resides  in  the  senses  and  re- 
presents the  exterior  qualities  of  bodies,  whereas  the 
latter  is  in  the  intellect  and  represents  the  nature  of 
objects.  Hence  we  have  defined  it  an  image  of  the 
nature  of  an  object  residing  in  the  intellect.  '  *  r  v 
.  4.  Finally,  the  idea  being  a  means  and  principle  of 
knowledge,  it  is  followed  by  an  act  of  the  mind  called 
apprehension.  This  may  be  defined  that  operation 
of  the  mind  by  which  it  knows  an  object  without 
affirming  or  denying  anything  about  it.  I  hear  the 
words  *•  soul,"  "  body,"  "  world  "  mentioned ;  the  act 


*  How  this  similitude  is  effected  will  be  seen  in  anthropology. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        29 

of  the  mind  by  which  I  know  these  objects  is  callec' 
apprehension.  We  liave  added,  without  affirming  or 
denying  anything  about  it,  to  distinguish  apprehen- 
sion from  judgments,  which  always  affirm  or  deny  a 
predicate  of  a  subject. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  ideas  are  there? 

A.  Ideas  are  intellectual  images.  Now,  images  can 
differ  from  each  other  for  two  reasons:  either  because 
the  objects  they  represent  are  different,  or  because 
they  have  a  different  way  of  representing  them.  The 
picture  of  a  flower-garden  and  that  of  a  shipwreck  are 
two  different  images,  because  each  represents  a  differ- 
ent object ;  as  likewise  the  representation  of  a  storm 
in  verses  and  another  in  music  are  also  two  different 
images,  because,  though  they  represent  the  same 
object,  they  exhibit  it  in  different  ways.  The  differ- 
ence of  ideas,  therefore,  may  originate  from  the  differ- 
ence of  the  objects  which  they  represent,  or  from  the 
different  way  of  representing  objects. 


ARTICLE   SECOND. 

Difference  of  Ideas  according  to  the  Difference  of  Objects, 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  ideas  are  there  according  to 
this  difference  ? 

A.  There  are,  first,  concrete  and  abstract  ideas.  Be- 
fore defining  them  we  must  remark  that  whatever 
exists  in  nature  either  exists  in  itself,  not  requiring 
anything  to  lean  upon,  to  cling  to,  in  order  to  exist,  or 
it  must  lean  on  something  to  exist.  When  a  thing 
does  not  require  any  other  object  to  lean  on  in  order 
to  exist,  but  is  self-supporting,  it  is  called  substance ; 
when  it  requires  sohiething  to  hang  on  in  order  to  ex- 
ist, it  is  called  accident^  modification^  or  quality.     The 


30        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

tendrils  of  the  vine  winding  around  the  oak  for  sup- 
port may  be  an  image  of  the  accident,  whereas  the 
stronor  and  robust  oak  which  defies  wind  and  storms 
may  be  taken  as  an  image  of  the  substance,  but 
only  as  an  image,  because,  after  all,  in  nature  both 
the  vine  and  the  oak  are  substances.  Here  is  a  better 
example :  a  table  is  a  substance  because  it  exists  in 
itself;  the  roundness  or  the  squareness  of  the  table  are 
an  accident,  because  neither  could  exist  without  the 
table. 

We  must  remark,  in  the  second  place,  that  all  ob- 
jects in  nature  are  substances  accompanied  by  their 
accidents  or  modifications.  But  it  is  clear  that  our 
mind,  which  is  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  analysis  or  of 
dividing,  can  separate  one  from  the  other  and  consider 
them  apart.  In  the  example  just  given  the  mind  may 
consider  the  substance  of  the  table  independently  of 
its  form  or  shape ;  or  it  may  lay  aside  the  substance 
of  the  table  and  fix  its  attention  upon  the  size  and  the 
shape  The  apprehension  by  the  mind  of  an  object  just 
as  it  is  III  nature^  substance  and  modijication  together,  is 
called  a  concrete  idea.  The  appreheiision  by  the  mind  of 
a  substance  without  its  modifications,  or  of  modifications 
without  their  substance,  is  called  an  abstract  idea. 

Again,  ideas  according  to  this  difference  may  be  sim- 
ple or  composite:  they  are  simple  when  they  repre- 
sent an  object  not  composed  of  parts,  as  God,  soul ; 
they  are  composite  when  they  represent  an  object  com- 
posed of  parts,  as  the  idea  of  a  building,  a  steam- 
engine.  Absolute  and  relative :  they  are  absolute  when 
the  object  represented  by  the  idea  does  not  involve 
any  relation  with  any  other,  as  exist e7ice ;  they  are 
relative  when  it  does  involve  it,  2js>  father,  son,  effect. 
Positive  diad  negative :  the  first  is  such  when  the  idea 
represents  the  reality  of  a  thing,  as  fruitful,  perfect ; 


Elements  of  Intellccttial  Philosophy.         31 

the  second  is  such  when  it  represents  that  which  a 
being  is  wanting  in,  as  barren,  imperfect. 

Finally,  it  may  be  collective,  singular,  particular,  and 
universal.  An  idea  is  called  collective  when  it  repre- 
sents the  union  of  various  individuals,  as  an  army,  a 
congregation,  a  people.  It  is  singular  when  it  repre- 
sents an  individual,  such  as  Napoleon,  Washington, 
Irving.  It  is  called  particular  when  it  represents  an 
object  less  extensive  in  relation  to  another,  as  the  idea 
of  man  is  a  particular  idea  in  relation  to  thot  of  ani- 
mal. We  shall  speak  of  universal  ideas  in  the  next 
article. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  ideas  are  there  in  respect  to 
the  manner  in  which  they  represent  objects? 

A.  It  is  an  ordinary  fact  that  sometimes  our  mind 
perceives  objects  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  easily  dis- 
tinguish them  from  all  others ;  and  oftentimes  it  per- 
ceives them  in  such  a  way  that  it  cannot  distinguish 
them  from  others.  For  instance,  if  I  should  see  the 
hemlock,  the  pine,  the  oak-tree,  I  could  easily  distin- 
guish them  from  all  other  trees,  my  acquaintance  with 
those  trees  being  very  accurate.  But  if  an  exotic  plant 
were  put  before  me  I  could  not  distinguish  it  from 
others.  When  we  perceive  an  object  in  such  a  way  as 
to  be  able  to  distinguish  it  from  all  others,  then  our 
idea  of  the  object  is  called  clear ;  otherwise,  obscure. 
But  if  we  have  such  an  idea  of  the  object  as  to  be  able 
not  only  to  distinguish  it  from  others  but  to  distin- 
guish its  particular  properties  from  the  particular  pro- 
perties of  other  objects,  then  our  idea  of  the  object 
is  called  distinct;  otherwise,  indistinct.  But  if  we 
should  have  such  an  idea  of  the  object  as  to  be  able 
not  only  to  distinguish  it  from  others  in  itself  and  in 
its  properties,  but  could  tell  the  peculiar  nature  and 
characteristics  of  the  properties  of  that  object  from 


3  2         Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

the  peculiar  nature  and  characteristics  of  tiie  proper- 
ties of  other  objects,  then  our  idea  of  it  is  called  ade- 
quate^ and  its  opposite  inadequate.  To  give  an  in- 
stance of  both  distinct  and  adequate  ideas,  we  will 
take  a  plant  with  which  we  are  so  well  acquainted 
that  we  can  tell  the  particular  size,  shape,  and  color  of 
its  trunk,  its  bark,  its  foliage,  its  flowers,  and  its  fruits. 
This  certainly  would  be  having  a  distinct  idea  of  that 
plant.  But  a  botanist  could  go  further,  and  be  able 
to  tell  not  only  the  particular  nature  and  properties  of 
that  plant,  but  the  particular  nature  and  properties  of 
each  part  of  the  plant.  He  would  have  an  adequate 
idea  of  the  plant. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
On   Universal  Ideas. 

Q.  What  is  the  meaning  of  a  universal  idea  ? 

A.  If  an  i'^ea  be  an  image,  a  universal  idea  must 
mean  nvc  .al  image.  The  word  universal  is  derived 
fror  tne  L"  .n  Avords  unuin  versus  a/ia,  and  signifies  a 
thing  ..  ^iicli  refers  to  many ;  so  that,  in  order  to  call  a 
thing  universal,  t'lese  two  elements  are  required,  o?te 
and  many.  Hence  a  universal  image  means  an  image 
representing  a  thing  common  to  many.  Now,  the  ques- 
tion arises — Is  it  possible  that  an  idea  can  represent 
something  common  to  many?  This  question,  upon 
which  all  philosophy  rests,  has  been  discussed  at 
all  times,  and  more  especially  from  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury to  the  fourteenth,  and  has  been  answered  dif- 
ferently, but  the  principal  opinions  may  be  reduced  to 
four. 

Q.  State  distinctly  the  state  of  the  question  and 
give  the  opinions  of  the  various  systems. 

A.  As  an  idea  is  an  image,  we  repeat,  a  universal  idea 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        33 

must  be  a  universal  image.  Now,  an  image  represents 
a  reality,  as  it  must  be  the  image  of  something.  There- 
tote  a  universal  image  must  represent  a  universal  reality, 
or  some  real  thing  common  to  many.  This  is  agreed 
upon  by  all  philosophers.  But  the  question  comes 
up.  Is  there  in  nature  such  a  thing  as  a  universal  object 
which  a  universal  idea  may  represent  ?  According  to 
the  different  answers  which  philosophers  have  given 
to  this  question  have  arisen  different  opinions  with  re- 
gard to  the  nature  of  universal  ideas.  The  first  opin- 
ion, held  by  philosophers  called  Nominalists,  holds  that 
in  'lature  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  universal  object 
common  to  many,  and  that  consequently  what  we  call 
universal  ideas  are  mere  words  or  names,  or  at  most 
certain  conceptions  of  our  mind  representing  a  number 
of  individual  things.  In  the  first  sense  this  opinion 
was  held  by  the  Epicureans,  and  in  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury probably  by  Roscellinus.  In  the  second  sense  it 
was  taught  by  Occam  in  the  middle  ages,  and  was  held 
in  modern  times  by  Hobbes,  Robinet,  Condillac,  and 
other  sensists. 

The  second  is  the  opinion  of  the  Conceptualists. 
They  maintain  that  a  universal  nature  or  object  cannot 
possibly  exist  either  actually  or  potentially — that  is  to 
say,  that  it  neither  exists  nor  is  there  any  cause  which 
could  ever  make  it  exist  ;  but  they  contend  that  the 
mind  can  conceive  such  a  thing  as  a  universal  nature 
merclyasitsown  offspring,  not  as  representing  anything 
really  existing  or  possible  to  exist,  and  consequently 
universal  ideas  are  nothing  more  than  mere  concep- 
tions of  our  mind,  representing  nothing  real.  This 
opinion  was  held  by  the  Stoics  of  old  and  by  Abelardus 
in  the  middle  ages,  and  is  maintained  by  all  the 
idealists  of  our  time. 

The  third  is  the  opinion  of  the  Realists.      They 


34        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

teach  that  universal  natures  do  really  exist,  and  that 
therefore  they  can  be  represented  by  a  universal  image. 
This  opinion  was  held  by  the  Platonists,  and  is  held  by 
the  Pantheists  of  our  days,  with  this  difference :  that 
Platonists  taught  that  these  universal  natures  existed 
in  themselves  and  were  the  types  of  individual  things, 
whereas  Pantheists  contend  that  they  exist  in  indi- 
vidual natures  but  with  a  distinct  existence. 

The  fourth  is  the  opinion  of  St.  Thomas,  and  lies 
between  the  opinion  of  the  Realists  and  that  of  the 
Conceptualists.  He  teaches  that  natures  represented  by 
universal  ideas  are  not  mere  intellectual  offspring  and 
forms  with  no  foundation  in  nature,  as  is  held  by  the 
Idealists,  nor  that  such  universal  natures  exist  in  fact, 
but  that  such  ideas  are  formed  by  our  mind  not  arbitrar- 
ily, but  with  a  foundation  in  reality.  Hence  St.  Thomas 
holds  that  universal  Jitures  exist  formally  in  their 
universal  form  in  the  mind,  but  fundamentally  in  re- 
ality ;  and  consequently  a  universal  idea  is  formally  so 
in  the  mind,  but  receives  its  foundation  from  reality. 
To  give  the  four  opinions  in  a  few  words,  we  say  a 
universal  idea  is  like  a  universal  portrait.  Now,  a  por- 
trait must  have  an  original.  Is  there  a  universal 
origin'al  in  nature  from  which  to  draw  this  portrait  ? 
Some  answer  no,  and  say  that  this  universal  por- 
trait is  a  mere  word  having  no  meaning  whatever. 
Others  answer  :  There  is  not,  nor  can  there  be,  a  univer- 
sal original,  but  the  mind  may  invent  one  as  its  own 
fancy  work.  Others  say:  To  be  sure  there  is  such  a 
universal  original,  and  the  portrait  may  represent  it 
exactly.  Finally,  St.  Thomas  comes  in  and  says:  Let 
us  distinguish  ;  in  nature  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
universal  original  from  which  to  draw  a  universal  por- 
trait, and  yet  this  universal  portrait,  which  we  call  uni- 
versal idea,  is  not  altogether  a  fancy  work  of  our  mind, 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        35 

because  the  mind  has  a  reason  and  a  foundation  for 
this  work,  as  it  makes  the  universal  portrait  from  find- 
ing in  reality  one  nature  common  to  many  individuals. 
Hence  this  universal  portrait  as  such  is  a  work  of  the 
mind,  but  the  original  is  supplied  by  that  one  nature 
found  in  real  things  to  be  common  to  many  indi- 
viduals. I  see,  for  instance,  Peter,  John,  James,  etc., 
all  with  their  peculiar  and  individual  differences.  But 
amid  all  these  differences  I  perceive  two  elements 
common  to  them  all,  rationality  and  animality.  I 
form  of  these  two  elements  an  idea  which  is  com- 
mon to  all  three  ;  I  compare  this  notion  with  all  the 
men  I  can  see,  and  find  in  them  the  same  common 
elements.  I  have  therefore  good  reason  to  form  the 
universal  idea  of  the  species  man,  consisting  of  the 
elements  of  animality  and  rationality.  But  every  one 
can  perceive  at  a  glance  that  that  universal  idea,  as 
such,  does  not  exist  in  nature,  for  in  nature  I  find 
those  two  elements  determined  and  contracted  by  in- 
dividual conditions  in  each  man,  and  therefore  form- 
ally the  universal  idea  exists  only  in  the  mind.  But 
can  any  one  say  that  I  have  no  foundation  in  reality 
for  such  an  idea,  since  I  have  drawn  it  from  the  obser- 
vation of  many  individuals  of  the  species  in  which  it 
is  found  contracted,  and  I  have  formed  it  by  elimi- 
nating from  those  two  elements  all  individual  con- 
ditions, and  then  by  comparing  the  notion  of  those 
two  elements  with  as  many  individuals  of  the  species 
as  I  can  observe,  and  by  finding  it  always  as  agreeable 
to  them  ? 

ARTICLE   THIRD. 

True  Opinion  about  the  Nature  of  Universal  Ideas. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  of  the  opinion  of  the  Nomi- 
nals? 


/     ,»,-  ,•  '>  '.■■  >  ■ 


o 


6        Elements  of  hitellectual  Philosophy, 


A.  They  say  that  universal  ideas  are  mere  sounds 
or  conceptions  of  a  number  of  individuals.  Now, 
such  opinion  is  false.  i.  Universal  ideas  cannot 
be  mere  words,  for  words,  as  every  one  knows,  are 
signs  of  ideas.  Now,  a  sign  cannot  exist  without  a 
thing  signified  by  the  sign  ;  therefore  all  these  words 
which  the  Nominals  call  universal  must  always  sup- 
pose a  universal  conception  of  the  mind. 

2.  It  will  not  do  to  say  that  the  best  part  of  the 
Nominals  admit  that  a  certain  conception  of  the  mind 
corresponds  to  these  words,  because  this  conception  is 
not  a  universal  idea,  but  a  conception  of  a  plurality 
and  number.  For  how  could  such  a  conception  re- 
present a  plurality  of  individuals?  Only  in  two 
ways  —  either  they  represent  this  number  of  indi- 
viduals distinctly  and  severally,  or  they  represent  it 
in  common  and  confusedly  in  consequence  of  a  cer- 
tain similitude  among  them.  The  first  supposition 
is  impossible,  because  individuals  are  surrounded  by 
so  many  qualities  and  accidents  that  each  one  of 
them  has  an  existence  all  its  own  and  distinct  from 
that  of  others.  Therefore  each  one  of  them  implies 
an  idea  and  a  conception  all  its  own,  and  consequently 
it  is  impossible  that  one  idea  could  represent  distinctly 
and  severally  a  number  of  individuals  as  individuals. 
How  could  I,  for  instance,  express  distinctly  and  seve- 
rally by  one  idea  Washington,  Shakspere,  Homer, 
Michael  Angelo,  Titus  Oates,  Arnold,  Robespierre, 
and  Joan  d'Arc  ?  If  it  is  said  that  one  conception  re- 
presents a  number  of  individuals  in  consequence  of  a 
certain  similitude  among  them,  then  we  say  that,  by 
the  admission  of  the  Nominals  themselves,  that  which 
is  represented  by  universal  ideas  are  not  individual 
things  as  such,  but  that  in  which  they  resemble  each 
other.     Therefore  a  universal  idea  must  be  something 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        3  7 

common  to  many.  3.  Besides  this,  we  always  attribute 
to  individuals  that  which  is  signified  by  the  universal 
idea,  or  words,  as  the  Nominals  call  them.  For  in- 
stance, we  say  Peter  is  a  man,  the  horse  is  an  animal. 
Now,  in  the  opinion  which  we  are  refuting  such  expres- 
sions would  be  absurd,  because  they  would  mean  no- 
thing, as  they  would  amount  to  this  :  Peter  is  a  mere 
name,  the  horse  is  a  mere  sound.  We  conclude  with 
the  remark  of  Leibnitz,  that  if  the  opinion  of  the 
Nominals  were  true,  all  the  sciences  which  rest  on 
universal  ideas  would  be  a  mere  empty  sound  and 
sceptics  would  win  the  day. 

Q.  What  is  to  be  said  of  the  second  opinion  ? 

A.  That  it  is  also  false.  i.  Because  it  is  a  fact 
that  we  divide  all  real  existences  and  individuals  ac- 
cording to  the  various  universal  ideas  of  genus,  spe- 
cies, and  the  like  ;  for  instance,  we  refer  Peter  and 
Socrates  to  the  genus  animal  and  to  the  species  mariy 
and  the  horse  and  the  lion  to  the  species  brute.  Now, 
if  nothing  real  and  objective  in  nature  corresponded 
with  these  universal  ideas,  by  what  right  could  we 
refer  the  horse  and  the  lion  to  the  species  brute  and 
man  to  the  species  man?  We  could  only  say  that 
Peter  corresponds  with  a  certain  fancy  work  of  our 
brain  called  man. 

2.  In  the  second  place,  if  the  opinion  of  the  Concep- 
tualists  were  admitted,  all  the  sciences  would  be  at 
an  end,  because  all  the  sciences  cannot  be  possible 
without  universal  propositions  and  ideas.  If,  there- 
fore, universal  ideas  represented  nothing  real  and  ob- 
jective, the  sciences  founded  upon  them  would  be 
mere  fictions  of  our  mind  and  not  sciences  of  real 
things. 

Q.  Examine  the  third  opinion. 

A.    I.  Universal    natures   cannot    exist   in   reality. 


38        Eiemenls  of  Intellectual  P/tiiosophy. 

This  will  be  demonstrated  when  w  speak  of  the 
essences  of  things.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  the 
third  opinion  must  be  false.  Besides,  ideas  must  re- 
present that  to  which  they  are  applied.  If  universal 
ideas,  therefore,  represented  universal  natures,  we 
could  not  apply  them  except  to  universal  natures. 
But  all  mankind  applies  them  to  individual  things  or 
persons  ;  we  say,  for  instance,  Walter  is  a  man,  my 
horse  is  an  animal.  Therefore  universal  ideas  do 
not  represent  universal  natures. 

Q.  Prove  the  fourth  opinion. 

A.  According  to  the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas,  uni- 
versal ideas,  as  such,  exist  formally  in  our  mind, 
but  fundamentally  in  individual  things.  Now,  that 
natures  represented  by  universal  ideas  exist  funda- 
mentally in  individual  things  is  proved  from  this: 
the  nature  which  the  intellect  perceives  in  the  uni- 
versal ideas  is  the  same  which,  restricted  and  contracted 
by  individual  conditions,  is  found  in  individual  things. 
This  is  so  true  that  we  predicate  it  of  each  individual, 
and  say  Peter  is  a  man,  the  horse  is  an  animal. 
Therefore  it  is  clear  that  natures  represented  by  uni- 
versal ideas  are  the  same  as  those  of  individual  objects. 
But  they  exist  formally,  as  universal,  only  in  the  intel- 
lect, and  are  its  own  work.  In  fact,  the  natures  of 
things  may  be  supposed  to  be  universal  in  a  threefold 
sense  :  i.  In  themselves,  considered  in  the  elements 
which  make  them  such  natures;  2.  Inasmuch  as 
they  exist  in  individuals;  3.  Inasmuch  as  they  exist 
in  the  intellect.  But  we  cannot  admit  the  two  first 
suppositions,  because  the  natures  of  things  cannot,  in 
the  first  place,  be  supposed  to  be  universal  in  them- 
selves, for  the  reason  that  all  that  which  belongs  to 
the  nature  of  an  object,  considered  in  itself,  must 
belong  to  every  individual  possessing  that  nature  ;  for 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         39 

instance,  all  the  elements  composing  human  nature 
must  belong  to  every  man.  If,  therefore,  universality 
belonged  to  human  nature  in  itself,  every  man  would 
be  a  universal,  which  is  absurd.  We  cannot  admit 
the  second  supposition,  that  a  nature  possesses  uni- 
versality as  it  exists  in  individuals,  because  everything 
which  is  found  in  an  individual  is  contracted  and 
determined  by  its  individual  conditions.  Therefore 
universality  must  be  attributed  to  the  ^natures  of 
things,  inasmuch  as  they  are  found  in  the  intellect 
— that  is  to  say,  the  nature  of  things,  being  found  in 
the  same  things  contracted  by  individual  qualities,  is 
lendered  universal  by  the  consideration  of  the  intel- 
lect, which  deprives  it  of  its  individual  qualities  and 
considers  it  as  common  to  all. 

Q.   Define,  then,  a  universal  idea. 

A.  It  is  an  idea  representing  a  common  nature y  found 
out  by  the  intellect  in  a  number  of  individuals  of  that 
nature, 

ARTICLE   FOURTH. 

Observations  respecting  the  Nature,  Elements ,  and  Pro- 
perties of  Universal  Ideas. 

Q.  What  remarks  should  we  make  in  order  to  illus- 
trate the  definition  just  given  ? 

A.  1.  We  must  observe  in  what  manner  an  idea 
is  rendered  universal.  The  natures  of  things,  as  we 
have  said,  are  singular.  In  what  manner,  then,  can 
our  intellect  render  them  universal?  We  answer,  by 
way  of  abstraction  and  reflection.  Our  intellect  is  en- 
dowed with  a  certain  faculty  of  separating,  in  a  given 
object,  one  thing  from  another,  and  of  fixing  its  atten- 
tion and  consideration  upon  one,  laying  aside  all  others ; 
as,   for  instance,  having  before  it  the  object  man,  it 


40        Elemenis  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

can  separate  it  in  all  its  elements  and  take  the  element 
animality  for  its  present  consideration,  laying  aside 
reason  ;  or  it  may  put  on  one  side  animality  and  take 
reason  for  its  consideration.  Our  intellect  exercises 
this  faculty  especially  about  individual  things  ;  be- 
cause, seeing  that  its  proper  object  is  not  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  singular,  but  the  nature  of  things,  and 
on  the  other  hand  finding  all  the  objects  of  nature 
clothed  with  individual  qualities  by  the  faculty  of  sepa- 
ration, it  takes  off  from  those  individual  objects  quality 
after  quality  until  the  bare  nature  is  left.  The  nature 
of  things  thus  deprived  of  and  purified  from  its  indi- 
vidual qualities  is  called  universal  inetaphysic,  and  the 
operation  by  which  the  intellect  has  reduced  it  to  that 
state  is  called  abstraction.  The  nature  thus  deprived  of 
its  individual  conditions  is  neither  universal  nor  singu- 
lar. It  is  not  singular,  because  it  has  been  stripped  of 
all  those  individual  qualities  which  made  it  so.  It  is 
not  universal,  because  it  only  exhibits  the  essential 
elements  of  a  nature  which,  in  themselves,  are  not  uni- 
versal ;  else  all  individuals  containing  those  elements 
would  be  universal.  Hence,  for  an  idea  to  be  truly 
universal,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  essence  repre- 
sented by  it  be  only  abstracted  from  its  individual 
qualities,  but  something  else  is  necessary.  It  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  that  the  intellect,  liaving  abstracted 
the  essence  from  individual  things,  should  consider  it 
fit  to  be  found  in  all  individuals  which  lie  under  it. 
Then  only  can  we  say  with  propriety  that  the  idea  is 
universal,  because  then  only  we  find  in  it  unity  and 
plurality — uttity  the  abstract  nature,  plurality  the 
individuals  possessing  it.  'Such  an  idea  is  called  uni- 
versal logic,  or,  strictly  speaking,  universal,  and  the 
second  operation  of  the  intellect,  seeking  for  the  same 
nature  in  \x\dW\d\x2iXs,  comparison  or  reflection.     By  two 


.  Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        41 

ways,  then,  an  idea  is  rendered  universal — by  abstrac- 
tion and  reflection. 

"  Doubtless  this  could  not  be  but  that  she*  turns 

Bodies  to  p  )irits  by  sublimation  strange  ; 
As  fire  converts  to  fire  the  things  it  burns, 

As  we  our  meats  into  our  nature  change, 
From  their  gross  matter  she  abstracts  the  forms, 

And  draws  a  kind  of  quintessence  from  things, 
Which  to  her  proper  nature  she  transforms, 

To  bear  them  light  on  her  celestial  wings 
This  doth  she  when  from  things  particular 

She  doth  abstract  the  universal  kinds,  § 

Which  bodiless  and  immaterial  are, 

And  can  be  only  lodg'd  within  our  minds."  f 

Q.  How  is  a  universal  idea  distinguished  from  all 
other  ideas  ? 

A.  It  is  easy  to  distinguish  it  from  singular  and 
particular  ideas.  The  only  idea  with  which  it  might 
possibly  be  confounded  is  the  collective.  But  it  is 
easy  to  distinguish  one  from  the  other  if  we  attend  to 
these  two  observations:  i.  The  universal  idea  can  be 
predicated  of  all  individuals  comprised  within  a  spe- 
cies or  a  genus,  whereas  the  collective  idea  can  only 
be  predicated  of  many,  but  not  of  all,  which  are  com- 
prised in  a  species.  .  For  instance,  take  the  species 
man;  that  idea,  man,  applies  to  all  the  individuals  of 
the  species,  but  the  idea  army  cannot  apply  to  all  in- 
dividuals of  the  species  man,  but  only  to  a  number  of 
them.  2.  The  universal  idea  can  be  predicated  of 
every  individual  of  the  species  separately,  whereas  the 
collective  idea  cannot  be  predicated  except  of  all  indi- 
viduals taken  together.  For  instance,  we  apply  the 
specific  idea  man  to  every  individual  man  taken 
separately,  but  we  could  not  predicate  the  collective 

*  The  soul,  t  Davies'  Poems, 


42         Elements  of  Iitie Hectical  Philosophy.       •   . 

idea  people  of  every  separate  individual  forming  a 
people. 

Q.  What  are  the  elements  of  a  universal  idea? 

A.  Two :  conipreJiensioti  and  extension.  To  have  a 
universal  idea  it  is  necessary  that  the  nature  repre- 
sented by  it  be  abstracted  from  its  individual  condi- 
tions, and  also  that  it  be  thought  as  applicable  to 
many  individuals.  Tfie  essential  constituents  of  the 
abstract  nature  are  called  the  comprehension  of  an 
idea.  Its  capacity  of  being  applied  to  many  is  called 
the  extension  of  an  idea. 

These  two  elements  are  governed  by  the  following 
law  :  They  are  always  contrary  to  each  other.  In  pro- 
portion as  the  comprehension  or  the  contents  of  an 
idea  increases,  its  extension  or  applicability  to  many 
diminishes ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  in  proportion  as 
its  extension  increases  its  comprehension  diminishes. 
This  law  is  expressed  by  the  following  formula :  The 
comprehension  of  an  idea  is  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  its 
extension.  For  instance,  if  to  the  idea  animal  you 
add  the  element  of  reason,  you  increase  its  compre- 
hension or  contents,  but  you  belittle  its  extension  ;  as 
in  the  former  state  it  could  be  applied  not  only  to  the 
human  species  but  also  to  the  brute  species,  whereas 
by  addir  ^  that  element  you  can  only  apply  it  to  the 
human  species. 

Q.  What  are  the  properties  of  universal  ideas? 

A.  A  universal  idea  represents  a  nature  capable  of 
being  attributed  to  many  individuals  or  species.  This 
capacity  of  being  attributed  to  many  individuals  or 
species  is  called  Predicability  of  an  idea. 

Again,  this  nature  included  in  the  universal  idea  is 
abstracted  from  all  its  individual  conditions  which  make 
it  belong  to  this  particular  individual  place  or  time. 
Now,  by  the  abstraction  these  particular  conditions 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,         43 

are  thrown  aside,  and,  therefore,  in  this  state  the 
nature  belongs  to  all  time  and  place.  This  property 
is  called  Perpetuity  of  an  idea.  This  must  not  be 
understood  in  the  sense  that  it  does  positively  exist  at 
all  time  and  is  eternal;  because  the  actual  and  real 
existence  of  the  universal  idea  is  in  our  mind  and 
follows  the  conditions  of  our  mind.  Our  mind  not 
being  eternal,  neither  is  the  universal  idea  eternal. 
The  universal  idea,  therefore,  is  perpetual  in  a  nega- 
tive sense — that  is  to  say,  inasmuch  as  it  bears  no  par- 
ticular traits  of  this  or  that  time,  place,  and  indi- 
vidual. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  DIFFEREXT  OBJECTS  WHICH  A  UNIVERSAL  IDEA 
MAY  REPRESENT,  AND  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  MODES  OF 
REPRESENTING  THEM. 

Q.  What  necessity  is  there  for  studying  the  differ- 
ent objects  of  a  universal  idea  and  the  different  modes 
Df  representing  them? 

A.  One  cannot  have  a  correct  notion  of  an  image  if 
he  does  not  know  the  objects  it  represents  and  the 
different  ways  of  representing  them.  Having,  there- 
fore, said  that  a  universal  idea  is  an  image  formed  in 
the  intellect,  to  understand  it  well  we  must  study  the 
objects  it  may  represent  and  the  different  ways  it  has 
of  representing  them.  In  other  words,  a  universal 
idea  represents  something  common  to  many.  We  must, 
therefore,  study  what  is  this  something  common^  and  in 
how  many  ways  it  may  be  attributed  to  many.  We 
shall  begin  from  the  ways  or  modes  in  which  a  uni- 
versal idea  represents  objects — ways  or  modes  which 
have  been  called  by  philosophers  categorema,  or,  sim- 
ply, universals. 

Q.  How  many  universals  are  there  ? 

A.  The  idea  is  called  universal  inasmuch  as  it 
represents  an  object  as  attributable  to  many.  There- 
fore the  modes  or  ways  of  representing  an  object 
universally  must  be  as  many  as  there  are  ways  of 
attributing  a  thing  to  many.  Now,  a  thing  may  be 
attributed  to  many  in  the  following  ways :  It  may  be 
attributed  to  them  as  representing  an  element  of 
their  ess' nee;  or  as  representing  that  particular  ele- 


Elements  of  Intellectua  I  Ph ilosophy.         4  5 

ment  which  distinguishes  them  from  all  others  and  in 
which  none  other  can  share  ;  or  as  representing  the 
full  and  complete  essence  ;  or  as  something  not  form- 
ing an  element  of  the  essence,  but  a  necessary  conse- 
quence of  it;  or,  finally,  as  something  not  at  all 
necessary  to  the  essence,  but  accidental  to  it.  For 
instance,  take  the  idea  animal  in  respect  to  man ; 
what  does  this  idea-  represent  with  respect  to  man  ? 
An  element  of  his  essence,  because  animality  enters 
as  an  element  in  man's  essence.  Take  the  idc  '  rea- 
sonable ;  what  does  it  represent  with  regard  to  man  ? 
That  peculiar  element  of  his  essence  which  distin- 
guishes man  from  all  other  beings  inferior  to  himself. 
Take  the  idea  reasonable  animal ;  what  does  it  repre- 
sent in  respect  to  man?  His  complete  essence. 
Take  the  idea  capable  of  learning ;  what  does  it 
represent  with  regard  to  man  ?  Something  which 
necessarily  follows  from  his  essence.  Take  the  idea 
white ;  what  does  it  represent  ?  Something  not  at 
all  necessary  but  quite  accidental  to  the  essence  of 
man. 

There  are,  therefore,  five  modes  of  representing 
something  as  common  to  many:  as  a  part  of  their 
essence  ;  as  their  complete  essence  ;  as  that  peculiar 
element  which  distinguishes  them  from  all  others ;  as 
something  necessarily  following  from,  or  something 
quite  accidental  to,  the  essence.  There  are  no  other 
possible  ways  of  representing  something  as  common 
to  many.  The  first — that  is,  that  common  thing 
which  forms  an  element  of  the  essence  of  many — is 
called  genus.  The  second — that  is,  that  common 
thing  which  represents  the  complete  essence  of  many 
—•is  called  species.  The  third  is  that  peculiar  ele- 
ment which  distinguishes  the  essence  from  that  of 
others,  and   is  called  differejice.     The  fourth  is  that 


46         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

which  necessarily  derives  from  the  essence,  and  is 
called  property.     The  fifth  is  called  accident. 

Q.  Speak  of  the  first  universal,  genus,  and  point 
out  its  offices. 

A.  Genus  is  defined  :  A  tiniversal  nature,  zvhieh  may 
be  attributed  to  several  species  as  an  element  of  their  re- 
spective essences.  Before  explaining  this  definition  we 
must  remark  that  we  are  obliged  necessarily  to  ex- 
plain the  gemis  by  means  of  the  species,  and  vice  versd, 
as  they  are  relative  terms.  That  they  are  naturally  re- 
lated is  clear  from  the  fact  that  two  things  are  neces- 
sary to  form  the  nature  of  genus — first,  it  must  be 
found  in  several  species,  and  not  in  several  indi- 
viduals, as  some  have  said,  because  genus  is  attribut- 
able only  to  that  which  is  immediately  under  it.  But 
directly  under  the  genus  is  the  species,  not  the  indi- 
vidual. Therefore  genus  must  be  attributable  to 
several  species.  The  second  is,  that  genus  is  at- 
tributed to  species  as  an  element  of  its  essence, 
which  it  has  in  common  with  other  species.  Thus 
animal,  which  is  genus  respecting  man  and  the  brutes, 
contains  only  an  element  of  their  essence. 

Q.  What  is  species  ? 

A.  A  universal  notio7i  which  can  be  attributed  to  many 
individuals  as  their  complete  essetice.  To  have  the 
nature  of  species,  therefore,  two  things  are  required : 
I.  It  must  be  applicable  to  many  individuals,  be- 
cause it  is  a  universal  notion,  just  because  it  is  attri- 
butable to  many  individuals.  2.  It  must  be  attribut- 
A  ed  to  many  individuals  as  their  complete  essence. 
Thus,  man  is  attributable  to  Peter,  John,  Walter,  and 
all  individuals  of  the  human  species,  as  representing 
their  complete  essence. 

Q.  What  is  difference  ? 

A.  A  universal  idea  which  can  be  attributed  to  many 


\ 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         /^*j 

individuals^  as  that  clement  ivhich  distinguishes  their 
essence  from  all  other  essences.  Reasonableness  in  man 
is  just  the  difference  wliicli  distinguislics  liis  essence 
from  all  others.  And  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  differ- 
ence is  a  universal  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  is  predicated 
of  many  individuals  as  the  distinj^uishing  element  of 
their  essence,  and  not  in  any  other  sense.  We  con- 
clude, therefore  :  Genus  is  a  universal  idea  which  repre- 
sents a  common  element  of  the  essence  of  a  number 
of  species.  Difference  represents  that  element  which 
distinguishes  the  species  from  each  other,  species  the 
complete  essence  of  many  individuals. 

Q.   What  are  the  degrees  of  universals? 

A.  Three :  supreme,  middle,  and  loivcst.  Genus  is 
called  supreme  when  it  has  no  other  above  it,  as  sub- 
stance. It  is  called  middle  when  it  has  other  genuses 
above  and  under  it,  as  body,  which  has  the  genus  sub- 
stance above  it  and  two  before  \t,  living  bodies  and 
inorganic  bodies.  It  is  called  lowest  when  it  has  no 
genus  under  it  but  species,  as  the  genus  animal,  which 
has  two  species  under  it,  reasonable  and  unreasonable 
animals.  Likewise  species  and  difference  are  called 
supreme  if  they  have  no  species  or  difference  placed 
above  them  ;  middle  if  they  have  them  above  and 
below  them ;  lowest  when  they  have  none  but  indi- 
viduals below  them. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
On  Property  and  Accident. 

Q.  Define  the  universal  called  property. 

A.  It  is  rt  universal  idea  representing  something  coin- 
mon  to  many  individuals,  as  necessarily  emanating  from 
their  essence.  Freedom  in  man,  for  instance,  is  a  pro- 
perty, because,  though  it  is  a  quality  which  does  not 


I 

48         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

enter  in  the  definition  of  his  essence,  is  yet  neces- 
sarily flowing  from  it.  And  if  so  "owing,  it  is 
clear  that  it  must  have  the  same  qualifications  as 
the  essence.  Now,  the  essence  has  three  qualifications  : 
I.  It  is  applicable  only  to  the  species,  because  by 
means  of  the  essence  individuals  are  classified  in  their 
own  species.  2.  It  must  be  applicable  to  all  the  indi- 
v'iduals  of  the  species.  3.  And  that  for  ever,  because 
neither  the  species  nor  the  individual  can  ever  exist 
without  their  nature.  Property,  therefore,  must  be 
applicable  to  one  species,  to  all  the  individuals  of  the 
species,  and  for  ever.  These  three  qualities  distin- 
guish property  from  all  accidents ;  from  those  acci- 
dents which  are  applicable  to  the  species,  but  not 
to  all  individuals.  We  can  say,  for  instance,  that 
every  man  is  free,  but  we  cannot  say  that  every  man 
is  a  poet,  the  latter  being  an  accident  which  be- 
comes some  of  the  species,  but  not  all ;  from  those 
which  belong  to  all  the  individuals  of  the  species,  but 
not  exclusively  to  that  species.  I  can  predicate  free- 
dom of  man  alone,  but  to  have  two  feet  or  to  possess 
teeth  1  can  say  of  man  and  many  of  the  species  brute. 
'     Q.  Define  accident. 

A.  It  is  quite  the  contrary  of  property,  and  may  be 
defined  :  That  universal  notion  wJiich  may  be  fomid 
or  not  in  a  number  of  individuals  tvithout  at  all  inter- 
fering with  their  nature.  Hence,  in  order  to  have  the 
idea  of  accident  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should  be 
separable  from  an  individual ;  it  is  enough  that  we 
may  conceive  the  individual  as  without  that  accident, 
leaving  at  the  same  time  his  nature  unchanged.  To 
be  black  is  inseparable  from  the  raven,  yet  that  quality 
is  an  accident  in  the  raven,  as  we  can  easily  think  its 
essence  without  that  quality. 

Q.  How  can  universals  be  predicated  of  a  thing? 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        49 

A.  Before  answering  the  question  we  must  make 
two  remarks:  i.  That  universals  may  not  only  be 
predicated  of  real  objects,  but  may  be  predicated  of 
each  other ;  as,  for  instance,  accident  may  have  its 
genus,  species,  difference,  property,  and  accident. 
Thus  the  accident  red  is  a  species  under  the  genus 
color,  the  difference  of  which  might  be  determined  by 
a  given  shade  of  red,  etc. 

Second  remark.  Universals  may  be  predicated  in 
the  abstract  form  or  in  the  concrete,  as  we  may  say 
animality  and  animal,  reasonable  and  reasonableness, 
free  and  freedom,  learned  and  doctrine. 

Having  premised  these  two  remarks,  we  give  the 
rules  how  universals  may  be  predicated  of  things : 

1st  rule.  Difference^  property^  and  accident  arc  never 
predicated  of  a  subject  in  the  abstract  form,. but  always 
in  the  concrete.  Because  these  universals  represent  a 
quality,  and  therefore  must  be  applied  as  adjectives 
which  qualify  a  thing.  Now,  adjectives  are  concrete 
and  not  abstract;  hence  we  must  say  man  is  reason- 
able and  free,  and  not  man  is  reasonableness  and  free- 
dom ;    Peter  is  learned,  and  not  Peter  is  doctrine. 

2d  rule.  Genus  and  species  are  predicated  in  the  con- 
crete form  when  it  is  question  of  substances.  Ilcncc  it 
is  right  to  say  Peter  is  a  man,  but  wrong  to  say  Peter 
is  humanity.  The  reason  is  that  substances  are  attri- 
buted in  their  true  and  complete  sense,  and  therefore 
in  concrete. 

3d  rule.  Genus  and  species^  when  it  is  question  of 
accidental  things,  are  predicated  in  the  abstract.  I  can 
say,  for  instance,  whiteness  is  a  color,  but  not  that 
which  is  white  is  colored,  because  when  the  accident 
is  expressed  in  a  concrete  form,  as  when  we  say 
colored  instead  of  color,  the  principal  idea  which  is 
meant  is  no  longer  the   accident  but  the  substance 


50        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

which  upholds  it,  and  therefore  there  would  be  no 
more  question  of  accidents  but  of  substances. 

4th  rule.  Universals  are  predicated  in  alt  their  com- 
pre/iensioUy  but  not  in  alt  their  extension.  Because,  in 
order  to  attribute  a  universal  idea  to  a  thing,  it  is 
necessary  that  I  shouW  find  all  the  elements  compos- 
ing that  universal  idea  in  the  thing  to  which  I  wish  to 
attribute  it ;  but  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  that  that 
thing  should  be  the  only  one  to  which  the  universal 
may  be  applied,  otherwise  it  would  no  longer  be  uni- 
versal. 

ARTICLE    SECOND. 

Of  the  Objects  of  Universal  Ideas,  or  of  Being  and  its 

Categories. 

Q-  What  is  the  object  of  universal  ideas? 

A.  It  is  being,  or  one  of  its  determinations.  Because 
the  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  is  an  image  which  represents 
things  to  be  known,  is  a  means  of  knowledge;  there- 
fore all  that  which  can  be  an  object  of  our  knowledge 
can  be  the  object  of  our  ideas.  But  the  object  of  our 
knowledge  can  only  be  being  or  one  of  its  determina- 
tions, as  a  thing  can  be  known  inasmuch  as  it  is.  These, 
therefore,  are  the  objects  of  universal  idea. 

Now,  that  being  can  stand  for  the  object  of  uni- 
versal idea  is  beyond  doubt,  as  we  daily  say  being  is, 
being  is  not.  Nothing  can  be  and  not  be  at  tu.  same 
time.  But  we  must  remark  that  when  the  idea  has 
being  for  its  object  it  does  not  represent  it, in  any  of 
the  five  modes  above  spoken  of — that  is,  as  genus, 
species,  difference,  property,  or  accident — because,  as  we 
shall  see  in  Ontology,  being  in  general  cannot  be  any 
of  these  things. 

Q.   How  many  are  the  determinations  of  being? 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        5 1 

They  are  innumerable,  as  every  being  is  a  determi- 
nation of  being.  But  here  we  intend  to  speak  only  of 
those  supreme  divisions  and  classifications  of  being  in 
which  all  other  beings  are  included,  because  the  object 
of  logic  is  not  this  or  that  particular  being,  but  the 
order  of  the  conceptions  of  our  mind.  It  is  necessary, 
therefore,  to  explain  those  common  divisions  and  uni- 
versal conceptions  which  put  in  order  and  distribute 
all  beings  into  so  many  classes  and  categories. 

Q.  How  many  categories  are  there  ? 

Ten  ;  because  being,  universally  considered,  can  be 
divided  into  substance  and  accident,  meaning  here  by 
accident  everything  which  is  not  a  substance.  Sub- 
stance, being  the  base  of  all  the  variety  of  accidents, 
and  hence  fixed  and  determinate  in  its  idea,  is  taken 
always  in  the  same  for  all  substances,  and  therefore  is 
not  divided  into  other  genuses.  Accident,  being  more 
vague  and  confused  and  various,  in  order  to  determine 
and  to  fitly  classify  it,  is  divided  into  nine  classes. 
Because  accident  is  added  to  substance  and  deter- 
mines it.  Now,  substance  maybe  determined  by  nine 
things — by  quantity,  relation,  quality,  action,  passion^ 
time,  place,  site,  and  habit.  Hence  accident  is  divided 
into  all  these  classes.  Being  in  general,  therefore,  is 
divided  into  ten  grand  orders,  which  are  called  cate- 
gories— that  is,  supreme  genuses  of  things — and  which 
are  substance,  quantity,  relation,  quality,  action, passion, 
time,  space,  site,  habit.  This  is  the  celebrated  division 
of  being  accepted  and  illustrated  by  the  greatest 
thinkers  of  antiquity.  We  shall  give  here  the  defini- 
tion of  substance,  accident,  relation,  and  quality,  as 
they  occur  so  frequently  in  logic,  and  shall  speak  of 
the  rest  in  Ontology.  •     ' 

Substance  is  that  which  exists  in  itself,  and  not  in 
another^  as  Peter,  tree,  stone.     By  this  substance   is 


52        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,    ^ 

easily  distinguished  from  accident,  Avhich  is  that 
which  must  lean  on  another  in  order  to  exist,  as 
white,  square,  round,  etc, — things  which  cannot  exist 
without  leaning  on  another. 

It  is  to  be  carefully  remarked  that  the  essence  of 
the  substance  is  to  be  in  itself  and  not  by  itself.  The 
first  means  that  the  substance  requires  no  other  being 
to  lean  on  in  order  to  exist,  which  is  true ;  the  second 
would  mean  that  substance  does  not  require  a  cause 
to  create  it,  which  is  false  of  finite  substances. 

Relation  can  be  defined  that  order  luhich  an  object 
has  with  regard  to  another  ;  how  an  object  lies  to  an- 
other. For  instance,  paternity  is  a  relation  which  im- 
plies the  order  in  which  a  father  stands  to  his  son. 

This  category  may  be  real  or  logical :  it  is  real  when 
it  exists  actually  in  nature,  as  the  relation  of  pater- 
nity ;  it  is  logical  when  it  is  placed  by  our  mind. 

Quality.  This  accident  may  be  defined  tJiat  ivhich 
of  itself  gives  a  special  manner  of  being  to  the  sub- 
stance. 

It  is  called  an  accident  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
specific  difference,  which  is  also  a  quality,  but  consti- 
tutes tlie  essence.  The  other  words  distinguish  it 
from  other  accidents  because  other  accidents  modify 
the  substance  more  or  less,  but  this  they  do  not  by 
themselves,  but  in  consequence  of  something  else  ;  as, 
for  instance,  quantity  qualifies  the  substance,  not 
by  itself,  but  by  the  extension  of  parts  which  it  pro- 
duces in  it.  But  when  I  say  Peter  is  good,  this 
quality  gives  of  itself  a  new  mode  of  existence  to 
Peter. 

Q.  Recapitulate  all  we  have  said  in  this  chapter. 

A.  From  what  we  have  said  in  this  chapter  it  is 
evident  how  many  and  what  are  the  different  species 
of  universal  ideas.     A  universal  idea  is  an  intellectual 


Eleinenls  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,         53 

representation.     Now,  these  representations  or  forms 
are  as  different  as  are    the    objects    they    represent 
and  the  modes  of  representing  them ;  and,  as  there 
are  five  modes  of  representing  an  object  in  a  universal 
way—genus,   species,   difference,  property,  and   acci- 
dent— so,  under  this  respect,  there  aie  five  universal 
ideas— those  of  genus,  species,  difference,  property, 
and  accident.     With  regard  to  the  object,  as  there  are  • 
ten  most   universal  objects,  so  there  are  ten  universal 
ideas— substance  accident,  and  this    subdivided  into 
relation,  quantity,  quality,  action,  passion,  time,  place, 
and  habit, 


• 


CHAPTER   III. 

OF  THE  EXPRESSION  OF  IDEAS  OR  OF  TERMS. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Definition  and  Division  of  Terms. 

Q.   What  are  terms  ? 

A.  Among  the  many  means  we  have  of  manifesting 
our  ideas,  words  claim  the  first  place. 

"  The  words     .     .     .     the  speaking  picture  of  thn  mind, 
The  extract  of  the  soul,  that  labor'd  how 
To  leave  the  image  of  herself  behind." 

— Daniels*  Poems. 

Words,  inasmuch  as  they  form  a  part  of  a  proposi- 
tion or  reasoning,  are  called  terms,  because  they  are 
the  very  thing  to  which  a  proposition  or  reasoning  may 
be  finally  reduced  ;  though  the  idea  itself  which  forms 
part  of  the  judgment  or  proposition  is  oftentimes  called 
term.  A  term,  therefore,  strictly  speaking,  may  be 
defined  that  into  which  a  simple  proposition  may  be 
resolved.  For  instance,  God  is  holy;  this  proposition 
mav  be  resolved  into  God  and  holy  ;  these,  therefore, 
are      e  terms  of  the  proposition. 

Q.  How  are  terms  divided  inasmuch  as  they  are 
signs  of  ideas? 

I.  A  term  may  be  of  as  many  kinds  as  there  are  ideas, 
because  they  are  destined  exactly  to  express  ideas, 
and  everything  which  has  relation  with  another  object 
may  easily  be  called  after  it,  as  we  say  generally 
wholesome  food,  drink,  and  so  forth,  not  because  such 

54 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        55 

things  are  subject  to  health,  but  because  they  have 
relation  with  it,  inasmuch  as  they  are  either  its 
cause  or  its  sign.  Likewise,  terms  having  relation  to 
ideas  may  reasonably  be  called  after  them.  Hence,  as 
there  are  abstract,  concrete,  collective,  particular, 
universal,  and  individual  ideas,  and  so  forth,  so  there 
are  also  abstract,  concrete,  collective,  particular, 
universal,  and  individual  terms.  But  besides,  terms 
as  signs  may  be  divided  into  three  great  classes. 
Some  signify  a  thing  by  themselves,  such  as  the  term 
man ;  others  cannot  express  anything  by  themselves, 
but  must  be  joined  to  others,  as  some^  every^  which 
uttered  by  themselves  mean  nothing,  but  have  a  mean- 
ing when  united  to  those  of  the  former  class,  as  some 
mcn^  every  tree;  others,  finally,  may  or  may  not 
signify  something  by  themselves.  The  first  are  called 
by  modern  philosophers  terms  significative  by  them- 
selves;  the  second,  significative  by  means  of  others ; 
the  third  are  called  mixed  terms.  The  first,  however, 
strictly  deserve  the  name  of  terms. 

Q.  How  are  terms  significative  by  themselves  sub- 
divided ? 

A.  I.  Into  positive  and  negative.  The  first  signify 
something,  as  wrt'w  /  the  second  express  the  absence 
of  something,  as  impotent — that  is,  the  absence  of 
power.  About  the  latter  we  must  remark  that  some 
of  them  are  negative  as  to  the  word,  but  positive  as 
to  the  meaning,  as  innocence,  immortality,  infinity^ 
which  imply  a  positive  perfection  ;  others  are  positive 
as  to  the  word  and  negative  as  to  the  sense,  as  jnortal, 
corruptible,  blind. 

2.  Into  complex  and  incomplex,  the  first  are  those 
which  are  formed  of  more  than  one  significative  word, 
as  Washington  Irving ;  the  second  of  one,  as  tree^ 
spiritual. 


56        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

3.  Into  nnivocal,  equivocal,  analogical.  The  first  are 
those  which  are  applied  to  several  objects  under  the 
same  signification,  as  animal,  which  is  applied  to  man 
and  to  beasts. 

The  second  are  those  which  are  applied  to  several 
things  in  a  different  meaning,  as  scorpion,  which  means 
the  animal  of  such  name,  and  is  also  given  to  one  of 
the  signs  of  the  Zodiac. 

The  third  are  those  which  lie  between  the  two  for- 
mer ones,  and  which  are  not  applied  to  more  than  one 
thing  in  the  same  meaning,  nor  in  a  meaning  alto- 
gether different,  but  are  applied  to  something  in  con- 
sequence of  a  certain  similarity  with  other  things  ;  as 
when  we  say  the  air  is  very  healthy,  the  term  heal- 
thy is  analogical,  because,  although  the  term  can  be 
strictly  applied  only  to  the  human  body,  it  is  yet  by 
analogy  or  resemblance  applied  to  air,  to  food,  to 
color,  etc. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 

Properties  of  Terms. 

Q.  How  many  are  the  properties  of  terms? 

A.  Five :  supposition,  alienation,  amplification,  re- 
striction, and  appellation ;  because  every  term  may  be 
applied  either  in  its  proper  meaning,  and  then  we 
have  supposition  ;  or  in  a  meaning  not  its  own,  and 
then  wc  have  alienation  ;  or  in  a  wider  meaning,  and 
then  we  have  amplification ;  or  in  more  restricted 
sense,  and  we  have  restriction  ;  or  it  may  be  added  to 
illustrate  another  term,  and  then  we  have  appellation. 

The  supposition  of  a  term  is,  therefore,  nothing 
more  than  the  use  of  the  word  in  its  proper  sense. 
The  appellation  may  be  twofold.  It  is  material  when 
the  term  is  used  not  for  its  object  but  for  itself,  as  in 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        57 

that  sophism  mentioned  and  refuted  by  Clement  of 
Alexandria :  **  What  thou  utterest  passeth  through 
thy  mouth.  But  thou  utterest  house ;  therefore 
house  passeth  through  thy  mouth."  The  supposition 
of  the  term  here  is  material ;  it  means  the  word  house, 
but  not  the  object  signified  by  the  work.  On  this  also 
is  founded  that  beautiful  impersonification  of  the  five 
vowels : 

"We  are  little  airy  creatures, 
All  of  different  voice  and  features  ; 
One  of  us  in  glass  is  set, 
One  of  us  you'll  find  \njet. 
T'other  you  may  see  in  tin, 
,        And  the  fourth  a  box  within  ; 
If  the  fifth  you  should  pursue, 
It  can  never  fly  from  you" 

— Swift. 

When  the  term  is  used  to  mean  the  object,  then  the 
supposition  is  formal,  as  a  house  must  have  walls  and 
roof. 

Q.  How  is  formal  supposition  subdivided  ? 

A..  I.  Into  logical  and  real.  It  is  logical  when  the 
term  expresses  that  which  exists  only  logically,  as 
animal  is  a  pred?cable  called  genus.  It  is  real  when 
the  term  is  used  to  express  that  which  really  agrees 
with  the  object,  as  the  animal  is  sensitive. 

2.  Into  collective  and  distributive.  It  is  collective 
when  we  use  a  common  word  for  all  the  objects  signi- 
fied and  taken  together,  as  the  apostles  were  twelve. 
It  is  distributive  when  the  term  can  be  used  not  only 
for  all  but  for  each  one,  as  man  is  rational.  But  with 
regard  to  this  distributive  supposition  we  must  remark 
that  the  individual  objects  may  be  either  each  indi- 
vidual, or  not  each  individual  but  each  species,  as  all 
animals  were  in  Noe's  ark.     The  sense  here  is  that 


5  8        Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy. 

not  each  individual  animal  was  there,  but  each  indi- 
vidual species. 

Q.  What  is  appellation,  and  how  is  it  subdivided  ? 

A.  It  is  the  application  of  one  term  to  another,  and 
it  is  formal  and  material — formal  when  it  naturally 
agrees  with  the  other,  as  the  physician  cures  ;  material 
when  it  is  merely  accidental,  as  the  physician  sings  or 
dances. 

Q.  What  is  alienation  ? 

A.  The  use  of  a  term  not  in  its  own  proper  mean- 
ing, but  in  another,  as  the  Lion  of  jfuda,  the  Sun  of 
Jiisiice. 

Q.  What  is  amplification  ? 

A.  It  is  the  extension  of  a  term  from  a  less  compre- 
hensive sense  to  a  greater,  as  great  men  will  always  be 
honored — meaning  not  only  great  men  of  the  present 
time,  but  of  all  time  and  place ;  and  that  playful 
amplification  of  Pitt : 

"  From  the  small  acorn  see  the  oak  arise, 
Supremely  tall  and  towering  in  the  skies  ! 
Queen  of  the  groves  !  her  stately  head  she  rears, 
Her  bulk  increasing  with  increasing  years  ; 
Now  moves  in  pomp  majestic  o'er  tlie  deep, 
While  in  her  womb  ten  thousand  thunders  sleep — 
Hence  Britain  boasts  her  far-extended  reign, 
And  by  the  expanded  acorn  rules  the  main." 

-    Q.  What  is  restriction  ? 

A.  The  use  of  a  term  which  has  a  broader  significa- 
tion in  a  more  narrow  one,  as  Eve  was  the  mother  of 
all  living.  Living,  in  this  phrase,  is  taken  in  a  more 
restricted  sense  than  it  has,  naturally  meaning  every- 
thing which  has  life,  from  the  plant  to  God,  whereas 
in  the  phrase  it  is  merely  to  express  men. 


>■« 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PROXIMATE  MATTER  OF  REASONING ;  AND,  FIRST,  OF  THE 
NATURE  OF  JUDGMENT  AND  PROPOSITION. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Nature  and  Definition  of  Jndgment. 

Q.  What  is  judgment  ? 

A.  We  have  said  that  our  mind  acquires  universal 
ideas  when  it  considers  a  quality  as  applicable  to  a 
number  of  subjects.  If,  then,  the  mind  applies  a 
quality  to  one  or  more  subjects,  or  removes  it  from 
them,  we  have  another  act  of  the  mind  called  judg- 
ment. For  instance,  our  mind  may  reflect  on  the 
quality  rational^  as  applicable  to  Peter,  John,  Walter, 
Andrew,  and  to  all  men,  but  it  may  do  more :  from 
the  possibility  it  may  pass  to  the  fact  and  actually 
apply  that  quality  to  them,  and  say  Peter  is  rational, 
John  is  rational,  all  men  are  rational ;  or  it  may 
deny  a  quality  of  a  subject,  as  man  is  not  bird.  In  the 
first  instance  we  have  a  universal  idea ;  in  the  second, 
a  judgment. 

Q.  In  what  exactly  lies  the  nature  of  judgment? 

A.  To  be  able  to  affirm  or  to  deny  a  quality  of  a 
subject  it  is  necessary  that  the  mind  should,  in  the 
first  place,  compare  the  idea  of  the  subject  with  the 
idea  of  the  quality ;  and,  next,  that  it  should  perceive 
the  agreement  or  the  disagreement  which  may  exist  be- 
tween the  two,  otherwise  it  could  not  affirm  or  deny 
one  or  the  other.     Now,  though  the  comparing  of 

89 


6o        Elements  of  hitellectual  Philosophy. 

the  quality  with  the  subject  be  necessary  to  render  a 
judgment  possible,  yet  the  true  nature  of  judgment 
lies  exactly  in  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the 
quality  with  the  subject,  and  in  the  affirming  or  de- 
nying on  or  the  other.  Because  to  form  a  judgment, 
as  we  have  said,  the  actual  application  to,  or  the  re- 
moving of  a  quality  from,  a  subject  is  necessary.  But 
in  the  mere  comparison  of  the  two  terms  that  appli- 
cation is  wanting.  When  I  raise,  for  instance,  a  ques- 
tion in  my  mind.  Is  Peter  honest  ?  and  begin  to  com- 
pare the  two  terms,  I  have  not  pronounced  a  judgment 
as  yet,  because  I  have  made  no  application.  When  I 
say  Peter  is  honest,  then  I  have  formed  a  judgment. 
The  essence,  therefore,  of  the  judgment  lies  not  in 
the  comparison  of  the  two  terms  but  in  the  discovery 
of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  two  ideas, 
subject  and  quality,  and  in  the  affirmation  or  denial  of 
the  same.  And  as  definition  must  express  the  nature 
of  a  thing,  so  we  may  rightly  define  judgment  the  per- 
ception of  the  agreement  of  a  quality  with  a  subject, 
or  the  disagreement  of  a  quality  from  a  subject ;  or, 
with  St.  Tliomas,  that  act  of  the  mind  by  which  it  unites 
or  divides  by  affirming  or  denying.  The  thing  which 
is  affirmed  or  denied  is  caXX^d  predicate ;  that  of  which 
something  is  affirmed  or  denied  is  called  subject ;  and 
the  judgment,  if  it  affirm  something  of  the  subject,  is 
called  affirmative  ;  if  it  deny,  is  called  negative. 

Q.  What  conclusions  do  you  draw  from  the  nature 
of  judgment?       • 

A.  I.  That  judgment  is  a  more  perfect  knowledge 
relatively  to  ideas,  because  by  means  of  the  idea  no- 
thing is  affirmed  or  denied  of  a  subject,  and  hence 
its  knowledge  is  not  complete ;  whereas  the  nature  of 
judgment  consists  exactly  in  that  affirmation  or  nega- 
tion.     Therefore  judgment  is  a  more  perfect  know- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        6i 

Icdcje  than  simple  apprehension,  and  is  therefore  a 
proximate  matter  of  reasoning,  as  being  a  more  per- 
fect knowledge  of  a  thing.  ''     1       '..,.'1 

2.  In  judgment  there  is  always  found  a  universal 
percepL'on  ;  because,  the  essence  of  judgment  consist- 
ing iii  affirming  or  denying  a  predicate  of  a  subject,  or, 
in  other  words,  in  saying  that  one  of  the  terms  is  the 
other,  as  man  is  rational,  there  lurks  in  that  affirma- 
tion the  perception  of  the  unity  of  being  between  the 
subject  and  the  predicate,  man  and  rational.  But  to  see 
unity  common  to  a  plurality  is  a  universal  perception  ; 
therefore  in  every  judgment  there  is  always  a  univer- 
sal perception.  This  is  also  the  case  when  the  judg- 
ment is  negative,  as  when  wp  say  Peter  is  not  a  phi- 
losopher, because  I  discover  that  not  to  be  a  philoso- 
pher is  common  also  to  Peter,  from  which  it  is  evident 
how  important  to  reasoning  and  logic  are  universal  per- 
ceptions. 

ARTICLE   SECOND.  .   ,    . 

Nature  of  Propositions. 

\ 

Q.  Give  the  definition  and  elements  of  a  proposition. 

A.  Judgment  is  so  called  when  confined  within  the 
mind  ;  when  it  comes  out  of  the  mind  clothed  in  words 
it  is  called  proposition.  Man  is  a  reasonable  being  is 
a  judgment  expressed  in  words,  and  therefore  a  pro- 
position. And  because  judgment  affirms  or  denies 
something  of  a  subject,  according  to  this  a  proposition 
may  be  defined  a  discourse,  by  which  we  affirm  or 
deny  a  quality  of  a  subject.  Hence  three  elements 
enter  into  a  proposition — the  thing  of  which  something 
is  affirmed  or  denied,  and  which  is  called  subject ;  the 
quality  which  is  affirmed  or  denied,  and  which  is  called 
predicate ;   and,  finally,  the  verb  is  or  is  net,  which, 


62        Elements  of  IntellecHial  Philosophy. 

strictly  speaking,  expresses  the  essence  of  judgment — 
that  is,  the  act  of  the  mind  forming  tlie  agreement 
or  disagreement.  Tiie  first  two  are  called  the  terms 
of  a  proposition.  The  verb  is,  because  uniting  them 
together,  is  called  copula. 

Q.  What  remarks  ought  to  be  made  as  to  the 
copula  in  a  proposition.^ 

A.  I.  The  copula  is  always  necessary  in  a  proposi- 
tion, and  no  proposition  can  be  formed  without  the 
verb  to  be.  Because  to  establish  a  proposition  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  express  the  subject  and  the  predicate, 
but  it  is  also  necessary  to  express  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement which  one  has  with  the  other.  Now,  this 
agreement  or  disagreement  cannot  be  expressed  by 
means  of  the  predicate  only,  because  the  predicate 
without  the  copula  would  imply  no  relation  to  the 
subject.  Therefore  the  copula  is  necessary  in  every 
proposition. 

2.  Having  established  the  necessity  of  the  copula, 
and  having  said  that  it  is  a  verb,  we  must  pay  atten- 
tion to  its  signification,  to  its  mood,  its  tense,  and  to 
the  special  manner  of  using  it.  As  to  its  significa- 
tion, we  must  remark  that  to  be,  in  the  proposition, 
docs  not  mean  to  exist,  because  the  copula  docs  not 
express  the  real  existence  of  the  terms  ;  as,  for  instance, 
when  I  say  Shakspere  is  the  greatest  English  poet, 
I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  Shakspere  does  actually 
exist  now,  I  mean  merely  to  unite  that  predicate  to 
Shakspere.  Therefore  the  copula  in  propositions 
merely  expresses  the  agreement  of  the  predicate  with 
the  subject,  or  the  act  of  the  intellect  applying  the 
predicate  to  the  subject.  Whether  the  objects  signi- 
fied by  the  terms  exist  or  not  it  is  no  business  of  the 
copula  to  express.  It  is  by  a  different  act  of  the  mind 
and  by  investigating  the  nature  of  the  terms  that   it 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        6 


■> 


can  be  found  out  whether  they  be  r:al  or  logical.  Nor 
is  it  contrary  to  this  theory  to  say  that  there  are  some 
propositions  in  which  the  copula  expresses  the  real 
existence,  as  Socrates  is ;  because  that  proposition 
amounts  to  this:  Socrates  is  existing;  in  which  case 
also  the  copula  expresses  the  union  of  the  two  terms. 

Q.  Of  what  mood  and  tense  must  the  copula  be? 

A.  As  to  the  mood,  it  must  be  the  indicative  mood, 
because  the  copula  in  a  proposition  is  used  to  affirm 
and  declare  a  predicate  of  a  subject  or  to  deny  it  of 
the  subject.  But  of  all  the  moods  of  a  verb  only  the 
indicative  has  the  office  to  afifirm,  to  declare,  to  deny. 
Therefore  the  copula  in  a  proposition  must  be  in  the 
indicative  mood. 

As  to  the  tense,  it  must  be  the  present  tense,  be- 
cause the  copula,  as  we  have  said,  does  not  express 
the  real  existence  of  the  terms,  but  the  act  by  which 
the  mi'^J  unites  the  predicate  with  the  subject  or 
separates  one  from-  the  other.  But  this  act  is  done 
when  the  mind  judges — that  is,  in  the  present  time. 
Tlicrcfore  the  copula  must  be  in  the  present  tense. 
If  there  be  any  propositions  having  the  copula  in  the 
past  or  future  tense,  the  time  past  or  future  must  be 
applied  to  the  tenses,  and  not  to  the  copula.  The  pro- 
position, for  instance,  The  Messias  was  the  Redeemer 
of  Israel,  must  be  understood  to  mean  the  Messias  is 
he  who  was  the  Redeemer  of  Israel,  the  predicate 
being  zvho  was  the  Redeemer  of  Israel. 

I'inally,  we  must  remark  that  the  copula  in  a  pro- 
l)osition  may  be  incorporated  in  the  predicate,  as, 
for  instance,  in  the  proposition  John  is  sleeping,  the 
predicate  sleeping  may  be  incorporated  in  the  copula, 
and  we  can  say  John  sleeps.  From  this  originate 
those  verbs  which  grammarians  call  adjective — that  is, 
tliose  which  contain  the  verb  to  be  as  an  attribute  to 


64         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

distinguish  them  from  the  verb  to  be  as  substantive. 
In  conclusion  one  must  pay  close  attention  to  the 
nature  of  the  copula,  because  from  it  all  these  things 
proceed.  The  copula  is  nothing  else  but  the  act  of 
the  mind  uniting  or  separating  the  predicate  from  the 
subject,  in  which  the  essence  of  judgment  consists.  It 
follows  from  this,  ist,  that  the  copula  is  as  necessary 
to  the  proposition  as  that  act  is  essential  to  judgment ; 
2d,  that  the  copula  does  not  express  the  real  exis- 
tence of  the  subject  or  predicate,  but  merely  the  act 
of  the  mind  uniting  or  separating  them  ;  3d,  that  that 
act  being  nothing  else  but  an  affirmatJon  or  negation, 
the  office  of  the  indicative  mood,  the  copula  expressing 
it  must  be  also  in  the  indicative  mood  ;  4th,  that,  the 
act  being  performed  in  the  present  time,  the  copula 
must  be  in  the  present  tense ;  5th,  that  in  that  act 
the  predicate  being  considered  as  applicable  to  the 
subject,  it  may  easily  be  incorporated  in  the  copula, 
the  office  of  which  is  just  to  refer  the  predicate  to  the 
subject. 

•  .  »'>    .'ill  •,      jt  '     ■     •  ■       ■     1  ':  .         _    ,^  '  : 

/  •'  ;  '■         '■!('  li.    :'■•'■''''.  ^  "''■■  .      ■    .   •  '  '      '     ■ : 

t 

.  I     I    -       ,  J     < '     .«    .        '       .  I  "  i  •  '■'•.' 

.■l(Vf  ■      I       •{      .      I ,.■"•'•'  ,•''■'" 

,1     (i   ;    •  ''.i         •   '       1     .  >!        (    '  •  ,  ,         '      .      '  ,  ■  ■•     "■ 


'  •     (■      > 


CHAPTER   V. 

DIFFERENT  SPECIES  AND  PROPERTIES  OF  PROPO- 
SITIONS. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Difference  of  Proposition  considered  as  to  the  Copula. 

Q.  What  causes  the  difference  of  propositions? 

A.  From  the  nature  of  a  being  immediately  arise 
its  difteren^  species  and  properties,  because  the  spe- 
cies of  a  thing  is  nothing  more  than  the  nature  of  the 
thing  itself  differently  modified,  and  its  properties  are 
an  immediate  consequence  of  that  nature.  Having, 
therefore,  determined  the  nature  of  judgment  and  pro- 
position, it  will  be  easy  to  deduce  from  it  their  divi- 
sion and  properties.  The  nature  of  judgment  or 
proposition  lies  in  applying  or  not  a  predicate  to  a 
subject ;  therefore  propositions  must  be  different,  ac- 
cording to  the  difference  of  such  application.  This 
application  may  vary  from  two  causes,  from  itself 
and  from  the  way  it  is  made,  or  from  the  terms 
which  are  applied — that  is,  either  from  the  copula  or 
the  terms. 

Q.  How  many  different  propositions  are  there,  con- 
sidered as  to  the  copula? 

A.  In  propositions  the  predicate  may  either  be  ap- 
plied to  the  subject  or  denied  of  the  subject ;  or  it 
may  be  denied  of  the  subject,  but  at  the  same  time 
insinuating  that  another  may  be  agreeable  to  it. 
When  the  predicate  is  applied  to  the  subject,  then  the 
proposition  is  affirmative,  such  as  God  is  infinite,  the 

H 


66         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Church  is  imperishable  ;  when  the  predicate  is  denied 
of  the  subject  then  t^e  proposition  is  negative- — man  is 
not  a  pure  spirit,  beauty  is  not  imperishable  ;  when  it 
is  denied  of  the  subject,  insinuating  that  some  other 
predicate  may  be  agreeable  to  it,  then  the  proposition 
is  called  indefinite  ;  as,  The  brute  is  not  man,  in  which 
proposition,  if  we  remove  the  predicate  man  from 
brute,  we  insinuate  that  some  other  attribute  may 
apply  to  it.  Hence,  an  indefinite  proposition  is  nei- 
ther affirmative  nor  negative,  but  partakes  of  both. 
These  propositions,  liowever,  are  not  so  common  or 
important  ;  more  common  and  important  are  the 
affirmative  and  the  negative. 

Q.  To  what  law  are  affirmative  and  negative  propo- 
sitions subject? 

A.  To  the  following :  In  affirma<^ive  propositions 
the  predicate  is  applied  in  all  its  comprehension  or  in 
the  totality  of  the  elements  of  which  it  is  composed, 
but  not  in  all  its  extension — that  is,  not  in  its  full  capa- 
city of  being  applied.  Homer  is  an  epic  poet  ;  Bacon 
is  a  naturalist ;  the  predicate  epic  poet  in  the  first 
proposition  is  applied  to  Homer  in  the  totality  of 
elements  composing  that  idea — that  is,  every  quality 
forming  an  epic  poet  agrees  with  Homer — but  not  in  its 
full  capacity  of  being  applied,  as  that  predicate  may 
be  applied,  to  others,  as  to  Dante,  Milton.  Virgil,  etc. 
In  the  second  proposition  the  predicate  naturalist 
agrees  with  Bacon  in  the  same  sense — that  is,  in  the 
totality  of  elements  forming  that  idea — but  may  be  ap« 
plied  to  others,  such  as  Locke,  Hobbes,  Condillac, 
etc.  The  reason  of  this  law  is  drawn  from  the  very 
nature  of  affirmative  propositions,  because  when  we 
affirm  a  predicate  of  subject  in  a  proposition  we  say 
that  one  thing  is  the  other.  Now,  we  could  not  say 
that  unless  all  the  elements  of  the  predicate  agreed 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         67 

with  the  subject ;  therefore,  in  these  propositions,  the 
predicate  must  be  taken  in  its  comprehension,  but 
not  in  all  its  extension,  because  when  we  affirm  a  pre- 
dicate of  a  subject  we  want  to  express  the  quality 
with  which  the  subject  is  endowed,  and  not  the  num- 
ber of  individuals  which  may  have  it. 

In  negative  propositions  the  predicate  is  not  denied 
in  all  its  comprehension  but  in  all  its  extension,  be- 
cause, in  order  to  say  that  a  thing  is  not  another,  it  is 
sufficient  that  a  single  element  of  the  one  is  not  found 
in  the  other;  but  it  is  denied  in  all  its  extension,  be- 
cause if  that  which  is  signified  by  the  predicate  could 
agree  with  any  part  of  the  subject,  we  could  not  sim- 
ply remove  the  predicate  from  the  subject.  For 
instance,  when  we  say  The  circle  is  not  square  we 
mean  to  say  that  no  possible  circle  can  ever  be  square, 
otherwise  we  could  not  say,  absolutely  speaking,  the 
circle  is  not  square. 

Q.  In  how  many  ways  can  we  affirm  or  deny  a  pre- 
dicate of  a  subject  ? 

A.  In  two  ways  :  by  simply  affirming  or  denying  the 
predicate  of  a  subject,  or  by  expressing  the  manner  or 
mode  in  which  a  predicate  may  be  applicable  to  a  sub- 
ject. In  the  first  case  we  have  simple  propositions,  in 
the  second  w^^/rt-/ propositions.  Thus,  when  I  say  The 
rose  is  fragrant,  I  utter  a  simple  proposition  ;  when  I 
say  ^lan  is  necessarily  reasonable,  I  pronounce  a  modal 
proposition,  because  I  express  the  manner  in  which 
the  predicate  agrees  with  the  subject. 

Q.  How  many  ways  or  modes  are  there  by  which  a 
predicate  may  agree  or  disagree  with  a  subject  ? 

A.  Four;  and  hence  there  can  be  four  species  of 
modal  propositions.  The  predicate  may  agree  or  dis- 
agree with  a  ^v\i]Qzt  possibly  ox  impossibly ^  necessarily  or 
accidentally  ;  and,  therefore,  propositions  may  express 


68         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy 

the  possibility  or  impossibility  of  a  predicate  agreeing 
with  a  subject,  the  necessity  or  contingency  of  its  agree- 
ing or  not  with  it.  If  they  express  the  possibility  they 
are  called  possible,  as  Man  can  be  a  philosopher  ;  they 
are  called  impossible  if  they  express  the  impossibility 
of  the  predicate  agreeing  with  the  subject — as,  Man  can- 
not be  infinite ;  necessary  if  they  express  the  necessity 
— as.  The  soul  is  necessarily  immortal ;  contingent  if 
they  e?;press  the  contingency — as,  The  Ethiopian  is 
black  by  accident. 

Q.  What  other  modes  of  affirming  or  denying,  and, 
consequently,  how  many  kinds  of  propositions,  are 
there  ? 

A.  Two,  absolute  and  hypothetical.  We  can  apply 
or  not  the  predicate  to  the  subject  absolutely,  without 
expressing  the  case  when  it  may  or  may  not  agree 
with  the  subject,  or  we  may  express  the  case  when 
it  may  or  may  not  apply  to  the  subject.  In  the  first 
case  we  have  absolute  propositions — as,  Man  is  a  rea- 
sonable animal ;  in  the  second  we  have  hypotheti- 
cal or  conditional  propositions — as.  Where  there  is 
smoke  there  must  be  fire.  These  latter  propositions 
are  threefold,  connex,  conjunctive,  and  disjunctive. 
The  first  is  that  in  which  the  condition  is  expressed 
by  the  word  if;  as,  If  there  are  footprints  some  one 
must  have  walked.  This  proposition  is  formed  of 
two,  one  which  expresses  the  condition,  and  is  called 
antecedent — as.  If  there  are  footprints;  the  other 
affirms  or  denies  the  predicate,  and  is  called  conse- 
quent, because  depending  on  the  first — as,  some  one 
must  have  walked.  The  truth  of  these  propositions 
does  not  lie  in  the  truth  of  the  antecedent  or  conse- 
quent, but  in  the  connection  ;  if  the  connection  is 
true  the  proposition  is  true;  if  false,  false — as,  If 
donkeys  had  wings  they  would  fly.      This  proposition 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        69 

is  true,  though  it  is  not  true  that  donkeys  can  have 
win^Ts  because  the  connection  is  true.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  I  said,  If  America  exists  Rome  exists,  both 
antecedent  and  consequent  are  true,  but  the  proposi- 
tion is  false,  because  there  is  no  connection  between 
the  two. 

The  conjunctive  proposition  is  that  in  which  the 
propositions  are  united  by  the  words  and,  not ;  as,  for 
instance,  He  is  not  both  dead  and  alive.  Conjunctive 
proposition,  then,  is  that  in  which  is  expressed  the 
impossibility  of  two  things  being  together,  and  in 
order  to  be  true  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  a 
repugnance  between  the  two.  Hence  the  following 
proposition  is  not  true :  Peter  cannot  both  sleep  and 
breathe,  be    -use  those  two  things  can  go  together. 

A  disjunctive  proposition  is  that  in  which  proposi- 
tions are  united  together  by  the  words  either,  or;  as, 
for  instance,  It  is  either  night  or  day.  This  propo- 
sition, to  be  true,  two  conditions  are  necessary:  i. 
That  there  be  a  true  opposition  between  the  proposi- 
tions of  which  it  is  composed.  2.  That  the  enume- 
ration of  parts  be  complete,  otherwise  the  adversary 
may  catch  at  that  which  is  omitted. 

ARTICLE  SECOND. 
Difference  of  Propositions^  Considered  as  to  their  Terms. 

Q.   How  are  propositions  divided  under  this  respect  ? 

A.  The  other  cause  of  difference  in  propositions,  as 
we  have  said,  is  the  difference  of  terms.  Terms  may 
be  different  either  on  account  of  their  extension  or 
of  their  number.  Hence  we  have  difference  of  pro- 
positions from  the  difference  of  terms  as  to  their 
extension  and  as  to  their  number. 

As  extension  renders  terms  singular,  particular,  and 


5  o        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

universal,  so  propositions  under  this  respect  may  be 
singular,  particular,  and  universal.  They  are  called 
singular  if  their  subjects  be  singular — as,  Peter  is  a 
philosopher  ;  particular  if  the  subjects  be  particular — 
as,  Some  men  are  good  writers ;  and,  finally,  universal 
if  the  subjects  be  universal — as,  All  men  are  rational 
animals.  Let  it  be  carefully  remarked  that  the  ex-' 
tension  of  propositions  is  taken  from  the  subjects,  and 
not  from  the  predicate.  Because  the  predicate  is  at- 
tributed in  the  proposition  only  to  the  subject  men-r 
tioned,  therefore  the  subject  must  determine  the  ex- 
tension of  the  proposition  ;  as  when  I  say  Peter  is  a 
philosopher,  Longfellow  is  a  poet,  the  predicate  philo- 
sopher in  the  example  is  applied  only  to  Peter,  there- 
fore Peter  must  determine  the  extent  of  the  proposi- 
tion. 

Q.  How  are  propositions  divided  as  to  the  number 
of  the  terms? 

•  A.  Into  single  and  multiple.  Are  called  single 
when  they  are  formed  of  one  subject  and  one  predi- 
cate— as,  Blessed  are  the  meek.  Are  multiple  when 
they  are  composed  of  more  than  one  subject  or  more 
than  one  predicate ;  as,  Franklin  was  a  mechanic,  a 
philosopher,  and  a  statesman.  This  proposition  is 
equivalent  to  these  three  :  Franklin  was  a  mechanic, 
Franklin  was  a  philosopher,  Franklin  Avas  a  statesman. 

There  are  different  kinds  of  single  and  multiple  pro- 
positions. As  to  the  single  proposition,  it  may  be  so 
by  itself  or  by  reduction.  The  example.  The  nieek  are 
blessed,  shows  a  proposition  single  in  itself.  They  arc 
called  single  by  reduction  when,  though  we  may  affix 
to  the  subject  or  to  predicate  various  terms  and  other 
propositions,  yet  they  can  all  be  reduced  to  one  idea. 
For  instance,  He  who  betrayed  the  cause  of  American 
independence   was   Arnold,   called    emphatically  the 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         7 1 

Traitor.    All  this  can  be  reduced  to  one  idea — Arnold 
betrayed  the  cause  of  American  independence. 

Multiple  propositions  are  divided  into  explicit  or  im- 
plicit. They  are  called  explicit  when  openly  they 
have  more  than  one  term  or  proposition ;  implicit 
when  apparently  they  seem  to  be  one,  but  ♦^heir  mean- 
ing is  equivalent  to  more  than  one,  proposition — as, 
Among  animals  man  only  is  reasonable ;  the  word 
only  turns  that  proposition  into  two :  all  animals  do 
not  reason,  man  reasons. 

ARTICLE   THIRD,      i. 
Properties  of  Propositions. 

Q.  What  and  how  many  are  the  properties  of  pro- 
positions ? 

A.  Property  is  called  that  which  follows  necessarily 
from  the  nature  of  a  thing,  which  always  accompanies 
it  and  is  never  separated  from  it.  Now,  admitting 
the  nature  of  proposition,  three  things  follow  from  it 
— opposition^  conversion^  and  equivalence.  These  are 
consequent  upon  every  species  of  proposition  ;  every 
species  of  proposition  being  able  to  have  its  opposite, 
its  converse,  and  its  equivalent.  Therefore  there  are 
three  properties  of  propositions,  opposition,  conver- 
sion, and  equivalence. 

Q.  What  is  opposition?  . 

It  is  the  affirming  and  denying  in  two  propositions 
the  same  predicate  of  the  same  subject,  at  the  same 
time  and  under  the  same  respect.  This  opposition  may 
be  threefold,  contradictory,  contrary,  and  subcontrary, 
and  hence  there  may  be  contradictory,  contrary,  and 
subcontrary  propositions.  Propositions  are  called  con- 
tradictory when  of  the  two  propositions  onq  is  uni- 
versal, the  other  is  particular — as.  All  men  are  just,  some 


72         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

man  is  not  just.  They  are  called  contrary  when  both 
are  universal — as,  All  men  are  just  ^  all  men  arc  not  just ; 
subcontrary  when  both  propositions  are  particular — 
some  men  are  just ^  some  men  are  not  just.  Of  these  last 
St.  Thomas  observes  that,  properly  speaking,  they  can- 
not be  called  opposite,  because,  in  order  to  have  oppo- 
sition, it  is  necessary  that  the  subject  be  the  same  in 
both  propositions.  Now,  in  subcontrary  propositions, 
the  subject,  being  taken  in  particular,  is  not  the  same 
in  both. 

Q.  What  have  you  to  observe  with  regard  to  the 
truth  of  such  propositions? 

A.  I.  Contradictories  cannot  be  both  true  or  false, 
but  one  must  be  true  and  the  other  false.  Because 
otherwise  the  same  thing  would  and  would  not  be  at 
the  same  time.  As  in  the  example,  All  men  are  just, 
some  men  are  not  just,  it  is  evident  that  one  of  them 
must  be  false,  otherwi  -  one  thing  would  and  would 
not  be  at  the  same  time,  since  one  proposition  is  in- 
cluded in  the  other. 

Contraries  cannot  be  both  true,  because  if  the 
affirmative  is  true  the  negative  must  be  false,  since 
the  predicate  is  affirmed  and  denied  of  the  same  sub- 
ject in  an  universal  sense.  They  can  be  either  one  true 
and  the  other  false  when  the  predicate  necessarily 
agrees  with  the  subject — as,  All  men  are  reasonable,  all 
men  are  not  reasonable ;  or  may  be  both  false  when 
the  predicate  only  accidentally  agrees  with  the  sub- 
ject— as.  All  men  are  philosophers,  no  man  is  a 
philosopher. 

Subcontraries  cannot  be  both  false,  but  must  be 
either  both  true  if  the  predicate  agrees  with  the  sub- 
ject only  accidentally — as,  Some  men  are  rich,  some 
men  are  not  rich;  or  one  false  and  the  other  true 
when  the  predicate  agrees  necessarily  with  the  sub- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         'j'}, 

ject — as,  Some  men  have  a  soul,  some  men  have  not 
a  soiil. 

Q.  What  is  the  meaning  of  equivalence  of  propo- 
sitions? •        •  V  . 

A.  When  we  please  we  can  reduce  opposite  propo- 
sitions to  the  same  signification,  and  when  this  is  done 
we  have  the  equivalence  of  propositions.  This  is  ac- 
complished by  means  of  the  particle  not,  thus :  Con- 
tradictory propositions  are  rendered  equivalent  by 
placing  the  particle  not  before  the  subject  of  either 
proposition.  For  instance,  the  contradictories,  All 
men  are  rich,  some  men  are  not  rich,  I  can  make 
equivalent  by  saying  not  all  men  are  rich,  and  I  re- 
duce to  the  same  sense  as  some  men  are  rich.  Con- 
traries are  made  equivalent  by  placing  the  particle 
not  after  the  subject  of  the  affirmative ;  as,  for  in- 
stance, All  men  are  just,  all  men  are  not  just.  I  can 
put  not  after  men  in  the  first  proposition,  and  reduce 
the  sense  to  no  man  is  just. 

Q.  What  is  conversion? 

A.  The  changing  of  the  place  of  the  predicate  into 
that  of  the  subject,  and  vice  versd,  keeping  safe  the 
truth  of  the  proposition — as.  Every  man  is  a  reason- 
able animal ;  I  could  say  every  reasonable  animal  is  a 
man. 

Q.  What  is  the  use  of  equivalence  and  conversion? 

A.  They  are  of  very  great  use  in  discovering  soph- 
isms of  adversaries,  in  understanding  obscure  and 
difficult  propositions  by  reducing  them  to  a  clearer 
form. 


r 


J  -1 . 


CHAPTER  VI. 

TRUTH  OF  JUDGMENTS  AND  PROPOSITIONS. 

ARTICLE  FIRST. 

What  is  Logical  Truth  f 

Q.   Give  an  idea  of  truth  in  general. 

A.  To  answer  this  question,  we  must  remark  that 
whatever  exists  may  have  a  twofold  relation  with  the 
intellect.  Things  may  be  related  to  the  intellect 
inasmuch  as  they  draw  their  existence  from  it,  or  in- 
asmuch as  they  are  known  by  it.  Thus,  a  house  is 
referred  to  the  intellect  of  the  architect  in  a  different 
way  from  that  in  which  it  is  referred  to  the  intellect 
of  the  beholders.  To  the  intellect  of  the  architect  it  is 
related  inasmuch  as  it  originates  from  it ;  to  that  of 
the  beholders  inasmuch  as  it  is  known  by  it.  Now,  it 
is  evident  that  things  could  not  exist  except  they  were 
conceived  by  the  intellect,  which  is  their  cause,  in 
which  case  the  relation  they  have  with  such  intellect 
is  an  essential  relation  ;  but  things  could  exist  very 
well  without  any  other  intellect  knowing  them,  conse- 
quently the  relation  they  have  with  the  intellect 
which  merely  knows  them  is  an  accidental  relation. 
The  house  spoken  of  in  the  example  is  related  essen- 
tially to  the  intellect  of  the  architect ;  whereas  it  is 
related  only  accidentally  to  the  beholders'  mind.  We 
must  remark,  in  the  second  place,  that  between  the 
object  and  the  conception  of  the  intellect  either  pro- 
ducing it  or  merely  knowing  it  there  may  pass  a  re- 
lation of  agreement  and  conformity,  or  disagreement, 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        75 

because  oftentimes  the  object  does  not  correspond 
with  the  intellect  of  the  artist,  and  frequently  the  in- 
tellect does  not  apprehend  a  thing  just  as  it  is.  The 
(V^rconcnt  of  the  thing  with  the  intellect  from  ivhich  tt  is 
p'odiiccd  is  called  metaphysical  truth.  The  agreement 
of  an  object  ivith  the  intellect  knozuing  it  is  called  logical 
truth.  On  the  contrary,  the  discrepancy  of  the  thing 
ivith  the  intellect  which  originates  it  is  called  metaphysi- 
cal falsehood ;  and  the  discrepancy  of  the  object  zvith  Uic 
intellect  knowing  it  is  called  logical  falsehood.  Both 
kinds  of  truths  are  defined  by  St.  Thomas  the  equation 
of  the  object  with  the  intellect.  We  shall  speak  in  this 
article  only  of  logical  truth,  which  we  have  defined 
the  agreement  of  the  object  with  the  intellect  which 
knows  it. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  logical  truths  are  there? 

A.  Logical  truth  may  be  different,  according  as  we 
coi\sider  the  things  which  are  known  and  the  manner 
of  knowing  them.  Considering  the  manner  of  know- 
ing things,  logical  truth  may  be  mediate  or  immediate. 
It  is  called  immediate  when  the  intellect  discovers  the 
truth  of  a  judgment  the  moment  it  is  presented  to  it, 
— as,  The  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts  ;  of  this 
judgment  the  intellect  perceives  the  truth  the  moment 
it  perceives  the  terms.  On  the  contrary,  when  the 
intellect,  in  order  to  know  the  truth  of  a  judgment, 
must  make  use  of  other  truths  better  known  to  it, 
that  truth  is  called  mediate  ;  as,  when  hearing  that  the 
human  soul  is  immortal,  in  order  to  perceive  the  truth 
of  that  proposition  I  must  have  recourse  to  other 
propositions  better  known  to  me.  As  to  the  terms, 
logical  truth  may  be  of  fact  and  of  reason.  It  is  truth 
of  fact  when  the  objects  are  subject  to  experience ;  it 
is  of  reason  when  the  terms  ar  :  concerned  about  ab- 
stract principles. 


76        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

ARTICLE    SECOND. 

Is  Truth  found  in  the  Act  of  Apprehension  or  in  that 

of  Judgment  ? 

Q.  In  what  act  is  truth  found  ? 

A.  The  acts  of  our  mind  are  three — apprehension, 
judgment,  and  reasoning.  Reasoning  is  nothing  else 
but  a  series  of  judgments  and  ideas  formed  by  the 
mind.  Hence,  truly,  the  acts  of  knowing  are  ideas 
and  judgments.  Besides,  strictly  speaking,  reasoning 
is  nothing  more  than  a  third  judgment  deduced  from 
two  others,  and  is  true  or  not  according  to  the  truth 
and  order  of  the  two  first.  Hence  truth  can  only  be 
sought  in  ideas  and  judgments.  It  is  found  perfectly 
in  judgments.  Locke,  Rosmini,  Galuppi,  and  others 
contend  that  it  can  be  i'ound  in  ideas.  We  follow  the 
opinion  of  St.  Thomas,  whose  doctrine  on  this  point 
seems  to  us  more  simple,  natural,  and  true.  It  is  as 
follows : 

1.  Truth,  really  and  perfectly,  is  only  in  judg- 
ments. We  prove  it  as  follows :  Truth  consists  in  the 
agreement  between  the  object  and  the  intellect,  and 
hence  to  know  the  truth  is  to  know  just  this  conform- 
ity. But  to  know  that  the  apprehension  of  the  intel- 
lect is  conformable  with  the  object  is  the  work  of 
judgment.  Therefore  truth  perfectly  can  be  found 
in  judgment,  because  then  only  the  intellect  possesses 
truth  perfectly  when  it  not  only  has  it,  but  when  it 
knows  that  it  has  it. 

Truth  is  that  thing  after  which  the  tendency  of  the 
intellect  is  drawn,  and  is,  therefore,  the  perfection  of 
the  intellect.  Therefore,  truly  and  perfecMy,  it  is 
found  only  in  that  act  of  the  mind  which  is  a  com- 
plete and  true  knowledge,  such  as  judgment. 

2.  Truth    is  found    imperfectly    in    apprehension, 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,        'jy 

inasmuch  as  by  means  of  the  simple  apprehension 
the  intellect  apprehends  something  as  true,  but  does 
not  know  it  to  be  such.  In  fact,  simple  apprehen- 
sions of  the  intellect  represent  the  essence  of  things, 
as  we  shall  see;  and  therefore  they  must  be  comform- 
able  to  the  things  apprehended.  Now,  in  this  con- 
formity between  apprehension  and  the  object  appre- 
hended lies  truth.  Therefore,  even  in  aoprehension 
we  can  find  logical  truth.  But  logical  tru.a  is  said  to 
be  imperfectly  in  apprehension  and  in  an  incipient 
state,  because  the  intellect,  by  means  of  the  simple 
apprehension,  does  not  know  this  conformity,  as  this 
belongs  to  judgment. 


♦   .       •      .    •  •  • 


.  ...^ 


!;^v\^'Vo^A■•>■^;.'■.^•:v'..^^'■  vi"'  V'   '.-.^o^V'. 


PART   SECOND. 


FORM  OF  REASONING. 

Having  treated  of  the  matter  of  reasoning,  which 
are  terms  and  propositions,  we  must  now  speak  of 
the  form — that  is,  we  must  see  how  those  terms  and 
propositions  must  be  placed  together  in  order  to  form 
reasoning.  All  that  can  be  said,  however,  with 
regard  to  the  form  of  reasoning  may  be  brought 
under  four  heads — first,  the  essential  structure  and 
order  of  reasoning;  second,  its  different  species; 
third,  its  external  expression  ;  fourth,  its  defects. 


CHAPTER   I. 

OP  THE  ESSENTIAL  STRUCTURE  OP  REASONING, 

ARTICLE  FIRST. 

Of  the  Structure  of  Reasoning  in  General, 

Q.  What  is  reasoning? 

A.  Propositions  which  may  appear  before  the  mind 
are  of  two  kinds.  Some  are  so  evident  that  the  mo- 
ment they  "are  presented  before  the  mind  their  truth 
can  be  at  once  perceived  ;  as,  The  whole  is  greater  than 

one  of  its  parts;  ,a  thing  cannot  be  and  ffot  be  at  the 

78 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        79 

same  time.  These  are  called  truths  evident  of  them- 
selves, or  first  truths.  Others,  and  they  the  greatest 
number,  are  such  as  cannot  be  at  once  perceived  by 
the  mind.  For  instance.  The  soul  is  immortal ;  a  spiri- 
tual being  cannot  occupy  space ;  time  is  the  measure  of 
movement,  and  so  forth.  Now,  in  order  to  know  these 
truths  our  mind  must  employ  others  better  known  to 
it,  and  which  have  some  connection  and  relation  with 
those  it  wants  to  know,  and  by  placing  and  comparing 
them  together  comes  to  the  knowledge  of  those  it  did 
not  know.  This  operation  is  called  reasoning  or  dis- 
course, and  may  be  defined  tliat  act  of  the  mind  by  which 
from  two  judgments  a  third  is  deduced,  or  that  act  which 
deduces  the  unknown  from  the  known.  For  instance, 
the  miiid  cannot  see  the  connection  between  the  sub- 
ject soul  and  the  predicate  immortal.  What  does  it 
do?  It  compares  both  with  a  third  idea,  to  see 
whether  they  agree  or  disagree  with  that  third  idea, 
and  if  it  discover  that  they  do  agree  it  draws  the  con- 
clusion that  they  must  agree  together.  This  third  idea 
may  be  spiritual,  and  the  reasoning  may  be  constructed 
as  follows : 

That  which  is  spiritual  is  immortal. 

But  the  soul  is  spiritual. 

Therefore  it  is  immortal. 

Q.  What  is  the  order  of  reasoning  ? 

A.  It  consists  exactly  in  this:  The  mind  wishes  to 
know  if  a  proposition  be  true  or  false  ;  in  other  words, 
if  a  predicate  agrees  with  a  subject.  In  order  to  find 
this  out,  the  mind  does  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
what  men  do  when  they  wish  to  find  out  if  the  length 
of  two  bodies  is  tne  same  or  not:  they  take  a  tiiird 
one  as  a  rule,  and  try  it  first  with  the  one  and  then 
with  the  other ;  and  thus  they  can  tell  if  their  length 
agrees  together  or  not.      The  mind   does   the  same 


8o        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

when  it  wants  to  know  if  a  predicate  agrees  with  a 
subject.  It  takes  a  third  idea,  and  makes  it,  as  it 
were,  the  rule  or  measure,  and  compares  it  first  with 
the  subject  and  then  with  the  predicate.  Now,  natu- 
rally three  suppositions  can  result  from  this  compari- 
son :  I.  That  third  idea  may  be  found  to  agree  both 
with  the  predicate  and  the  subject.  2.  It  may  be 
found  to  agree  with  the  one  and  not  with  the  other. 
3.  It  may  be  found  to  agree  with  neither.  In  the 
first  case,  when  the  third  idea  is  found  to  agree  both 
with  the  subject  and  the  predicate,  then  the  mind 
knows  and  concludes  that  the  predicate  and  subject 
agree  together,  founded  on  that  principle  that  two  things 
which  agree  zvith  a  third  agree  together.  For  instance, 
the  mind  does  not  know  if  the  soul  is  simple.  It  takes 
for  a  third  idea  that  which  has  no  parts,  and  compares 
subject  and  predicate  with  that  third  idea,  thus:  That 
which  is  simple  has  no  parts.  But  the  soul  has  no 
parts  ;  therefore  it  is  simple.  These  reasonings  are 
called  affirmative.  In  the  second  case,  when  the 
third  idea  is  seen  to  agree  with  the  one  and  not  with 
the  other,  the  mind  concludes  that  they  do  not  agree 
together,  on  the  principle  that  i7vo  things^  one  of  which 
agrees  zvith  a  third  and  the  other  7iot,  do  not  agree  to- 
gether. For  instance,  the  mind  knows  the  disagree- 
ment between  these  two  ideas,  a  material  substance 
and  the  human  soul,  by  means  of  the  third  idea,  a 
thinking  substance,  and  reasons  thus :  A  thinking 
substance  is  not  material.  But  the  soul  is  a  thinking 
substance;  therefore  it  is  not  material.  Here  the 
third  idea,  a  thinking  substance,  agrees  with  the  sub- 
ject soul,  but  not  with  the  predicate  material.  In  the 
third  supposition  nothing  can  be  concluded,  as,  the 
third  idea  not  agreeing  with  any  of  the  terms,  no  con- 
nection whatever  is  established  between  them. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.        8 1 

Q.  What  are,  then,  the  elements  and  fundamental 
principles  of  reasonini^? 

A.  It  must  result  from  three  propositions,  and 
these  ordained  in  such  a  way  that  the  mind  may  see 
the  last  proposition  as  included  in  the  two  first. 

It  must  be  formed  of  three  terms  :  the  subject,  the 
predicate,  and  the  third  idea. 

We  have  said  three  propositions ;  because  in  every 
reasoning  three  comparisons  are  made,  one  of  the 
predicate  with  the  third  idea  ;  the  other  of  the  third 
idea  with  the  subject  ;  the  third  of  the  subject  with 
the  predicate.  And  from  each  of  these  comparisons 
arise  a  judgment  and  a  proposition.  They  must  be 
arranged  in  such  a  way  that  the  last  be  contained  in 
the  two  first  ;  otherwise  there  would  be  no  reasoning, 
but  three  unconnected  propositions.  The  three  terms 
are  called  as  follows  :  The  predicate  the  major  term, 
because  ordinarily  speaking  it  is  more  extensive  ;  the 
subject  the  minor  term,  because  generally  more  re- 
stricted ;  the  third  idea  the  middle  tQrrc\y  from  the  office 
which  it  exercises.  Likewise  also  the  propositions : 
that  in  which  the  third  idea  is  compared  with  the 
predicate  is  called  the  major  proposition  ;  that  in  which 
the  third  id^a  is  compared  with  the  subject  is  called 
the  minor  ;  that  in  which  the  subject  and  the  predicate 
are  compared  is  called  consequent  or  consequence. 
And  because  ordinarily  in  the  first  proposition  the 
predicate  is  compared  with  the  third  idea,  and  in  the 
second  the  subject  is  compared  with  the  third  idea, 
the  first  is  always  called  the  major,  the  .second  the 
minor,  and  both  together,  in  regard  to  the  conse- 
quence, are  caW^d  premises. 

All  reasonings  are  either  affirmative  or  negative. 
The  foundation  of  the  affirm:*tive  is  that  principle 
that  tivo  things  which  agree  with  a  third  agree  together* 


82         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

.' 
Of  the  negative  the  principle  is  tivo  things  of  which 
one  agrees  with  a  thirds  ami  the  other  does  not,  cannot 
agree  together. 

Now,  gathering  together  all  wc  have  said,  it  is 
evident  that  in  order  to  have  reasoning  the  following 
things  are  necessary :  ist.  That  the  mind  be  respect- 
ing the  truth  of  a  proposition  in  the  state  of  doubt, 
desirous  to  rem  v^e  it ;  this  is  the  end  of  reasoning. 
2d.  It  must  have  a  third  idea,  which  is  the  means 
whereby  it  reasons.  3d.  It  must  compare  this  third 
idea  with  the  terms  of  the  proposition  it  wants  to 
know,  which  constitutes  the  nse  of  that  third  idea. 
4th.  It  must  deduce  from  that  comparison  the  truth 
it  wants  to  find  out,  which  is  the  effect  of  reasoning. 
We  shall  speak  of  each  of  these  separately. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
Of  the  End  which  causes  the  Mind  to  Reason. 

Q.  What  are  the  difierent  states  the  mind  may  find 
itself  in  with  regard  to  truth  ? 

A.  The  end  which  incites  the  mind  to  reason  is 
that  it  may  remove  that  state  of  doubt  in  which  it 
finds  itself  with  regard,  to  a  certain  truth,  and  take  up 
another  state.  To  explain  this  properly  we  must 
give  an  idea  of  the  different  states  in  which  the  mind 
may  find  itself  with  regard  to  truth.  Our  mind, 
when  a  truth  is  presented  before  it,  may  be  affected 
if.  three  different  ways.  It  may  adhere  to  it  without 
any  hesitation  or  fear  of  its  contrary ;  it  may  adhere 
to  it  with  a  certain  hesitation  and  fear  of  its  con- 
trary ;  or  it  may  not  adhere  to  it  at  all  and  remain  in  a 
state  of  suspense,  hanging,  as  it  were,  between  yes  and 
no.  Each  of  these  things  constitutes  a  state  of  the 
mind  with  regard  to  truth  :  the  first  is  called  certainty  ; 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         83 

the  second  is  called  probability  or  opinion  ;  the  thir<l 
is  called  doubt. 

Q.  What  is  certainty  ? 

A.  That  state  of  the  mind  by  which  it  firmly  adheres  to 
a  known  truth  ivithoiit  fear  of  the  opposite.  It  may  be 
metaphysical, physical,  and  moral.  It  is  called  metaphy- 
sical certainty  when  it  is  founded  on  the  very  essence 
of  things ;  for  instance,  it  is  metaphysically  certain 
that  a  square  has  four  sides.  .It  is  called  physical 
when  it  is  founded  on  the  constancy  of  natural  and 
physical  laws,  as  it  is  physically  certain  that  a  body 
gravitates  towards  its  centre.  It  is  called  moral  when 
it  is  founded  on  the  testimony  of  men  and  the  laws 
governing  human  acts ;  as,  for  instance,  it  is  morally 
certain  that  Washington  was  the  first  President  of 
the  United  States.  Hence,  ?is  it  is  evident,  meta- 
physical certainty  is  absolute,  as  founded  on  the 
essences  of  things  which  are  immutable.  Physical 
and  moral  certainties  are  hypothetical,  as  they 
are  founded  on  the  supposition  of  the  constancy 
of  the  laws  which  govern  the  physical  and  the 
moral  world.  This  last  observation  gives  rise  to  an- 
other distinction  of  certainty,  intritisic  and  extrinsic. 
It  is  intrinsic  when  it  arises  from  the  knowledge  of  the 
thing  itself.  It  is  extrinsic  when  it  is  founded  on  the 
testimony  of  others. 

O.   How  many  degrees  of  certainty  are  there? 

A.  Certainty  is  made  up  of  two  elements  the  cling- 
ing of  the  mind  to  the  truth  ;  and  the  exclusion  of 
any  tendency  to  the  opposite.  Now,  as  regards  the 
second  element,  certainty  has  no  degrees,  because  this 
excluding  all  fear  of  the  opposite  is  incapable  either 
of  increase  or  diminution.  As  regards  the  first  ele- 
ment, the  clinging  of  the  mind,  .this  may  admit  of 
degrees,  as  the  mind  may  cling  to  a  truth  with  more 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

or  less  tenacity ;  for  instance,  in  metaphysical  cer- 
tainty the  clinging  of  the  nnind  is  stronger  and  more 
tenacious  than  in  the  other  two. 

Q.  What  is  probability  ? 

A.  That  state  of  the  mind  in  ivJiich  it  adheres  to  a 
truth  luith  a  kind  of  fear  of  the  opposite.  It  may  be 
also  intrinsic  and  extrinsic.  It  is  intrinsic  when 
founded  on  the  essence  of  the  thing  itself,  extrinsic 
when  it  is  founded  pn  arguments  outside  the  thing 
itself.  M     , 

It  may  have  different  degrees,  according  to  the  va- 
lue and  number  of  arguments  and  motives  which  sup- 
port it.  Because  an  opinion  in  respect  to  another 
opinion  may  be  equally  probable,  more  probable, 
most  probable  in  proportion  as  the  arguments  sup- 
porting it  grow  in  weight  and  number.  But  it  must 
be  remarked  that  all  these  degrees  of  probability  can 
never,  no  matter  what  their  weight  or  number  may 
be,  reach  to  certainty,  because  if  they  remain  probable 
they  must  always  imply  some  fear  of  the  opposite, 
and  no  being  by  mere  union  with  another  of  the 
same  kind  can  change  its  nature,  hence,  even  united 
together,  all  these  degrees  of  probability  must  imply 
some  fear  of  the  opposite.  But  certainty  essentially 
excludes  all  fear.  Therefore  a  number  of  degrees  of 
probability  can  never  give  certainty. 

Q.  What  is  doubt? 

A.  That  state  of  the  mind  in  which  it  does  not 
adhere  either  to  one  side  or  the  other  of  an  object 
proposed,  but  haags  in  suspense.  It  has  been  beauti- 
fully personified  by  Spenser  in  his  "  Faerie  Queene  "  : 

'*  His  name  was  Doubt,  that  had  a  double  face  ; 
Th*  one  forward  looking,  th'  other  backward  bent." 

J  ,       -       ■ 

As  it  is  clear,  doubt  differs  from  certainty  and  pro- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.         85 

bability..  because  both  imply  adliesion  ;  doubt  implies 
suspension. 

It  may  be  positive  or  negative,  because  the  mind 
may  withdraw  its  adhesion  either  because  it  sees  no 
reason  in  the  one  or  other  of  the  two  things,  or  be- 
cause it  perceives  equal  reasons  on  both  sides.  From 
which  it  appears  that  a  negative  doubt  cannot  have 
any  degrees,  whereas  the  positive  can,  in  proportion  as 
the  reasons  pro  and  con  diminish  or  increase  ;  in  the 
latter  case  the  doubt  approaches  nearer  to  probability. 

Q.  Wiiat  is  ignorance  \ 

A.  The  absence  of  knowledge.  \Vc  have  not 
enumerated  it  among  the  states  of*  the  mind  because 
it  is  rather  the  absence  of  a  state. 

Q.  In  what  state  is  the  mind  before  reasoning? 

A.  In  the  state  of  doubt.  It  could  not  be  in  igno- 
rance, because  he  who  is  ignorant  about  something 
cannot  wish  for  nor  seek  it.  Now,  to  reason  is  to 
seek  for  something.  Therefore,  when  the  mind  pro- 
ceeds to  reason  it  cannot  be  in  ignorance.  It' cannot 
be  in  a  state  of  adhesion  or  certainty*  because  if  it 
knew  a  truth  it  would  not  seek  for  it.  Therefore,  in 
order  to  reason  the  mind  must  neither  be  in  itjnorance 
nor  in  the  state  of  adhesion,  but  must  be  wavering 
between  the  two ;  neither  be  ignorant  altogether  nor 
certain,  but  in  the  state  of  doubt.  Doubt,  therefore, 
must  always  go  before  reasoning  and  demonstration. 
Hence  the  truth  which  the  mind  wants  to  find  out  by 
reasoning  before  the  demonstration  is  called  the  qtics- 
tion ;  after,  it  is  called  thesis.  This  do  '.bt  is  called 
methodical  doubt.  And  it  is  distinguished  from  that 
of  the  sceptics  and  from  that  of  Descartes.  Sceptics 
doubted  of  everything,  and  wished  to  remain  in  doubt ; 
whereas  the  doubt  called  methodical  is  invented  just 
to  bring  one  out  of  doubt,  and  it  is  called  methodical 


86        Elements  of  Intellectual  Pkilosophy. 

because  it  is  taken  and  supposed  by  necessity  of 
metliod,  whereas  the  doubt  of  the  sceptics  is  called 
systematic  because  assumed  on  system.  It  is  dis- 
tinguished from  that  of  Descartes,  who  held  that 
science  must  proceed  from  doubt;  but  his  doubt  was 
universal,  extending  to  all  first  and  self-evident  truths, 
whereas  oui'  doubt  is  particular,  extending  only  to 
those  truths  of  mediate  evidence  which  need  to  be 
demonstrated. 

Q.  What  does  the  mind  aim  at  in  reasoning  ? 

A.  It  seeks  to  remove  the  state  of  doubt  and  to  as- 
sume another  state.  But  doubt  excluded,  there  are  no 
other  states  but  that  of  probability  and  certainty. 
Therefore  the  mind  in  reasoning  aims  at  probability  and 
certainty.  From  this  arises  the  division  of  reasoning 
\vito  probable  and  apodictic^  though  strictly  speaking  the 
mind  in  reasoning  properly  aims  at  certainty,  and  at 
probability  only  indirectly  and  incidentally.  The  rea- 
son is  this :  In  probability,  as  we  have  said,  two  ele- 
ments are  found,  the  adhesion  of  the  mind  to  the  object 
and  the  fear  of  the  contrary.  Now,  the  mind  when  it 
aims  at  probability  in  reasoning  is  not  led  to  do  so  from 
the  fear  oTthe  opposite,  for  in  this  respect  probability 
is  akin  to  doubt,  and  the  mind  would  shrink  from  it  as 
it  does  from  doubt.  Therefore  it  aims  at  probability, 
to  adhere  to  the  truth  and  to  avoid  the  fear  of  the 
opposite.  Hence  it  strictly  aims  at  certainty,  which 
excludes  fear  and  implies  firmness  of  adhesion.  When 
it  cannot  possibly  attain  certainty,  then  it  aims  at 
probability;  but  only  indirectly  and  accidentally.  We 
may,  therefore,  draw  as  a  general  conclusion  of  the 
whole  article  that  the  mind  in  reasoning  aims  at  cer- 
tainty as  the  proper  end  of  that  operation. 


.    Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,         87 

ARTICLE    THIRD. 

Of  the  Means  which  the  Mind  uses  in  Reasoning,  or 
of  the  Middle  Term, 

Q.  What  is  meant  by  middle  term  ? 

A.  It  is  that  third  idea  with  which  the  mind  com- 
pares the  predicate  and  the  subject.  It  finds  it  out  as 
follows :  When  the  mind  doubts  about  a  proposition 
it  shows  that  it  does  not  know  its  truth  or  its  false- 
ilood.  Now,  to  know  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  a  pro- 
position does  not  mean  anything  else  but  to  know  the 
unity  or  non-unity  of  being  between  the  predicate  and 
the  subject ;  or,  in  other  words,  to  know  if  the  predi- 
cate be  or  not  the  same  as  the  subject ;  since  the 
whole  form  of  a  proposition  consists  in  telling  if  the 
subject  be  the  predicate  or  not.  To  reason,  there- 
fore, is  to  endeavor  to  know  the  unity  or  non-unity  of 
being  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate.  Hence 
to  find  the  middle  term  is  nothing  else  than  to  find  the 
similitude  or  agreement  between  the  predicate  and  the 
subject.  Now,  when  we  want  to  find  out  a  similitude 
between  two  things  which  is  not  yet  apparent,  the 
way  we  follow  is  this :  to  consider  both  things  from 
every  side,  to  see  if  we  can  find  out  some  com  "^n, 
point  of  resemblance.  In  the  same  manner  the  m:  * 
acts  when  it  proceeds  to  reason  ;  it  considers  from 
every  point  of  view  the  subject  and  the  predicate,  to 
see  if  it  can  find  some  point  wliich  may  present  a 
similitude  with  or  difference  from  the  other.  This 
point  of  similitude  which  it  finds  first  in  the  one  and 
then  in  the  other,  or  of  difference  which  it  finds  in. one 
and  not  in  the  other,  it  assumes  as  the  middle  term. 
Hence  to  find  the  middle  term  we  must  consider  both 
subject  and  predicate  from  every  possible  side. 

Q.  What  and  how  many  are  these  sides  according 


88        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

to  which  we  may  consider  the  terms  of  a  proposition, 
and  from  them  draw  the  middle  term  ?        -  ;  » 

A,  They  are  ten ;  and  from  the  office  they  fulfil 
are  called  common  points,  or  topics,  of  argumentation, 
because  the  predicate  and  the  subject  cannot  be  con- 
sidered except  from  these  points  of  cause,  effect,  subject, 
adjuncts,  contraries,  similes,  name,  dejinition,  division, 
and  authority.  From  all  these  we  can  take  ,the  mid- 
dle term.  -^        ^      •=    .       .i  • 

Q.  Give  an  example  from  each.     >f    •:  ."  o^^      ";-fi; 

A.  We  take  the  middle  term  from  cause  when  we 
show  the  effects  from  these  causes ;  as,  for  instance, 
showing  from  its  material  cause  that  the  human  body 
is  corruptible  ;  thus,  that  which  is  made  of  matter  is 
corruptible.  But  the  human  body  is  made  of  matter, 
therefore  it  is  corruptible. 

From  the  effects  we  take  the  middle  term,  showing 
the  cause  from  its  effects.  The  most  wonderful  dra- 
matic productions  argue  a  most  powerful  imagina- 
tion. But  Shakspere  has  produced  the  most  won- 
derful plays,  therefore  he  must  have  had  the  most 
powerful  imagination.     *'    f'i^''  '/**'•  ■■  "    >.'*''.  : 

We  take  the  middle  term  from  the  subject  when  we 
show  of  the  accident  something  deduced  from  its  sub- 
ject ;  for  instance,  that  quality  which  leans  on  a  more, 
noble  subject  is  in  itself  more  noble.  But  the  quali- 
ties of  the  soul  lean  on  a  subject  more  noble  than  the 
•body,  therefore  they  are  more  noble  than  those  ot- 
the  body.  -nur,   •!»>  njrA-^ 

'j^-From  the  adjuncts  or  circumstances  when  we  show 
something  from  all  that  surrounds  the  subject,  such 
as  t.'me,  place,  persons,  means,  and  the  like. 

Fiom  contraries,  making  one  contrary  exclude  an- 
other ;  as,  for  instance,  T'^uth  is  a  good  of  the  intel- 
lect, therefore  falsehood  is  its  evil 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,         89 

From  similes,  showing  one  to  be  like  to  the  other ;  as, 
Americans  gained  their  independence  by  those  virtues 
which  make  up  pure  patriotism,  therefore  they  will 
continue  to  preserve  it  by  the  same  virtues.  v?;** 

We  take  the  middle  term  from  the  name  in  two 
ways:  i.  From  its  signification;  as,  Angel  mean?  a 
messenger,  therefore  angels  are  messengers  between 
God  and  men.  From  its  etymology  philosophy  means 
love  of  wisdom,  therefore  philosophers  love  wisdom. 

From  the  definition  is  drawn  the  middle  term  when 
we  argue  from  those  elements  which  compose  it ; 
as,  science  is  to  know  a  thing  from  the  principles 
which  constitute  it.  But  I  know  the  principles  of  a 
certain  subject,  therefore  I  have  the  science  of  that 
subject. 

From  division  we  take  the  middle  term  when  we 
argue  from  the  parts  to  the  whole,  and  from  the  whole 
to  the  parts.  As,  for  instance,  the  head,  the  arms,  the 
hands,  the  fingers,  and  all  the  other  parts  of  the 
human  body  are  animated,  therefore  the  whole  body 
is  animated.    <..   ,       ...  '    ,>  ..   ..  .    ..'\^:uu 

Finally  from  authority,  when  we  take  the  middle 
term  from  the  authority  of  others. 

Q.  What  criterion  must  guide  us  in  assuming  the 
middle  term?  .,,    ,   ,.  ,      ,(;.,i,..|  ,..;>    •;  ■  . 

A.  In  assuming  the  middle  term  we  must  pay  atten- 
tion to  two  rules  :  ist,  In  affirmative  propositions  the 
middle  term  must  never  be  more  extensive  or  ample 
than  the  predicate.  For  instance,  to  show  that  man 
is  an  animal  I  could  not  take  the  middle  term,  sub- 
stance, and  say.  Man  is  substance;  but  the  substance 
is  animal,  therefore  man  is  an  animal.  This  reason- 
ing proves  nothing,  because  the  middle  term,  sub- 
stance, is  much  more  extensive  than  animal.  Again, 
the  following  reasoning  would  be  vain  :  Peter  is  a  man; 


go        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

but  John  is  a  man,  therefore  John  is  Peter.  Here  the 
middle  term,  man,  is  more  ample  than  Peter. 
I  2d.  On  the  contrary,  in  negative  propositions  the 
middle  term  must  not  be  more  restricted  than  the 
predicate.  The  following  reasoning  would,  therefore, 
be  bad  :  The  finite  is  material ;  but  the  soul  is  not 
material,  therefore  it  is  not  finite.  The  reasoning  is 
false  because  the  middle  term,  material,  is  taken  in  a 
more  restricted  sense  than  the  predicate,  finite.  The 
reason  of  both  rules  is  found  in  what  we  have  already 
said.  The  middle  term  is  that  side  of  similitude  or 
difference  by  means  of  which  the  predicate  agrees  with 
the  subject  in  force  or  not.  But  in  affirmative  propo- 
sitions the  predicate  must  agree  with  the  subject  in  all 
its  comprehension ;  therefore  the  middle  term,  which 
must  represent  that  comprehension,  must  not  be  more 
extensive  than  the  predicate,  otherwise  it  would  have 
less  comprehension.  On  the  contrary,  in  negative 
propositions  the  predicate  must  be  denied  of  the  sub- 
ject in  all  its  extension.  Therefore  the  mrddle  term, 
which  must  represent  that  extension,  must  not  be  less 
extensive  than  the  predicate.        ,  ..    .;  ,  ,     ,       ,,,.;  j 

■ri.,,.  ;,  .        ARTICLE    FOURTH.      .,      ..:    .    \     .U 

Of  the    Use  of  the  Middle  Tcriiiy   or  of  Figures  and 

Modes. 

,  Q.  How  is  the  middle  term  to  be  used  ? 
i  A.  The  use  of  an  instrument  or  means  consists  in 
making  it  available  for  the  end  for  which  it  has  been 
invented.  Now,  the  middle  term  is  intended  for  the 
object  of  comparing  it  with  the  two  terms  of  the  pro- 
position by  means  of  the  artificial  structure  of  the 
premises  ;  therefore  the  proper  use  of  the  middle  term 
consists  in  this  comparison  and  in  the  artificial  struc- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,        91 

ture  of  the  premises.  This  comparison  may  be  made 
in  different  ways.  Because  the  middle  term  in  that 
comparison  may  vary  in  two  ways,  either  because  of 
the  place  it  occupies  in  the  structure  of  the  reasoning, 
and  of  the  figure  it  makes  in  the  premises,  now  ap- 
pearing as  predicate  and  now  as  subject,  or  because 
of  the  manner  according  to  which  propositions  are 
formed,  negative  or  affirmative,  universal  or  particular, 
by  the  help  of  the  same  middle  term.  The  diversity 
which  the  structure  of  the  reasoning  takes  from  the 
figure  the  middle  term  makes  in  the  premises  is  called 
the  figure  of  syllogism ;  that  which  arises  from  the 
second — that  is,  the  different  manner  of  propositions — 
is  called  the  mode  of  syllogism.  Hence,  to  understand 
what  and  how  many  are  the  uses  of  the  middle  term 
we  must  speak  of  the  figures  and  modes  of  syllogism. 

Q.   What  is  a  figure? 

A.  That  different  disposition  which  the  middle  tertn 
takes  in  relation  to  the  extreme  terms  in  the  premises. 

This  disposition  or  placing  may  be  made  in^  three 
different  ways.  The  first  is,  when  the  middle  term  is 
subject  in  the  major  and  predicate  in  the  minor,  as  in 
this  reasoning :  Every  animal  (middle  term  subject) 
has  a  sensitive  appetite  ;  but  man  is  an  animal  (middle 
term  predicate),  therefore  man  has  a  sensitive  appetite. 

The  second  way  is,  when  the  middle  term  acts  as 
predicate  in  both  premises.  Every  man  is  endowed 
with  reason  ;  but  no  horse  is  endowed  with  reason  ; 
therefore  no  horse  is  man.  •  '  ''•"'^  "  ^  i  ^^   u 

The  third  is,  when  the  middle  term  officiates  as  sub- 
ject in  both  premises  ;  as,  for  instance,  Being  is  op- 
posed to  nothingness.  But  being  is  identical  with 
good  ;  therefore  good  is  opposed  to  nothingness. 

There  is  a  fourth  figure  which  can  be  reduced  to  the 
first ;  therefore  we  do  not  speak  of  it. 


92        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Q.  V^XxdX  2S^  modes  ?      :;;;!,"      ... 
1    A .  7  Z/^y  may  be  defined  the  disposition  or  locating  of  the 
premises  according  to  their  universality  or  particularity, 
their  affirtnation  or  negation,  ,    -    r.     ;;  ^      ;•, 

Q.   How  many  modes  can  a  syllogism  have? 

A.  Sixty-four;  because  every  figure  can  have  six- 
teen modes,  since  in  every  figure  the  premises  may  be 
either  both  universal  or  both  particular,  or  the  major 
universal  and  the  minor  particular  ;  and  each  of  these 
modes  has  four  others  under  it,  according  to  affirma- 
tion or  negation,  because  the  premises,  either  univer- 
sal or  particular,  may  be  both  affirmative  or  both 
negative,  or  the  major  negative  and  the  minor  affirma- 
tive, or  vice  versa.  Of  all  these  modes  only  ten  arrive 
at  a  conclusion.  Each  one  may  amuse  himself  by 
enumerating  them  for  exercise. 

'■*■" 

'  ARTICLE   FIVE. 

Of  the  Deduction  of  the  Consequent  from  the  Premises. 

:  Q.  In  what  manner  is  the  consequence  deduced 
from  the  premises  known  by  the  intellect?  .  ,'  , 
f  A.  We  can  gather  from  all  we  have  said  that  in 
reasoning  the  mind  in  the  major  compares  the  middle 
term  with  the  predicate,  and  sees  that  they  agree  to- 
gether ;  hence,  when  in  the  minor  it  comes  to  compare 
the  middle  term  with  the  subject,  it  may  be  really 
said  to  be  comparing  the  predicate  with  the  subject, 
because  it  knows  and  has  seen  in  the  major  that  the 
predicate  is  the  same  as  the  middle  term.  In  a  word, 
in  the  minor  it  sees  the  predicate  in  the  subject  by 
means  of  the  middle  term  as  through  a  lens.  From 
this  we  can  conclude  how  the  mind  comes  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  consequence.  Because  that  which 
it  affirms  without  hesitation  in  the  consequence  it  has 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        93 

already  seen  in  the  minor,  and  would  contradict  itself 
if  it  affirmed  in  the  consequent  something  contrary  to 
what  it  has  said  in  the  premises.  Hence,  it  has  been 
rightly  said  that  the  premises  stand  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  consequences  as  the  cause  to  the  effect,  because 
the  mind,  having  known  the  premises,  cannot  ignore 
the  consequences,  as,  having  supposed  the  action  of 
the  cause,  the  effect  must  follow. 

ARTICLE   SIXTH. 
Rules  of  Reasoning, 

Q.  How  many  rules  of  reasoning  are  there  ? 

A.  The  following:  1st.  There  cannot  be  more  than 
three  terms  in  the  reaso7iing.  The  reason  of  the  rule 
may  be  gathered  from  all  we  have  said.  But  here  we 
must  observe  that  oftentimes  a  fourth  term  is  hidden, 
and  this  happens  when  a  term  is  used  equivocally,  now 
in  one  sense  and  then  in  another — as,  for  instance,  the 
rat  is  a  syllable;  but  a  syllable  cannot  eat  cheese, 
therefore  the  rat  cannot  eat  cheese. 

2d  rule.  In  the  conclusion  no  term  must  be  taken  in  a 
more  extensive  sense  than  it  has  in  the  premises ;  be- 
cause that  which  is  more  extensive  and  universal  can- 
not be  found  in  that  which  is  less  so.  Hence,  if  the 
term  in  the  conclusion  is  taken  in  a^  more  universal 
sense,  it  cannot  be  found  in  the  premises  and  could 
not  be  deduced  from  it.  Against  this  rule  is  that 
sopl.ism  of  Cellius:  "You  are  not  what  I  am;  but  I 
am  a  man,  therefore  you  are  not  a  man." 

3d  rule.  The  middle  term  should  not  enter  into  the  con- 
clusion, because  its  use  consists  in  comparing  it  with 
the  other  two  terms,  which  is  only  done  in  the  pre- 
mises— as,  for  instance.  Napoleon  was  a  general ;  but 
Napoleon  was  poor,  therefore  Napoleon  was  a  poor 


94         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

.     ,     '■  ■       ' 

general.     Shakspere  was  a  poet ;  but  Shakspere  was 

poor,  therefore  he  was  a  poor  poet. 

4th  rule.  The  middle  tertn  must  be  takett  in  a  uni- 
versal sense^  at  least  in  one  of  tJie  premises ;  because  if 
it  was  taken  in  a  particular  sense  in  both  premises  we 
should  have  two  terms  and  not  one — as,  for  instance, 
a  certain  animal  is  endowed  with  reason  ;  but  the 
nightingale  is  a  certain  animal,  therefore  the  nightin- 
gale is  endowed  with  reason. 

5th  rule.  No  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from  two  nega- 
tive propositions,  because  when  both  are  negative  it  is 
clear  that  the  middle  term  agrees  neither  with  the 
predicate  nor  with  the  subject,  and  therefore  nothing 
can  be  concluded  from  them.  Hence  the  following 
reasoning  would  be  bad  :  Man  is  not  eternal ;  but  the 
animal  is  not  eternal,  therefore  man  is  not  an  animal. 

6th  rule.  No  coficlusion  can  be  drawn  from  two  par- 
ticular premises^  because  in  this  case  the  middle  term 
would  be  taken  in  particular  senses  in  both  premises. 

7th  rule.  The  cojiclusion  must  share  ifi  the  fortune  of 
the  zueaker  party  ;  that  is  to  say,  if  one  of  the  premises 
is  particular  the  conclusion  must  be  particular,  be- 
cause otherwise  the  terms  would  be  more  ample  in  the 
conclusion  than  in  the  premises ;  if  of  the  premises 
one  is  negative,  the  other  affirmative,  the  conclusion 
must  be  negative,  because  in  this  second  case  the  mid- 
dle term  agrees  with  the  one  and  not  with  the  other, 
and  therefore  subject  and  predicate  do  not  agree 
together. 

8th  rule.  We  cannot  draw  a  negative  conclusicn  from 
two  affirmative  premises.     The  reason  is  clear. 


V  ♦ .{- 


CHAPTER  II. 

DIFFERENT  SPECIES  OF  REASONING. 
ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Of  the  Variety  of  Reasonings  ;  and,  first,  of  the  Indue- 

tive  Syllogism. 

Q.  Whence  arises  variety  of  syllogisms? 

A.  We  must  distinguish  three  things  in  the  mid- 
dle term  :  i.  What  it  is  in  itself.  2.  The  connec- 
tion which  it  has  with  the  extreme  terms.  3.  The 
special  form  by  which  they  are  connected.  Because, 
the  middle  term  must  be  something  in  itself,  and  in 
order  to  become  the  middle  term  must  have  some  con- 
nection with  the  extreme  terms,  and  also  have  such 
connection  under  a  certain  form.  Now,  since  the 
variety  of  syllogisms  originates  in  the  middle  term,  it 
is  clear  that  such  a  variety  arises  from  the  three  heads 
just  mentioned — that  is,  from  the  intrinsic  diversity  of 
the  middle  term,  from  the  different  connection  it  has 
with  the  extremes,  and  from  the  difference  of  form. 

Q.   What  is  the  division  arising  from  the  first  head  ? 

A.  From  the  first  head  arises  the  division  of  syllo- 
gisms into  inductive  and  deductive,  or  into  indtiction 
and  syllogism  properly  so  called.  Because  the  middle 
term,  considered  in  itself,  may  represent  either  a  uni- 
versal idea  or  particular  ideas ;  in  other  words,  it  may 
represent  a  whole  from  which  a  part  is  deduced,  or 
the  parts  from  which  the  whole  arises.  In  the  first 
case  the  syllogism  is  called   deductive  or  syllogism 


96        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.  , 

simply,  in  the  second  it  is  called  inductive  or  induc- 
tion simply. 

Q.  What  is  induction  ? 

A.  That  kind  of  reasoning  in  which,  from  the 
enumeration  of  the  particular  parts  of  a  subject,  is 
•gathered  the  whole  and  the  universal.  For  instance, 
the  lion,  the  horse,  the  ox,  the  leopard,  man,  and  the 
like  are  sensitive.  But  all  these  constitute  the  genus 
animal ;  therefore  the  genus  animal  is  sensitive. 

Induction  may  be  of  two  kinds,  complete  and  in- 
complete, because  the  enumeration  of  the  particulars 
may  be  complete  or  incomplete,  and  according  as  it 
is  the  one  or  the  other  induction  is  complete  or  incom- 
plete.  I 

O.  What  is  to  be  observed  as  to  the  incomplete 
induction  ? 

A.  Wc  must  carefully  observe  in  what  sense  we 
can  say  that  the  enumeration  of  its  parts  is  not  com- 
plete. Because  if  by  this  it  is  meant  to  convey  the  idea 
that  from  an  incomplete  enumeration  of  parts  we 
can  draw  a  general  consequence  without  adding  to  or 
supposing  anything  more  in  that  incomplete  enu- 
meration, as  some  modern  logicians  have  thought,  it 
is  false,  and  would  be  contrary  to  that  rule  of  reason- 
ing which  forbids 'the  consequence  to  have  a  greater 
extension  than  the  premises.  The  whole  is  certainly 
more  ample  and  universal  than  some  of  its  parts. 
But  in  the  incomplete  induction,  according  to  these 
logicians,  the  consequence  contains  the  whole  because 
universal,  and  the  premises  contain  only  some  parts 
because  the  induction  is  incomplete  ;  therefore  the 
incomplete  induction,  as  it  is  explained  by  some 
modern  logicians,  is  repugnant  to  the  fundamental 
rules  of  syllogisms,  because  in  it  the  consequence  is 
more  ample  than   the  premises.     Therefore,  in  order 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,        97 

to  avoid  such  inconvenient,  if  the  enumeration  of 
parts  is  not  complete  it  must  be  made  so  in  some 
way.  This  is  done  by  adding  after  the  incomplete 
enumeration  of  parts  the  phrases  and  so  forth,  and  the 
like^^s  the  ancients  observed,  who  held  that  induction 
could  conclude  nothing  except  to  the  enumeration  of 
parts  one  could  add  and  so  on  of  the  rest. 

Q.  For  what  reason  and  upon  what  foundation 
could  you  add  and  so  on  of  the  rest  ? 

A.  That  phrase  is  added  in  force  of  the  principles  of 
analogy,  that  nature  is  limited  to  one  thing ;  that  nature ^ 
ivhen  not  prevented^  zvorks  always  in  the  same  manner. 
Upon  this,  having  observed  that  a  certain  property  is 
constantly  found  in  many  individuals,  we  become  as- 
sured that  it  belongs  to  their  nature  ;  and  because 
nature  works  always  in  the  same  way  in  all  individu- 
als, we  attribute  the  same  property  to  the  rest  of  the 
individuals  not  mentioned  in  the  enumerations.  The 
true  difference,  therefore,  between  complete  and  in- 
complete induction  is  this :  that  in  the  first  the  enu- 
meration of  parts  is  actually  complete  ;  in  the  other 
it  is  not  actually  complete,  but  becomes  so  by  means 
of  the  phrases,  and  so  on  luith  the  rest,  and  the  like. 

Q.  What  is  the  principle  on  which  both  deductions 
rest? 

A.  That  which  agrees  or  disagrees  ivith  all  the  par- 
ticidars  implied  in  the  idea  of  the  subject  agrees  or  dis- 
agrees with  the  subject  taken  as  a  whole  or  universally. 

Q.  What  has  Bacon  done  with  regard  to  induction? 

A.  Modern  philosophers  sing  loudly  the  praises  of 
Bacon  for  the  services  he  has  rendered  to  philosophy 
in  teaching  the  inductive  process.  But  we  have  to 
observe  that  he  has  done  nothing  as  to  the  logical 
form  of  induction  which  was  not  known  and  tauejht 
by  the  ancients.     All  that  Bacon  has  done  is  to  point 


98         Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

out  the  way  how  to  proceed  in  the  observation  of  par- 
ticular facts  by  way  of  negation  and  affirmation,  so 
that  truly  he  has  treated  only  of  the  most  common 
part  of  induction. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 

Of  Deductive  Syllogism  and  its  Species. 

Q.  What  is  deductive  syllogism  ? 

A.  If,  in  reasoning,  instead  of  particulars  we  take 
the  universal  as  the  middle  term,  then  we  have  the 
inductive  syllogism,  or  syllogism  properly  so  called, 
which  may  be  defined  that  reasoning  in  which  from 
the  luiiversal  is  deduced  the  particular  contained  in  it  — 
for  instance,  Every  animal  is  sensitive  ;  but  man  is  an 
animal,  therefore  he  is  sensitive. 

Q.   How  many  kinds  of  syllogisms  are  there? 

A.  Several,  i.  The  syllogism  h  priori  and  ii  pos- 
teriori. The  first  is  that  in  which  the  middle  term  is 
something  which  by  its  nature  is  understood  before 
that  which  it  is  intended  to  demonstrate,  and  acts  as 
the  cause  of  that  which  is  demonstrated.  Hence  it  is 
called  also  from  the  cause — for  instance,  every  being 
endowed  with  reason  has  a  will ;  but  man  is  endowed 
with  reason,  therefore  he  has  a  will.  Here  the  middle 
term,  reason,  is  the  true  cause  of  the  will,  as  reason  io  a 
rational  tendency.  The  second  is  when  we  assume  as 
middle  term  something  which  is  conceived  by  the 
mind  as  posterior  to  the  thing  which  we  want  to  de- 
monstrate, as  when  we  prove  a  thing  from  its  effects 
or  properties. 

2.  Syllogisms  from  the  proximate  reason  and  from 
the  remote,  reason.  The  first  is  that  in  which  the  mid- 
dle term  contains  the  proximate  and  adequate  reason 
of  the  thing.  The  second  is  that  in  which  the  middle 
term  contains  only  the  remote  cause  of  the  thing. 


Elemenis  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        99 

3.  Direct  and  indirect  syllogisms.  The  first  is  that  in 
which  the  middle  term  contains  a  truth  which  has  some 
connection  with  the  proposition  to  be  demonstrated. 
It  is  called  indirect  when,  having  supposed,  as  hypothe- 
sis, the  contrary  proposition,  we  take  as  middle  term 
an  absurdity,  and  show  that  the  absurdity  proceeds 
from  that  hypothesis.  It  is  called  also  demonstration 
from  absurd  consequences.  For  instance,  wishing  to 
demonstrate  the  free  will  of  man,  we  take  as  middle 
term  the  absurdities  which  would  follow  from  the  de- 
nial of  it — for  instance,  the  destruction  of  virtue,  of 
reward  and  penalty,  etc. 

4.  Syllogisms  from  statements  admitted  by  adversa- 
ries, called  ex  datis,  and  it  is  that  in  which  the  middle 
term  is  something  admitted  by  the  adversary. 

ARTICLE    THIRD. 

Of  Demonstrative  or  Apodictic,  and  Probable  Syllogisms, 

Q.  What  is  the  next  thing  to  be  considered  in  the 
middle  term,  and  what  division  of  the  syllogisms  arises 
therefrom  ? 

A.  The  next  thing  to  be  considered  in  the  middle 
term  is  the  connection  it  has  with  the  extremes,  and 
from  this  arises  another  division  of  the  syllogism — that 
of  demonstrative  and  probable.  This  division  of  the 
syllogism  is  made  from  its  efficacy  in  demonstrating  a 
truth.  But  the  efficacy  of  reasoning  results  from  the 
connection  which  the  middle  term  has  with  the  ex- 
tremes; therefore  this  division  of  the  syllogism  into  de- 
monstrative and  probable  depends  on  the  connection 
which  the  middle  term  has  with  the  extremes.  Thus, 
in  order  to  have  a  demonstrative  syllogism,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  middle  term  should  be  so  connected  with 
the  extremes  as  to  contain  tho: proximate,  necessary,  and 


I oo       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

proper  cause  of  a  thing.  Cause ^?\\\zf^  the  syllogism  is 
intended  to  produce  science,  that  is,  knowledge  certain, 
necessary,  and  evident.  But  science  is  knowledge  de- 
duced from  its  cause  ;  therefore  the  middle  term  of  the 
demonstrative  syllogism  must  contain  the  cause.  This 
cause  must  be  necessary,  because,  if  it  were  acciden- 
tal, the  conclusion  would  not  be  necessary,  and  hence 
unscientific.  It  must  be  the  proper  cause,  because  a 
common  cause  would  belong  not  only  to  the  thing  we 
want  to  demonstrate,  but  also  to  others,  and  therefore 
could  produce  only  probable  knowledge.  It  must 
be  tic  proximate  cause,  since  the  remote  cause  would 
give  but  an  inadequate  knowledge. 

Q.  What  is  probable  syllogism,  and  by  what  criterion 
may  we  distinguish  it  from  the  other? 

A.  The  syllogism  is  called  probable  when  its  middle 
term  has  no  necessary  connection  with  the  extremes — 
as,  for  instance,  when  the  middle  term  is  drawn  from 
etymology,  from  authority,  from  a  common  cause,  from 
effects  not  necessarily  connected  with  that  reason 
alone  and  such  as  can  originate  in  some  other  cause, 
etc.,  or  from  some  accident,  etc.  By  keeping  in  view 
all  these  things  one  can  have  a  criterion  to  distinguish 
the  probable  from  the  demonstrative  syllogism. 

ARTICLE.   FOURTH. 
Of  Categorical  and  IlypotJictical  Syllogisms. 

Q.  Define  these  two  kinds  of  syllogisms. 

A.  The  connection  of  the  middle  term  with  the  ex- 
tremes must  be  put  in  a  special  form.  Now,  gene- 
rally speaking,  the  middle  term  may  be  conwected  with 
the  extremes  in  two  forms,  either  in  an  absolute  way 
or  conditionally;  hence  the  division  of  syllogisms 
into  categorical  and  conditional  or  hypothetical. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       loi 

The  categorical  or  absolute  syllogism  is  that  in 
which  the  middle  term  is  connected  with  the  extremes 
in  an  absolute  way.  The  conditional  is  that  in  which 
the  middle  term  is  connected  by  way  of  a  conditional 
proposition  in  the  major.  iVIoderns  call  the  first  sim- 
ple and  the  second  composite. 

Q.  What  are  the  species  of  conditional  syllogisms?    • 

A.  A  conditional  syllogism  is  that  in  which  the  mid- 
dle term  in  the  major  is  bound  by  a  certain  condition. 
Therefore  this  syllogism  may  be  of  as  many  kinds  as 
there  are  ways  in  which  a  term  may  be  bound  to  an- 
other by  way  of  condition — that  is  to  say,  as  there  are 
species  of  conditional  propositions.  Now,  these  pro- 
positions are  of  three  kinds — connex,  conjiuictive,  and 
disjunctive.  Therefore  there  are  three  kinds  of  condi- 
tional syllogism — connex,  conjunctive,  and  disjunctive.  . 

The  first  is  that  in  whir':  ihe  major  is  a  connex  pro- 
position. For  instance,  If  the  soul  is  a  spiritual  princi- 
ple, it  is  immortal ;  but  the  soul  is  a  spiritual  princi- 
ple, therefore  it  is  immortal. 

The  second  is  that  in  which  the  major  is  a  conjunc- 
tive proposition  ;  as,  One  cannot  sleep  and  be  awake 
at  the  same  time  ;  but  John  is  asleep,  therefore  he  is 
not  awake. 

The  third  is  that  in  which  the  major  is  a  disjunctive 
proposition  ;  as,  Peter  is  either  alive  or  dead  ;  but  he  is 
alive,  therefore  he  is  not  dead. 


.-■  V  '■■'■■  ■  '      '  '  '■  *  I.  y  ■«      ■  .  '  s      '  .      '      .    ' 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF  THE  EXPRESSION  OP  REASONING. 
ARTICLE  FIRST. 

Different  Ways  of  Expressing  a  Reasoning. 

(^.  Define  the  different  ways  of  giving  expression 
to  reasoning. 

A.  Besides  syllogism  and  induction,  of  which  we 
have  spoken,  there  are  the  enthymeme,  the  epichi- 
lema,  the  sorites,  the  prosyllogism,  and  the  dilemma. 

Oftentimes  in  reasoning  the  premises  are  so  easy 
and  clear  that  we  omit  one  of  them — as.  Virtue  is  the 
greatest  good  in  the  world  ;  therefore  it  should  be 
practised.  Here  the  major  is  left  out  ;  that  is,  that 
which  is  the  greatest  good  should  be  practised.  When 
the  reasoning  is  so  expressed  it  is  called  enthymeme. 
On  the  contrary,  we  have  the  epichirema  when  to 
one  or  both  premises  we  add  proof — as,  Idleness  is 
hurtful  because  the  parent  of  all  vices.  But  what  is 
hurtful  should  be  avoided,  therefore  idleness  should  be 
avoided. 

The  sorites  is  a  reasoning  composed  of  several  pro- 
positions, so  arranged  that  the  predicate  of  the  first  is 
the  subject  of  the  second,  and  so  on  until  in  the  conse- 
quence the  predicate  of  the  first  proposition  is  united 
with  the  subject  of  the  last — as.  Truth  is  the  object  of 
the  intellect.  That  which  is  the  object  of  the  intel- 
lect perfects  it.  That  which  perfects  the  intellect  is 
the  proper  good  of  man.     That  which  is  the  proper 

to* 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      103 

good  of  man  is  to  be  followed.  Therefore  truth  is  to 
be  followed. 

The  prosyllogism  is  the  union  of  two  syllogisms  so 
connected  together  that  the  consequence  of  the  first 
officiates  as  the  major  of  the  second.  For  instance, 
Sensible  goods  do  not  fully  satisfy  human  aspirations  ; 
but  that  which  does  not  fully  satisfy  human  aspira- 
tions is  not  the  true  happiness  of  a  man,  therefore 
reasonable  goods  are  the  true  happiness  of  man.  But 
that  which  is  not  man's  true  happiness  must  not  be 
exclusively  sought  for ;  therefore  sensible  goods  must 
not  be  exclusively  sought  for. 

The  dilemma  is  a  syllogism  which  has  for  its  mrjor 
a  disjunctive  proposition,  and  from  each  of  the 
members  of  which  we  endeavor  to  draw  a  conclusion 
against  the  adversary.  For  instance  :  Christianity  was 
either  propagated  by  the  force  of  miracles  or  without 
miracles.  If  it  was  propagated  by  miracles,  it  is 
divine  ;  if  it  was  not  propagated  by  miracles,  this  is 
the  greatest  of  all  miracles,  that  a  religion  opposed  by 
the  whole  world  and  contradicting  all  human  passions 
should  subdue  this  world  and  should  be  propagated 
all  over  by  twelve  rude  and  ignorant  fishermen. 

All  these  expressions  of  reasoning  can  be  reduced  to 
the  syllogism,  as  one  can  easily  see  by  himself;  as,  for 
instance,  the  dilemma  given  above  may  be  reduced  to 
the  following  syllogisms  :  If  the  Christian  religion  was 
propagated  by  means  of  miracles  it  is  divine.  But  it 
was  propagated  by  means  of  miracles,  therefore  it  is 
divine.  The  minor  is  proved  by  this  other  syllogism  : 
If  we  deny  that  miracles  propagated  it,  we  must  ac- 
count for  that  propagation  effected  without  miracles. 
But  this  would  be  a  greater  miracle  under  the  circum- 
stances ;  therefore  the  Christian  religion  was  propa- 
gated by  means  of  miracles. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

;;  FAULTS  OF  REASONING. 

'*  ARTICLE  FIRST. 

Sophistries  of  Thought, 

Q.  What  is  a  sophism  ? 

A.  Reasoning  is  intended  to  bring  us  to  the  know- 
ledge of  the  truth  ;  therefore  it  is  faHacious  when 
under  the  appearance  of  truth  it  insinuates  falsehood. 
This  fault  is  called  sophism.  This  insinuation  of 
falsehood  under  the  appearance  of  truth  may  arise 
from  two  sources:  cither  from  \.\\q.  form  when  the 
rules  laid  down  to  construct  reasoning  are  not  kept,  or 
from  the  matter  when  this  is  in  reality  false  but  ap- 
pears under  the  garb  of  truth.  We  shall  say  nothing 
of  the  fallacies  originating  from  the  form,  as  they  can 
be  easily  detected  by  means  of  the  rules  laid  down. 
We  shall  therefore  speak  of  the  faults  proceeding  from 
the  matter.  These  may  be  divided  into  two,  fallacies 
of  thought  and  fallacies  of  words. 

Q.  Speak  of  each  of  them. 
-'  A.  Among  the  fallacies  of  thoughts  the  first  is  that 
called  of  accident^  which  occurs  when  we  attribute  to 
a  subject  a  predicate  as  substantial  and  necessary 
when  it  only  agrees  with  it  accidentally.  For  in- 
stance. Reason  is  oftentimes  faulty,  therefore  it  is  an 
evil. 

The  next  is  the  fallacy  of  passing  from  the  absolute 
to  the  relative,  and  vice  versd.  It  is  committed  when 
we  attribute  something  to  the  subject  In  an  absolute  and 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy.       t  o 5 

unconditional  manner  when  It  may  be  attributed  to  it 
only  under  certain  respects  and  conditions;  as,  Medi- 
cine gives  health  to  the  body,  therefore  it  should  al- 
ways be  taken. 

3.  The  fallacy  of  false  cause.  This  is  perpetrated 
when  we  assign  as  the  cause  of  something  that  which 
is  not  really  so  ;  as.  The  soul  united  to  the  body  thinks, 
therefore  the  soul  separated  from  the  body  cannot 
think. 

4-  I^^M^^^^  ^^^^  question  or  principle.  This  is  com- 
mitted when  we  assume  as  the  premises  of  reasoning 
that  which  must  be  proved,  though  we  use  different 
words — as.  The  human  soul  is  imperishable,  therefore 
it  is  immortal. 

5.  The  ignoraniia  elenchi.  It  is  incurred  when  the 
adversary  tries  to  evade  the  question  and  to  find  a 
contradiction  against  our  statement  which  is  really  not 
to  be  found  therein. 

6.  Fallacy  of  mafiy  questions.  This  is  committed 
when  the  adversary,  to  the  many  interrogations  which 
he  heaps  one  upon  the  other,  wants  a  single  answer, 
either  affirmative  or  negative,  whereas,  in  order  to  an- 
swer properly,  it  would  be  necessary  to  distinguish  and 
give  an  answer  to  each  question  in  particular. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
.    Fallacies  of  Words. 

O.  What  are  the  fallacies  of  words? 

A.  I.  Figure  o{  expression.  This  proceeds  from  the 
fact  that  an  expression  may  seem  like  to  another 
when  in  reality  it  is  not. 

2.  Equivocation — when  we  make  use  of.  an  am- 
biguous term  in  the  same  argument,        •.  •  > '        ^r^  .  :v 

3.  Fallacy  of  pronunciation,  when  we  use  promis- 


I  o6      Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

cuously  a  word  which  by  a  slight  variety  of  pronun- 
ciation may  be  made  to  signify  different  things. 

4.  Amphibology — when,  in  consequence  of  the 
structure  and  placing  of  words — there  arises  an  am- 
biguous sense  which  may  be  applied  to  one  or  to  the 
contrary  part.  For  instance,  that  answer  given  by  the 
oracle  of  Apollos  to  Pyrrhus,  King  of  Epirus:  Aio  te 
JEacida  Rofnanos  vincere  posse  ("  Pyrrhus  the  Romans 
shall,  I  say,  subdue  ") — which  closely  resembles,  as 
Shakspere  remarks,  the  witch  prophecy,  "The  duke 
yet  lives  that  Henry  shall  depose." 

5.  Fallacy  of  composition.  This  is  committed  when 
that  which  is  only  true  in  a  divided  sense  is  taken  in  a 
composite  sense — as,  Every  man  can  live  and  die. 

6.  Fallacy  of  division.  This  is  the  contrary  of  that 
of  composition,  and  is  committed  when  that  which 
is  true  in  a  composite  sense  is  used  in  a  divided  sense. 

Q.  How  are  fallacies  refuted  ? 

A.  If  the  syllogism  be  false  in  the  matter,  then  we 
must  deny  that  proposition  which  contains  falsehood. 
If  it  be  faulty  because  the  fallacy  renders  the  sense 
ambiguous,  then  we  must  clear  up  the  meaning  of  that 
proposition  which  presents  the  ambiguity. 


PART  THIRD. 


END    OF  REASONING. 

Q.   Of  what  shall  we  treat  in  the  third  part  of  logic  ? 

A.  The  end  of  reasoning  being  certainty  or  science, 
since  a  knowledge  which  is  certain  and  acquired  by 
reasoning  is  called  science,  it  follows  that  we  must 
speak  of  science  in  this  third  part.  But  in  science  we 
must  distinguish  two  things — that  which  is  properly 
so  called  and  th^  way  by  which  we  arrive  at  it,  which 
is  called  inethod.  Therefore,  in  treating  of  science  we 
must  speak  of  science  and  of  method.  And  because 
in  everything  we  find  first  the  way  to  it  and  then  the 
thing  itself,  therefore  we  shall  speak  of  method  first 
and  then  of  science.  We  shall  treat  of  method  in 
three  chapters:  i,  its  nature  and  necessity;  2,  its 
elements  and  means ;  3,  its  divisions. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  THE  NATURB  AND  THE  NECESSITY  OF  METHOD. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Definition  and  Necessity  of  Method  in  general. 

Q.  Define  method  and  its  nature.      ' 
A.  If  science  is  to  be  acquired  by  means  of  reason- 
ing, it  is  evident  that  it  is  Jiidden  and  fav  from  us,  and 

X07 


1 08       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

that  we  arrive  at  it  by  a  slow  process  of  the  mind. 
Now,  that  which  is  far  away  and  is  cicquired  slowly  by 
a  process  of  the  mind  sup^^oses  a  way  which  leads  to  it ; 
therefore  scierce  supposes  a  way  which  leads  to  it. 
This  way  is  called  method,  which  may  be  defined 
that  way  or  order  which  the  mind  follows  in  the  ac- 
quis it  ion  of  science. 

From  this  definition  it  appears  what  things  are  neces- 
sary to  have  method,  and  in  what  the  nature  of  the  lat- 
ter properly  consists.  The  method  is  a  way  or  road. 
Now,  we  find  three  things  in  a  road — the  starting-point, 
the  term  at  which  we  arrive,  and  the  means,  which  lies 
between  the  two.  Three  things,  likewise,  are  neces- 
sary in  method  :  the  principle,  from  which  it  starts, 
the  means,  and  the  end.  The  principle  or  principles, 
which  may  be  different  and  various,  are  those  truths, 
of  immediate  evidence,  and  indemonstrable,  which  are 
always  supposed  in  science,  and  which  are  taken  as  a 
starting-point,  and  maybe  of  fact  3.\\6.  of  reason  :  of 
fact — as,  The  ivorld  exists  ;  of  reason — as,  Nothing  can 
be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time.  The  end,  or  term,  is  sci- 
ence, because  it  is  that  which  method  aims  at.  The 
means  is  that  order  or  process  of  acts  which  the  mind 
pursues  to  arrive,  from  the  principles,  at  science. 

Now,  the  nature  of  method  does  not  consist  in  the 
principles  or  the  end  but  in  the  process,  because,  as  to 
the  principles,  they  must  be  already  known  ;  as  to  the 
term — that  is.  Science,  or  the  acquisition  of  truth — this 
follows,  and  is  a  consequence  of,  the  method.  There- 
fore, strictly  speaking,  the  nature  of  method  lies  in 
the  order  and  process  of  the  mind. 
•  Q.  What  is  the  difference  between  method  and 
reasoning  ?  .^ii:-<'.  h       ;  ^ 

A.  A  doubt  might  arise  from  what  we  have  said 
whether  method  and  reasoning  be  not  the  same  thing ; 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,       109 

because  if  method  is  a  process,  so  is  reasoning ;  if 
method  arrives  at  science  by  that  process  so  does  rea- 
soning; if  method  starts  Irom  indemonstrable  princi- 
ples, so  does  reasoning.  In  what,  then,  are  they  distin- 
guished from  each  other  ?  To  answer  this  question  we 
must  distinguish  with  St.  Thomas*  two  kinds  of  pro- 
cesses in  human  science  ;  "  The  first  is  a  process  of  suc- 
cession (and  time),  as  when,  after  having  considered  one 
thing,  we  turn  around  to  consider  another,  and  thus 
complete  our  first  knowledge.  The  other  process  is 
by  way  of  causality,  when  from  the  principles  we  draw 
conclusions  which  naturally  originate  from  them." 
The  first  process  is  that  of  one  who  views  a  variety 
of  objects  one  after  the  other ;  the  second  is  that 
of  one  who  considers  the  light  as  springing  from  the 
sun,  the  flower  as  budding  from  the  tr  ^,  etc.  The 
first  process  is  method ;  the  second  is  reasoning. 

Q.  Is  method  necessary? 

A.  By  the  nature  of  our  mind  we  are  so  constituted 
that  we  cannot  understand  everything  at  once  and  sim- 
ultaneously, but  must  understand  things  successively, 
and  part  after  part.  Now,  to  do  this  well  we  must 
follow  an  order  of  some  kind.  Therefore  it  is  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  acquire  science,  to  follow  a  certain 
order.  But  the  essence  of  method  lies  just  in  this 
order  ;  therefore  method  is  necessary. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
Method  must  be  One  and  Definite — Eclecticism, 

Q.  What  can  you  say  of  the  eclecticism  of  Cousin  ? 

A.  This  philosopher  has  broached  a  very  strange 
theory  about  method.  He  maintains  that  pure  error 
is  not  to  be  found  in  the  human  mind,  and  that  error 

♦  I  p.  qu.  14,  art.  7. 


no       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

is  an  incomplete  truth.  From  this  he  concludes  that 
all  the  erroneous  systems  of  philosophers  cannot  be 
called  so  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  contain  any 
truth  at  all,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  they  contain 
truth  in  an  incomplete  manner.  This  truth,  in  the 
long  succession  of  centuries  up  to  our  times,  has  al- 
ready been  exhausted  by  philosophers,  some  of  them 
pvesenting  one  part  and  some  another,  but  none  ex- 
hibiting the  whole  truth.  Hence  we  cannot  find  any 
new  truth ;  but  our  business  is  to  gather  the  truths 
scattered  here  and  there.  From  these  statements  he 
concludes  that  it  is  not  proper  to  have  any  determi- 
nate and  definite  system  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
but  that  we  should  gather  all  that  is  good  and  true 
here  and  there  in  every  system,  and,  rejecting  the 
false,  endeavor  to  reconcile  all  systems.  This  sort  of 
method  is  called  eclecticism. 

Now,  without  entering  into  the  examination  of  the 
principles  assumed — that  pure  error  is  impossible,  that 
error  is  an  incomplete  truth;  for  this  shall  be  done  in 
Metaphysics — we  say  that  this  theory  is  contradictory, 
because  at  the  same  time  that  it  rejects  all  sorts  of 
method  it  supposes  already  a  definite  method.  Be- 
cause how  could  the  mind  gather  the  truth  here  and 
there  in  this  system  or  in  the  other,  separate  it  from 
falsehood,  and  keep  the  one  and  reject  the  other,  with- 
out a  rule  to  guide  it  in  this  selection  and  discrimina- 
tion ?  Now,  this  rule  guiding  the  mind  in  this  process 
implies  a  method.  Therefore  eclecticism,  which  re- 
jects all  method,  supposes  a  method.  We  conclude, 
therefore,  that  a  method  is  necessary  to  acquire  science, 
and  that  this  must  be  definite.  In  fact,  a  method 
must  start  from  a  definite  point.  Now,  a  definite  point 
of  starting  renders  the  way  also  definite.  Method, 
therefore,  must  be  one  and  definite. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       iii 

ARTICLE  THIRD. 

Q.  How  can  we  determine  the  true  method  ? 

A.  This  is  a  very  difficult  question,  and  cannot  be 
answered  here  in  consequence  of  the  many  controver- 
sies which  have  arisen  on  the  point,  and  to  answer 
which  more  knowledge  of  philosophy  is  needed  than 
we  hitherto  acquired.  We  must,  therefore,  leave  the 
answer  to  this  question  for  another  part  of  this  work. 
Here  we  shall  give  those  essential  characteristics 
which  must  accompany  a  true  method,  whatever  it 
may  be.  Now,  the  first  essential  character  of  true 
method  is  that  it  must  be  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  our 
intellectual  faculties.  Because  method  is  that  process 
which  our  mind  follows  in  the  acquisition  of  truth. 
But  our  mind  and  our  intellectual  faculties  in  the 
acquisition  of  truth  follow  always  that  way  which  is 
natural  to  them ;  therefore  true  method  must  be 
agreeable  to  the  nature  of  our  mind.  Moreover, 
method  is  a  guide  and  a  help  to  lead  our  faculties  to 
science.  But  a  guide  contrary  to  the  nature  and 
faculties  of  a  being  would  be  a  hindrance  rather  than 
a  help  ;  therefore  true  method  should  be  agreeable  to 
the  nature  of  our  faculties.  ;, 

From  this  it  follows  that  a  true  method  must  pro- 
ceed after  these  laws  :  i.  In  the  investigation  of  truth 
it  must  start  from  that  which  is  better  known  to  come 
to  that  which  is  less  known.  This  law  is  clear,  and 
we  shall  only  explain  what  is  meant  by  it.  That 
which  is  more  knowable  may  be  understood  in  two 
ways — m  itself  and  according  to  its  nature^  or  in  rela- 
tion to  our  mind.  A  thing  is  called  better  known  in 
ttself  and  according  to  its  nature  when  it  is  naturally 
first  and  more  perfect  than  another,  as  the  cause  with 
regard   to   its   effects.    Hene  God,  who  is  most  per- 


112       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.  v 

feet  and  necessary,  is,  according  to  his  nature,  the  most 
knowable  of  all  beings.  But  oftentimes  that  which  is 
most  knowable  according  lo  its  nature  is  less  known 
in  regard  to  us — as,  for  instance,  some  cause  which, 
according  to  its  nature,  is  always  more  knowable  than 
itt  effects,  may,  with  regard  to  us,  be  less  known  than 
its  effects.  Now,  in  the  law  laid  down,  when  we  say 
that  we  must  proceed  from  that  whicK  is  better  known 
to  that  which  is  less  known,  we  mean  with  regard  to 
what  is  better  known  to  our  mind,  and  not  with  re- 
gard to  that  which  is  better  known  in  itself  and  by  its 
own  nature.  The  reason  is  easily  understood.  In 
every  road  the  starting-point  is  that  which  is  nearer 
to  the  one  who  is  to  go.  But  the  method  is  the  road 
of  our  mind ;  therefore  its  starting-point  should  be 
that  which  is  nearer  to,  and  better  ktioivn  with  regard 
to  it. 

The  second  law  is  that  the  mind  should  proceed 
from  the  better  known  to  the  less  known  gradually, 
and  not  by  leaps ;  because  the  last  conclusion  results 
from  the  preceding  conclusions,  and  hence  the  know- 
ledge of  the  last  conclusion  is  the  effect  of  the  pre- 
ceding conclusions.  Whenever  one  of  tbem  is  missing 
the  knowledge  of  our  mind  is  no  longer  perfect. 

The  third  law  prescribes  that  between  the  various 
gradations  and  conclusions  there  should  be  a  con- 
nection. , 


7  'r^'^v  ■^,-. '• .  '«%.'.'  .^t'' v:>'»'  .1-..' ' 


t" 


\. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ELEMENTS  AND  MEANS  OF  METHOD.  ' 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Of  the  Elements  of  Method ;  and,  firsts  of  Analysis  and 

Synthesis. 

Q.  What  are  the  elements  of  method  ? 

A.  The  essence  of  method,  as  we  have  seen,  consists 
not  in  the  principles  from  which  Jt  starts,  nor  in  the 
term  where  it  ends,  but  in  that  process  by  which  from 
the  principles  we  arrive  at  the  end.  Now,  this  pro- 
cess implies  an  order  of  operations  which  must  be  gone 
through  to  obtain  an  end.  The  elements  of  method, 
therefore,  are  those  operations  by  which  the  mind,  by 
means  of  reasoning,  arrives  at  science. 

Q.  How  many  of  these  operations  are  there? 

A.  Two,  analysis  and  synthesis.  The  first  is  that 
act  of  the  mind  which  resolves  a  certain  subject  into 
its  elements ;  and  because  we  cannot  resolve  anything 
except  it  is  composite,  therefore  analysis  is  that  opera- 
tion of  the  mind  which  travels  from  the  composite  to 
the  simple.  And,  again,  because  the  whole  is  more 
complex  than  its  parts,  the  effect  more  complex  than 
the  cause,  the  particular  more  co.nplex  than  the  uni- 
versal, the  example  more  so  thau  the  rule,  and  the  fact 
more  so  than  the  principle,  hence  analysis,  after  all, 
is  that  operation  which  travels  from  the  whole  to  the 
parts,  from  the  effects  to  the  cause,  from  the  particular 
to  the  universal,  from  the  example  to  the  rule,  from 

the  facts  to  the  principle.     Thus,  when  the  natural 

113 


114      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy^ 

philosopher,  from  the  experience  of  natural  pheno- 
mena, discovers  a  law,  he  proceeds  by  way  of  analysis ; 
when  an  artist,  from  the  various  examples,  draws  a 
rule,  he  also  makes  use  of  analysis. 

The  following  lines  of  Pope  are  a  specimen  of  the 
finest  analysis.  He  wants  to  prove  the  superiority  of 
reason  over  the  senses,  as  he  states  in  the  first  two 
lines : 

"  Far  as  creation's  ample  range  extends. 
The  scale  of  sensual,  mental  powers  ascends." 

And  he  proves  it  by  the  following  analysis : 

"  Mark  how  it  mounts  to  man's  imperial  race, 
From  the  green  myriads  in  the  peopled  grass  ; 
What  modes  of  sight  betwixt  each  wide  extreme. 
The  mole's  dim  curtain  and  the  lynx's  beam  ; 
Of  smell,  the  headlong  lioness  between, 
And  hound,  sagacious,  on  the  tainted  green; 
Of  hearing,  from  the  life  that  fills  the  flood, 
To  that  which  warbles  through  the  vernal  wood  ; 
The  spider's  touch,  how  exquisitely  fine  ! 
Feels  at  each  thread,  and  lives  along  the  line; 
In  the  wise  bee  what  sense  so  subtly  true 
From  poisonous  herbs  extracts  the  healing  dew! 
How  instinct  varies  in  the  grovelling  swine, 
Compared,  half-reasoning  elephant,  with  thir  .'  1 
'Twixt  that  and  reason,  what  nice  barrier, 
For  ever  separate,  yet  for  ever  near  I 
Remembrance  and  reflection,  hvnv  allied  ; 
What  thin  partitions  sense  from  thought  divide  ! 
And  middle  natures,  how  they  long  to  join, 
Yet  never  pass  the  insuperable  line  I 
Without  this  just  gradation  could  they  be 
Subjected,  these  to  those,  or  all  to  thee? 
The  powers  of  all  subdued  by  thee  alone. 
Is  not  thy  reason  all  these  powers  in  one  ?"  -  ■■    ' 

"■   -■  — Essay  on  Man, 

Synthesis  is  the  opposite  of  analysis.  It  means 
composition.  But  only  the  simple  is  put  together. 
Hence  synthesis,  after  all,  means  that  act  of  the  mind 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       1 1 5 

which  proceeds  from  the  simple  to  the  composite ; 
and  as  the  parts  are  more  simple  than  the  whole,  the 
cause  more  simple  than  the  effect,  the  universal  more 
so  than  the  particular,  the  principle  more  so  than  the 
fact,  the  rule  more  so  than  the  example,  hence  we 
have  the  operation  called  synthesis,  when  from  the 
parts  we  go  to  the  whole,  from  the  cause  to  the  effect, 
from  the  universal  to  the  particular,  from  the  principle 
to  the  fact,  from  the  rule  to  the  examples. 

ARTICLE    SECOND. 

Use  of  Analysis  and  Synthesis.  ' 

Q.  When  and  how  must  these  two  operations  be 
used? 

A.  A  great  dispute  has  arisen  among  philosophers  as 
to  when  and  how  to  use  these  two  operations;  some 
wanting  to  use  synthesis  first,  and  then  analysis,  and 
others  wanting  to  use  analysis  first,  and  synthesis  after- 
wards. To  resolve  this  question  we  must  observe,  in 
the  first  place,  that  when  the  mind*  sets  out  to  inves- 
tigate an  object,  it  must  know  it  somewhat,  at  least 
confusedly;  because  if  it  knew  it  net  it  would  not  set 
out  upon  its  investigation. 

2.  In  force  of  the  nature  of  our  intellect,  this  object 
to  be  investigated  must  be  presented  before  it  in  a 
complex  state. 

3.  The  mind  truly  knows  it  when  it  knows  all  its 
parts  and  the  manner  by  which  they  are  knit  to- 
gether. If  this  last  observation  needed  any  proof  it 
might  be  demonstrated  thus :  Then  only  have  we  a 
true  knowledge  when  it  corresponds  to  the  reality  of 
the  object.  Now,  to  get  at  the  reality  of  an  object 
which  is  complex  two  things  are  required  ;  the  parts 
and  their  union,  made  according  to  the  nature  of  the 


Ii6       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

object.  Therefore  it  is  only  when  we  know  the  parts 
of  a  complex  object,  and  the  manner  after  which  they 
are  knit  together,  that  we  can  be  said  to  have  true 
knowledge  of  it. 

Having  premised  these  things,  we  come  to  the  solu- 
tion of  the  question,  Which  must  we  use  first  in  the 
acquisition  of  science,  synthesis  or  analysis?  We 
say,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  is  impossible  not  to  make 
use  of  analysis  in  science  ;  because,  when  we  come  to 
know  and  to  distinguish  the  parts  of  a  whole  appre- 
hended in  a  confused  manner  at  first,  the  process 
which  we  follow  is  analytic.  Again,  it  is  impossible 
not  to  use  synthesis ;  because,  to  have  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  a  whole,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  know  its 
pr.rts,  but  it  is  necessary  to  know  how  they  lie  to  each 
other  and  to  the  whole.  This  process,  as  it  is  evident, 
is  synthetic ;  therefore  in  science  we  must  use  both. 

Besides,  we  are  so  made  by  nature  that  our  know- 
ledge ordinarily  begins  from  experience  and  from 
facts,  and  from  them  arises  to  principles.  Now,  this 
is  analysis.  On  the  other  hand,  experience  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  give  us  science,  because  it  does  nothing-more 
than  to  affirm  a  fact ;  hence  we  stand  in  need  of  syn- 
thesis also,  which  shows  the  connection  of  facts  with 
principles;  therefore  science  needs  both  these  opera- 
tions. The  second  question  is,  How  are  they  to  be 
used,  supposing  that  they  are  both  necessary? 

We  have  said  that  the  first  thing  we  do  after  that 
confused  knowledge  of  an  object  is  to  separate  and 
distinguish  the  parts,  and  then  we  study  the  i.ianner 
in  which  they  are  used.  Therefore  we  begin  first  by 
analysis  and  then  use  synthesis.  Again,  we  have  said 
that  our  knowledge  starts  from  experience.  Now,  ex- 
perience implies  analysis^  therefore  in  science  we 
begin  first  from  analysis.     This,  of  course,  '-  under- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       117 

stood  in  a  subjective  sense,  inasmuch  as  science  is  an 
act  of  our  mind,  but  not  inasmuch  as  when,  after  hav- 
ing acquired  science,  we  wish  to  impart  it  to  others. 
In  that  case  we  use  analysis  first  and  synthesis 
afterwards,  or  vica  versa,  just  as  we  see  it  more  con- 
ducive to  our  object  of  imparting  it. 

ARTICLE   THIRD. 
On  Definition 

Q.  What  is  definition  ? 

A.  Whatever  may  be  tne  starting-point  of  our 
minds,  either  analysis  or  synthesis,  it  must  have  some 
fixed  limits,  in  order  not  to  be  too  much  distracted  and 
wandering  about.  These  limits  are  appointed  by  defi- 
nition and  division. 

Definition  is  a  short  discourse  which  declares  what 
is  that  of  which  we  are  treating.  It  may  declare  a 
name  or  a  thing,  and  hence  is  distinguished  into  no- 
minal and  real.  It  is  called  nominal  when  it  explains 
the  signification  of  a  name  ;  r^«/ when  it  manifests  the 
nature  of  the  thing  signified  by  the  name.  Both  may 
be  formed  in  different  ways,  and,  therefore,  are  of  dif- 
ferent kinds.  The  nominal  definition  may  be  formed 
in  three  different  ways:  i.  From  the  etymology,  as 
when  we  say,  TJie  word  philosophy  means  love  of  zvisdom. 
2.  From  the  common  use  in  which  a  word  is  taken — 
as,  A  wise  man  is  understood  by  all  to  mean  one  who 
judges  from  the  standpoint  of  the  highest  causes.  3.  From 
our  special  signification — as,  /  mean  by  eloquejice  the 
present  impassioned  state  of  my  soul  transfused  into 
words. 

A  real  definition  maybe  also  formed  in  three  ways: 
I.  By  giving  the  essential  constituents  of  a  being;  as, 
Man  is  a  reasonable  animal.  2.  By  explaining  the  man- 


ii8      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

ner  in  which  it  has  been  produced  ;  as,  The  circle  is  a 
figure  described  by  the  extremity  of  a  straight  line 
turning  upon  the  other  fixed  extremity.  This  is  called 
genetic  definition.  3.  By  describing  the  thing  by  its 
most  important  accidents  and  exterior  causes ;  as, 
Man  is  an  animal,  provident,  sagacious,  full  of  reason 
and  counsel.  This  is  called  descriptive  and  is  used  in 
oratory.  The  nominal  definition  must  always  precede 
the  real,  it  being  of  the  utmost  importance  in  a  dis- 
pute to  be  agreed  upon  the  signification  of  the  terms 
used.  But  to  determine  the  nature  of  a  thing  the 
real  definition  is  the  most  important  and  necessary  to 
a  methodic  process. 

Q.  Give  the  laws  of  definition. 

A.  I .  The  definition  must  be  clearer  than  that  which 
is  defined^  because  the  whole  object  of  the  definition 
is  just  this. 

2.  The  thing  defined  must  not  enter  into  the  definition^ 
at  least  under  the  same  respect  in  which  it  is  defined^ 
otherwise  we  should  declare  the  unknown  by  th^  un- 
known. 

3.  It  must  be  convertible  tvith  the  thing  de fitted. 

4.  //  must  be  formed  from  the  proximate  genus  and 
the  specific  difference  of  the  thing  to  be  defined,  because 
the  definition  must  fix  the  proper  limits  of  a  being. 
Now,  every  being  agrees  in  some  things  with  other 
beings  and  disagrees  in  other  things;  therefore  a  defi- 
nition must  express  that  in  which  the  object  defined 
agrees  with  others  and  that  in  which  it  differs  from 
them.  This  is  done  by  using  the  proximate  genus 
and  the  specific  difference. 


'■}■•',    \:-,.y^^:    i:''. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,       119 

ARTICLE  FOURTH. 

Of  Division. 

Q.  What  is  division,  and  how  many  kinds  of  divisions 
are  there  ? 

A.  Division  is  the  distribution  of  a  whole  into  its 
parts ;  it  is  of  as  many  kinds  as  we  may  suppose  a  whole 
to  be.  Now,  a  whole  can  be  so  actually  or  potentially. 
It  is  actually  so  when  it  is  really  composed  of  parts, 
which  may  be  physical,  as  in  a  house  the  walls,  the 
roof,  etc.;  metaphysical,  as  in  man  animality  and  ra- 
tionality ;  accidental,  as  the  modifications  of  a  being ; 
logical,  when  they  are  supposed  by  the  mind. 

It  is  potentially  so  when  it  actually  has  no  parts, 
but  can  have  them  as  the  universal  relatively  to  the 
particular  ;  genus,  for  instance,  respectively  to  species ; 
because,  though  genus  actually  does  not  contain  the 
species,  yet  it  maybe  divided  according  to  the  species, 
as  animals  may  be  divided  into  reasonable  and  unrea- 
sonable. Division,  therefore,  may  distribute  the  ac- 
tual and  the  potential  whole. 

Q.  What  are  the  laws  of  division? 

A.  The  following:  i.  It  must  be  entire;  that  is, 
that  no  part  of  the  subject  must  be  left  out,  so  that 
all  the  parts  put  together  may  be  equal  to  the  whole. 

2.  The  parts  must  be  somewhat  opposed  to  each 
other,  so  that  the  one  does  not  contain  the  other.' 

3.  The  division  should  be  effected  in  an  orderly 
way;  that  is,  a  subject  should  be  divided  first  in  its 
more  general  parts,  and  these  in  their  turn  subdivided, 
and  so  on. 

4.  It  should  not  be  too  minute,  which  would  engen- 
der confusion. 


•  .^    -* 


■?   ■■ 


CHAPTER  III. 

DIVISION   OF    METHOD— THAT  A5,   OF  METHOD  OF  INVEN- 
TION AND  OF  DISCIPLINE. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  method"  are  there? 

A.  Two,  method  of  invention  and  method  of  dis- 
cipline. We  can  attain  science  in  two  ways :  either  by 
discovering  it  ourselves  or  by  learning  it  from  one  who 
has  already  found  it.  The  first  is  called  method  of 
invention  ;  the  other,  of  discipline. 

Q.  What  are  the  truths  which  the  intellect  may 
discover  ? 

A.  Four  questions  may  always  be  raised  upon  a 
subject:  i.  Whether  it  exists?  2.  What  is  it?  3. 
What  are  its  qualities  ?  4.  What  originates  its  ex- 
istence, and  for  what  does  it  exist  ?  Hence  there  are 
four  truths  which  may  be  discovered  in  a  subject : 
existence,  essence  and  nature,  qualities,  and  the  causes 
of  existence.  Of  these  four  truths  two  properly  be- 
long to  science  :  What  is  it,  and  from  whence  comes 
it,  and  why  ?  That  is  the  essence  and  the  efficient 
and.final  cause  of  a  thing.  The  others  are  subject  to 
experience,  and  are  a  way  to  science,  but  not  science 
itself. 

Q.  What  are  the  means  to  obtain  truth  ? 

A.  They  can  be  of  two  kinds,  direct  and  indirect, 
because  we  can  either  discover  truth  by  ourselves  or 
learn  it  from  others  ;  the  first  is  called  direct,  the 
other  indirect.  The  direct  may  belong  to  sensitive 
and  to  intellectual  knowledge.  Now,  using  these  two 
means  to  arrive  at  science,  two  things  may  happen  : 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      121 

either  we  arrive  at  the.  knowledge  of  the  principles  and 
of  the  nature  of  a  thing  or  we  do  not.  If  the  first,  then 
our  mind  is  satisfied  and  rests  ;  if  the  second,  the  mind, 
to  be  satisfied,  seeks  some  other  means,  and  supposes 
a  principle  which  may  explain  all  the  accidents  of  the 
subject,  and  which  may  fulfil  the  office  of  its  nature 
for  the  time  being  until  it  succeeds  really  to  find  it 
out.     This  supposed  principle  is  called  hypothesis. 

Such  is  the  way  which  the  mind  follows  in  the  pursuit 
of  truth.  Of  t.he  senses  and  of  the  intellect,  and  of  their 
value  as  means  of  truth,  and  of  the  indirect  means— 
that  is,  the  testimony  of  others — we  shall  speak  in 
another  place.  Here  we  shall  say  a  few  words  with 
regard  to  experience  and  to  hypothesis. 

Q.  What  is  experience,  and  what  are  its  laws  ? 

A.  Experience  has  often  been  confounded  with 
observation.  To  observe  is  to  look  at  the  facts  jii"*- 
as  they  happen,  and  nothing  more,  whereas  experience 
means  always  a  certain  knowledge  of  some  properties 
revealed  by  observation.  Hence  is  it  that,  though 
observation  is  satisfied  with  one  fact,  experience 
requires  several,  and  most  rarely  is  satisfied  with 
one,  and  when  this  happens  the  fact  must  be  of 
the  highest  importance  and  equivalent  to  many  facts. 
This  is  the  reason  also  why  the  word  experience  has 
been  extended  not  only  to  mean  the  gathering  of  a 
property  of  an  object  from  the  observation  of  many 
facts,  but  is  used  to  mean  the  artificial  reprbduction 
of  facts  to  force,  as  it  were,  the  object  more  clearly 
to  reveal  its  properties.  Thus  chemists,  for  instance, 
make  experiments  by  reproducing  facts  and  pheno- 
mena to  force  the  object  to  reveal  itself.  In  one 
word,  experience  and  experiment  are  ordained  to 
gather  from  the  observation  of  facts  the  properties 
and  qualities  of  beings. 


122      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy 

» 

The  laws  which  must  guide  us  in  the  experience  of 
facts  are:  i.  We  must  pay  attention  to  the  least 
circumstances  of  place,  of  time,  of  manner,  because 
the  least  influence  of  these  things  causes  a  variation 
in  the  experiment.  2.  We  must  repeat  and  vary 
the  experiment,  try  it  with  other  instruments  and 
under  different  circumstances,  oftentimes  using  a  con- 
trary process,  in  order  that  the  phenomenon  may  be 
known  under  all  its  aspects.  3.  We  must  protract 
the  experiment  for  a  certain  time,  and  pay  attention 
to  those  more  constant  and  stable  effects  and  con- 
ditions which  may  accompany  the  phenomenon. 
These  laws  require  the  utmost  diligence  in  their  ob- 
^  servation,  and  the  greatest  patience  in  continuing 
them. 

Q.  What  is  hypothesis,  and  what  are  its  laws  ? 

A.  We  have  said  that  oftentimes,  in  spite  of  all  our 
constancy  in  experimenting,  we  cannot  find  the  prin- 
ciple and  reason  of  a  phenomenon.  Then  we  put 
forth  a  principle  which  may  better  explain  it ;  this  is 
called  hypothesis,  which  may  be  defined :  A  probable 
opinion  put  forth  to  explain  the  nature  and  reason  of 
a  phenomenony  which  nature  and  reason  are  not  known 
by  experience^  nor  as  yet  demonstrated  by  reason.  The 
laws  are:  i.  We  must  only  take  as  an  hypothesis  that 
principle  which  may  explain  most  of  the  circum- 
stances, and  these  the  most  important. 

2.  That  it  contain  nothing  repugnant  to  the  laws 
of  nature  already  known. 

3.  That,  among  the  hypotheses,  should  be  chosen 
which  proceeds  in  the  most  simple  way.   ■ 

If  in  the  prosecution  of  the  experiments  we  find  out 
that  that  hypothesis  explains  the  true  nature  of  the 
phenomenon,  then  the  probability  becomes  certainty 
and  the  hypothesis  becomes  thesis. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        1 23 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 

Of  the  Method  of  Discipline. 

Q.  What  is  meant  by  teaching? 

A.  When  science  is  found  the  method  employed  to 
communicate  it  to  others  is  called  didactic,  or  of  dis- 
cipline. In  order  to  understand  the  nature  of  this 
method  we  must  see  what  it  is  to  teach  science. 

To  teach  is  to  manifest  the  science  which  we  know, 
and  to  cause  others  to  learn  it.  But  to  know,  in  a 
scientific  way,  means  to  deduce  a  conclusion  from 
principles  certain  and  evident ;  therefore  to  teach 
science  implies  inducing  the  mind  of  the  pupil  to 
draw  consequences  from  known  principles.  Hence  it 
appears  that  the  teacher  is  not  the  principal  cause  of 
the  science  in  the  disciple,  but  a  guide  who,  by  means 
of  signs — that  is,  words — leads  the  disciple  and  induces 
him  to  draw  conclusions  from  known  principles  in  the 
same  manner  as  he  drew  them  himself.  "Hence  the 
principle  or  cause  of  the  science  in  this  case  is  not 
the  teacher  but  the  reason  of  the  disciple. 

From  this  appears  the  strangeness  of  the  opinion  of 
those  who  hold  that  the  analytic  method  is  good  to 
discover  science,  the  synthetic  to  impart  it.  We  say 
that  in  general  the  best  method  of  teaching  science  is 
the  same  one  which  discovered  it.  Because  to  teach 
is  to  incite  the  mind  of  the  disciple  to  form  those 
same  demonstrations  which  are  in  our  mind;  there- 
fore the  easiest  method  is  the  same  followed  by  us  in 
the  formation  of  those  demonstrations. 

Besides,  between  the  method  of  invention  and 
that  of  discipline  exists  the  same  difference  which 
intervenes  between  nature  and  art,  because  the  in- 
ventive method  is  natural,  that  of  discipline  is  arti- 
ficial.     But  art  must  imitate  nature ;   therefore  the 


124      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

method  of  discipline  must  imitate  the  method  of  in- 
vention. 

This,  however,  must  not  be  understood  so  strictly 
as  to  forbid  the  use  of  any  other  method.  The  best 
rule  in  this  matter  is,  that  method  is  the  best  which 
best  facilitates  the  acquisition  of  science,  and  there- 
fore when  the  analytic  answers  the  purpose  let  the 
analytic  be  followed  ;  when  the  synthetic,  let  the  latter 
be  followed,  because  the  easiest  and  the  clearest  way 
is  always  the  most  natural. 


,  i       ;rf  , ; 


■( 


.•>.' 


. ')  , 


j^,  r*  ^   '     -     > 


CHAPTER   IV. 

OF  SCIENCE,  ACCORDING  TO  ITS  STRICTEST  ACCEPTATION, 
INASMUCH  AS  IT  IS  KNOWLEDGE. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Idea  of  Science. 

Q.  In  how  many  ways  can  the  word  science  be 
used  ? 

A.  In  two  ways,  though  both  are  connected  to- 
gether. In  the  first  place,  science  implies  a  particular 
knowledge  of  an  object.  But  our  mind  can  have  also 
several  distinct  ideas  of  an  object,  and  form  several 
distinct  conclusions  about  it,  which  it  may  put  to- 
gether in  order  and  form  a  whole  body  of  knowledge. 
Hence,  in  the  second  place,  science  may  be  used  also 
to  express  that  orderly  series  of  scientific  knowledge 
we  form  about  an  object.  In  this  chapter  we  shall 
treat  of  science  in  the  first  signification,  leaving  it  to 
the  next  to  treat  of  it  in  its  second  acceptation. 

Q.  Give  an  idea  of  science  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  spe- 
cial knowledge  of  an  object. 

A.  It  is  called  a  special  knowledge  of  a  set  purpose, 
because  science  does  not  mean  any  knowledge  what- 
ever, but  only  a  perfect  knowledge.  This  sense  is 
attached  to  science  even  by  common  sense,  because 
men  generally  attach  a  different  sense  to  the  word 
knowledge  and  to  that  of  science,  meaning  by  the 
latter  a  fuller,  more  evident,  and  more  noble  know- 
ledge. Science,  therefore,  implies  a  perfect  knowledge. 
From  this  idea  we  can  draw  the  elements  necessary 
and  essential  to  the  conception  of  science,  because 


126       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophyi 

three  things  are  necessary  to  have  a  perfect  knowledge : 

1.  It  must  be  certain,  because,  besides  certainty,  there 
is  nothing  but  doubt  and  probability,  or  opinion.  But 
doubt  is  the  want  of  knowledge,  and  probability  is  an 
imperfect  knowledge,  always  implying  a  certain  fear 
of  the  contrary  ;  therefore  we  can  call  perfect  only 
that  knowledge  which  is  accompanied  by  a  certainty. 

2.  It  must  be  evident,  either  mediately,  or  immedi- 
ately ;  because,  if  knowledge  is  certain,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  mind  should  have  no  fear  of  the  contrary. 
To  have  no  fear  of  the  contrary  the  mind  must  feel 
perfectly  secure  about  it.  To  feel  perfectly  secure 
it  is  necessary  that  it  should  sec  clearly  into  the 
principles  on  which  it  is  founded,  and  discover  the 
connection  between  those  principles  and  the  conclu- 
sions drawn  from  them  ;  therefore  science  must  be 
evident  knowledge.  Moreover,  if  this  knowledge  were 
not  evident  but  obscure,  it  would  not  be  perfect  but 
imperfect.  3.  It  must  be  a  k*'  'ge  deduced  from 
its  causes,  because  otherv.  it  c  ild  be  neither  cer- 
tain, evident,  nor  perfec  - -^♦^  .ertain,  because  then 
only  can  we  be  said  to  have  certainty  when  not  only 
do  we  know  that  a  thing  is  but  also  that  it  must  be  so, 
which  absolutely  excludes  all  fear  of  the  opposite. 
But  the  necessity  that  a  thing  must  be  so  is  only 
known  when  we  discover  the  cause  and  the  connection 
which  it  has  with  it.  Therefore  knowledge,  to  be  cer- 
tain, must  be  deduced  from  its  causes.  It  could  not 
be  evident,  because  when  the  mind  can  see  no  connec- 
tion between  a  thing  and  its  cause  it  cannot  have  true 
evidence,  as  it  can  see  a  void,  and  never  can  rest  until 
it  discovers  that  connection.  It  could  not  be  perfect, 
since  that  knowledge  alone  is  perfect  which  leaves 
nothing  to  discover,  and  when  we  know  not  the  cause 
of  a  thing  we  cannot  say  that  there  is  nothing  more 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,      127 

to  discover;  therefore  science  must  be  a  knowledge 
deduced  from  its  principles. 

Q.  Give  a  full  definition  of  science  according  to  the 
above  principles. 

A.  A  knowledge,  certain  and  evident,  deduced  from 
its  principles  or  causes.  Here  a  difficulty  might  be 
raised.  We  cannot  always  investigate  the  cause  of  an 
object,  and  yet  we  can  have  a  scientific  knowledge  of 
it.  For  instance,  God  has  no  cause,  and  yet  we  can 
have  the  science  of  Him,  which  is  called  Theology. 

In  answer  to  this  difficulty  we  say  that  when  we 
cannot  investigate  the  cause  of  an  object,  in  that  case 
the  knowledge  of  its  effects  performs  the  office  of  the 
cause,  as  when  we  say  God  exists  because  He  has 
created  the  world,  God  is  most  perfect  because  He 
is  the  cause  of  all  the  perfections  of  creatures  ;  here 
the  knowlec-^e  of  the  effect  performs  the  office  of 
cause. 

O.  How  can  we  make  the  effect  officiate  as  cause? 
Is  not  this  contradictory? 

A.  When  a  cause  has  produced  a  certain  effect,  it 
has  imposed  the  necessity  of  its  own  existence  for 
having  produced  that  effect,  and  of  its  being  such  by 
nature  as  the  effect  produced  requires  ;  because  as,  on 
one  side,  the  effect  must  necessarily  exist  since  the 
cause  has  acted,  and  must  be  such,  and  not  otherwise, 
as  the  cause  has  made  it,  so  likewise,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  cause  must  necessarily  exist  because  its 
effects  exist ;  it  must  necessarily  have  produced  it, 
because  the  effect  is  already  produced,  and  must 
necessarily  be  so-and-so,  because  the  effect  is  so- 
and-so,  and  not  otherwise.  Therefore  in  this  case 
the  effect  performs  the  office  of  cause  in  the  con- 
struction of  science,  since  we  can  argue  from  a  certain 
effect  the  existence  of  the  cause,  its  being  produced 


128      Elements  of  Intelleclual  Philosophy, 

by  the  cause,  and  somewhat  the  nature  of  the  cause. 
Hence  St.  Thomas  has  observed  that  when  we  de- 
monstrate the  cause  by  its  effects,  then  the  effect 
officiates  as  the  cause,  and  the  definition  of  the  effect 
is  (nven  instead  of  that  of  the  cause.  Here  we  must 
observe  that  we  do  not  say  that  the  effect  is  the  cause 
of  the  existence  of  the  cause,  as  Hegel  objected 
with  regard  to  the  demonstration  of  the  existence  of 
God  from  His  effects.  We  only  say  that  the  effect 
merely  officiates  as  the  cause  in  the  demonstration,  in- 
asmuch as  we  have  said  every  effect  necessarily  sup- 
poses a  cause,  and  such  a  cause  as  befits  the  effect ; 
and,  therefore,  supposing  the  existence  of  the  effect, 
the  cause  also  must  exist,  and  be  such  as  the  effect 
requires.  Besides,  by  the  same  cause  we  do  not 
merely  understand  the  efficient  and  the  final  causes, 
but  also  the  principles  essential  to  a  being,  ^  hich  form 
it,  which  may  be  reduced  to  the  formal  cause.  But 
the  essential  principles  of  a  being  may  be  easily  read 
and  discovered  in  their  effects  more  or  less,  according 
as  the  effect  approaches  the  cause  and  equals  its 
power,  as  we  must  find  the  similitude  of  the  cause  in 
its  effect.  Therefore,  even  when  we  demonstrate  from 
effects,  science  is  knowledge  from  its  causes.  It  may 
not  be  quite  perfect,  but  it  is  science  for  all  that,  be- 
cause containing  all  the  elements  of  science. 

Q.  What  must  you  observe  as  to  the  object  of 
science  ? 

A.  I.  Science  must  have  for  its  object  the  essence 
and  the  immutable  relations  of  the  essence  of  things. 
It  must  have  for  its  object  the  essence,  because  science 
is  knowledge  certain  and  universal.  But  such  know- 
ledge must  have  an  Qbject,  which  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  immutable;  therefore  the  object  of  science  must 
be   immutable.     But   only   essences  are   immutable; 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       129 

therefore  the  object  of  science  must  be  the  essences 
of  things. 

Of  these  essences  we  must  know  the  elements  and 
their  immutable  relations,  because  science  lies  in  the 
knowledge  of  the  connection  and  relation  between 
effects  and  their  causes.  But  we  could  not  know  this 
connection  between  effects  and  their  causes  without 
knowing  the  elements  and  the  immutable  relations  of 
the  essences  of  things  ;  therefore,  etc. 

The  second  observation  is  in  relation  to  what  is 
necessary  in  the  intelligent  subject  in  order  to  have 
scientific  knowledge.  Because  it  is  not  necessary,  in 
order  to  have  a  scientific  knowledge  of  an  object,  to 
have  been  able  to  produce  it,  as  was  asserted  by  Vico, 
who  held  that  the  intellect  knows  only  what  it  docs ; 
but  it  is  sufficient  that  there  exist  a  means  which  may 
represent  to  our  mind  effects  and  their  causes,  their 
relations  and  essences,  in  which  means  the  mind  may 
see  all  those  things.  This  means  we  have  in  ideas, 
and  the  force  of  reading  them  lies  in  our  intellect. 
The  principle  of  Vico  would  only  render  possible  one 
science — that  is,  mathematics,  which  is  the  creation  of 
man  ;  and  upon  this  principle  the  German  panthe- 
ists have  constructed  their  system,  as  we  shall  see  in 
its  proper  place. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
Of  Science  in  Relation  to  Opinion  and  Faith. 

Q.  How  is  science  distinguished  from  opinion  and 
faith?     :  ,.,-.:  ^  , 

A.  As  to  opinion,  science  Is  distinguishable  from  it 
in  four  ways:  i.  \n  knowledge,  \^\\\q\\  in  science  most 
firmly  clings  to  the  object  known  without  the  least 


1 30      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

fear  of  the  opposite,  whereas  opinion  impHes  an  adhe- 
sion of  the  mind  with  fear  of  the  opposite. 

2.  As  to  the  matter;  this  in  science  being  always 
necessary  and  immutable,  whereas  in  opinion  it  is 
oftentimes  mutable  and  contingent. 

3.  For  the  means,  which  in  science  is  the  demon- 
strative syllogism,  deducing  certain  and  evident  know- 
ledge from  its  causes,  whilst  in  opinion  the  means 
is  the  probable  syllogism. 

4.  For  the  manner  according  to  which  they  are  pro- 
duced, science  being  produced  by  one  efficacious  de- 
monstration, whilst  opinion  is  engendered  by  the 
aid  of  various  syllogisms  in  consequence  of  their 
weakness. 

As  to  faith,  science  can  be  distinguished  from  it 
for  two  reasons:  I.  The  certainty  of  science  consists 
in  two  things — in  the  intrinsic  evidence  of  the  object 
and  in  the  firmness  of  adhesion  of  the  mind.  On  the 
contrary,  faith  consists  only  in  the  firmness  of  the  ad- 
hesion of  the  mind,  not  caused  by  the  internal  evi- 
dence of  the  object  as  perceived  by  the  mind,  but  by 
the  external  evidence  only  if  we  speak  of  human 
faith,  and  by  other  causes  if  we  speak  of  divine  faith, 
the  clinging  of  the  mind  which  the  latter  implies  being 
caused  also  by  an  internal  operation  of  God  upon  the 
soul. 

2.  In  science  we  adhere  to  the  qqx\z\w^\ox\  forced  by 
the  necessity  of  the  principles.  In  faith  we  cling  to 
the  object  prompted  by  the  will,  which  presents  that 
belief  as  good.  r"       . 


'^\«\\y^X\^:'S"^    ^ ','>•-•.'-:..  \\':VW\'     '-^     ^-t\ 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  SCIENCE  IN  ITS  MORE  ENLARGED  SIGNIFICATION  INAS- 
MUCH AS  IT  IS  A  SYSTEM  OF  TRUTHS, 

ARTICLE   FIRST." 
Idea  of  Science  in  this  Second  Sense. 

Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  science  in  this  second 
sense  ? 

A.  Any  system  of  truths  belonging  to  a  definite 
order  of  things  and  presented  in  one  body. 

Q.  Is  not  science,  understood  in  this  latter  sense, 
confounded  with  art,  in  which  truths  and  rules  are 
also  presented  in  one  body  ? 

A.  Art  is  only  an  order  of  rules  upon  some  particu- 
lar thing,  whereas  science  is  always  a  deduction.  In 
art  we  do  not  always  find  the  evidence  of  principles ; 
in  science  always.  In  art  the  order  of  rules  which  it 
gives  cannot,  strictly  speaking,  be  called  a  system  ;  in 
science  the  body  of  truths  which  it  exhibits  is  always 
called  a  system.  Three  things,  therefore,  are  the  pro- 
perty of  science  in  this  second  sense :  principles,  de- 
duction, and  system. 

Q.  What  about  principles? 

A.  A  principle  is  that  from  which  a  thing  proceeds ; 
and  because  we  here  speak  of  knowledge,  the  principle 
is  that  by  which  a  thing  is  known.  But  we  do  not 
know  by  means  of  another  principle,  except  that 
which  cannot  be  known  by  itself;  therefore  we  must 
call  principles  those  propositions  known  of  them- 
selves, and  which  are  the  cause  of  the  knowledge  of 

»3I 


132       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       , 

many  others — for  instance,  Every  effect  supposes  a 
cause ;  Those  things  which  are  equal  to  a  third  are 
equal  to  one  another.  NotJmig  can  be  and  not  be  at  the 
same  time ;  from  which  it  appears  that  there  are  three 
properties  of  a  principle — evidence,  necessity,  and 
universality.  Evidence  is  that  property  by  which 
a  thing,  in  being  presented  to  our  mind,  makes  itself 
known  most  clearly.  It  is  of  two  kinds,  mediate 
and  immediate.  It  is  called  immediate  when  the 
thing  can  be  known  by  itself  without  the  need  of  any 
other,  as  the  principles  above  mentioned.  It  is  called 
mediate  when  the  truth  cannot  be  known  by  itself, 
but  stands  in  need  of  other  truths  to  be  known.  The 
evidence  of  principles  must  be  immediate,  because  it 
must  be  the  cause  of  the  knowledge  of  other  truths. 
From  this  property  of  evidence  flows  the  other,  of  ne- 
cessity. Because  if  the  thing  is  evident  by  itself  the 
mind  cannot  refuse  its  adhesion  to  it,  but  must  neces- 
sarily give  it.  This  is  called  the  necessity  of  a  prin- 
ciple. Finally,  universality,  the  third  property  of  a 
principle,  is  a  consequence  flowing  from  the  very  na- 
ture of  a  principle.  A  principle  is  that  which  is  the 
cause  of  0  knowledge  of  many  other  truths.  Now, 
this  must  be  understood,  inasmuch  as  these  truths 
are  contained  in  that  principle.  Now,  this  property 
of  being  able  to  extend  to  many  truths,  and  in  all 
cases,  is  called  the  universality  of  a  principle  ;  there- 
fore a  principle  must  be  universal. 

Q.  Can  there  be  one  principle  for  all  sciences? 

A.  This  is  impossible,  because,  i,  the  principles  of 
sciences  must  correspond  with  the  real  and  objective 
principles  of  things.  But  the  species  of  things  which 
are  the  object  of  our  knowledge  are  many  and  various ; 
therefore  many  and  various  must  be  the  principles 
of  sciences.      2.   A   principle   is  a  law — that  is,  ex- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      133 

presses  a  certain  respect  according  to  which  things 
comprehended  in  it  are  regulated.  But  things  are 
many  and  various,  and  various  are  the  respects  under 
which  they  may  be  regarded  ;  therefore  various  must 
be  .the  principles  of  sciences.  It  is  true  that  there 
exists  one  principle  which  is  the  foundation  of  cer- 
tainty, the  principle  of  contradiction,  but  this  can 
never  be  such  as  to  enable  us  to  derive  from  its  first 
cause  the  science  of  an  object.  This  principle  does 
not  regard  any  matter  of  science. 

Q.   How  are  principles  divided  ? 

A.  Into  proper  and  common.  Common  principles 
V.  are  those  which  are  used  in  all  sciences  ;  as,  Nothing  is 
done  witho7tt  a  sufficient  reason  ;  It  is  impossible  that  a 
thing  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time,  of  the  same  kind. 
Proper  and  other  principles  are  those  which  regard 
the  special  matter  of  a  particular  science  ;  as,  Do  as 
you  would  be  done  by,  which  is  a  principle  of  the 
moral  science. 

Into  analytic  and  synthetic.  The  first  are  those  in 
which  the  predicate  is  found  in  the  idea  of  the  sub- 
ject ;  as.  The  ivhole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts. 
The  second  are  those  in  which  the  predicate  is  not 
included  in  that  of  the  subject,  but  is  attached  to  it  in 
force  of  our  experience  ;  as.  Every  body  tends  towards 
its  centre.  In  other  words,  the  one  originates  in  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  the  other  does  not. 

The  opposite  of  the  analytic  principles  is  absolute, 
repugnant,  and  contradictory,  and  not  even  God  him- 
self could  effect  it ;  but  the  opposite  of  synthetic 
principles  is  contradictory  only  hypothetically,  that  is, 
supposing  that  the  laws  according  to  which  bodies  are 
governed  be  maintained  constant.  For  instance,  it  is 
an  absolute  contradiction  to  say  that  a  thing  is  and  is 
not  at  the  same  time,  and  God  himself  could  not  effect 


134       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

such  a  thing;  but  it  is  not  contradictory  in  itself  to 
say  that  a  body,  instead  of  tending  towards  its  centre, 
should  tend  upwards,  because  this  may  be  done  by 
suspending  the  law  of  gravitation,  which  is  net  essen- 
tial to  the  nature  of  the  body.  It  is  only  contra- 
dictory in  the  hypothesis  that  the  laws  now  governing 
bodies  be  constant ;  hence,  admitting  the  law  of  gravi- 
tation actually  in  force  in  a  given  body,  it  is  a  contra- 
diction to  say  that  it  could  tend  upwards. 

Q.  What  is  the  means  of  science? 

A.  The  other  thing  most  necessary  to  science  is 
reasoning.  Some  philosophers,  as  the  school  of  Locke 
and  Condillac,  pretend  that  the  only  means  of  science 
is  induction.  But  such  a  theory  is  absurd.  Induction, 
of  itself,  does  nothing  more  than  generalize  a  fact,  but 
says  nothing  of  the  reason  why  such  a  fact  is  so  and 
not  otherwise,  and  why  it  takes  place,  nor  discovers 
the  connection  between  cause  and  effect.  Now,  all  this 
is  necessary  to  science  ;  therefore  induction  alone  can- 
not suffice  for  science.  Therefore  we  must  hold  that 
the  primary  and  essential  means  of  science  is  the  apo- 
dictic  reasoning.  And  as  science,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a 
system,  cannot  prove  everything  apodictically,  so  all 
other  kinds  of  argumentations  are  most  useful,  even 
those  which  produce  nothing  more  than  probable 
knowledge. 

Q.  What  is  the  last  thing  necessary  to  science  ? 

A.  The  connection,  or  order.  For  science  must 
equal  its  subject ;  and  as  then  only  we  have  truth 
when  the  form  of  the  intellect  is  equal  with  the 
thing,  so  science  is  true  and  perfect  only  when  it  is  a 
true  image  of  its  object.  But  the  object  is  in  itself 
perfectly  well  arranged  and  set  in  order ;  therefore 
science  also  must  be  well  arranged  in  its  cognitions. 
Here  we  may  recall  the  observation  of  Vico,  that  in 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       1 3  5 

knowing  an  object  we  should  divide  it  in  its  parts  and 
construct  it  gradually  in  our  minds,  as  if  we  were 
making  it.  Nay,  this  is  just  what  gives  to  a  treatise 
the  character  of  science — the  order  and  connection  of 
the  deductions.  ; 

ARTICLE  THIRD. 

Distinction  and  Order  of  Sciences. 

Q.  What  is  there  to  be  observed  about  the  unity 
and  distinction  of  sciences? 

A.  The  true  and  principal  criterion  of  the  unity  of 
sciences  is  their  object.  Science,  in  this  second  sense, 
is  a  system  of  knowledge  belonging  to  a  certain  order 
of  things  ;  therefore,  if  that  order  of  things  be  one, 
the  science  will  be  one,  and  hence  the  unity  of  each 
science  depends  upon  the  unity  of  its  object.  But  we 
must  draw  a  distinction  here.  The  object  of  the  sci- 
ence may  be  considered  materially  and  formally.  We 
consider  it  materially  when  we  look  it  everything  and 
every  element  which  constitutes  its  being  ;  we  consider 
it  formally  when  we  look  only  at  that  respect  accord- 
ing to  which  it  is  the  object  of  a  given  science.  Now, 
the  unity  of  a  science  is  constituted  by  its  formal  ob- 
ject, but  not  by  its  material ;  hence  it  may  happen 
that  many  things  materially  different  from  each  other 
may  form  one  object  of  a  science,  being  regarded 
under  one  peculiar  aspect.  For  instance,  how  many 
are  the  material  objects  of  physics?  Numberless; 
yet  they  form  one  object  of  that  science,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  regarded  under  the  one  aspect  as  phenomena 
of  bodies.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  happen  that  an 
object  materially  one  may  form  the  object  of  many 
sciences,  in  each  of  them  being  considered  under  a 
peculiar  aspect.     Man,  for  instance,  one  material  ob- 


136      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.  - 

ject,  may  be  the  object  of  anatomy,  physiology,  pa- 
thology, psychology,  and  so  forth.  The  formal  object, 
therefore,  is  that  which  gives  unity  to  a  science. 

As  to  distinction,  we  say  that  unity  is  the  foundation 
of  distinction,  because  a  thing  is  distinct  from  others 
because  it  is  in  itself  one.  But  unity  is  given  to  science 
by  its  formal  object ;  therefore  from  the  formal  object 
arises  the  distinction  of  sciences.  Hence  a  science  is 
different  from  others,  according  as  its  formal  object. is 
more  or  less  different ;  as,  for  instance,  theology  is  dis- 
tinct from  cosmology,  because  their  formal  objects  are 
different ;  natural  theology  is  distinct  from  revealed 
theology,  because  their  formal  object  is  different. 

Omitting  all  other  distinction^  of  sciences,  we  shall 
say  a  word  of  that  well-known  distinction  into  specu- 
lative and  practical.  A  speculative  science  is  that 
which  regards  its  object  only  as  truth ;  practical,  that 
which  regards  its  object  as  to  be  acted  on  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  speculative  sciences  are  those  which  have  for 
their  object  the  contemplation  of  truth ;  practical, 
those  which  have  for  their  end  action. 

Q.  What  is  the  order  and  dependence  of  sciences? 

A.  Though  sciences  be  different,  yet  they  must  be 
set  in  order  and  be  dependent.  When  many  things 
are  destined  to  one  end  it  is  •  ecessary  that  one  of 
them  should  govern  and  regulate  the  others.  But  all 
sciences  and  arts  are  destined  to  one  end — the  perfec- 
tion of  man  ;  therefore  it  is  necessary  that  one  of  them 
should  govern  and  regulate  all  others  and  take  the 
name  of  wisdom.  But  one  may  ask.  What  is  that  sci- 
ence which  may  rule  and  govern  all  others?  That 
which  has  certainly  the  aptitude  to  govern  and  rule 
others.  But,  as  Aristotle  remarks,  among  men  those 
are  naturally  able  to  govern  who  have  more  intellectual 
power ;  and  those  who  are  more  robust  in  body  but 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      1 3  7' 

wanting  in  talent  are  naturally  liable  to  be  governed. 
Hence  that  science  must  be  the  first  and  govern  all 
others  which  is  most  intellectual.  But  that  which  is 
most  intellectual  is  occupied  about  those  objects  which 
are  most  intelligible.  The  intelligible  is  the  universal ; 
therefore  that  science  is  first  which  has  a  more  uni- 
versal object.  But  philosophy  has  an  object  more 
universal  than  other  science ;  therefore  philosophy  is 
that  first  science  on  which  all  depend.  And  here  we 
conclude  this  first  part  of  philosophy  with  that  from 
which  we  started,  after  having  given  a  brief  idea  of 
the  matter,  the  form,  and  the  end  of  reasoning. 


M  '     '■   .  V     '-     1 


ONTOLOGY 


»39 


/  '1^;-!    .    '  ' 


1i;i 


':■  riK'ji 


ONTOLOGY. 


INTRODUCTION— OBJECT  OF  METAPHYSICS— DEFINI- 
TION OF  ONTOLOGY, 


Q.  Give  the  object  of  metaphysics. 

A.  In  Logic  we  have  spoken  of  being  inasmuch  as 
it  is  the  product  of  the  mind,  and  have  explained  the 
nature  of  reasoning.  This  was  obliged  to  be  done  be- 
fore all  things  else,  not  because  of  the  dignity  of  the 
object,  but  by  necessity  of  method,  as  we  have  shown 
in  the  Introduction  to  Philosophy.  We  proceed  now 
to  speak  of  real  being,  which  forms  the  object  of  meta- 
physics. This  word,  composed  of  two  Greek  words, 
means  that  which  follows  physics,  and  was  given  by 
the  compilers  of  Aristotle's  works  to  those  thirteen 
books  in  which  they  found  the  philosopher  treated 
of  real  being,  the  name  happily  chiming  with  the  ob- 
ject of  these  books,  since  metaphysics  treats  of  things 
separated  from  matter  either  by  abstraction  of  the 
mind,  as  being  in  common,  or  by  their  nature,  as  the 
soul  and  God,  and  if  it  treat  at  all  of  material 
things  it  does  so  in  a  more  noble  way  than  physics. 

Q.  Give  the  division  of  metaphysics. 

A.  It  has  been  divided  into  four  parts — Ontology, 
Anthropology,  Cosmology,  and  Natural  Theology. 

Q.  What  is  Ontology,  and  what  are  its  parts  ? 

A.  Ontology  is  that  part  which  treats  of  real  being, 


X4X 


142  Introduction. 

considered  in  common  and  in  a  general  way.  But 
about  real  being,  considered  in  a  general  way,  our 
mind  may  naturally  enquire  the  following  things : 
I.  What  is  the  nature  of  real  being,  considered  in  a 
general  way  ?  2.  What  are  its  properties  ?  3.  What 
are  its  principles  and  causes?  4.  How  is  it  divided? 
Therefore,  according  to  this  natural  order,  we  shall 
treat  of  these  four  things :  of  the  nature  of  real  being 
in  general,  of  its  properties,  of  its  causes,  and  of  its 
divisions.  Beginning  from  the  first,  we  shall  treat  of 
it  in  the  following  chapters:  i.  Of  being  considered 
in  itself  and  in  a  most  general  way ;  2.  Of  the  first  de- 
terminations of  being — that  is,  of  essence  and  exis- 
tence ;  and  3.  Of  the  manner  in  which  these  two  last 
concur  in  forming  real  being. 


\  .■:- 


•«:S'  «■;* 


^.».v 


l.„. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  BBING^  CONSIDERED  IN  ITSELF  AND  IN  A  MOST 
GENERAL  WAY. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

Of  the  Idea  of  Being  in  Itself 

Q.  Can  you  give  a  definition  of  being? 

A.  We  cannot,  because  a  definition  must  be  com- 
posed of  the  proximate  genus  and  of  the  specific  dif- 
ference of  the  thing  defined.  Now,  being  can  have 
neither;  therefore  it  is  incapable  of  being  defined. 
The  minor  is  proved  thus:  Every  genus  must  have 
specific  dift'erences,  which  are  not  comprehended  in 
the  essence  and  idea  of  the  genus,  but  lie  outside  of 
it.  For  instance,  the  genus  animal  has  two  specific 
differences,  reasonable  and  brute.  These  are  outside 
the  essence  and  idea  of  the  genus.  Now,  there  can 
be  nothing  which  is  not  comprehended  in  the  idea  of 
being;  therefore  being  cannot  be  defined.  It  may  be 
declared  by  saying  that  being  is  everything  which  is 
in  any  way  whatever,  or  that  which  can  be  positively 
conceived. 

Q.  What  consequences  do  you  draw  from  this  doc- 
trine? 

A.  I .  That  being  is  the  most  general  and  simple  idea.. 
The  most  general,  because  nothing  can  be  more  inti- 
mate and  essential  to  all  things  than  that  of  being 
something.  Now,  this  is  just  what  is  meant  by  being. 
Therefore  this  idea  is  applicable  to  all  things,  and 
hence  most  general.     Again,  being  agrees  with,  and  is 


144      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

attributed  not  only  to,  all  things  but  also  to  all  con- 
ceptions and  ideas  ;  therefore  it  is  the  most  general 
of  all  ideas. 

It  is  the  most  simple — that  is,  it  has  a  less  number 
of  elements  and  a  more  restricted  comprehension  than 
all  other  ideas,  because,  as  we  have  said  in  Logic,  the 
comprehension  of  an  idea  is  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  its 
extension.  Consequently,  this  idea,  being  the  most 
general,  is  the  least  comprehensive,  and  hence  most 
simple. 

2.  Being  is  the  first  idea,  both  in  the  chronological  a7id 
logical  order.  This  idea  is  first  in  the  chronological 
order,  inasmuch  as  it  is  acquired  by  our  minds  before 
any  other  idea.  For  our  mind  is  so  constructed  that 
it  must  travel  in  its  investigations  from  that  which  is 
less  perfect  to  that  which  is  more  so,  and  hence  from 
that  which  is  more  general  and  confused  to  that  which 
is  less  general  and  more  distinct.  But  no  idea  is  more 
general  than  that  of  being  ;  therefore  it  is  the  first 
which  is  acquired  by  the  mind.  Hence  the  first  thing 
we  perceive  in  all  things  is  that  they  are,  that  they 
are  something,  and,  gradually  proceeding  forward  in 
the  knowledge  of  them,  we  come  to  know  them  more 
perfectly  and  more  minutely. 

This  idea  is  also  first  in  the  logical  order,  by  which 
we  understand  that  all  other  ideas  are  subject,  and  can 
be  reduced  to  the  idea  of  being.  In  fact,  everything 
can  be  resolved  into  its  primitive  and  more  simple  ele- 
ments. But  the  idea  of  being  is  common  to  all  ideas, 
and  is  the  most  simple  of  them  all  ;  therefore  they  all 
can  be  reduced  to  that  idea. 

Again,  all  other  ideas  are  determinations  of  the  idea 
of  being  ;  therefore  they  can  be  reduced  to  that  idea. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  idea  of  Shakspere.  This  is 
an  individual  idea  of  the  greatest  of  our  English  poets, 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       145 

the  most  individual  expression  of  somebody.  But  let 
us  resolve  that  into  its  more  general  elements,  and 
ask,  What  is  the  greatest  of  English  poets  ?  A  man — 
something  more  general  yet.  But  what  is  a  man  ? 
A  twofold  substance,  spiritual  and  material,  united 
together  by  one  personality — more  general  still.  But 
what  is  a  substance  ?  It  is  a  being  that  stands  by  it- 
self. Here  we  have  reduced  the  idea  of  Shakspere 
to  the  idea  of  being  by  stripping  it  of  its  determina- 
tions ;  therefore  the  idea  of  being  is  the  first  in  the 
logical  order. 

Being  is  the  best  known  of  all  ideas,  because  we  be- 
come acquainted  with  things  unknown  by  means  of 
that  which  we  know.  But  we  have  the  idea  of  being 
by  itself,  and  by  its  means  we  are  introduced  to  the 
knowledge  of  all  other  things  ;  therefore  being  is  the 
best  known  of  all  ideas. 

The  idea  of  being,  therefore,  does  not  include  in 
itself  any  determination  of  substance  or  accident,  of 
essence  or  existence,  of  reality  or  possibility  ;  because 
with  none  of  these  conceptions  can  we  reconcile  the 
characters  and  properties  which  become  the  idea  of 
being. 

Q,  What  is  the  idea  of  not  being  ? 

A.  The  negation  of  the  idea  of  being — that  is,  Jtot/i- 
ing.  But  nothing  has  not  an  idea  of  its  own,  since  every- 
thing is  known  inasmuch  as  it  is,  and  nothing  is  the 
negatioii  of  being  ;  therefore  not/iing cannot  be  known 
by  itself  or  possess  an  idea  of  its  own,  but  must  be 
conceived  through  the  idea  of  being. 


I 


46      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 


ARTICLE    SECOND. 

Of  the  Univocal  Attributio7i  of  Being  and  of  the  Principle 

of  Contradiction. 

Q.  In  how  many  ways  can  a  nature  or  property  be 
predicated  of  various  subjects? 

A.  In  two  ways,  univocally  and  equivocally.  The 
first  is  when  that  nature  or  property  is  attributed  to, 
and  found  in,  the  subject  in  the  same  degree  and  un- 
der the  same  signification.  The  second  is  when  that 
nature  or  property  is  attributed  to  many,  not  because 
found  in  them  in  the  same  degree,  but  in  consequence 
of  a  certain  resemblance  and  proportion  between  the 
subjects.  For  instance,  we  attribute  the  nature  of 
reasonable  to  all  the  subjects  called  men,  in  the  same 
degree  and  under  the  same  signification  ;  therefore  we 
attribute  it  univocally.  But  we  attribute  the  quality  of 
healthy  to  the  animal  body,  to  food,  to  air,  to  place, 
not  in  the  same  sense  and  degree,  but  on  account  of 
the  resemblance  between  the  objects  called  healthy ; 
we  attribute  it,  therefore,  equivocally. 

Q.  To  what  can  the  idea  of  being  be  attributed 
univocally? 

A,  Only  to  itself,  as  when  we  say.  Being  is ;  then 
being  is  attributed  to  itself  in  the  same  identical  signifi- 
cation. From  this  manner  of  attribution  proceed  va- 
rious analytical  judgments,  as  that  which  we  call  oiidcn- 
iity,  and  which  is  expressed  thus  :  That  ivhich  is^  is;  that 
which  is  not,  is  not.  The  judgment  called  of  excluded 
means — as.  Something  either  is  or  is  not ;  or  as  that 
spoken  of — Being  is.  But  on  close  consideration  all 
these  judgments  may  be  reduced  to  one,  which  is  the 
foundation  of  all  judgments,  and  which  is  called  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  which  is  expressed  thus : 
A  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       147 

Q.  Is  this  principle  important  in  science  ? 

A.  It  is  most  important,  as  that  which  comprehends 
all  the  judgments  which  arise  from  the  univocal  attri- 
bution of  being. 

Q.   What  are  its  properties? 

A.    \.  It  is  knoivn  by  itself. 

Principles  called  self-evident,  or  known  by  them- 
selves, are  those  in  which  the  predicate  is  contained  in 
the  idea  of  the  subject ;  so  much  so  that  the  moment 
we  know  the  terms,  that  very  mome.it  we  perceive  the 
truth  of  the  judgment.  Take  the  principle,  for  in- 
stance, The  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts. 
All  we  have  to  do  to  perceive  the  truth  of  this  judg- 
ment is  to  understand  the  terms,  in  which  we  find 
that  any  part  of  a  whole  is  contained  in  it  as  one  of 
its  elements,  and  that,  therefore,  the  whole  is  greater 
than  any  of  its  parts,  as  a  total  is  greater  than  the 
units  composing  it.  Now,  in  no  other  principle  is  this 
quality  of  self-evidence  found  better  than  in  that  of 
contradiction,  because  in  it  the  predicate  enters  as 
identical  with  the  subject,  since  the  terms  of  such 
principle  are,  Being  is  being,  not  being  is  not  being; 
therefore  the  principle  of  contradiction  is  self-evident. 

2.  It  is  the  most  universal  judgment  and  principle. 
The  narrowing  of  a  judgment  arises  from  two  causes: 
from  the  subjects  to  which  they  extend,  and  from  the 
matter  of  which  they  treat.  For  instance,  the  fol- 
lowing judgment,  Man  is  a  reasonable  animal^  is  nar- 
rowed down  by  the  subject,  because  it  extends  to  man 
only,  and  even  as  to  him  it  applies  neither  to  his  will, 
his  liberty,  his  body,  his  soul  in  general,  but  only  to 
his  specific  difference  of  being  reasonable.  And  be- 
cause the  matter  of  which  a  judgment  treats  is  repre- 
sented by  the  predicate,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  above 
judgment,  and  in  any  other  like  it,  we  may  say  that  a 


148      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

judgment  is  restricted  and  determined  by  .the  predi- 
cate and  the  subject.  Hence  the  greater  or  lesser 
universality  of  a  judgment  depends  exclusively  on  the 
terms  composing  it.  Now,  among  all  judgments, 
there  is  none  which  has  such  universal  terms  as  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  because  its  terms  are  being 
and  not  being.  Therefore  it  is  the  most  universal  prin- 
ciple, and  there  can  be  no  judgment  not  contained 
therein. 

3.  It  is  the  first  and  supreme  principle. 

A  principle,  to  be  such,  must  have  two  qualities : 
I.  It  must  be  self-evident.  2.  To  it  we  must  be  able 
to  reduce  all  other  principles.  But  we  have  shown 
that  the  principle  of  contradiction  is  self-evident.  We 
can  show  also  that  we  can  reduce  all  other  principles 
to  it,  because  principles  and  judgment  are  reducible 
to  another  when  they  can  be  resolved  into  another, 
more  general,  in  which  they  are  contained.  For  in- 
stance, the  principle,  TJie  head  is  smaller  than  the  body, 
is  true,  because  it  can  be  reduced  to  that  other  more 
general  principle,  The  part  is  siuallcr  than  the  whole. 
But  the  principle  of  contradiction  is  the  most  common 
and  universal  principle;  therefore  to  it  can  be  reduced 
all  other  principles  ;  therefore  it  holds  the  primacy 
over  all  other  principles.  This  is  so  true  that  no  other 
principle  can  be  produced  which  may  claim  the  prece- 
dence over  the  principle  ^f  contradiction.  Attempts 
have  been  made  by  sevei.  philosophers  to  bring  for- 
ward a  principle  which  could  pretend  to  this  prece- 
dence, but  they  have  all  failed.  Des  Cartes  produced  his 
pet  theory:  I  think,  therefore  I  am  ;  but  this  principle 
is  true,  because  founded  on  that  of  contradiction.  A 
thing  cannot  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time,  because 
if  the  latter  were  not  true  how  could  one  say,  I  think, 
therefore  I  am  ?  since  in  that  case  it  would  not  be  con- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       149 

tradictory  that  one  should  think  and  not  exist  at  the 
same  time.  Leibnitz  proclaimed  his  principle  of  suffi- 
ciont  reason,  Nothing  can  exist  without  a  sufficient 
reason^  and  pretended  partial  primacy  for  it ;  but  all 
in  vain,  since,  if  the  principle  of  contradiction  were 
not  true,  it  would  be  possible  for  a  thing  to  exist  and 
have  no  sufficient  reason  to  account  for  it.  Conse- 
quently, Leibnitz  was  wrong  in  saying  that  the  princi- 
ple of  cu  itradiction  was  first  among  necessary  truths, 
and  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  was  first  among 
contingent  truths,  since  all  truths  depend  upon  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  and  it  holds  precedence  of 
them  all. 

ARTICLE  THIRD. 
Of  the  Analogical  Attribution  of  Being. 

Q.  Of  what  is  being  predicated  analogically  ? 

A.  We  have  said  that  being  is  predicated  univocally 
only  of  itself;  therefore  it  is  attributed  analogically  to 
all  other  subjects.  These  may  be  God  and  the  crea- 
ture, and  the  latter  may  be  a  substance  or  an  accident ; 
therefore  being  is  predicated  analogically  of  God,  of 
creatures,  of  substances,  and  of  accidents.  This  may 
be  briefly  demonstrated  as  follows  : 

I.  We  can  attribute  something  univocally  to  a 
number  of  subjects  when  they  agree  in  the  same  spe- 
cies, or  at  least  in  the  same  genus.  When  they  do  not 
agree  even  as  to  genus,  then  we  attribute  the  same 
thing  to  them  only  in  consequence  of  a  certain  com- 
mon aspect  or  relation.  Now,  being  cannot  be  genus, 
as  we  have  shown  in  the  first  article ;  therefore  we 
cannot  predicate  being  of  God  and  creatures,  of  sub- 
stances and  accidents,  univocally,  but  equivocally  in 
force  of  a  certain  common  aspect  we  discover  between 


150      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

them.  Therefore  God  and  the  creature  agree  in  the 
common  attribution,  being,  but  only  by  a  certain  ana- 
logy between  them,  and  not  because  they  belong  to 
the  same  species  or  genus  or  have  tlie  same  being. 

2.  Univocals  have  this  special  property  of  their 
own  :  that  they  are  found,  according  to  their  common 
aspect,  in  the  same  manner  in  all  those  subjects  to 
which  they  are  attributed,  as  man,  which  is  predicated 
of  many  individuals,  and  is  found  in  all  of  them  in  the 
same  manner.  On  the  contrary,  in  analogous  things 
the  common  feature  is  found  in  a  different  way  in  the 
subjects,  as  the  attribute  sound,  which  may  be  predi- 
cated of  food,  of  the  animal  body,  of  the  mind,  etc., 
and  which  is  not  found  in  the  same  manner  in  these 
several  subjects.  But  being  is  not  found  in  the  same 
manner  in  God  and  in  the  creature,  in  the  substance 
and  in  the  accident ;  therefore  it  can  only  be  attri- 
buted to  them  analogically. 

3.  Univocals  are  restricted  by  the  difference  which 
lies  outside  the  common  nature,  whereas  analogicals 
are  determined  always  by  the  different  manner  in  which 
they  enjoy  that  common  aspect  which  makes  them  ana- 
logicals. For  instance,  mtimal  is  not  determined  and 
narrowed  down  by  the  different  manner  in  which  it  is 
found  in  man  and  in  the  brute,  because  it  is  the  same 
in  both  ;  but  by  the  difference  of  reasonable  or  un- 
reasonable, which  lies  outside  the  essence  of  the  ani- 
mal. Now,  being  cannot  be  narrowed  down  by  any 
difference  lying  outside  the  nature  of  being — because 
what  is  there  which  is  not  being  ? — but  it  is  narrowed 
down  by  the  different  manner  of  being.  Therefore 
being  is  predicated  analogically  of  those  different  sub- 
jects. That  being  is  found  differently  in  God  and  in 
the  creature,  in  the  substance  and  the  accident,  as 
we  have  supposed  in  the  minor  of  all  the  preceding 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy,      1 5 1 

arguments,  is  evident ;  because  God  is  the  essential, 
most  pure,  infinite,  independent  being,  the  fulness  of 
all  perfections  of  being  ;  whereas  creatures  are  not 
essential  or  necessary  beings,  nor  have  they  the  ful- 
ness of  being,  but  have  a  borrowed,  finite,  dependent 

being.  ■        v.     ,  .  .  

Substances  are  independent  of  accidents  as  to  their 
existence ;  accidents  cannot  exist  without  the  sub- 
stance. The  latter  possesses  being  directly  and  in 
itself;  the  accident  only  indirectly  and  by  means  of 
the  substance.  The  being  of  the  substance  is  strictly 
such,  but  the  accident  is  only  an  adjunct,  an  appendage 
to  the  being  of  the  substance.  Therefore  it  is  evi- 
dent that  being  is  found  in  a  different  manner  in  God 
and  in  the  creature,  in  the  substance  and  the  accident, 
and  that,  therefore,  we  can  predicate  being  of  all  these 
subjects  only  analogically. 


^.  ^v  '■>  -  ■  ■  --v     ♦'  !  ■     ,  ,0  :;-,'^^ 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  DETERMINATIONS  OF  BEING  IN  GENERAL,— 
ESSENCE  AND  EXISTENCE. 

ARTICLE  FIRST. 

How  are  Determinations  of  Being  to  be  Understood  ? 

Q.  How  is  the  idea  of  being  determined  and  nar- 
rowed down  ? 

A.  Being,  as  we  have  described  it  in  the  first  chap- 
ter, indeterminate  and  common,  does  not  exist  in 
nature.  To  represent,  therefore,  a  real  being,  that 
idea,  in  force  of  its  vagueness  and  indetermination,  is 
not  sufficient,  but  must  be  made  more  definite  and 
contracted.  But  how  is  this  to  be  done  ?  How  can 
being  be  made  definite?  AH  other  ideas  can  be 
made  more  definite  by  adding  something  distinct 
and  different  from  them  ;  as,  for  instance,  the  idea 
of  animal  is  made  more  definite  by  adding  to  it 
the  element  of  reasonable.  But  this  cannot  be  done 
with  the  idea  of  being,  because  what  can  we  add  to  it 
which  is  not  being?  To  limit,  therefore,  the  idea  of 
being  must  be  done  by  the  same  idea  of  being  a  little 
more  explicit ;  because  ideas  must  correspond  to  ob- 
jects, but  objects  are  so  many  special  beings ;  there- 
fore their  ideas  can  be  nothing  more  than  so  many  ex- 
plicit conceptions  of  being. 

Q.  What  are  the  first  limitations  of  being  ? 

A.  Two :  essence  and  existence.  But  to  under- 
stand these  two  limitations  it  is  necessary  to  speak 
first  o{ possibility.     The  idea  of  possibility  has   been 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       153 

variously  misrepresented  by  philosophers.  A  possible 
is  that  which  is  capable  of  being.  This  aptitude  may 
be  of  two  kinds:  intrinsic  and  extrinsic.  A  being  is 
called  intrinsically  possible  when  the  elements  which 
must  constitute  it  do  not  clash  with  each  other;  be- 
cause possibility  has  relation  to  being,  hence  all  that 
which  may  be  is  possible.  But  to  prevent  a  thing  from 
being  can  be  effected  only  by  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction ;  therefore  all  that  which  does  not  involve 
an  interior  repugnance  is  possible.  Now,  the  mere 
intrinsic  possibility  or  agreement  of  the  elements 
which  have  to  constitute  the  being  would  not  of 
itself  be  sufficient  for  a  being  really  to  exist.  An- 
other condition  is  required,  because  everything  which 
may  be  cannot  come  from  the  mere  possibility  to  the 
actual  act  of  being,  except  by  means  of  a  being 
already  in  act  which  may  carry  that  aptitude  into 
reality.  To  be  able  to  exist  by  means  of  this  exter- 
nal agent  carrying  that  internal  aptitude  into  the  ac- 
tual fact  of  being  is  called  extrinsic  possibility.  And 
because  these  extrinsic  agents  or  causes  may  be  either 
God  or  creatures,  extrinsic  possibility  is  divided,  ac- 
cording to  St.  Thomas,  into  possibility  according  to 
the  supreme  cause — God — and  into  possibility  accord- 
ing to  the  proximate  causes,  meaning  creatures. 

Everything  which  is  contrary  to  possibility  is  called 
impossible,  which  may  also  be  of  two,  kinds,  intrinsic 
and  extrinsic  impossibility.  The  first  occurs  when  the 
terms  or  elements  of  a  thing  are  contradictory,  as  a 
square  circle,  a  four-angle  triangle,  a  material  spirit. 
The  second  is  found  wjien  there  is  no  external  cause  to 
carry  the  intrinsically  possible  into  reality.  From 
these  definitions  we  may  gather  that  all  that  which  is 
intrinsically  impossible  is  also  externally  so,  and  can 
never  be  effected,  even  by  God  himself. 


154       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Q.  Give  the  different  misrepresentations  of  this 
idea  by  philosophers. 

A.  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  Robinet,  doing  away  with  all 
idea  of  the  possible,  have  said  that  thing  only  is  pos- 
sible which  really  exists.  This  is  absurd.  Possible  is 
that  which  may  be.  Now,  if  we  look  at  the  idea  of 
being  in  itself,  we  find  tha^  it  can  extend  not  only  to 
things  really  existing,  but  also  to  many  more.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  we  regard  the  causes  which  may 
reduce  possibilities  to  act,  we  find  that  they  could  ef- 
fect a  great  deal  more  than  they  actually  do.  We 
know  by  the  testimony  of  internal  consciousness  that 
we  could  do  a  great  many  more  things  than  we  do. 
God  could  certainly  create  many  more  things  than  he 
has  created,  else  his  power  were  limited  ;  therefore  the 
idea  of  such  philosophers  is  false. 

Others  have  said  that  the  omnipotence  of  God  is 
the  index  and  the  test  of  the  intrinsic  possible,  that 
alone  being  possible  which  can  be  effected  by  that 
perfection.  Now,  in  the  first  place,  these  philosophers 
turn  around  in  a  circle,  for  if  we  ask  them  what  is  that 
which  God's  omnipotence  can  do,  they  will  answer. 
That  which  is  intrinsically  possible  ;  and  if  we  beg  of 
them  to  tell  us  what  is  intrinsically  possible,  they  will 
subjoin,  That  which  God's  power  can  do. 

Finally,  others,  like  Descartes,  have  said  that  the 
intrinsic  possibility  of  things  depends  upon  the  will 
of  God.  If  God  wills  a  thing,  well  and  good  ;  it  is  in- 
trinsically possible.  If  he  do  not  will  it,  it  is  impos- 
sible. Now, according  to  this  opinion,  it  would  follow 
that  if  God  pleased  to  make  the  circle  square  he  could 
do  so,  or  that  a  triangle  should  have  four  angles,  which 
is  absurd,  because  that  which  involves  a  contradiction 
is  nonentity,  a  mere  nothing.  Consequently,  in  the 
supposition  of  God's  effecting  that  which  is  intrinsically 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       155 

impossible,  we  would  have  the  infinite  power  of  God 
exercising  itself  about,  and  resulting  in,  a  nullity  worse 
than  Parturient  monies^  nascctur  ridiculus  mus, 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 
Definition  of  Essence, 

Q.  What  is  essence  ? 

A.  The  idea  of  essence,  in  consequence  of  its  sim- 
plicity, is  developed  in  various  ways,  and,  according  to 
these  different  ways,  it  takes  different  names.  Gather- 
ing these  different  ways  under  certain  heads,  we  may 
say  that  essence  may  be  considered  under  a  threefold 
aspect:  i,  in  itself;  2,  relatively  to  itsefifects;  3,  re- 
spectively to  its  conception  in  our  minds.  Considered 
in  itself,  it  may  be  defined  :  That  ivhick  causes  a  thing" 
to  be  what  it  is  and  distinguishes  it  from  all  others. 
Under  this  aspect  it  is  strictly  and  properly  called 
essence. 

Considered  in  its  effects,  it  is  defined :  That  first 
radical  and  intimate  principle  of  all  actions;  and  proper- 
ties zvhich  may  belong  to  a  being.  In  this  regard  it  is 
called  nature. 

Finally,  considering  it  relatively  to  our  way  of  ap- 
prehending it,  it  may  be  defined  :  That  which  is  first 
conceived  as  the  first  thing  in  a  beings  or  that  which  is 
expressed  by  the  definition.  Under  this  relation  it  is 
called  conception^  or  reason. 

From  these  definitions  we  draw  the  following  corol- 
laries : 

I.  Essence  in  the  first  sense— that  is,  in  itself— 
can  only  be  attributed  to  substances,  because  the  es- 
sence is  that  which  causes  a  being  to  be  what  it  is 
ind  to  be  distinguished  from  all  others ;  therefore 
it  can  be  attributed  to  that  only  which  strictly  and 


156       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosopky. 

perfectly  exists.  But  this  can  be  said  only  of  sub- 
stances, because  accidents  are  imperfect  beings  or 
the  mere  complement  of  a  being.  Therefore  essences, 
strictly  and  properly  speaking,  can  be  attributed  only 
to  substances.  We  say  this  not  as  meaning  that  acci- 
dents have  no  essence,  but  as  implying  that  it  can  be 
attributed  to  accidents  only  imperfectly  in  the  same 
sense  as  being  is  predicated  of  them. 

2.  Essences  dwell  intimately  in  things,  because 
they  are  the  principle  and  origin  of  the  properties  and 
actions  of  things.  Hence  Plato  was  wrong  in  admit- 
ting essences  separated  from  things  and  existing  in 
themselves,  and  which  were  the  cause  of  the  being  and 
knowledge  of  things,  because  things  are  what  they  are 
in  force  of  their  essence,  and  become  known  by  means 
of  the  essence.  Therefore,  if  essences  were  separated 
from  objects,  they  would  no  longer  be  what  they  are, 
and  would  not  become  known. 

3.  It  follows  that  the  essence  is  that  by  means  of 
which  things  are  truly  and  properly  known,  and  the  first 
thing  we  conceive  about  an  object  when  wc  come  to 
think  about  it.  Hence  the  opinion  of  Locke  and  Gio- 
bertl  Is  false  which  asserts  that  the  essences  of  thincfs 
are  unknowable,  and  that  our  mind  knows  only  certain 
essences  which  it  forms  itself.  Such  an  opinion  is  ab- 
surd, first,  because  our  knowledge  can  only  be  called 
true  knowledge  when  it  corresponds  to  the  reality  of 
things.  But  that  by  which  things  are  what  they  are 
is  the  essence  ;  therefore  we  have  a  knowledge  of 
things  only  when  we  know  their  essences.  Conse- 
quently, if  essence  were  unknowable,  we  could  never 
have  a  true  knowledge  of  things,  and  would  fall  into 
scepticism. 

2.  Sciences  would  become  impossible,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  founded  upon  the  essence  of  things. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,      157 

3.  It  is  a  fact  that  we  know  the  real  essences  of 
many  things,  inasmuch  as  we  perceive  in  them  certain 
differences  which  cause  them  to  be  what  they  are  and 
enable  us  to  distinguish  them  from  others,  and  which 
differences  we  perceive  as  the  source  of  all  the  pro- 
perties of  such  things.  For  instance,  we  can  distin- 
guish plants  from  brutes,  brutes  from  men,  men  from 
pure  spirits  ;  and  we  see  something  in  all  these  as  the 
principle  and  source  of  their  properties.  Now,  if 
this  is  not  knowing  the  real  essence  of  these  things, 
what  is? 

4.  Finally,  we  cannot  see  why  the  essences  of 
things  should  be  unknowable  and  unthinkable.  Every- 
thing is  knowable  inasmuch  as  it  is  and  in  the  way  it 
is.  But  the  essence  is  that  by  which  a  thing  is  what 
it  is ;  therefore  everything  is  knowable  by  its  essence, 
and  it  cannot  be  impossible  that  essences  should  be 
known  and  be  the  object  of  our  thought. 

Q.  How  are  essences  distinguished  ? 

A.  Essences  cause  beings  to  be  what  they  are; 
therefore  they  must  be  different,  according  to  the  dif- 
ference of  beings.  Now,  beings  are  first  classified 
as  substances  and  accidents ;  therefore  there  must  be 
essences  of  substances  and  essences  of  accidents.  The 
first  are  found  perfectly  in  the  beings  of  which  they 
are  the  essence ;  the  second  only  imperfectly.  The 
essences  of  substances,  then,  are  divided  into  essences 
of  material  substances  and  essences  of  simple  and  im- 
material substances.  The  first  are  composed  of  matter 
and  form,  and  cannot  be  without  matter.  The  others 
are  forms  only,  without  matter,  and  consequently  are 
more  perfect  than  the  first.* 

r.  *  St  Thomas,  Z7«  £»/a // £'«Mii//a.      „    .  i    .    >.*     ' 

f        •    » " '   ■  ^  . 


1 5  8       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

•  '•'■■.       .-     '     '      ARTICLE    THIRD.     "   *  ' 

,  Remarks  on  Essences. 

Q.  What  rema'rks  have  you  to  make  on  essences  ? 

A.  The  first  is  about  the  indivisibility  of  essences. 
From  our  having  distinguished  essences  of  simple  sub- 
stances, one  must  not  infer  that  such  essences  are  simple, 
having  one  single  property ;  nor  from  our  having  dis- 
tinguished essences  of  compound  substances  has  any 
one  a  right  to  conclude  that  such  essences  may  be  di- 
vided into  parts  like  their  substances.  With  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  divine  essence,  all  other  essences  are  formed 
of  more  than  one  property,  but  they  are  all  indivisi- 
ble in  spite  of  that.  Essences  locate  objects  in  their 
proper  species  and  genus,  cause  them  to  be  what  they 
are  and  to  be  distinguished  from  all  others.  Hence 
it  happens  that  definitions  which  express  essences 
must  be  composed  of  the  proximate  genus  and  the 
specific  difference,  because  the  essences  of  creatures 
must  have  something  which  agrees  with  other  crea- 
tures, and  something  which  may  distinguish  them 
from  others.  Consequently,  they  must  have  at  least  a 
twofold  property,  that  of  the  proximate  genus  and  that 
of  the  specific  difference.  But,  nevertheless,  they  are 
indivisible,  as  Aristotle  says,  like  the  species  of  num- 
bers, to  which  if  we  add  or  subtract  a  unit  their  spe- 
cies is  changed.  Likewise  with  essences:  if  we  add 
to  them  one  property  or  take  away  one  property,  they 
are  no  longer  the  same  essences.  For  instance,  if  we  add 
to  the  genus  animal  the  species  reasonable  we  have 
man  ;  or  if  we  take  reasonable  we  have  the  brute. 
Essences,  therefore,  are  composed  of  more  than  one 
property,  but  are  indivisible  in  the  sense  that  we  can 
neither  add  to  nor  subtract  from  them  any  property 
necessary  to  make  such  essences. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,       159 

The  second  remark  is  that  to  all  essences  may  be 
attributed  the  three  following  qualities :  immutability, 
necessity^  and  eternity.  But  as  this  may  be  misunder- 
stood, it  is  necessary  to  explain  in  what  sense  an  es- 
sence is  immutable,  necessary,  and  eternal.  Essences 
cannot  be  said  to  be  immutable,  necessary,  and  eternal 
in  the  sense  that  they  have  a  position  and  actual  exist- 
ence in  themselves.  Before  they  actually  existed  in 
themselves  they  did  not  exist  at  all ;  they  were  created 
in  time,  and  might,  absolutely  speaking,  be  destroyed. 
Hence  in  this  sense  they  are  mutable,  contingent, 
and  temporary.  But  they  are  said  to  be  immutable, 
necessary,  and  eternal  in  two  ways:  i.  As  to  the 
elements  of  which  they  are  composed.  These,  as 
we  have  said,  are  indivisible,  inasmuch  as  we  can 
neither  add  to  nor  subtract  from  them,  otherwise  they 
would  not  form  the  same  essence.  In  this  sense  they 
cannot  change.  Now,  what  is  unchangeable  is  neces- 
sary and  eternal ;  therefore  essences,  with  regard  to 
the  elements  of  which  they  are  composed,  are  im- 
mutable, necessary,  and  eternal.  For  instance,  a  tri- 
angle is  composed  of  three  angles  and  three  sides ; 
'  and  hence  at  no  time  will  it  ever  be  possible  that  it 
could  have  four  angles  and  four  sides  and  remain  a 
triangle. 

2.  Essences  are  immutable,  necessary,  eternal  in- 
asmuch as  they  are  found  positively  in  God's  essence 
and  intellect,  because  wc  know  that  in  God  are  to  be 
found  the  archetypes  of  all  things.  Essences,  there- 
fore, inasmuch  as  they  exist  in  the  divine  intellect,  in 
which  are  the  archetypes  of  all  things,  are  immutable, 
necessary,  and  eternal.     ,"• 

But  from  the  fact  that  essences,  as  to  the  elements 
from  which  they  result,  and  inasmuch  as  they  are  seen 
by  the  divine  intellect  in  God's  essence,  are  immu- 
table, necessary,  and  eternal,  wc  cannot  infer  that  they 


1 60      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

do  or  must  actually  exist  in  themselves  outside  the 
essence  of  God.  But  the  only  inference  we  can  draw 
is  that  if  they  ever  exist  in  themselves—  :i  thing  de- 
pending on  the  free-will  of  God — they  must  necessarily 
be  composed  of  such  elements. 

The  last  remark  regards  essences  in  relation  to 
their  properties  and  action. 

And,  first,  as  to  properties.  These  being  so  bound 
up  with  the  essence,  it  follows  that  by  adding  or  sub- 
tracting one  of  them  the  essence  vanishes  ;  and,  vice 
versdy  excluding  the  essence,  the  properties  also  van- 
ish. This,  of  course,  must  be  understood  0^  essential 
properties. 

With  regard  to  the  action,  we  remark  that,  the  es- 
sence being  the  most  intimate  and  first  principle  of 
action  in  a  thing,  these  actions  must  be  agreeable  in 
nature  to  the  essence,  because  every  being  acts  as  it  is. 
If  it  were  otherwise,  the  being  would  and  would  not 
be  such  a  being,  which  is  a  contradiction. 

ARTICLE    FOURTH. 
Oti  Existence. 

Q.  What  is  existence  ? 

A.  The  idea  of  existence  is  so  simple  that  it  can 
hardly  be  defined.  We  shall  treat  of  it  as  follows  :  We 
have  said  that  in  God  exist  the  archetypes  of  all  es» 
sences — that  is  to  say,  the  idea  of  the  elements  of 
which  the  essences  of  things  must  be  composed  ;  and 
we  have  remarked  also  that  as  snch  they  have  no  real 
existence  in  themselves.  But  suppose  God  determines 
to  realize  those  ideas,  and  does  so  in  fact ;  in  that  case 
the  essences  are  actualized.  This  gives  the  idea  of 
existence,  which  may  be  defined  that  by  which  an 
essence  is  brought  out  of  nothing,  or  the  realization 
or  actuality  of  an  essence  in  itself. 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF  THE  MANNER  IN  WHICH  ESSENCE  AND  EXISTENCE 
CO-OPERATE  TO  FORM  A  REAL  BEING. 

Q.  How  do  essence  and  existence  co-operate  to 
form  a  real  being? 

A.  To  have  real  being  essence  and  existence  are 
necessary.  This  is  proved  as  follows:  First  the  es- 
sence is  necessary.  The  essence  is  that  by  which  a 
thing  is  what  it  is  and  is  distinguished  from  all  others  ; 
the  radical,  internal  principle  of  all  the  properties  and 
actions  of  the  thing — that  which  is  manifested  by  the 
idea  of  the  thing.  But  all  real  being  is  something 
in  itself,  by  which  something  it  is  distinct  from  all 
others ;  it  has  properties  and  actions,  and,  conse- 
quently, an  internal  principle  from  which  its  actions 
proceed,  and  is  necessarily  possessed  of  a  conception 
peculiar  to  itself.  Therefore  in  all  real  being  the  es- 
sence is  necessary. 

Existence  is  also  necessary.  Existence  is  the  act 
of  the  essence,  or  that  by  which  the  essence  is  put 
beyond  the  sphere  of' possibility  by  having  undergone 
the  action  of  the  cause.  But  all  essences  of  real  being 
must  be  actual  and  not  potential ;  they  must  have 
passed  from  under  the  action  of  the  cause,  because 
when  a  thing  is  under  the  action  of  the  cause  it  is  on 
the  way  to  existence,  but  does  not  as  yet  exist,  and, 
when  it  is  in  nothingness,  is  not  real.  Therefore 
existence  is  necessary  to  real  being. 

We  must  remark  here  that  essence  and  existence  are 
distinct  in  created  beings,  but  not  so  in  God.    In  fact,  if 

iSi 


1 62      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

in  creatures  essence  were  the  same  thing  as  existence, 
creatures  would  always  exist  by  the  necessity  of  their 
nature.  Because  that  is  indispensable  to  them  which 
is  required  by  their  essence ;  if,  therefore,  in  the  sup- 
position their  essence  were  the  same  as  existence, 
the  latter  would  be  indispensable  to  them,  and  hence 
their  existence  would  be  necessary  by  the  necessity 
of  their  nature.  But  such  a  thing  cannot  be  said  of 
creatures,  which  do  not  exist  by  the  necessity  of  their 
nature ;  therefore  in  creatures  essence  is  distinct  from 
existence. 

2.  If  there  were  a  creature  in  which  essence  were 
not  distinct  from  existence,  to  it  we  should  naturally 
attribute  all  that  which  belongs  to  being,  as  such.  But 
it  does  not  become  being,  as  such,  to  be  an  effect,  be- 
cause in  that  case  every  being  would  be  an  effect,  and 
God  also.  Therefore,  if  in  creatures  existence  were 
not  distinct  from  essence,  their  being  would  not  be 
an  effect ;  in  other  words,  they  would  no  longer  be 
creatures. 

But  if  essence  and  existence  were  distinct  in  all 
beings,  all  beings  would  have  an  existence  by  acci- 
dent ;  all  would  be  potential  beings  first  before  being 
actual ;  all  beings  would  be  produced  without  our 
ever  being  able  to  find  a  necessary  cause  always  in 
act.  But  this  would  be  a  contradiction  ;  therefore  we 
must,  on  the  other  hand,  admit  the  necessity  of  a 
being  in  which  essence  and  existence  are  not  distinct, 
and  which  may  be  the  cause  of  all  the  others.  This 
is  the  uncreated  Being.  This  will  be  better  explained 
in  Theology. 

Q.   How  are  essence  and  existence  distinguished  ? 

A.  They  cannot  be  distinguished  as  true  parts  of 
a  whole,  because  a  part  is  not  the  whole.  But  the  es- 
sence is  not  a  part  of  the  substance  but  of  the  whole — 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       1 63 

that  is,  of  the  whole  substance.  Therefore  essence  and 
existence  cannot  be  distinct  from  each  as  true  integral 
parts,  nor  concur  to  form  the  real  being  as  parts  form 
the  whole.  Again,  the  part  does  not  exhibit  the  idea 
of  the  whole.  But  the  essence  exhibits  the  idea  of 
the  whole  being ;  therefore  essence  cannot  consti- 
tute the  real  being  as  an  integral  part  constitutes  the 
whole.  They  concur,  therefore,  as  act  and  potenti-. 
ality,  because  the  act  of  the  essence  is  existence.  We 
might  also  say  that  they  concur  as  two  acts,  because 
the  essence  is  the  act  of  being,  inasmuch  as  it  makes 
it  be  such  and  no  other ;  existence  is  the  act  of  being, 
inasmuch  as  it  draws  it  out  of  nothing  and  determines 
it  to  the  act.* 

*  St.  Thomas.  C0K/r        ,  lib.  ii.  ch.  34. 


itv.:-/     ■■■  ■..   .     ..       :,    .         ..        .  ,■,..   ;    .,    ..  .       ...  .     ■    .  ■ .  " 


.k 


CHAPTER  IV. 

•  ., .  .     OJf  THE  PROPERTIES  OF  BEING. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

•  ■•  V    .  Qn  Unity. 

Q.  How  can  being  have  properties,  and  what  can 
they  be  ? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  the  properties  of  being  cannot 
be  something  merely  ideal  or  purely  negative.  Not 
ideal,  because  that  which  is  fashioned  by  the  intellect 
and  has  only  a  logical  existence  cannot  be  the  property 
of  being.  Not  purely  negative,  because  the  idea  of  pro- 
perty implies  always  something  positive  and  real.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  idea  of  being  is  the  most  common 
and  universal,  and  comprehends  everything  in  itself. 
What,  consequently,  is  there  positive  and  real  in 
beings  distinct  from  itself,  which  may  answer  as  its 
properties? 

Nothing.  Therefore  if  a  property  must  be  some- 
thing positive,  and  if  there  can  be  nothing  positive 
which  is  not  included  in  being,  we  must  conclude  that 
the  properties  of  being  cannot  be  anything  else  than 
being  itself,  inasmuch  as  it  is  affected  either  by  some 
negation  or  some  other  extrinsic  relation  which  may 
really  be  attributed  to  it.  As  to  negation,  this  can- 
not affect  being,  except  in  the  sense  that  we  deny  of  it 
its  being  divided,  because  being,  taken  universally,  does 
not  present  this  or  that  distinction  ;  hence  we  cannot 

deny  of  it  this  or  that  particular  thing,  but  only  that 

164 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy.       1 6 5 

which  is  opposed  to  being,  which  is  next  to  absolute 
negation — that  is,  division,  as  we  shall  see. 

Division  alone,  therefore,  can  be  denied  of  being ; 
and  this  negation  of  division  constitutes  the  first 
property  of  being,  which  is  unity. 

With  regard  to  extrinsic  relations,  there  cannot  be 
any  others  than  those  referring  to  the  intellect  and 
to  the  will,  because  only  the  relation  to  the  intellect 
and  to  the  will  is  common  to  all  beings.  But  the 
relation  of  being  to  the  intellect  is  called  truth,  and 
the  relation  of  being  to  the  will  goodness  ;  therefore 
the  properties  of  being  are  no  more  than  three — 
unity,  truth,  and  goodness.  And  they  arise  from  being 
in  this  order  :  first  unity,  next  truth,  and,  finally, 
goodness.* 

Q.  Explain  the  idea  of  metaphysical  unity. 

A.  The  first  property  of  being,  then,  is  unity.  This 
may  be  defined  :  TJiat  property  of  being  by  which  it  is  un- 
divided in  itself  and  divided  from  others. 

This  is  called  metaphysical  unity,  but  to  under- 
stand it  well  it  is  necessary  to  carefully  determine 
it.  First,  it  must  not  be  confounded  with  numeri- 
cal unity — to  wit,  that  unity  which  is  the  measure 
and  principle  of  number.  From  this  arise  two, 
three,  four — that  is,  number ;  but  from  metaphysical 
unity  no  number  can  arise,  at  least  directly,  but  only 
being.  Neither  must  we  confound  the  property  of 
unity  with  that  quality  which  makes  a  thing  unique, 
because  the  latter  property  implies  that  a  thing  is 
sole,  or  that  which  excludes  the  existence  of  an  equal 
thing,  whereas  the  former  excludes  a  division  of  it- 

*  This  natural  m>stery  of  three  distinct  things  in  being,  and  which,  though  dis» 
tinct  from  each  other,  cannot  be  anything  else  than  one  being,  can  only  beexplained  by 
a  higher  and  more  sublime  mystery,  the  principal  dogma  of  our  faith — the  Trinity. 
We  shall  develop  this  view  in  the  internal  evidences  of  Christianity  in  the  second 
volume  of  this  work. 


1 66      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

self.  In  a  word,  metaphysical  unity  adds  nothing  to 
being,  except  the  negation  of  its  being  divided.  But 
from  this,  however,  we  cannot  deduce  that  the  idea 
of  unity  is  a  negative  one.  Also  iinmefise,  immortal, 
immutable  seem  to  express  a  negative,  yet  their  idea 
is  positive ;  likewise  unity,  which,  after  all,  does  not 
imply  anything  else,  except  the  same  entity  *  of  being, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  not  divided.  We  have  added  to  the 
definition  that  which  divides  it  from  others,  so  that 
this  unity  implies  two  elements,  that  of  being  undi- 
vided in  itself  and  divided  from  others.  The  first  is 
necessary  and  essential  to  metaphysical  unity  ;  the 
second  is  a  consequence  of  the  first,  because  a  being 
is  distinct  from  others,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is 
in  itself  undivided. 

Q.  Prove  that  every  being  is  one. 

A.  Everything  is  and  is  called  being  inasmuch  as 
it  has  an  entity  of  its  own.  But  that  which  has  an  en- 
tity of  its  own  does  not  contain  more  t'  .n  one  being, 
and  is,  therefore,  in  itself  undivided ;  and  that  which 
has  an  entity  of  its  own  does  not  share  it  with  others, 
and  is,  therefore,  distinct  and  divided  from  others,  all 
of  which  things  are  necessary  conditions  to  establish 
metaphysical  unity ;  therefore  every  being  is  one.  2. 
Every  being  has  an  essence,  by  which  it  is  restricted 
to  be  this  and  not  another.  Now,  to  be  restricted  to  a 
particular  existence  means,  first,  to  be  confined  and 
restricted  under  special  form,  and  not  to  be  divided 
into  several  entities ;  besides,  if  it  is  restricted  to  a 
special  existence  it  is  necessarily  distinct  and  divided 
from  all  others ;  therefore  every  being  is  one. 

3.  Finally,  a  being  is  either  simple  or  composite — 
that  is,  either  immaterial  or  material.     If  it  be  simple, 

.*    '  *'-'/!   !•  V       •  Word  uied  by  Boitley.  *       ,' 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       1 6  7 

it  is  undivided  in  itself,  both  actually  and  potentially, 
and  not  only  undivided  but  indivisible,  and  this  by 
necessity  of  nature.  If  it  be  composite,  then  it  may 
be  divisible  potentially  ;  but  actually  it  is  always  un- 
divided, because  it  does  not  possess  its  entity  when  its 
parts  are  divided,  but  only  when  they  are  united; 
therefore  every  being  is  itself  undivided.  Every  being, 
therefore,  is  one,  and  unity  is  convertible  with  being. 

Q.  What  remarks  must  be  made  on  the  nature  of 
unity  ? 

A.  We  have  said  that  the  idea  of  metaphysical 
unity  implies  two  elements,  indivision  in  itself  and  di- 
vision from  other  beings — the  first  necessary  and  essen- 
tial, the  second  a  consequence  of  the  first.  Now,  we 
must  make  some  remarks  on  both.  As  to  the  first,  it 
is  clearly  seen  that  unity,  or  indivision  in  itself,  is  a 
perfection  of  being,  and  that  a  being  is  perfect  in  pro- 
portion to  its  indivision,  and  for  that  reason  we  say 
that  the  idea  of  unity  is  positive. 

We  have  said,  moreover,  that  unity  is  convertible 
with  being  ;  therefore  it  is  different  in  proportion  to 
the  difference  of  being.  Now,  beings  may  be  simple 
or  composite  ;  therefore  unity  may  be  twofold  :  the 
unity  of  simplicity^  which  consists  in  a  thing  not  only 
being  undivided  actually,  but  in  being  altogether 
indivisible  ;  the  unity  of  composition,  which  agrees 
with  composite  beings,  and  which  implies  actual 
indivision  and  potential  division — that  is,  though 
actually  undivided  it  may  be  divided.  Again,  this 
composition  may  be  essential  or  accidental — as,  for 
instance,  the  union  of  the  body  and  soul  is  essential, 
the  union  of  many  soldiers  to  form  an  army  is  acci- 
dental ;  hence  two  kinds  of  unity  of  composition, 
natural  and  accidental. 

This  indivision,  whether  it  belongs  to  composite  or 


1 68      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

simple  beings,  whether  it  agrees  with  them  naturally 
or  accidentally,  inasmuch  as  it  is  considered  as  really 
corresponding  to  itself,  is  called  identity.  Wherefore 
identity  is,  strictly  speaking,  the  absolute  conformity 
of  a  being  with  itself;  and  only  in  a  loose  sense  can 
we  call  identity  the  conformity  of  one  being  with 
another. 

As  to  the  other  element  of  unity — that  is,  distinction 
from  other  beings — this  may  be  of  different  kinds  and 
has  several  degrees. 

Distinction,  like  indivision,  follows  the  condition  of 
being.  Now,  one  being  may  be  divided  from  another 
either  really  or  logically ;  therefore  the  distinction  of 
one  being  from  another  may  be  of  two  kinds,  logical 
and  real.  It  is  logical  when  things  are  not  really  dis- 
tinct from  each  other,  but  are  so  conceived  and  dis- 
tinguished by  the  intellect ;  for  instance,  in  God  his 
essence  and  his  attributes  are  not  leally  distinct,  but 
our  intellect,  the  better  to  know  them,  considers  them 
separately  by  a  logical  distinction.  Real  is  when  a 
thing  is  not  really  another;  as,  between  cause  and 
effect  there  passes  a  real  distinction.  Both  are  of  dif- 
ferent kinds:  the  real  is  subdivided  into  substantial, 
accidental,  and  modal  ;  the  substantial  is  that  which 
exists  between  separate  substances — for  instance,  be- 
tween man  and  the  brute,  or  between  the  principles 
really  distinct  of  a  composite  substance,  as  between 
the  soul  and  bod}  ,  which  are  the  principles  forming 
man. 

Accidental  and  modal  distinction  is  that  which 
exists  between  the  substance  and  its  modifications,  or 
between  one  accident  and  another  and  its  modes. 

Logical  distinction  is  subdivided,  in  a  twofold  man- 
ner, into  purely  mental  or  logical  and  into  virtually 
logical.     The  former  occurs  when  the  mind  makes  the 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       1 69 

distinction  without  having  any  foundation  in  reality, 
as  if  one  were  to  distinguish  man  from  reasonable 
animal.  The  second  is  when  it  is  made  with  some 
foundation  in  reality,  as  when  we  distinguish  in  the 
human  soul  the  rational,  the  sensitive,  and  the  vege- 
tative principle,  because,  though  the  soul  is  but  one 
principle,  it  has  yet  these  three  faculties  and  affords 
some  foundation  for  that  distinction. 

Distinction  may  have  different  degrees,  because 
that  which  is  different  from  another  may  be  so  more 
or  less,  according  as  it  is  more  or  less  conformable 
with  the  other.  Now,  the  limits  of  conformity  or 
non-conformity  determine  the  degrees  of  distinction. 
This  gives  rise  to  various  notions,  i.  Things  may  be 
distinct  from  each  other  as  to  the  essence,  inasmuch 
as  the  essence  of  one  is  not  the  essence  of  the  other, 
and  in  this  case  they  are  called  diverse^  and  the  dis- 
tinction diversity.  2.  Things  may  agree  in  the  es- 
sence or  some  other  common  feature,  but  vary  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  essence  or  the  feature  common 
to  both  is  found  in  each;  and  in  this  case  those  things 
are  called  different,  and  the  distinction  difference.  3. 
Or  they  may  agree  in  the  essence  and  in  the  determi- 
nations of  the  essence,  but  vary  as  to  their  qualities; 
and  in  this  case  they  are  called  dissimilar,  and  the 
distinction  dissimilarity ;  and  if  they  agree,  similar ^ 
and  the  agreement  similarity.  4.  If  things  agree  in 
essence,  determination  of  the  essence,  and  qualities, 
but  vary  in  quantity,  they  are  called  unequal^  and  the 
distinction  inequality ;  and  if  they  are  even  in  this, 
equal,  and  the  agreement  equality.  5.  Finally,  if 
things  are  considered  as  divided  only  in  respect  to 
number,  they  are  called  distinct,  and  the  division  dis- 
tinction,   .,  .  ,    ....        .. 


1 70      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 

On  the  Truth  of  Being. 

Q.   Give  the  idea  of  metaphysical  truth. 

A.  In  Logic  we  defined  truth  to  be  the  conformity 
or  the  agreement  of  things  with  the  intellect.  Now, 
things  may  Lc  regarded  as  related  to  the  intellect  in 
two  ways :  either  because  they  are  produced  by  it,  or 
because  they  are  merely  the  object  of  its  apprehen- 
sion. For  instance,  all  natural  things  can  be  referred 
to  the  divine  intellect  in  the  first  manner,  not  only 
inasmuch  as  they  are  known  by  it  but  also  inasmuch 
as  they  are  created  by  it.  They  can  be  referred  to  the 
human  intellect  only  in  the  second  manner,  inasmuch 
as  they  are  known  by  it.  From  this  arises  the  distinc- 
tion of  truth  into  metaphysical  and  logi«.d.  Meta- 
physical truth  consists  in  the  agreement  of  all  natural 
things  with  the  divine  intellect,  on  which  they  depend 
for  their  existence.  Logical  truth  consists  in  the 
agreement  of  the  conceptions  of  our  intellect  with  the 
things  which  those  conceptions  represent.  Here  we 
treat  merely  of  metaphysical  truth,  to  establish  which 
two  things  are  required  :  the  entity  of  the  thing  which 
is  the  foundation  of  truth,  and  its  agreement  with  the 
type  existing  in  the  divine  intellect. 

Q.  What  errors  were  maintained  by  Wolfius  and 
Locke  with  regard  to  the  essence  of  metaphysical 
truth? 

A.  Wolfius  and  his  followers  held  that  the  formal 
reason  or  essence  of  truth  consists  only  in  the  entity 
of  a  thing.  Locke  maintained  that  it  lies  in  the 
agreement  of  the  real  existence  of  things  with  the 
ideas  of  our  intellect.  Both  these  opinions  are  false. 
The  first  is  false  because,  if  the  entity  of  a  thing  alone 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.      171 

established  \\s  truth,  truth  would  not  imply  any  rela- 
tion, but  would  be  altogether  the  same  thing  with 
being,  and  hence  entity  and  truth  would  be  only  two 
words  meaning  the  identical  thing.  But  this  conse- 
quence is  false  by  the  admission  of  the  Wolfians  them- 
selves, who  teach  that  truth  is  not  the  thing  itself, 
but  a  transcendental  property  of  being.  Therefore 
the  essence  of  truth  cannot  consist  in  the  entity  of  a 
thing. 

The  second  opinion  is  false.  The  essence  of  truth 
cannot  be  placed  in  the  agreement  of  things  with  an 
intellect  to  which  they  are  related  only  accidentally, 
but  witli  an  intellect  to  which  they  are  necessarily  and 
essentially  related.  Now,  things  are  related  neces- 
sarily and  essentially  only  to  the  divine  intellect,  and 
only  accidentally  to  our  intellect ;  therefore  the  truth 
of  things  must  be  found  in  their  conformity  with  the 
divine  intellect. 

Q.  Prove  that  every  being  is  true. 

A.  I.  Every  being  is  just  what  i  is.  But  every 
being  is  just  what  it  is  because  God  has  thought  to 
make  it  so  ;  therefore  every  being  is  what  God  has 
thought  it  to  be,  and,  therefore,  conformable  with 
the  divine  type. 

2.  If  things  did  not  correspond  with  the  divine 
archetypes  after  which  God  made  them,  we  should 
conclude  that  either  he  knew  not  or  could  not  create 
them  just  as  he  thought  them  out.  But  the  first  sup- 
position is  repugnant  to  infinite  Wisdom  ;  the  second, 
to  divine  Omnipotence.  Therefore  all  beings  must  be 
conformable  with  the  divine  archetypes.  Hence  wich 
reason  was  it  said  by  the  schoolmen  that  being  and 
truth  are  convertible  terms — that  is,  that  every  truth  is 
being  because  the  truth  of  things  is  founded  upon 
the  entity  of  a  thing,  and  every  being  is  true  be- 


172       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

cause  every  being  necessarily  implies  a  relation  with 
the  divine  intellect. 

Q.  What  remarks  must  be  made  on  the  nature  of 
truth?  :■;.     -         •■    ,.      ;., 

A.  From  what  we  have  said  it  is  clear  that  the 
nature  of  metaphysical  truth  is  such  that  it  absolutely 
excludes  the  contrary ;  hence  it  would  be  abstird  to 
say  thi  there  can  be  metaphysical  falsehood,  and  if 
we  call  anything  false  we  do  so  only  in  a  logical  sense 
— that  is,  it  is  true  in  itself,  but  we  may  misapprehend 
it. 

It  is  clear,  in  the  second  place,  that  truth  is  neces- 
sary and  universal,  because  all  beings  must  necessa- 
rily be  related  to  their  types  which  are  in  the  divine 
intellect;  whereas  logical  truth  is  accidental,  because 
things  are  not  necessarily  and  by  their  nature  related 
to  our  intellect,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  latter  is  re- 
lated to  them.  Finally,  it  is  clear  also  that  in  meta- 
physical truth  the  intellect  is  the  measure  of  things, 
because  things  have  in  themselves  just  what  the  intel- 
lect has  idealized  and  proposed  to  create ;  on  the  con- 
trary, in  logical  truth  things  are  the  measure  of  the 
intellect,  because  the  latter  can  know  just  what  things 
represent.  Hence  in  metaphysical  truth  first  comes 
the  operation  of  the  intellect  and  next  the  thing  ;  in 
logical  truth  first  the  thing  and  then  the  operation  of 
the  intellect.  ,    -  .  r  • 

Q.  Is  truth  one  or  manifold  ? 

A.  We  must  answer  by  making  a  distinction.  If  we 
speak  of  logical  truth,  then  it  is  not  one  but  many ; 
because  logical  truth  is  the  agreementof  the  conception 
of  the  intellect  with  the  things  which  those  concep- 
tions represent ;  therefore  there  can  be  as  many  logical 
truths  as  there  are  things  of  which  faithful  conceptions 
may  be  formed  by  the  intellect.        , 


Elements  of  Intellectual 'Philosophy,       173 

If  we  speak  of  metaphysical  truth,  then  we  must  dis- 
tinguish again.  If  we  look  at  truth  in  its  formal  rea- 
son or  essence,  that  which  really  makes  it  truth,  then 
it  is  only  one  ;  because  that  which  makes  all  being-: 
true  is  their  conformity  with  the  divine  intellect.  Now, 
this  relation  with  the  divine  intellect  is  only  one  and 
the  same  in  all  things  ;  therefore  in  this  sense  meta- 
physical truth  is  one.  If  we  look  at  truth  in  its 
fundamental  aspect — that  is,  at  the  entity  of  things 
— as  there  are  various  entities,  so  we  may  say  that 
there  are  various  truths.  But  it  must  be  under- 
stood that  truth  in  the  latter  sense  is  only  taken 
improperly  and  analogically,  and  not  in  its  true  and 
proper  sense. 

Q.  Is  truth  necessary,  immutable,  and  eternal  ? 

A.  W^  must  again  distinguish.  If  we  speak  of 
metaphysical  truth,  it  is  so,  because  this  truth  is,  pro- 
perly speaking,  in  the  divine  intellect.  But  everything 
which  is  found  in  the  divine  intellect  is  necessary,  im- 
mutable, and  eternal;  therefore  truth  is  necessary, 
immutable,  and  eternal.  But  if  we  speak  of  logical 
truth,  then  we  must  again  distinguish.  If  it  is  ques- 
tion of  the  truth  of  first  principles  and  their  most 
immediate  consequences,  this  is  certainly  necessary, 
immutable,  and  eternal,  because  no  one  can  be  de- 
ceived or  change  his  opinion  about  them.  But  their 
necessity,  immutability,  and  eternity  is  like  that  of  es- 
sences, of  which  we  have  spoken.  If  we  speak  of  those 
truths  which  are  discovered  by  reasoning,  and  are 
deduced  immediately  from  first  principles,  then  the 
conformity  of  our  intellect  with  them  may  change,  not 
because  what  has  been  once  conformable  with  things 
may  change  in  itself  but  because  our  intellect  may  dis- 
miss it  and  turn  to  error.  Hence  in  the  sense  ex- 
plained we  may  say  w'*^h  Shakspere  : 


J  74       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

"s    )  ..        "  Truth  is  truth  to  the  end  of  reckoning";*        t>  '.V  i  f 
or  with  Bryant : 

"  Truth  crushed  to  earth  shall  rise  again:        If,,-,    •, ;     ■ 
The  eternal  years  of  God  are  hers."  f 

,/•(•,.     .      .1.  .;?,t^i'n',"U» '>v.;  ;.i.;.;:jf  •(.iiUiiiiU'!;:..   •;  i)..j  ^r;,     , 

'•  •  '  '       ARTICLE   THIRD.     ^' -  ■''  it  .  j:*.    ■ ;  '  J/i . 


Of  the  Goodness  of  Being. 


.1  i,\  • 


Q.  Give  an  idea  of  the  goodness  of  being. 

A.  Some  have  said  that,  formally  speakir  ^,  good- 
ness is  the  same  as  being.  But  if  such  were  the  case, 
goodness  would  add  nothing  to  being,  and  the  idea  of 
both  would  be  the  same.  Now,,  this  is  false,  because 
either  in  speaking  or  thinking  we  distinguish  these 
two  ideas  from  each  other.  Others  have  held  that 
the  formal  conception  of  goodness  is  the  same  as  that 
of  perfection.  This  is  also  false,  because  we  think  a 
being  perfect  by  considering  it  alone  by  itself,  and  in- 
asmuch as  it  does  no't  fail  to  have  all  those  things 
requisite  for  its  essence,  virtue,  and  operation,  the 
very  things  in  which  perfection  consists.  On  the  con- 
trary, goodness  always  implies  a  relation  to  a  ten- 
dency of  which  it  forms  the  proper  object,  because 
that  which  a  tendency  yearns  after  is  goodness.  We 
are  obliged,  therefore,  to  conclude  that  goodnesr,  for- 
mally and  essentially  considered,  lies  in  its  being 
sought  after  by  a  tendency  or  appetitive  faculty,  and 
it  may  therefore  be  defined:  That  property  for  which  a 
thing  is  sought  after.    •''    "  ''  -'^ '  <*    -     -.  » 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  goodness  are  there  ? 

A.  Three  kinds,  metaphysical,  physical,  and  moral. 
The  first  consists  in  this,  that  a  being  is  sought  as 
being  in  general ;  the  second,  inasmuch  as  it  is  such  a 


V  'V.i  *  **■    »*. 


•  "  Measure  for  Measure."    ''i'iW^i^r-  lUiVK  V,li:i       f  Bryant's  poems. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       171 

being  in  particular ;  the  third,  inasmuch  as  it  is  agree- 
able with  moral  laws.  We  shall  speak  here  only  of 
metaphysical  goodness.  •       ;  • 

Q.   Prove  that  every  being  is  good.    .  .         . 

A.  That  this  metaphysical  goodness  is  the  common 
and  necessary  property  of  every  being  is  proved  thus  : 
The  formal  reason  of  the  goodness  of  a  being  lies  in 
the  fact  that  it  may  be  sought  after  by  an  appetitive 
tendency.  But  every  being  may  be  sought  after  by  an 
appetitive  tendency  ;  therefore  every  being  is  good. 
The  major  is  apparent  from  the  definition  of  goodness 
we  have  already  given.  The  minor  is  proved  as  follows : 
A  thing  is  appetible  inasmuch  as  it  is  perfect,  because 
every  being  seeks  and  desires  only  its  own  perfection. 
But  every  being,  as  being,  is  perfect,  because  every 
being,  as  such,  is  in  act,  and  a  thing  is  called  perfect 
inasmuch  as  it  is  in  act.  Therefore  every  being  is 
appetible. 

O.  What  remarks  have  you  to  make  on  the  nature 
of  goodness? 

A.   I.  It  is  clear  from   the   reason  just   given  that, 

though    goodness  in  its  formal  idea  is  distinct  from 

perfection   and   entity,   it   has    yet    a    strict    alliance 

with  both ;  because  every  being  is  good  inasmuch  as 

it  is  perfect,  and  is  perfect  inasmuch  as  it  is  being,  so 

that  being  is  the  foundation  of  the   perfect,  and  the 

perfect  the  ground-work  of  the  good ;  hence  in  order 

being  comes  first,  next  the  perfect,  and  last  the  good. 

For  this  reason  it  is  said  that  goodness  is  convertible 

with  being.      ,,.:,. _..yT...M\,    ■..:-■•  v;;,'.V 

■  ,.  "t .  -■  ■  <■  •   . .  ■ 

■  >         II  Q^Q  truth  is  clear  :  whatever  is,  is  right." 

.    «,'  '     ;  •  — roPE. 

2.  As  being  may  be  either  essential  or  accidental, 
so  metaphysical  goodness  may  be  either  essential  or 


176       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

accidental.  Essential  goodness  is  that  which  is  be- 
coming to  essences ;  and  as  essences  are  incapable  of 
"rowth  or  decrease,  so  neither  is  essential  goodness 
capable  of  such  change.  Accidental  goodness  is  capa- 
ble of  'Tfovvth  or  decrease,  because  accident  does  not 
constitute  the  essence,  but  is  added  to  the  essence 
already  constituted,  as  to  be  learned  is  accidental  to 
goodness,  and  therefore  may  be  pable  of  increase 
or  diminution.  3.  From  this  theory  of  the  goodness 
of  being  other  most  important  corollaries  follow  in 
relation  to  evil. 

Evil  is  the  opposite  of  good,  and  is  defined :  The 
absence  of  a  perfection  required  vt  a  being.  For  in- 
stance, sight  is  required  in  man's  body,  and  hence  its 
absence  is  a  real  evil.  But  if  a  perfection  is  not  re- 
quired by  the  nature  of  a  being,  its  absence  cannot  be 
called  evil ;  hence  if  a  stone  is  not  endowed  with  a 
rational  principle,  this  can  nev6r  be  called  an  evil. 

In  this  sense  Pope  has  said : 

"  Then  say  not  man's  imperfect,  Heaven  in  fault ; 
Say  rather  man's  as  perfect  as  he  ought : 
His  knowledge  measured  to  his  state  and  place, 
His  time  a  moment,  and  a  point  his  space." 

—Essay  on  Man. 

From  this  it  follows :  i.  That  evil  is  not  in  itself  an 
entity.  Every  entity  is  good,  because,  as  we  have 
said,  good  is  convertible  v/ith  being.  Now,  evil  is  the 
opposite  of  good  ;  therefore  evil  is  the  opposite  of 
entity,  or  the  privation  of  being.  2.  Evil  is  founded 
and  exists  in  good.  If  evil  has  no  entity  of  its  own,  it 
follows  that  it  cannot  exist  in  itself;  therefore  it 
must  exist  in  some  being.  But  every  being  is  good ; 
therefore  evil  must  exist  in  good.  3.  Einl  supposes  a 
cause^  and  this  cannot  be  hit  a  good.  Evil  is  the  pri- 
vation and  the  absence  of  a  certain   perfection  which 


Elemenis  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       1 7  7 

the  nature  of  being  requires  and  must  have.  But  that 
a  certain  being  should  be  deprived  of  its  natural  per- 
fection, this  must  originate  in  a  cause  which  may  draw 
that  being  outside  its  disposition  and  order ;  there- 
fore evil  supposes  a  cause.  This  cause  must  be  good. 
Because  a  nonentity  cannot  be  cause,  as  it  cannot  act ; 
if  evil,  therefore,  must  have  cause,  this  must  be  an 
entity.  But  good  and  entity  are  convertible ;  there- 
fore good  is  the  cause  of  evil.  4.  Good  is  the  cause  of 
evil  only  accidentally.  Every  effect  must  have  a  pro- 
portion and  likeness  with  its  cause  ;  therefore  the 
proper  effect  of  good  cannot  be  but  good.  If,  there- 
fore, sometimes  it  produces  evil,  this  cannot  be  but  by 
accident.  5.  Metaphysical  evil,  propounded  by  Leibnitz^ 
is  an  absurdity.  Metaphysical  evil,  according  to 
Leibnitz,  consists  in  the  limitation  of  the  creature,  in- 
asmuch as  it  cannot  have  other  perfections  than  those 
required  by  its  essence  and  nature.  Now,  this  is  not 
evil,  because  evil  is  the  absence  of  a  perfection  re- 
quired by  the  nature  of  a  being.  But  perfections 
which  are  not  required  by  the  nature  of  a  being 
are  not  due  to  it ;  therefore  their  absence  cannot  be 
an  evil.  Hence  metaphysical  evil,  invented  by  Leib- 
nitz and  his  followers,  does  not  exist. 

Q.  What  is  the  order  of  the  transcendental  proper- 
ties of  being? 

A.  They  proceed  from  being  in  this  manner:  first  is 
unity,  next  truth,  and,  last,  goodness.  That  unity 
is  the  first  transcendental  property  of  being  is  evident 
because  it  is  absolute,  ancf  becomes  being  by  itself 
and  not  by  any  denomination  to  any  exterior  thing,  as 
truth,  which  implies  a  relation  to  an  intellect ;  and 
goodness,  which  implies  a  relation  to  an  appetitive 
faculty.  Now,  the  absolute  is  before  the  relative  ; 
therefore  unity  is  before  truth  and  goodness.      Next 


1 78      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

comes  truth,  because,  i.  Truth  implies  a  relation  to 
an  intellect,  goodness  to  an  appetitive  faculty  or  a 
will.  But  the  intellect  precedes  the  will;  therefore 
truth  is  before  goodness.  2.  Because  goodness  is,  in 
a  certain  manner,  founded  on  truth;  health,  for  in- 
stance, to  be  good,  must  be  real,  true  health,  because 
if  it  were  false  it  could  not  be  good  health.  Now,  the 
foundation  of  a  thing  precedes  the  thing  itself;  there- 
fore truth  is  before  goodness.  From  this,  of  course, 
we  must  not  conclude  that  the  aforesaid  properties  are 
really  distinguishable  from  being;  their  distinction 
from  it  being  only  logical,  without  a  foundation  in  re- 
ality. ,.•..- 

'    '  '  .  .    .  .  •  •   '  * 

■  '      '•    •       ARTICLE    FOURTH.  ,7 

The  Beautiful. 

Q.  Why  do  you  speak  here  of  the  beautiful,  and 
what  is  its  definition  ? 

We  speak  here  of  the  beautiful  because  it  has  such 
close  connection  with  unity,  truth,  and  goodness. 
Nov/,  before  giving  the  definition  of  the  beautiful  we 
must  distinguish  three  things  about  it :  the  formal 
essence  of  the  beautiful,  its  foundation,  and  its  effect. 

And,  first,  as  to  its  foundation.  The  beautiful  is 
founded  on  goodness,  because  our  soul  cannot  take 
pleasure  in  anything  except  what  it  desires  and  craves 
for.  But  our  soul  cannot  crave  except  what  it  appre- 
hends as  good  ;  therefore  our  soul  cannot  take  plea- 
sure except  in  what  it  appllehends  as  good.  Now,  our 
soul  does  take  pleasure  in  the  beautiful ;  therefore  it 
must  apprehend  something  good  in  the  beautiful  as  its 
foundation.  '^^r.  f>^M'<J"r^.: ;>>:>: ,,7,,:'  li/v^iI^/  -.?  ..ifs.,,., 
'•  As  to  its  effect,  it  is  admitted  by  all  philosophers, 
and  confirmed  by  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  that 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       179 

the  effect  of  the  beautiial  consists  in  giving  pleasure. 
The  simplest  child,  for  instance,  in  looking  at  the  sky 
in  its  most  magnificent  apparel,  in  looking  at  a  land- 
scape, cries  out,  with  pleasure  beaming  from  its  eyes, 
Oh  !  how  beautiful,  how  charming.  And  what  the 
child  does,  so  do  the  most  consummate  artists,  as  was 
the  case  with  Michael  Angelo  in  the  presence  of  the 
Apollo  of  Belvedere,  when  he  stood,  day  after  day, 
rapt  in  pleasure,  contemplating  that  wonderful  repre- 
sentation of  the  human  form  divine,  chiselled  with 
such  admirable  art  and  truth,  which  has  not  as  yet 
been  surpassed  ;  the  effect  of  the  beautiful,  therefore, 
is  to  give  pleasure. 

As  to  its  essence,  the  beautiful  consists  in  variety 
reduced  to  unity  by  order  and  proportion  of  the  parts 
with  each  other  and  with  the  whole. 

Q.  Explain  the  definition. 

A.  The  beautiful  consists,  i,  in  variety y  because  if 
we  were  to  contemplate  unity  bare  and  naked,  and  no- 
thing but  unity,  we  should  soon  get  tired  and  wearied 
and  turn  a\vay  from  it  in  disgust. 

2.  In  unity  ;  because  if  we  saw  a  number  of  objects 
without  any  connection  or  relation  with  each  other, 
the  same  effect  would  result :  we  should  take  no  plea- 
sure '\i\  contemplating  them. 

3.  Order  is  required,  because  a  number  of  objects 
put  together  without  any  idea  or  principle  regulating 
their  arrangement  would  present  nothing  but  con- 
fusion, and  be  not  only  unable  to  cause  pleasure  but 
render  impossible  the  unity  required  for  the  beautiful. 

4.  Proportion  is  required  between  the  parts  and  the 
whole.  This  proportion  means  that  there  should  be 
a  kind  of  softening  in  the  variety  of  each  part,  so  as  to 
gently  make  way  for  the  unity  of  the  whole  ;  because 
if  the  parts  were  kept  in  their  decided,  crude  variety 


,   1 80      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

unity  could  never  be  effected.  But  if,  in  the  extremes 
of  each  part,  a  softening  of  their  variety  is  produced, 
so  that  one  part  may,  by  its  extreme  being  softened 
down,  ahiiost  touch  the  extreme  of  the  other  part,  also 
softened  down,  the  unity  is  gently  procured  without 
disturbing  the  variety  of  the  parts.  If  the  extremes 
of  these  parts  could  not  be  softened  down,  their 
nature  not  permitting  it,  then  between  one  part  and 
another  a  third  must  be  placed,  of  such  nature  as  to 
answer  for  the  keeping  of  the  proportions  required  to 
result  in  unity.  To  illustrate  this  theory  about  pro- 
portion we  may  make  use  of  the  parts  of  creation,  the 
best  representation  of  the  beautiful.  God  has  created 
spiritual  beings  and  sensitive  beings,  living  and  inani- 
mate beings.  Had  he  kept  the  variety  of  each  of 
these  species  in  their  crude  state,  so  to  speak,  thfe  har- 
mony and  the  beauty  of  creation  would  have  been 
marred  in  consequence  of  the  too  great  contrast  be- 
tween them.  But  God  put  an  intermediate  species 
between  each  to  soften  down  the  contrast  and  make 
way  for  the  unity  of  the  whole.  Hence  between  the 
purely  spiritual  species  and  the  sensitive  God  has 
placed  man,  partaking  of  the  spiritual  and  the  sensible 
softened  down  in  him  ;  between  the  sensitive  beings, 
such  as  animals,  and  the  living  beings,  such  as  plants, 
God  has  placed  a  kind  of  animal  endowed  with  one 
sense,  and  that  very  dull,  so  as  to  approach  the  two 
species  together,  such  as  the  polypus  and  all  corallines ; 
between  the  living  beings  or  plants  and  the  inanimate 
God  has  placed  something  which  seems  to  be  border- 
ing between  the  plant  and  the  animal,  such  as  the  fungi, 
under  which  name  botanists  comprehend  also  a  large 
number  of  microscopic  plants  forming  the  appearances 
called  mouldiness,  mildew,  smut,  rust,  brand,  etc. 
Q.  How  is  the  beautiful  divided?       ^"  "     t-f  '^f 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.        1 8 1 

A.  The  beautiful  is  divided  into  natural,  artificial, 
and  moral ;  and  the  natural  is  subdivided  into  spiritual 
and  corporal. 

The  beautiful  natural  is  that  which  is  found  in  every 
being  and  in  the  whole  assemblage  of  created  beings 
forming  the  universe.  That  in  every  being  we  find  a 
variety  reduced  to  unity  by  order  and  proportion  is 
evident ;  because,  first,  every  nature  is  composed  of 
different  principles,  which  are  so  connected  together 
by  order  and  proportion  as  to  make  a  beautiful  whole. 
Take,  for  instance,  man.  He  is  composed  of  body 
and  soul :  the  body  consists  of  motive,  vegetative,  sen- 
sitive faculties;  the  soul  of  intellectual  and  volitive 
faculties.  The  motive  faculties  are  subject  to  the 
vegetative,  then  to  the  sensitive.  The  variety  of  the 
senses  is  brought  into  unity  by  what  is  called  a  com- 
mon sensorium.  These  are  brought  into  communica- 
tion with  the  intellectual  faculties  by  means  of  the 
imagination,  which  is,  as  it  were,  a  faculty  akin  to  the 
senses  and  to  the  intellect.  The  will  governs  all  these 
faculties. 

"The  elements 
So  mixed  in  hitn  that  Nature  mijjht  stand  up  j 

And  say  to  all  the  world,  •  7'his  is  a  man.''  " 

— Shakspere, 

That  the  same  variety  reduced  to  unity  by  order 
and  proportion  is  admired  in  the  universe  is  too  evi- 
dent to  need  any  demonstration  ;  therefore  we  may 
conclude  that  every  being  is  beautiful. 

The  spiritual  beautiful  is  that  which  is  admired  in 
spiritual  beings  ;  the  corporal  that  which  is  admired  in 
corporal  beings.        •  „ ...  ^x    v,..  t^  .:.■,.  -..-  .  •.^,'  v->  N-wimrf- 

The  artificial  beautiful  is  that  which  is  produced  by 
human  genius  and  art,  and  must  consist  of  the  same 


1 8  2       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

elements — that'  is,  variety  reduced  to  unity  by  order 
and  proportion. 

The  moral  beautiful  consists  in  the  conformity  of 
the  human  actions  with  the  eternal  principle  of  right. 

We  must  remark  in  general,  in  support  of  the  theory 
of  the  beautiful  given  above,  that  in  works,  either  of 
nature  or  art,  where  the  variety  is  made  of  objects 
forming  each  one  a  whole  by  itself,  and,  as  it  were, 
independent,  the  unity  cannot  be  found  as  actually 
existing  in  them  in  a  material  sense,  but  results  from 
the  order  and  proportions  of  the  parts,  which  all  are 
made  to  conspire  in  l-epresenting  and  expressing  an 
idea  intended  by  the  artist.  Thus  in  the  universe  we 
cannot  find  a  material  unity,  as  it  is  made  up  of  a 
numberless  variety  of  objects,  each  forming  an  indi- 
viduality by  itself.  But  all  conspire",  by  their  order 
and  proportion  in  being  and  in  action,  to  show  forth 
the  grandeur  and  the  infinite  excellence  of  the  Creator, 
the  idea  which  God  intended  to  express. 

The  same  must  be  said  of  artificial  beauty.  When  in 
the  productions  of  art  the  variety  is  made  up  of  indi- 
vidual objects,  each  forming  a  whole  by  itself,  the 
unity  which  must  be  sought  in  such  productions  can 
only  be  ideal ;  that  is,  the  artist  must  so  choose  its 
objects,  and  arrange  and  dispose  them  in  such  a  man- 
ner, and  put  such  proportion  between  them  that  they 
naturally  suggest  the  idea  he  wanted  to  incorporate. 
Take, /or  instance,  the  "  Last  Judgment"  of  Michael 
Angelo  in  the  Sistine  Chapel.  The  great  artist  could 
not  put  in  such  a  picture  a  material  unity,  as  it  is  formed 
of  a  great  number  of  objects  having  an  individuality  of 
their  own.  But  he  so  chose  and  arranged  each  ob- 
ject that  they  all  conspire  in  representing  the  dread- 
ful horror  of  that  day — the  idea  which  he  wanted  to 
express.     This  he  has  attained  by  representing  the 


Elcfnents  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       183 

Judge  with  such  dread  majesty  on  his  countenance, 
by  surrounding  that  majesty  with  such  an  array  of 
angels  and  saints,  themselves  in  awe  and  almost 
trembling,  and  by  a  multitude  of  horror-stricken 
wretches  awaiting  that  judgment,  that  tlie  beholder  is 
at  once  impressed  with  the  idea  of  the  artist  and 
almost  feels  the  horror  of  that  day  subduing  his  soul. 

The  second  remark  is  that,  as  we  have  sho\Vn  every 
being,  as  such,  to  be  beautiful,  it  follows  that  being 
is  convertible  with  the  beautiful,  and  that  an  object  is 
beautiful  in  the  same  proportion  as  it  is  a  being,  and 
that  consequently  the  Supreme  Being  is  the  supreme 
beauty,  which  beauty  in  him  consists  in  the  infinite 
variety  of  his  attributes,  reduced  to  infinite  simplicity 
of  his  essence,  or  rather,  as  the  Christian  revelation 
teaches  us,  in  the  mystery  of  the  Trinity,  which  is  vari- 
ety of  persons  and  unity  of  essence,  the  supreme  type 
of  all  beauty.     But  enough  of  the  beautiful. 

Q.  Say  a  word  on  the  sublime. 

A.  Being  may  oftentimes  by  its  fulness  seem  to 
transcend  our  capacity  of  apprehension  and  the 
ordinary  limits  of  other  beings.  Then  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  call  it  sublime.  Hence  the  true  foundation 
of  the  sublime  is  the  infinite,  which  alone  has  natu- 
rally no  limit ;  and  in  proportion  as  beings  approach 
more  or  less  the  infinite  they  assume  more  or  less  the 
/:haracters  of  the  sublime.  Hence  it  follows  that  in 
the  works  of  art  the  sublime  is  obtained  by  the  ideal 
and  the  indeterminate,  which,  by  leaving  the  object 
expressed  not  deprived  of  its  entity,  but  in  a  kind  of 
ideal  and  indeterminate  condition, enhance  its  grandeur 
before  our  imagination. 

Such  is  the  definition  which  God  gave  of  himself  to 
Moses,  "  I  am  who  am,"  which  has  been  called  sublime 
by  all  the  geniuses  of  mankind.     Such  is  the  descrip- 


1 84       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

tion  of  Satan  by  Milton,  etc.  The  sublime  is  of 
three  kinds,  because  being  may  transcend  the  limits 
of  our  capacity  of  apprehension  by  its  entity,  by  its 
force,  by  its  extension  as  to  duration  and  grace.  If 
the  being  transcend  the  limits  by  its  nature,  then  it  is 
called  the  sublime  ontological ;  if  by  its  force,  the  sub- 
lime dynamic  ;  if  by  its  duration  or  space,  the  mathe- 
matical sublime. 


1       I.' 


CHAPTER  V. 

ON  THE  CAUSES  OF  BEINGS. 
ARTICLE  FIRST. 

On  the  Nature  and  Idea  of  Cause. 

Q.  Why  do  we  treat  of  the  cauiies  of  being,  and 
what  order  shall  we  follow  in  speaking  of  them  ? 

A.  The  idea  of  cause  has  such  connection  with  that 
of  being  that  the  mind,  in  reasoning  upon  one,  cannot 
pass  over  the  other  ;  because  every  being  is  either 
cause  or  caused^  hence  the  idea  of  cause  always  follows 
being.  Hence,  having  spoken  of  the  properties  of 
being,  we  must  now  speak  of  its  causes.  And  to  give 
an  orderly  and  adequate  idea  of  them  we  shall  first 
give  an  idea  of  cause  and  of  its  nature  ;  2,  of  its  diffe- 
rent species;  3,  of  the  relations  they  have  with  their 
effects  and  with  themselves. 

Cause  is  understood  to  be  the  principle  of  a  thing  ; 
hence  it  takes  ordinarily  the  name  of  principle.  But, 
strictly  speaking,  the  idea  of  cause  is  different  from 
that  of  principle.  Principle,  in  its  strictest  accepta- 
tion, means  merely  something  from  which  another 
thing  proceeds  in  any  manner  whatever.  Cause  means 
something  upon  which  another  thing  depends  as  to  its 
being.  Hence  the  idea  of  cause  implies  a  certain  de- 
pendence and  inferiority  of  being  in  the  thing  which 
is  caused,  whereas  the  idea  of  principle  does  not  imply 
a  dependence  or  inferiority  of  being  as  regards  the 
thing  proceeding  from  it.* 

♦  Hence  the  Church  calls  the  Father  in  God  the  principle  of  His  Son,  but  not  the 
rnnse,  because  the  Son  is  perfectly  equal  to  the  Father  in  nature  and  attributes,  and 
in  no  way  inferior  to  Him. 

185 


1 8  6       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy. 

Hence  it  is  apparent  that  the  idea  of  cause,  i,  is 
narrower  than  that  of  principle,  because  every  cause 
is  principle,  but  not  every  principle  is  cause.  2.  Cause 
implies  always  a  real  and  positive  influx  upon  the 
being  which  depends  upon  it,  and  which  is  called 
effect.  3.  Cause,  at  least  in  nature  if  not  in  time,  is 
conceived  always  before  the  effect.  After  all  these 
remarks  we  may  define  cause  to  be  that  ivhich  posi- 
tively concurs  in  tJie  being  of  a  thing.  Hence  the  idea 
of  cause  is  always  relative,  implying  a  necessary  rela- 
tion to  that  thing  to  the  being  of  which  the  cause  has 
concurred. 

The  term  of  this  relation,  as  we  have  said,  is  called 
effect.  From  this  relation  arise  those  principles  of 
immediate  evidence  ;  Every  effect  supposes  a  cause  ; 
No  being  can  be  the  cause  of  itself;  All  that  ivhich 
is  contained  in  the  effect  must  be  found  in  the  causey 
etc. 

Q.  What  was  Hume's  error  as  to  the  idea  of  cause? 

A.  Hume  asserted  that  the  idea  of  cause  has  no 
objective  value ;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  does  not  repre- 
sent a  real  thing.  He  proved  his  assertion  thus :  Ob- 
servation is  the  only  source  of  our  knowledge  ;  but 
observation  cannot  give  us  the  idea  of  cause ;  there- 
fore the  idea  of  cause  is  not  objective.  He  proved 
his  minor  thus  :  Cause  implies  a  connection  with  the 
effect;  now,  observatioi  merely  manifests  a  succes- 
sion of  facts  in  nature,  but  not  their  connection; 
therefore  observation  cannot  give  the  idea  of  cause. 
He  concludes  from  this  that  the  principle  of  causality 
— that  is,  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause — is  a 
prejudice  of  our  mind. 

Now,  how  absurd  this  opinion  is  every  one  can  see 
by  himself,  and  we  could  easily  pass  it  unnoticed,  as 
it  is  founded  on  that  principle  that  all  our  knowledge 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy,      187 

is  derived  from  observation,  which  principle  we  shall 
prove  to  be  utterly  false.  Yet  we  shall  make  a  few 
remarks  upon  it  the  better  to  illustrate  the  idea  of 
cause.  We  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  idea  of 
cause  is  objective.  Hume  admits  that  the  idea  of 
cause  would  be  objective  if  observation  not  only  mani- 
fested to  us  a  succession  but  also  a  connection  in 
natural  facts.  Now,  such  is  the  case ;  therefore  the 
idea  of  cause  is  objective.  The  minor  is  proven  by 
the  following  reasons :  Succession  implies  the  idea  of 
one  thing  following  another,  connection  the  idea  of  one 
thing  springing  or  proceeding  from  another.  Such  is 
the  difference  between  succession  and  connection. 
Now,  observation,  manifests  not  only  many  things 
following  one  another,  but  also  many  things  springing 
and  proceeding  from  othtrs.  In  fact,  we  have  our 
senses,  sight,  hearing,  taste,  and  we  know  that  they 
were  given  us  for  an  object — the  sight  to  see,  the  ears 
to  hear,  and  the  palate  to  taste — and  we  use  them 
whenever  we  wish  to  feel  their  action  or  effect. 
Again,  everybody  feels  that  when  he  wants  to  talk 
he  talks,  and  when  he  wants  to  move  he  moves,  and  if 
he  wants  to  be  at  rest  he  can  do  so  at  once.  We  feel, 
therefore,  that  these  facts  are  not  only  things  which 
follow  one  after  the  other,  but  which  spring  and  ori- 
ginate one  from  the  other. 

Besides,  to  feel  that  a  certain  thing  is  wholesome 
and  another  hurtful  does  not  exceed  the  power  of  ob- 
servation, as  it  Is  manifest  to  all  mankind.  But  this 
implies  that  we  can  feel  that  one  thing  proceeds 
from  another;  therefore  observation  manifests  to  us 
not  only  the  succession  but  the  connection  of  facts. 
When  we  eat,  for  instance,  something  unwholesome, 
and  we  feel  a  certain  effect  from  it  injurious  to  our 
health,  we  certainly  observe  the  connection  between 


1 8 8      Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy. 

the  eating  of  that  thing  and  the  injurious  effect  result- 
ing thereby,  and  not  merely  the  succession  of  one 
thing  after  the  other,  because  we  feel  that  that  injuri- 
ous effect  only  follows  the  eating  of  that  particular 
thing;  hence  we  feel  their  connection. 

Now,  nothing  more,  even  according  to  Hume,  is  nec- 
essary to  render  the  idea  of  cause  objective  ;  therefore 
that  idea  is  objective.  This  we  have  said,  confining 
ourselves  within  the  limits  of  observation,  and  we  add 
that  our  mind,  by  observing  from  all  these  facts  and 
depriving  them  of  their  particular  circumstances,  forms 
the  general  idea  of  cause  and  of  effect. 

If,  then,  the  idea  of  cause  is  objective,  it  is  evident 
that  what  Hume  asserts  about  the  principle  of  causali- 
ty— that  it  is  a  prejudice  of  our  mind — is  false  ;  because 
if  a  certain  reality  correspc^ds  to  the  idea  of  cause — 
that  is,  a  thing  which  really  concurs  to  the  existence 
of  another — it  is  clear  that  we  can  argue  rightly  from 
the  existence  of  the  effect  to  the  existence  of  the 
cause. 


ARTICLE    SECOND. 

Of  the  va'/ious  Causes;   and,  first,  of  Material  and 
'  Formal  Causes. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  causes  are  there  ? 

A.  We  have  defined  cause  to  be  that  which  concurs 
positively  to  the  existence  of  a  thing.  Now,  four  are 
the  principles  which  can  concur  in  the  existence  of 
anything;  therefore  there  are  four  kinds  of  causes. 
Of  these  four  principles  two  are  intrinsic  and  two  ex- 
trinsic. The  two  intrinsic  principles,  speaking  of  ma- 
terial things,  are  the  matter  and  the  form,  both  of 
which  are  necessary  to  constitute  composite  beings. 


Elemen  is  of  Intellectua  I  Ph  ilosophy,       1 8  9 

But  matter  could  not  have  its  form  if  this  were  not 
given  to  it  by  an  exterior  agent,  and  this  exterior  agent 
would  not  act  except  prompted  by  an  end  in  view. 
Therefore,  besides  the  matter  and  the  form,  two  exte- 
rior agents  concur  in  the  existence  of  a  thing,  the  ex- 
terior agent  and  the  end  which  moves  it.  These, 
then,  are  the  four  causes:  the  material  (matter),  the 
formal  (form),  the  efficient  cause  (the  agent),  and  the 
final  cause  (the  end).  And  as  in  any  given  effect  of 
the  kind  we  are  speaking  of  we  first  observe  the 
material  cause,  then  the  formal,  and  afterwards  the 
agent  and  the  end,  so  we  shall  speak  first  of  the 
material  and  formal  causes,  and  then  of  the  other 
two. 

Q.  What  is  the  causality  of  matter  and  form  ? 

A.  Matter,  or  the  material  cause,  is  nothing  but  that 
thing  out  of  which  something  is  shaped  ;  for  instance, 
the  log  or  block  out  of  which  a  sculptor  makes  a 
statue  is  called  the  material  cause.  The  figure  or 
shape  which  the  sculptor  gives  it  is  called  the  for- 
mal cause.  But  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  cau- 
sality of  matter  and  form  does  not  consist  in  any  action 
which  they  may  perform,  because  whosoever  performs 
an  action  is  called  agent ;  hence  action  cannot  be  predi- 
cated of  the  material  or  formal  cause,  but  of  the  effi- 
cient cause.  The  causality,  therefore,  of  matter  and 
form  cannot  consist  in  an  action.  If  it  does  not  con- 
sist in  an  action,  then  their  causality  lies  in  their  entity, 
being  used  by  the  agent  to  form  composite  beings.  To 
this  causality  corresponds  a  double  effect  depending 
one  upon  another.  The  first  is  proper  to  each,  and  it 
is  for  matter  to  hold  the  form  and  for  the  form  to  ter- 
minate and  shape  the  matter.  The  second  is  common 
to  both,  and  is  the  whole  composite  resulting  from  the 
union  of  both. 


190      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Q.  What  is  meant  by  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  form  ? 

The  form,  before  it  is  appHedto  matter,  has  another 
mode  of  existence  in  the  efficient  cause,  and  this  other 
mode  is  so  ncxessary  to  the  form,  and  has  such  strict 
connection  with  it,  that  it  could  never  be  applied  to 
matter  if  it  did  not  previously  exist  in  the  agent.  For 
it  is  the  agent  that  must  produce  such  a  form  on  the 
matter.  But  the  agent  could  never  intend  to  intro- 
duce such  form  in  the  matter  if  the  similitude  of  that 
form  were  not  already  existing  in  him,  because  none 
can  give  what  he  has  not;  therefore  there  must  be 
the  similitude  of  the  form  in  the  agent.  This,  inas- 
much as  it  is  considered  as  having  to  be  introduced  in 
matter,  is  called  extrinsic  form  to  distinguish  it  from 
that  which  is  really  introduced  in  matter,  and  which  is 
called  intrinsic. 

This  extrinsic  form  may  be  of  two  kinds,  because  it 
is  of  such  a  nature  as  are  the  agents  in  which  it  is 
found.  Now,  agents  may  be  of  two  kinds,  because  they 
are  distinguished  by  the  manner  of  their  acting,  which 
may  be  either  byway  of  nature  or  by  way  of  intellect. 
Hence  natural  agents  and  intellectual  agents.  Like- 
wise the  extrinsic  form  is  distinguished  in  two  ways 
according  to  agents,  by  nature,  or  by  intellect ;  in  those 
agents  which  act  by  nature  the  form  is  found  accord- 
ing to  natural  being,  as  in  man  when  he  generates  man, 
in  fire  which  engenders  fire  ;  in  those  agents  that  act 
by  intellect  it  is  found  according  to  the  intelligible 
being,  as  the  similitude  of  a  building  is  in  the  mind  of 
the  architect.  But  as  agents  by  nature  do  not  of 
themselves  intend  to  introduce  the  form,  but  are  led 
and  guided  by  those  who  act  by  intellect,  as  the  arrcw 
reaches  the  mark  because  it  is  thrown  by  the  archer, 
so  agents  by  nature  may  be  considered  rather  as  in- 
struments of  the  agents  by  intellect ;  hence  the  name 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      1 9 1 

of  extrinsic  form  has  been  applied  more  properly  to 
the  form  of  the  effect  which  exists  in  the  intellect 
of  the  agent.  Taken  in  this  sense,  it  has  been  defined 
thdit  form  by  looking  at  which  the  artist  zvorks.  This 
has  received  the  name  of  exemplary  cause,  because,  as 
it  is  apparent,  it  concurs  in  the  production  of  the  effect, 
serving  as  model  and  example.  It  was  also  called 
idea,  and  received  for  the  first  time  that  name  by 
Plato,  and  from  it  the  name  of  idea  was  applied  to 
that  which  serves  as  means  of  knowledge. 

But  one  must  carefully  remark  the  difference  which 
exists  between  them.  Both  agree  in  this :  that  they 
are  a  similitude  of  something  existing  in  the  intellect, 
but  are  distinguished  by  these  several  heads:  I.  The 
idea  which  makes  us  understand  objects  is  not  the 
object  of  our  knowledge,  but  a  means  by  which 
the  intellect  perceives  things.  On  the  contrary,  the 
exemplary  cause  is  not  the  means  but  the  object  at 
which  the  mind  of  the  agent  looks.  2.  The  first  does 
not  always  belong  to  the  practical  intellect,  whereas  the 
second  always  does,  being  intended  to  be  outwardly 
expressed.  3.  The  first  has  no  connection  either  with 
the  efficient  or  the  final  cause;  but  the  exemplary 
cause  has,  because  it  has  connection  with  the  efficient 
cause,  inasmuch  as  it  determines  and  euides  the  acrent 
in  its  operation.  It  has  connection  with  the  final 
cause,  in  the  sense  that  the  end  of  the  agrent  is  nothing 
more  than  the  reproduction  of  that  form. 

ARTICLE   THIRD. 

On  Efficient  Cause. 

Q.  Define  an  efficient  cause. 

A.  The  form,  as  we  have  said,  would  not  be  given 
to  matter  but  for  the  action  of  the  efficient  cause. 


192       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

This  may  be  defined  :  That  extrinsical  principle  from 
which  primarily  and  properly  the  movement  of  the  ac- 
tion begins.  It  is  called  extrinsical  principle  to  distin- 
guish the  efficient  cause  from  the  material  and  formal 
causes,  which  are  intrinsic  principles.  We  have  added 
frojH  zuhich  the  movement  of  the  action  primarily  begins^ 
to  distinguish  the  efficient  from  the  final  cause  ;  be- 
cause, though  we  may  say  in  a  certain  sense  that  from 
the  end  everything  that  regards  the  causing  of  some- 
thing takes  its  rise,  yet,  strictly  speaking,  the  move- 
ment of  the  action  begins  primarily  in  the  agent,  and 
the  end  does  nothing  more  than  to  excite  the  agent 
to  begin  the  movement.  Finally,  we  have  added /r^ 
perly  to  distinguish  the  efficient  cause  from  the  sim- 
ple occasional  cause,  from  which  oftentimes  the  action 
begins,  but  does  not  properly  proceed  from  it. 

Q.  What  subjects  can  be  really  efficient  causes? 

A.  Malebranche,  and  many  Cartesians  with  him,  are 
of  opinion  that  to  be  really  efficient  cause  can  be  said 
of  God  only,  who  alone  can  really  act.  Creatures,  on 
their  part,  do  nothing  more  than  present  to  God  the 
occasion  for  acting,  but  in  themselves  are  really  devoid 
of  activity.  This  opinion  was  called  occasionalism,  be- 
cause it  denies  to  the  creature  all  real  activity,  and 
makes  them  exhibit  only  the  occasion  for  God  to  act 
in  them. 

3.  Now,  this  opinion  is  false  and  contains  several  ab- 
surd things.  In  fact,  that  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 
creature  should  have  the  power  of  acting  can  be  demon- 
strated as  follows  :  If  such  a  thing  involved  any  repug- 
nance, it  ought  to  involve  it  '  .her  on  the  part  of  God 
or  on  that  of  the  creature,  liut  it  does  not  involve 
repugnance  on  the  part  of  either;  therefore  it  is  not 
impossible  that  creatures  should  really  act. 

To  act  follows  to_  be,  and  is  proportionate  to  the 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       1 93 

amount  of  being.  This  can  be  seen  in  God  Himself,  to 
whom  occasionalists  allow  the  oower  of  acting,  because 
God  acts  as  He  is,  and  the  power  of  acting  is  in  pro- 
portion to  His  being,  and  that  kind  oi  poivcr  becomes 
Him  because  that  (^^/«^  becomes  Him.  Hence  to  act 
becomes  Him,  because  to  be  becomes  Him.  But  crea- 
tures have  a  being ;  therefore  it  is  not  repugnant  on 
their  part  that  they  should  have  the  power  of  acting. 
It  is  not  repugnant  on  the  part  of  God,  because  if 
God  could  communicate  to  creatures  their  being,  why 
could  not  He  also  communicate  them  the  power  of 
acting? 

2.  The  principal  reasons  which  occasionalists  al- 
lege to  show  that  impossibility  are  derived  from  two 
heads:  i.  God  being  a  most  perfect  cause,  it  in- 
volves a  contradiction  that  there  should  be  other 
efficient  causes  besides  Him;  2,  because  God  can  by 
Himself  produce  all  the  effects  which  take  place  in  the 
world.     If  acts,  therefore,  all  other  causes  are  useless. 

As  to  the  first  reason,  if  that  principle  were  true  we 
might  conclude  from  it  that  not  only  is  it  impossible 
that  any  creature  should  act  but  that  any  creature  should 
exist.  God  is  a  most  perfect  being ;  therefore  it  is 
impossible  that  there  should  be  other  true  beings  be- 
sides Him.  But  as  it  is  not  impossible  that  besides  the 
most  perfect  infinite  being  there  should  be  other  true 
finite  beings  created  bv  the  former,  likewise  it  is  not 
impossible  that  besides  that  first  and  most  perfect 
Cause  there  should  be  other  causes  created  by  the 
former.  On  the  contrary,  the  opposite  opinion  would 
involve  a  contradiction  ;  because  as  God's  perfection 
would  not  be  infinite  if  He  could  not  give  existence  to 
other  things  outside  Himself,  so  His  action  would  not 
be  infinite  if  He  could  not  communicate  it  to  others. 
And  this,  far  from  implying  necessity  or  insufficiency  on 


194       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

His  part,  would  be  a  sign  and  an  effect  of  His  immense 
perfection  and  goodness,  by  which  He  can  communi- 
cate His  similitude  not  only  as  to  being  but  also  as  to 
action. 

With  regard  to  the  second  reason,  if  this  were  of  any 
value  we  could  turn  it  againsi  the  occasionalists,  be- 
cause God  is  fully  sufficient,  to  act  all  alone  by  Himself, 
and,  in  that  case,  not  only  the  action  of  creatures  would 
become  usehss,  but  also  the  occasions,  since  He  could 
produce  all  sorts  of  effects  without  waiting  for  us  to 
present  Him  with  occasions.  Why  should  God  wait, 
for  instance,  that  I  should  put  water  in  my  m.outh,  in 
order  to  take  occasion  to  quench,  by  His  own  ac- 
tion alone,  my  thirst?  Could  he  not  do  that  Himself 
without  waiting  for  that  occasion?  Besides,  even 
granting  that  God  could  do  all  by  Himself,  ye<-  for  ' 
all  that  secondary  causes  would  not  be  useles;-; ;  be- 
cause, as  St.  Thomas  teaches,  it  is  against  the  idea  of 
wisdom  that  there  should  be  anything  useless  in  the 
works  of  the  wise.  Now,  if  created  things  did  not 
act  in  the  production  of  effects,  but  all  was  done  by 
God  Himself,  he  would  employ  other  things  to  pro- 
duce effects  uselessly  and  without  reason.  By  admit- 
ting secondary  causes,  of  course,  we  do  not  mean  to 
attribute  to  them  an  infinite  virtue ;  nor  is  this  nec- 
essary to  the  idea  of  cause,  as  Malebranche  contends. 
We  say  that  everything  has  the  power  of  acting  pro- 
portionate to  its  being.  But  to  the  creature  we 
attribute  a  being,  therefore  a  power  acting  propor- 
tionate to  that  being. 

3.  Finally,  if  the  opinion  of  the  occasionalists  were 
true,  God  would  be  the  real  uithor  of  all  the  crimes 
which  are  committed  in  the  worlc,  as  He  would  be  the 
only  real  agent,  which  is  absurd. 

Gathering  all  we  have  said  together,  we  say  that 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy.        1 9 5 

the  nature  of  cause  can  be  attributed  to  all  those 
things  which  liave  being,  and  can  be  attributed  to 
them  in  the  S3me  degree  and  proportion  as  being; 
and  because  being  properly  becomes  the  substance,  of 
substance  alone,  therefore,  may  we  predicate  the  name 
of  cause.  Hence  the  truth  of  that  saying  of  St. 
Thomas,  that  every  substance  has  the  power  of  acting. 

Q.   How  niany  species  of  efficient  causes  are  there? 

A.  The  nature  of  cause  lies  in,  this:  that  it  is  a  prin- 
ciple from  which  the  movement  of  the  action  proceeds  ; 
therefore  there  are  different  causes  in  consequence  of  the 
difference  of  the  movement  and  the  action.  But  every 
movement  may  be  different  from  two  heads,  either 
from  its  nature  or  from  its  term  ;  consequently, 
causes  may  differ  either  in  consequence  of  the  nature 
of  their  action,  or  in  consequence  of  the  effect  or  term 
which  they  produce.  As  to  the  manner  of  acting,  the 
cause  may  he: principal  or  instrumental.  The  principal 
cause  is  that  which  acts  by  itself — not  moved  by  an- 
other nor  used  as  a  means  by  another  cause  ;  as,  The 
artist  is  the  principal  cause  of  his  work.  Instrumental 
cause  is  that  which  is  used  as  a  means  by  the  principal ; 
as,  The  brush  and  the  colors  in  the  hand  of  the 
painter,  which  do  something,  and  hence  they  are  called 
cause  ;  but  as  they  cannot  do  that  something  without 
being  handled  by  the  painter,  they  are,  therefore,  called 
instrumental  causes. 

2.  Free  and  necessary  cause.  A  free  cause  is 
that  which  acts  with  deliberation  and  choice,  as  mas- 
ter of  its  action,  as  the  will  of  man  in  respect  to  par- 
ticular goods.  A  necessary  cause  is  that  which  is  im- 
pelled to  act  by  the  force  of  its  nature,  and  which  does 
not  regulate  its  act  by  deliberation,  as  all  the  action 
of  natural  agents  inferior  to  man. 

3.  First  and    secondary  cause.      The    first   is  that 


1 9  6       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

which  admits  of  no  other  cause  preceding  it,  such  as 
God  in  respect  to  all  created  causes.  Secondary  is 
that  which  is  moved  by  the  primary  cause,  such  as  all 
creatures  relatively  to  God. 

4.  Cause  by  itself  and  by  accidctit.  The  cause  by 
itself  is  that  which  does  that  to  which  it  is  destined 
by  its  own  nature,  as  for  fire  to  burn,  for  man  to  rea- 
son. Cause  by  accident  is  when  to  the  natural  effect 
of  a  cause  another  effect  is  added  accidentally  con- 
nected with  it ;  afj,  for  instance,  a  man  digging  the 
foundation  of  a  house  finds  a  treasure.  The  actual 
effect  of  the  man's  action  is  the  digging,  but  accident- 
ally the  other  effect  is  connected  with  it. 

On  the  part  of  the  effect,  efficient  causes  may  be 
univocal,  equivocal^  aftalogous.  The  cause  is  called 
univocal  when  it  produces  an  effect  like  to  itself  in 
species,  as  in  the  case  of  the  generation  of  animals 
which  engender  an  animal  of  the  same  species  as  them- 
selves. It  is  called  equivocal  when  it  produces  an  ef- 
fect similar  to  the  cause  as  to  genus,  as  the  sun  in  re- 
spect to  its  effects.  It  is  called  analogous  when  the 
cause  does  not  agree  with  the  effect  either  as  to  spe- 
cies or  genus,  but  yet  has  a  certain  likeness  with  it,  as 
God  in  respect  to  His  creatures. 

Proximate  and  remote.  Proximate  is  that  which 
produces  the  effect  immediately,  remote  when  it  pro- 
duces it  by  means  of  other  causes. 

ARTICLE    FOURTH. 
On  Final  Cause. 

Q.  What  is  the  nature  and  definition  of  final  cause  ? 

A.  The  efficient  cause  would  not  be  moved  to  act 
but  for  the  final  cause.  The  end  can  be  defined  :  That 
for  the  sake  of  which  something  is  done,  or  that  at 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       1 9  7 

which  one  aims  in  acting.  This  shows  the  difference 
of  the  final  from  all  other  causes.  The  mu.ter  is  that 
out  of  which  something  is  made,  the  form  is  that 
which  gives  it  figure  and  shape,  the  agent  is  that 
which  makes  it,  and  the  end  is  that  for  which  it  is 
made,  and  is  called  the  end  because,  having  obtained 
it,  the  action  terminates  and  the  agent  rests. 

That  the  end  is  a  true  cause  is  clear  from  consider- 
ing that  it  concurs  positively  in  the  production  of 
something  by  determining  the  agent  and  moving  it  to 
act. 

.  The  nature  of  its  causality,  besides,  consists  in 
moving  the  tendency  of  the  agent  and  in  arousing  the 
wish  of  the  agent  to  attain  it,  because,  as  the  influx 
of  the  efficient  cause  consists  in  acting,  that  of  the 
final  cause  is  in  being  wished  for. 

The  way  by  which  the  final  cause  acts  is  by  exhi- 
biting its  goodness,  true  or  seeming.  This  is  ex- 
pressed by  Pope  so  elegantly  : 

"  Modes  of  self-love  the  passions  wc  may  call  : 
'Tis  real  good,  or  siemingy  jiioi'cs  them  all." 

— Essay  on  Man, 

Because  every  being  wishes  its  own  perfection.  But 
the  perfection  of  a  being  is  its  good  ;  therefore  the 
end,  in  order  to  excite  a  desire  for  itself,  must  show 
itself  as  the  good  and  the  perfection  of  the  agent. 

Q.  On  what  being  can  the  end  exercise  its  influ- 
ence, and  for  what  being  is  it  becoming  to  have  an 
end? 

A.  To  act  for  an  end  becomes  all  beings,  of  what- 
ever nature  they  may  be ;  be  they  endowed  with 
knowledge  or  not,  be  they  spiritual  or  material,  all 
beings  must  aim  at  an  end. 

Q.  Prove  this. 


198      Eleme7tts  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

A.  First  proof :  From  what  we  have  said  of  causes 
we  see  that  by  necessity  of  nature  they  are  subject  to 
this  order :  the  matter  does  not  receive  its  form  ex- 
cept it  is  given  it  by  the  agent,  and  the  agent  is  not 
moved  to  give  that  form  except  when  determined 
hy  an  end,  because  if  it  were  not  determined  by  an 
end  to  a  certain  special  effect,  there  would  be  no 
reason  why  it  should  produce  one  effect  in  preference 
to  another ;  therefore  once  we  take  away  the  end, 
neither  efficient  cause  aor  formalTs  possible,  and  con- 
sequently no  effect  can  be  obtained. 

2.  Agents  are  either  free  or  necessary  causes  ;  but 
it  is  clear  that  free  agents  are  induced  to  act  by  an 
end,  because,  being  free,  they  are  indifferent  to  act  or 
not  to  act,  to  act  in  this  or  in  another  way,  to  act  this 
or  the  contrary  way,  and  the  end  alone  can  determine 
them  to  a  choice.  Necessary  agents  arc  called  so  be- 
cause they  are  by  nature  determined  and  necessitated 
to  act.  Now,  this  determination  comes  to  them  from 
the  end  ;  therefore  every  agent  aims  at  an  end. 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  not  all  agents  aim  at 
an  end  in  the  same  manner.  This  depends  upon  their 
nature.  Every  being  acts  according  to  its  nature. 
But  agents  are  different  by  nature  ;  therefore  they 
aim  at  an  end  in  a  different  manner.  In  fact,  all  the 
agents  in  nature  may  be  divided  into  three  classes. 
Some  are  gifted  with  reason  and  intellect,  by  which 
they  cannot  only  apprehend  the  end  but  also  see  how 
it  befits  their  nature,  and  can  discover  the  aptitude  of 
the  means  which  exist  in  order  to  obtain  it.  Others 
are  without  intellect,  but  are  endowed  with  senses,  by 
which  they  may  apprehend  the  end  at  which  they  may 
aim,  but  cannot  see  the  relation  which  exists  between 
it  and  their  nature,  nor  the  aptitude  of  the  means  to 
obtain  it.  Finally,  others  have  neither  intellect  nor  sense, 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.        199 

and  cannot  apprehend  the  end  at  all,  as  the  arrow 
which  goes  to  the  mark.  The  first  have  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  end,  and  can  reason  upon  the  means 
to  be  chosen,  and  heive  no  need  that  any  one  should 
direct  them  to  it,  but  being,  in  force  of  their  reason 
and  will,  masters  of  their  acts,  go  to  their  end  by  them- 
selves ;  and  of  such,  strictly  speaking,  it  is  said  that  they 
aim  at  an  end.  The  second,  knowing  by  the  way  of 
the  senses  the  end,  and  apprehending  it  somewhat, 
aim  at  it  in  a  certain  way,  but  according  to  the  man- 
ner of  their  knowledge,  that  is,  instinctively,  urged  by 
nature,  and  not  perfectly  by  themselves,  as  they  have 
not  the  mastery  of  their  acts.  Finally,  those  that 
have  neither  sense  nor  intellect  are  not  moved  by 
themselves  to  seek  the  end  by  an  intellect  external 
to  them. 

Q.   How  many  different  ends  may  there  be  ? 

A.  The  nature  of  the  end  lies  in  this  :  that  it  must  be 
intended  by  the  agent  as  the  term  of  its  tendency  and 
operation.  Therefore  it  may  be  different,  according 
to  the  different  way  of  intending  it  as  a  term.  Hence 
it  may  be  proximate,  intermediate,  and  ultimate : 
proximate  if  it  is  the  first  and  immediate  term  of 
the  tendency  :  ultimate  if  it  is  the  very  thing  which 
the  agent  intends  to  cease  operation  and  rest  after ; 
intermediate  if  it  is  a  term  of  the  tendency,  but 
neither  proximate  nor  last. 

2.  Principal  and  accessory.  The  first  is  that  which 
is  principally  aimed  at  by  the  agent,  and  hence  this 
is  the  principal  term  of  the  tendency.  The  second  is 
that  which  is  sought  by  the  agent  along  with  the 
principal,  but  not  so  that,  if  it  could  not  be  attained, 
the  agent  would  cease  to  seek  the  principal. 

End  of  the  action  and  end  of  the  agent.  The 
first  is  the  natural  term  of  the  action,  as  the  end  of 


200       Elements  of  hitellcctual  Philosophy. 

the  act  of  singing  is  to  sing.  The  second  is  that 
which  the  agent  proposes  to  himself,  as  a  singer  might 
propose  to  himself  riches  or  delight. 

Objective  and  subjective.  Objective  is  the  ob- 
ject which  is  sought  for.  Subjective  is  the  use  to 
which  the  agent  intends  to  put  the  object. 

ARTICLE   FIFTH. 

Of  the  Relation  of  Cause::  ivith  their  Effects  and  among 

Themselves. 

Q.  How  many  are  the  relations  which  causes  may 
have  ? 

A.  Relation  arises  from  the  respect  which  one  thing 
has  to  another.  Now,  a  cause  may  be  considered  in 
respect  to  its  own  effects  or  to  another  cause  with 
which  it  is  connected.  Therefore  causes  may  have 
relations  cither  with  their  own  effects  or  with  other 
causes  ;  and  we  must  speak  first  of  the  one  and  then 
of  the  other. 

Q.  What  are  the  relations  which  a  cause  may  have 
with  its  own  effects? 

A.  That  a  cause  has  relation  with  its  own  effects  is 
clear  from  all  we  have  said  with  regard  to  the  idea  of 
cause  and  effect ;  for  we  have  seen  that  between  cause 
and  effect  there  is  not  merely  succession  but  a  neces- 
sary connection,  and  that  the  effect  cannot  possibly 
exist  without  receiving  its  being  from  the  cause.  A 
necessary  consequence  flows  from  this,  namely,  that 
between  the  effect  and  its  cause  there  is  a  necessary 
and  true  relation,  which  consists  in  the  effect  depending 
as  to  its  being  upon  its  cause.  Also  from  this  neces- 
sary dependence  of  the  effect  upon  its  cause  three 
other  relations  arise  which  will  better  illustrate  its 
idea.     Wherever    several   beings    are    connected    to- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       2  o  i 

gether  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  find  these  three 
other  things  r  a  relatioit  of  order,  htcdiXxsQ  conniction 
implies  order,  a  certain  location  of  the  parts  cc  inect- 
ed  in  view  of  an  end  ;  a  relation  of  naturf,  because 
things,  in  order  to  be  connected,  should  have  a  certain 
natural  affinity  ;  a  relation  of  dignity,  because  where 
there  is  dependence  and  connection  among  a  number 
of  beings  it  is  necessary  that  one  should  be  more 
noble  than  the  other.  The  relation,  therefore,  of  de- 
pendence of  the  effect  upon  its  cause  gives  rise  to 
three  other  relations,  that  of  order,  of  nature,  and  of 
dignity.     We  shall  speak  of  each  separately. 

With  regard  to  the  relation  of  order,  this  must  con- 
sist in  the  priority  of  the  cause  with  regard  to  its 
effect;  because  if  the  effect  depends  as  to  its  being 
upon  the  cause,  a  relation  of  order  in  this  case  can- 
not consist  in  anything  else  except  that  the  cause 
must  be  before  the  effect.  But  it  must  be  remarked 
that  this  priority  may  be  of  two  kinds,  priority  of 
time  and  priority  of  nature.  The  first  consists  in  the 
one  being  temporarily  before  the  other ;  the  second 
consists  in  this:  that  though  cause  and  effect  may  be 
supposed  to  exist  simultaneously,  yet  the  cause  must 
be  conceived  always  first,  inasmuch  as  the  effect  could 
not  exist  without  it.  With  regard  to  the  priority  of 
nature,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  cause  is  always  be- 
fore the  effect.  But  with  regard  to  priority  of  time 
we  must  remark  that  we  may  consider  the  cause  only 
as  a  certain  being  in  itself,  irrespectively  of  any  rela- 
tion to  any  effect,  or  we  may  consider  it  as  merely  a 
cause.  If  we  consider  it  in  the  first  sense,  it  is  clear 
that  it  can  exist  before  the  effect ;  and  this  is  not 
impossible,  especially  in  what  are  called  successive 
causes,  in  which  case  it  is  necessary  that  the  cause 
which  produces  by  way  of  movement  and  possession 


202       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

should  exist  previously  to  the  effect.  In  the  second 
case  the  cause  cannot  exist  before  the  effect ;  because  a 
thing  is  called  a  cause  inasmuch  as  it  produces  an  effect ; 
therefore  it  cannot  possibly  be  called  a  cause  before 
actually  producing  the  effect. 

With  regard  to  the  relation  of  affinity  or  proportion, 
this  consists  in  a  certain  similitude  which  the  effect 
must  have  with  its  cause ;  because  the  effect,  so  to 
speak,  is  an  emanation  of  the  cause — something 
drawn,  as  it  were,  from  the  cause,  since  no  being 
gives  what  it  has  not.  Now,  all  this  necessarily  im- 
plies "a  similitude  between  the  effect  and  its  cause ; 
therefore  there  must  be  a  similitude  between  the  ef- 
fect and  the  cause.  This  similitude,  however,  varies 
in  proportion  as  the  effect  is  more  or  less  adequate 
to  the  activity  of  the  cause.  From  this  arises  the 
distinction  of  effects  into  univocal,  equivocal,  and 
analogous,  which  we  have  already  defined  above. 

With  regard  to  the  relation  of  dignity,  we  must 
observe  that  it  is  different  in  proportion  to  the  manner 
according  to  which  the  cause  concurs  in  the  effect. 
Now,  to  determine  this  the  following  remarks  are  to  be 
kept  in  view:  If  the  question  is  about  material  and 
intrinsic  formal  causes,  they  are  less  noble  than  their 
effect,  because  the  part  is  less  noble  than  the  whole  ; 
but  material  and  formal  causes  act  as  the  part  towards 
the  formation  of  the  whole,  therefore  they  are  less 
noble  than  their  effect.  We  have  said  the  intrinsic 
formal  causes,  because  the  extrinsic  formal  cause — 
that  is  to  say,  the  exemplar  and -type  which  is  in  the 
mind  of  the  artist — may  be  more  noble  than  the  ef- 
fect, as  are  all  the  types  of  things  existing  in  the  di- 
vine mind.  If  it  is  a  question  of  the  principal  final 
cause  in  agents  who  act  according  to  order,  it  is  al- 
ways more  noble  than  the  effect,  because  no  man  who 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       203 

acts  according  to  order  will  spend  more  in  order  to 
get  what  is  less,  nor  employ  what  is  more  noble  to 
attain  what  is  less  so.  Now,  the  effect  with  regard  to 
the  end  is  like  a  means  to  an  end ;  therefore  in  one 
who  acts  according  to  order  the  end  is  always  nobler 
than  the  effect.  If  it  is  a  question  of  the  efficient 
cause,  it  is  either  more  noble  than  the  effect  or  equal 
to  it,  because  the  cause  is  either  univocal  or  equivocal. 
If  it  is  univocal,  it  is  equally  as  noble  as  the  effect, 
which  belongs  to  the  same  species ;  if  it  is  equivocal, 
it  is  nobler  than  the  effect,  because  the  effect  in  this 
case  belongs  to  a  species  inferior  to  the  cause. 

Q.  What  is  the  relation  of  causes  among  them- 
selves ? 

A.  A  relation  always  means  connection  ;  therefore 
we  can  have  relation  between  causes  only  when  we 
can  find  1  hem  connected  together  to  obtain  an  effect. 
Beside^,  a  connection  between  two  things  may  be 
either  proper  or  accidental.  We  intend  to  speak  here 
of  the  proper  connection.  This  relation  between 
causes  may  be  of  order,  of  nature,  and  of  dignity, 
as  we  have  said  of  the  relations  of  causes  with  their 
effects. 

Of  the  relation  of  nature  among  causes  we  think 
we  have  said  enough  already  when  we  spoke  of  the 
proportion  which  the  nature  of  the  final  cause  must 
have  with  the  efficient  cause,  and  the  proportion 
which  the  agent  must  have  with  the  formal  cause,  and 
this  with  the  material.  We  shall  speak  of  the  relation 
of  order  and  dignity. 

As  to  the  relation  of  order,  we  may  distinguish  be- 
tween causes  of  the  same  nature  from  those  of  a  dif- 
ferent nature.  The  first  are  those  which  belong  to  the 
same  kind,  but  are  all  ordained  and  bound  together  to 
produce    the   same  effect ;    for  instance,  a  number  of 


204      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy . 

efficient  causes  bound  together  so  that  one  depends 
upon  the  other,  and  all  produce  something.  The 
second  are  those  belonging  to  difTcront  kinds,  as  the 
final,  the  efficient,  the  formal;  etc.,  which  are  different, 
but  still  one  depending  upon  the  other. 

Now,  if  the  causes  be  of  the  same  nature,  and  are,  in 
themselves,  in  proper  order,  whatever  other  accidental 
order  may  be  found  among  them,  it  is  always  neces- 
sary that  there  should  be  a  first  and  a  last  one  in  that 
order,  and  that  we  should  not  have  a  progression  ad 
infinitum;  because,  in  such  a  case,  in  order  to  obtain 
the  effect  it  is  necessary  that  the  action  of  one  cause 
should  pass  to  another,  and  from  this  to  a  third,  and 
so  on,  till  we  have  the  effect.  Hence  if  the  series  of 
such  causes  were  infinite,  the  action  and  the  move- 
ment should  have  to  go  through  an  infinite  series  to 
reach  the  effect.  But  the  infinite,  as  such,  cannot  be 
outstepped ;  therefore  we  cannot  admit  an  infinite 
series  of  causes. 

Besides,  in  a  series  of  causes  naturally  in  order  the 
first  is  the  cause  of  the  second,  this  of  the  third,  and  so 
on.  Take  away,  therefore,  the  first  cause  and  you  take 
away  also  the  last,  for  the  same  reason.  But  in  an 
infinite  series  we  cannot  find  a  first  cause,  because 
otherwise  it  would  be  finite ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
without  the  first  there  would  be  no  middle,  and  con- 
sequently no  last,  cause,  therefore  no  effect  at  all. 
Hence,  in  causes  of  themselves  well  arranged  there 
cannot  be  an  infinite  series,  but  there  must  be  a  first 
and  a  last.  Therefore  in  this  series  of  efficient  causes 
there  must  be  always  a  first  from  which  all  others  de- 
pend, and  in  the  series  of  final  causes  there  must  be  a 
primary  end  to  which  all  other  ends  are  directed. 
With  regard  to  different  causes,  besides  the  theory 
that  in  them  we  cannot  have  an  infinite  progression, 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       205 

for  the  same  reason  we  may  determine  also  which  of 
them  must  be  first  and  which  last.  In  causing,  the 
first  is  the  end,  bee  jse  it  moves  the  agent ;  next 
comes  the  agent,  who  must  act ;  and  finally  comes  the 
form  which  the  agent  intends  to  give  to  the  matter. 

As  to  the  relation  of  dignity  between  causes,  it  is 
clear  that  the  formal  cause  is  more  noble  than  the 
material,  because  the  form  gives  being  to  matter. 
Now,  that  which  gives  is  more  noble  than  that  which 
receives;  therefore  the  form  is  more  noble  than  the 
matter.  Next,  the  efficient  cause  is  more  noble  than 
the  form,  because  the  form  is  given  by  it  and  is  its 
own  likeness.  Finally,  the  final  cause  is  the  noblest 
of  them  all,  because  all  causes  act  in  order  to  obtain 
the  end.  But  the  end  is  sought  as  good  and  perfec- 
tion ;  therefore  all  other  causes  stand  in  relation  to 
the  final  cause  as  the  imperfect  to  the  perfect. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

DIVISION    OF  BEING, 
ARTICLE  FIRST. 

Of  Substance  mid  Accident. 

Q.  What  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter  ? 

A.  Being,  as  we  have  said  in  Logic,  is  divided  into 
ten  categories,  or  supreme  genera,  because  it  is  first 
divided  into  substance  and  accident,  and  this  latter 
is  divided  into  nine  other  genera.  We  shall  speak, 
then,  of  these  ten  categories,  and  first  of  substance 
and  accident. 

Substance  is  defined  that  which  exists  in  itself 
and  not  in  another  on  which  it  may  lean  as  subject. 
We  must  pay  attention  to  several  remarks  in  order  to 
understand  this  definition.  What  is  meant  by  those 
words:  that  thing  which  exists  in  itself?  i.  They  ex- 
clude all  inherence  of  the  thing  called  substance  in  any 
other  being  in  order  to  exist,  and  cause  it  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  accident,  the  essence  of  Avhich  is  to 
lean  on,  or  inhere  in,  another  thing  as  subject.  2. 
Those  words,  which  exists  in  itself,  must  not  be  taken  in 
such  a  sense  as  to  exclude  from  the  idea  of  substance  the 
idea  of  an  efficient  cause,  because  these  words  merely 
point  out  to  an  existence  in  one's  self  and  not  in 
another,  but  may  or  may  not  admit  of  an  efficient 
cause.  If  that  which  exists  in  itself  is  infinite,  then 
the  substance  does  not  require  a  cause  in  order  to  ex- 

ao6 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       2  07 

ist,  but  exists  of  its  own  nature.  If  the  substance  is 
finite,  then,  though  existing  in  itself,  it  requires  a 
cause  to  make  it  so.  In  other  words,  to  exist  in 
itself  does  not  mean  to  exist  by  itself.  The  first 
means  that  a  thing  does  not  require  to  lean  on  any 
subject  in  order  to  exist  ;  the  second  means  that  the 
thing  does  not  require  any  cause  to  give  it  existence, 
but  enjoys  existence  in  force  of  its  own  essence. 

2.  That  which  exists  in  itself  and  not  in  another 
is  called  substance,  principally  from  its  being  the 
subject  of  the  accident.  For  the  word  substance  is 
derived  from  those  two  Latin  words,  sub^  under,  an'^. 
stare,  to  be  placed  or  located.  Now,  that  the  substance 
is  tile  subject  of  accidents  is  demonstrated  as  follows: 
If  the  subject  of  accidents  were  not  the  substance,  it 
should  be  another  accident.  But  the  accident  cannot 
exist  in  itself,  but  must  lean  on  another  in  order  to  ex- 
ist ;  therefore  this  same  accident,  supporting  otner  acci- 
dents, must  either  lean  on  a  substance  or  on  another 
accident,  and  this  on  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 
But  a  progress  ad  infinitum  cannot  be  admitted  ;  there- 
fore the  substance  must  be  the  subject  of  accidents. 

But  wc  must  remark  here  again  that  it  is  not  neces- 
sary for  the  essence  of  a  substance  to  be  the  subject  of 
accidents.  The  essence  of  a  substance  is  to  be  in  itself. 
Besides  this,  it  may  or  may  not  be  subject  of  accidents. 
Finite  substances  which  are  perfectible  are  all  subject 
to  modifications  or  accident.  The  infinite  substance, 
which  is  God,  being  absolutely  perfect,  is  not  subject 
to  modifications. 

Q.  What  are  the  errors  of  philosophers  as  to  the 
idea  of  s'^bstance  ? 

A.  First,  Locke  contended  that  substance  is  a  number 
or  an  accumulation  of  accidents,  which  we  perceive  by 
means  of  the  senses,  gathered  and  co-existing  together 


2o8      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

in  a  wp.y  unknown  to  us.  We  say,  in  the  first  place, 
that  such  an  idea  of  substance  is  false,  even  accord- 
ing to  experience,  both  of  the  senses  and  of  conscious- 
ness ;  of  the  senses,  because  through  them  we  perceive 
bodies  under  every  variety  and  succession  of  modifica- 
tions, and  yet  in  perceiving  them  we  perceive  that 
we  experience  something  standing  permanent  un- 
der a  variety  and  succession  of  modifications,  and 
even  under  the  conflict  of  contrary  modifications;  of 
internal  consciousness,  for  we  are  conscious  that  our 
soul  is  subject  to  great  variety  of  thoughts,  of  desires, 
of  volitions  succeeding  each  other,  and  oftentimes 
clashing  with  each  other,  and  yet  we  perceive  at  the 
same  time  something  standing  permanent  and  the 
same  under  all  that  variety  and  conflict  of  modifica- 
tions. In  the  second  place,  the  opinion  of  Locke 
refutes  itself.  Because,  we  may  ask,  those  qualities  or 
accidents  which  form  the  accumulation  are  either  able 
to  exist  in  themselves  or  they  are  not.  If  they  are, 
then  they  are  so  many  substances;  if  they  are  not, 
then  they  must  lean  on  something  existing  in  itself  in 
order  to  exist.  It  will  not  do  to  say  that  those  modi- 
fications can  acquire  the  force  of  existing  in  them- 
selves by  aggregation  or  accumulation,  because  if 
the  qualities  have  not  singly  of  their  nature  the  force 
of  existing  in  themselves,  but  demand  a  subject  to 
lean  on,  this  want  of  leaning  on  a  subject  must  be  felt 
with  stronger  reason  by  the  whole  assemblage,  for  the 
mere  gathering  cannot  change  its  nature  ;  therefore  the 
opinion  of  Locke  is  false.  ,  Spinoza  also  held  an  er- 
roneous opinion  as  to  substance.  He  defined  a  sub- 
stance to  be  that  which  exists  in  itself,  and  can  be  con- 
ceived by  itself — that  is,  that  the  idea  of  which  does 
not  require  the  idea  of  another  in  order  to  be  con- 
ceived. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy,       209 

This  definition  of  substance  can  apply  only  to  God, 
for  a  thing  which  exists  in  itself,  and  which  can  be 
conceived  by  itself,  is  that  only  which  does  not  re- 
quire a  cause  in  order  to  exist,  because  if  it  required  a 
cause  to  exist  we  could  not  conceive  it  by  itself,  but 
would  be  obliged  to  have  the  idea  of  the  cause  in  order 
to  conceive  it.  God  alone,  therefore,  exists  in  Him- 
self in  such  a  way  that  he  does  not  require  any  cause 
or  principle  in  order  to  exist  or  be  known.  The  de- 
finition of  Spinoza,  therefore,  would  render  impossible 
all  created  substances. 


ARTICLE    SECOND. 
Principle  of  Individuali::ation. 

Q.  What  can  be  called  true  substance  ? 

A.  Substance  may  be  divided  into  first  and  second, 
or  into  real  and  logical.  The  substance  first  and  real 
is  the  individual.  The  substance  second  and  logical 
are  the  species  and  genera,  because  these  have  not  an 
existence  in  themselves,  except  inasmuch  as  they  are 
confined  to  the  individual.  The  real  and  proper  sub- 
stance, therefore,  is  the  individual.  This  is  defined  by 
St.  Thomas,  "  that  which  is  in  itself  undivided  and  dis- 
tinguishable from  others."  The  words  "that  which  is 
in  itself  undivided  "  mean  that  it  cannot  be  divided  and 
be  applicable  to  many  things,  in  contradistinction  of 
the  universal,  which  means  something  which  is  com- 
mon to  many;  the  words  "and  distinguishable  from 
others  "  mean  that  it  is  such  a  thing,  and  not  this  or 
that. 

Q.  What  is  meant  by  the  principle  of  individuali- 
zation ? 


2 1  o       Elemeti  is  of  In  te  lleciual  Pli  ilosopJiy. 

A.  We  shall  answer  by  an  example.  Let  us  take, 
for  instance,  the  human  species.  Thi*,consists  of  the 
elements  animality  and  reason.  All  the  individuals 
belonging  to  this  species  have  these  elements,  ani- 
mality and  reason,  for  every  man  is  a  reasonable 
animal.  Now,  we  may  ask,  so  long  as  every  indi- 
vidual of  the  human  species  has  all  the  elements  of  the 
species,  animality  and  reason,  what  is  that  thing  which 
contracts,  as  it  were,  the  speciesand  constitutes  the  indi- 
viduals in  each  species  ;  or,  in  other  words,  what  is  that 
which  makes  the  number  of  individuals  in  each  spe- 
cies, and  makes  them  undivided  in  themselves  and  dis- 
tinguishable from  others?  Now,  to  answer  this  ques- 
tion accurately  we  must  distinguish  between  beings. 
In  material  beings  the  principle  of  individualization  is 
matter,  because  the  principle  of  individualization  must 
be  intrinsic  and  substantial  to  the  being.  But  in 
material  beings  there  are  two  things  which  are  intrin- 
sic and  substantial — matter  and  form.  Form  cannot 
discharge  this  office  of  individualizing,  because  the 
form  of  its  own  nature  is  common  to  many,  and 
therefore-  cannot  be  the  principle  of  excluslveness  and 
incommunicability.  This  office,  therefore,  must  be 
fulfilled  bv  matter.  But  it  must  be  remarked  that 
matter  may  be  considered  in  two  ways — as  abstracted 
from  quantity  and  extension  and  common  to  all  the 
beings  comprised  within  a  species,  or  as  it  is  found  in 
the  real  world  marked  by  quantity.  It  is  in  the  latter 
sense  that  matter  is  the  principle  of  individualization. 

As  to  immaterial  substances,  if  these  have  their  ex- 
istence in  matter  as  its  form,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
human  soul,  their  individualization  arises  from  the  re- 
lation and  order  which  they  have  to  their  bodies, 
because  the  same  reason  given  above  applies  to  them 
also. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       211 

"  'Tis  true  that  the  souls 
Of  all  men  are  alike  ;  of  tlie  same  substance, 
By  the  same  Maker  into  all  infus'd  ; 
But  yet  the  several  matters  which  they  work  on, 
How  different  they  are  I  need  not  tell  you." 

— RuTTER,  Shepherd's  Jlolyday. 

But  if  they  be  purely  spiritual,  as  we  know  by 
revelation  angels  to  be,  they  are  individualized  by 
their  own  reality.  God  is  individualized  by  His  very 
nature  and  absolute  simplicity. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  substances  are  there? 

A.  Various  kinds  ;  Complete  and  incomplete. 
Complete  substances  are  those  which  are  not  destined 
to  exist  united  with  another  substance,  so  as  to  form 
together  a  perfect  whole,  as  man,  a  tree.  Incomplete 
are  those  which  are  destined  to  be  united,  such  as  the 
human  soul. 

A  complete  substance  may  be  endowed  with  intelli- 
gence, as  man  ;  or  not  have  inteMigence,  as  plant.  If 
it  is  endowed  with  intelligence,  it  is  called  person  ;  if 
it  is  not  endowed  with  intelligence,  it  is  called  an 
individual  or  siippositwn.  Hence  the  sitppositum  may 
be  defined  :  An  individual  and  complete  substance  in- 
comnmnicably  existing.  A  person  may  said  to  be  an 
individual  and  complete  substance  of  the  rational  nature. 

Q.  What  do  you  call  that  act  by  which  the  sub- 
stance really  exists  and  acts  ? 

A  subsistence,  which  may  be  defined  :  That  actuality 
by  which  a  complete  substance  exists  and  acts  without 
communicating  with  another  substance.  Here  two 
questions  arise  of  the  greatest  importance.  The  first  is  : 
Can  a  complete  substance  really  exist  and  act  without 
a  subsistence  of  any  kind  ?  In  answer  to  this  first 
question  we  say  no  substance  can  really  exist  and  act 
without  a  subsistence,  because,  although  we  can  con- 
ceive the  essence  and  nature  of  a  thing  as  possible 


212      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

without  a  subsistence,  yet  we  cannot  conceive  the 
nature  as  actually  existing  and  acting  without  it,  be- 
cause it  is  just  that  act  or  last  complement  of  being 
which  makes  it  really  actual ;  hence  the  saying  of 
schoolmen,  that  actiones  stmt  suppositoriim — actions 
belong  to  the  suppositum — meaning  that  actions  im- 
ply a  subsistence  in  order  to  be  possible. 

The  second  question  is  this  :  Admitting  that  no 
complete  substance  can  really  exist  and  act  without  a 
subsistence,  it  is  asked  :  Is  it  necessary  that  this  com- 
plete substance  should  have  its  own  subsistence,  or 
can  it  have  the  subsistence  of  another  and  made  ac- 
tually to  exist  and  to  act  by  the  subsistence  of  another 
nature  ;  or,  in  other  words,  does  each  nature  absolutely 
require  its  own  subsistence  in  order  to  exist  and  act ; 
or  is  it  possible  and  sufficient  for  it  to  subsist  by  the 
actuality  of  another  nature  ? 

This  question  must  be  answered  in  the  affirmative, 
because  we  can  conceive  that  although  a  complete 
substance  cannot  exist  or  act  without  a  subsistence, 
yet  it  is  not  necessary  that  this  subsistence  should  be 
its  own,  because  this  complete  substance  might  be 
united  in  a  most  intimate  manner  with  a  higher  sub- 
sistence, in  which  case  the  subsistence  of  the  inferior  na- 
ture should  give  way  to  the  superior.  This  is  the  case 
of  our  body.  It  would  have  a  subsistence  of  its  own 
were  it  not  united  to  the  soul,  and  that  in  such  a  way 
as  to  form  one  individuality.  But  because  of  this  union 
its  own  subsistence  must  give  way  before  that  of 
the  soul,  a  much  superior  substance.  When  separated 
from  the  soul  our  body  resumes  its  own  subsistence. 
Therefore  in  created  substances  nature  and  subsistence 
are  distinct  and  may  be  separated.* 

*  Upon  this  theory  and  truth  is  founded  the  fundamental  mystery  of  Chris- 
tianity—that mystery  which  has  ransomed  and  deified  the  world— the  Incarnation. 
Of  it  more  in  the  internal  evidences  of  Christianity. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,       2 1 3 

Q.  What  about  the  action  of  substances? 

A.  With  regard  to  action  there  is  this  difference  be- 
tween complete  and  incomplete  substance :  that  the 
former  bears  exclusively  the  attribution  of  every  ac- 
tion it  performs,  whereas,  in  the  case  of  the  latter, 
every  action  it  may  do  is  not  attributed  to  it,  but  to  the 
suppositum  or  complete  substance  resulting  from  the 
union.  For  instance,  man  is  a  complete  substance, 
and  therefore  he  bears  the  responsibility  of  every  one 
of  his  actions ;  but  his  soul  and  body  are  each  an  in- 
complete substance,  and,  therefore,  whatever  action 
may  be  performed  by  either  is  attributed  not  to  it 
but  to  the  complete  substance — that  is,  man.  The 
reason  of  this  is  because  the  operation  must  be  of  a 
piece  with  being. 

**The  "work  the  touchstone  of  nature  is. 
And  by  their  cperations  things  are  known."* 

But  the  being  of  an  incomplete  substance,  though 
existing  in  itself,  yet  does  nc  exist  for  itself,  but  for 
the  whole ;  therefore  it  does  not  act  for  itself,  but  for 
the  whole.  On  the  contrary,  a  complete  substance 
exists  in  itself  and  for  itself;  therefore  it  acts  also  for 
itself  and  must  be  responsible  for  its  action. 

There  is  also  this  difference  between  substances  as 
to  their  actions:  that  rational  substances,  or  persons, 
have  a  perfect  mastery  over  their  own  actions,  direct 
themselves  to  apprehend  the  end,  and  endeavor  to 
discover  the  agreement  or  disagreement  between  their 
actions  and  the  end  which  they  propose  to  themselves. 
Unintelligent  substances  must  be  directed  to  their  end 
by  others. 

"  What  things  soever  are  to  an  end  referr'd. 
And  in  their  motion  still  that  end  regard, 

♦  Davies'  Poems. 


214      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Always  the  fitness  of  the  means  respect, 
Those  as  conducive  choose,  and  those  reject, 
Must  by  a  judgment  foreign  and  urtknowh  ' 

Be  guided  to  their  end,  or  by  their  own  ; 
For  to  design  an  end,  and  to  pursue 
That  end  by  means,  and  have  it  still  in  view, 
.  Demands  a  conscious,  wise,  reflecting  cause, 
Which  freely  moves,  and  acts  by  reason's  laws  ; 
That  can  deliberate,  means  elect,  and  find 
Their  due  connection  with  the  end  designed." 

— Blackmore,  The  Creation, 

1 

ARTICLE    THIRD. 

Q.  What  is  an  accident  ? 

A.  Tlie  accident  is  opposed  to  substance,  and 
therefore  is  that  thing  which  does  not  exist  in  itself^ 
but  is  obliged  to  lean  on  the  substance  in  order  to  exist. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  accidents — absolute  and 
modal.  The  first  are  those  which  lean  on  the  sub- 
stance, such  as  movement,  heat,  cold.  The  modal  acci- 
dents are  called  the  different  modes,  or  manners,  ac- 
cording to  which  accidents  lean  on  the  substance — for 
instance,  velocity  or  tardiness  in  movement,  more  or 
less  intensity  of  heat,  cold,  and  so  forth. 

Q.  What  questions  can  be  raised  with  regard  to  ac- 
cidents ? 

A.  Two  questions.  The  first  is :  Is  the  being  of 
the  accident  different  from,  or  identical  with,  the  being 
of  the  sijbstance?  We  answer  that  accidents  are 
added  to  a\ubstance — they  come,  they  go.  Now,  if 
the  being  oi\the  accident  were  identical  with  that  of 
the  substance,  it  would  follow  that  the  same  thing 
would  be  added>to  itself,  that  it  would  come  upon  it- 
self and  go  from  itself,  which  is  absurd.  Therefore 
the  being  of  the  accident  is  different  from  that  of  the 
substance.         '  ""'  ' 

The  second  question  is  as  follows ;  Can  accidents 


'•  r 


Elemenis  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,      2 1 5 

ever  exist  without  their  own  substance  ?  with  regard  to 
which  question  we  answer  that  it  is  not  necessary  that 
an  accident  should  lean  on  its  own  natural  substance, 
so  to  speak,  but  it  may  be  upheld  by  a  foreign  force 
or  substance.  For  instance,  extension,  color,  taste, 
etc.,  are  all  accidents  of  bodies,  and,  therefore,  bodies 
may  be  called  the  natural  and  native  substance  of 
such  accidents.  But  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary 
that  these  accidents  should  be  upheld  by  the  sub- 
stance of  bodies.  They  may  be  supported  by  a  for- 
eign force — a  spiritual  substance,  for  example ;  be- 
cause it  is  intrinsically  necessary  for  the  nature  of 
the  accident  to  be  supported,  but  it  is  quite  indifferent 
to  the  same  nature  zuhat  it  is  supported  by — Its  own 
native  substance,  or  any  other  force  sufficient  to  up- 
hold it.  God,  therefore,  could,  by  His  infinite  power, 
effect  that  accidents  should  exist  without  the  sub- 
stance. In  "ib  case  they  would  not  exist  in  them- 
selves, but  be  supported  by  Omnipotence.* 

ARTICLE   FOURTH. 

Of  Quantity,  Relation,  and  Quality. 

Q.  How  many  accidents  are  there  ? 

A.  Nine — quantity,  relation,  quality,  action,  pas- 
sion, time,  site,  habit.  In  this  article  we  shall  speak 
of  the  first  three. 

Q.  What  kind  of  substance  does  quantity  belong  to, 
and  what  is  its  definition  ? 

A.  Quantity  is  a  proper  accident  of  corporal  sub- 
stances, because  these  alone  can  have  it.  But,  in  order 
to  give  an  adequate  definition  of  it  it,  is  necessary  to 

*  This  occurs  in  the  mystery  of  the  Eucharist,  where  the  accidents  of  bread  and 
wine— that  is,  the  color,  the  taste,  the  smell,  etc. — are  upheld,  not  by  the  substances 
of  bread  and  wine,  because  those  two  substances  have  been  changed  into  the  sub- 
stance of  the  flesh  and  blood  of  our  Lord,  but  are  supported  by  Omnipotence. 


2i6      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

determine  in  what  its  essence  consists.  Now,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  accident  quantity,  corporal  substances 
are  endowed  with  the  following  qualities:  i.  ex- 
tension— that  is,  the  possession  of  distinct  parts,  one 
of  which  is  not  the  other ;  2,  occupation  of  a  certain 
locality ;  3,  impenetrability — that  is,  that  all  these 
distinct  parts  cannot  be  in  each  other's  places  at 
the  same  time ;  4,  capacity  of  being  divided,  or  di- 
visibility ;  5,  capacity  of  being  measured,  or  ;«^«^«- 
rability.  That  these  qualities  belong  to  corporal  sub- 
stances in  force  of  their  quantity  is  beyond  doubt. 
We  ask,  therefore,  in  which  of  these  qualities  are  we 
to  place  the  essence  of  quantity  ?  Some  have  placed 
it  in  one,  some  in  another.  We  hold  as  follows  :  The 
proper  office  of  the  essence  is  to  be  that  first  internal 
and  radical  principle  in  a  being  which  gives  rise  to  all 
its  properties.  Hence  that  must  be  called  the  essence 
of  quantity  which  is  the  root  and  principle  of  all  its 
properties.  Now,  among  the  five  properties  of  quan- 
tity just  mentioned,  that  which  is  the  first  internal 
and  radical  principle  of  all  others  seems  to  be  exten- 
sion. In  this,  therefore,  must  we  place  the  essence  of 
quantity.  This  we  prove  as  follows  :  It  cannot  be  oc- 
cupation of  space,  because  this  property  belongs  to 
the  corporal  substance,  inasmuch  as  it  is  made  up  of 
parts,  and  we  must  conceive  the  body  first  as  having 
parts  and  then  as  occupying  space.  It  cannot  be  im- 
penetrability, which  also  supposes  the  body  first  hav- 
ing parts  and  extension,  and  afterwards  the  quality 
of  one  part  not  being  able  to  occupy  the  space  of 
another  at  the  same  time,  both  being  obliged  to  hold 
their  respective  places.  Neither  can  it  be  divisibility 
or  measurability,  for  the  same  reason.  Therefore  the 
essence  of  quantity  lies  in  extension ;  and,  as  each 
thing  is  to  be  defined  by  its  specific  difference,  we 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      2 1 7 

may  define  quantity  that  accident  by  zvhich  corporrA 
substances  have  extension. 

Quantity  may  be  of  two  kinds — continual  and  sepa- 
rate. The  first  is  that  the  parts  of  which  exist  to- 
gether, but  united  so  as  to  form  one  mass  or  a  whole, 
as  a  line.  The  separate  is  that  the  parts  of  which  are 
disjointed  and  divided,  as  number.  The  continual 
quantity  has  three  dimensions — length,  breadth,  and 
depth.  If  a  continual  quantity  is  considered  only  in 
regard  to  its  length,  it  is  called  line;  if  it  is  looked  at 
in  reference  to  its  breadth  and  depth,  it  is  called  sur- 
face ;  if  it  is  regarded  as  having  all  these  qualities,  it 
is  called  body. 

Finally,  quantity  may  be  fiyiite  and  infinite.  The 
first  is  that  which  has  limits;  the  second  is  that  which 
is  conceived  as  having  no  limits. 

Q.  Can  there  be  a  quantity  really  infinite  ? 

A.  We  answer  negatively  as  to  both  quantities, 
continual  and  separate.  The  first  cannot  be  really  in- 
finite, because  a  continual  quantity  may  be  either  a 
body,  a  surface,  or  a  line  ;  but  none  of  these  can  be  really 
infinite.  Therefore  continual  quantity  cannot  be  infi- 
nite.    The  minor  is  proved  as  follows : 

1.  All  bodies  have  a  surface;  but,  surface  is  the 
limit  of  a  body,  therefore  all  bodies  are  limited,  and 
cannot  be  actually  infinite. 

2.  The  surface  is  terminated  by  the  line ;  therefore 
all  surface  is  limited. 

3.  All  lines  are  terminated  by  points ;  therefore  all 
lines  are  limited,  and  consequently  all  continual  quan- 
tity is  limited. 

Separate  quantity  cannot  be  infinite,  because  all 
that  which  can  become  greater  or  less  cannot  be  infi- 
nite. But,  supposing  a  given  number,  you  can  always 
add  to  or  subtract  from  it  a  unity,  and  thus  make  it 


2i8        Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

greater  or  less.     Therefore  no  separate  quantity  can 
be  infinite. 

Q.  Can  any  quantity  be  potentially  infinite? 

A.  If  we  speak  of  separate  quantity  we  must 
answer,  Yes ;  because  to  every  number  we  may 
always  add  other  units.  But  if  we  talk  of  continual 
quantity,  we  must  make  a  distinction.  When  that 
continual  quantity  is  abstracted  from  every  sensible 
form  that  is  a  mathematical  quantity,  it  may  be  po- 
tentially infinite,  because  it  is  not  impossible  to 
think  of  an  abstract  quantity  to  which  we  are  con- 
tinually adding.  But  if  by  continua.1  quantity  we  mean 
that  which  actually  belongs  to  bodies  in  nature,  then 
it  is  impossible  that  it  should  be  infinite,  because  what- 
ever exists  in  nature  has  definite,  determinate  being, 
and  hence  the  quantity  which  accompanies  it  has  a  de- 
finite form  also.  Therefore  in  this  sense  there  cannot 
be  a  continual  quantity  even  potentially  infinite. 

Q.   Give  the  definition  and  elements  of  relation  ? 

A.  Relation  is  defined:  the  order  which  a  thing  has 
witJi  another ;  or,  the  Jiow  tzvq  things  lie  to  each  other. 
From  this  definition  it  is  clear  that  to  obtain  relation 
three  things  are  required:  i,  the  subject,  or  that 
which  is  related ;  2,  the  term,  or  that  to  which  the 
subject  is  related  ;  3,  the  principle,  or  reason  why 
the  subject  is  related  to  the  term.  Thus  in  the  rela- 
tion of  paternity  the  father,  who  generates,  is  the  sub- 
ject;  the  son,  who  is  generated,  is  the  term;  the 
foundation  or  reason  for  the  relation  is  generation. 

The  subject  and  the  term,  because  the  relation  runs 
between  them,  are  called  the  extremes,  and  oftentimes 
the  terms,  of  the  relation.  Now,  extremes  in  every 
relation  must  have  this  proper  qualification:  that, 
considered  as  such — that  is,  as  relatives — they  must 
exist  together,  both  as  to  their  being  and  as  to  their 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       2 1 9 

being  known ;  as  to  their  being,  because  the  father 
could  not  exist  without  the  son,  and  vice  vcrsd ;  as 
to  their  being  known — that  is  to  say,  that  the  know- 
ledge of  the  one  must  necessarily  carry  along  with  it 
the  knowledge  of  the  other — because,  when  we  consider 
relative  terms  as  such,  the  knowledge  of  one  must 
necessarily  imply  the  knowledge  of  the  other. 

Q.   Speak  of  the  distinction  of  relation. 

A.  In  logic  we  divided  relation  into  real  and  logic. 
Here  we  must  add  that  real  relation  may  be  mutual 
and  not  mutual.  It  is  called  mutual,  or  strictly  real, 
when  the  relation  is  real  in  both  extremes,  as  in  the 
example  above  given  of  paternity  and  sonship.  It  is 
called  not  mutual  when  the  foundation  of  the  relation 
is  real  in  one  extreme  and  not  in  the  other,  but  placed 
there  by  our  mind.  Such  is  the  relation  of  creation. 
On  the  creature's  side  it  is  real,  because  it  has  placed 
in  it  something  real ;  on  God's  side  it  is  logical,  be- 
cause His  creating  the  universe  effected  nothing  new 
in  His  nature. 

Q.  Do  real  relations  truly  exist? 

A.  Certainly,  i.  Because  none  can  doubt  that  a 
father  is  a  true  father  of  his  son,  and  vice  vcrsd ;  that 
two  plus  two  are  equal  to  four;  that  two  red  roses  are 
similar  in  color.  But  paternity  and  sonship,  equality 
and  similarity  are  mere  relations ;  therefore  there 
exist  true  relations. 

2.  It  is  certain  that  there  exists  in  the  universe  an 
admirable  order  of  different  beinni.  and  none  could 
assert  that  it  is  merely  a  fiction  of  our  fancy,  or  a 
pure  extrinsic  denomination,  because  in  that  order 
and  harmony  lies  the  whole  good  of  the  universe. 
But  such  order  is  nothing  more  than  a  real  chain  of 
relations;  therefore  there  exist  true  relations. 
'  ■  3.  We  judge  of  the  rights  and  duties  in  civil  society 


220       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

by  merely  considering  the  relations  among  indivi- 
duals ;  but  if  the  relations  between  individuals  were 
not  real,  the  rights  and  duties  emanating  from  them 
would  not  be  real.  Therefore  we  must  admit  real 
relations. 

Q.  Under  how  many  heads  may  we  bring  all  these 
relations? 

A.  Under  three  heads.  Relation  is  the  order  which 
a  thing  has  with  another;  therefore  there  are  as  many 
relations  as  there  are  ways  by  which  a  thing  may  have 
order  with  another.  Now,  a  thing  may  have  order 
with  another  (i)  inasmuch  as  it  forms  one  of  its  essen- 
tial elements,  and  both  together  constitute  a  genus 
or  a  species,  as  the  relation  which  exists  between  the 
human  soul  and  the  body.  2.  A  thing  may  have 
order  with. another  as  the  cause  to  the  effect — as  the 
relation  of  a  father  to  his  child,  of  an  architect  to  the 
building,  etc.  3.  A  thing  may  have  order  with  an- 
other in  consequence  of  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  both  in  some  accidental  quality — as  two 
red  roses,  two  white  lilies,  etc. 

Q.  Give  the  essence  and  definition  of  quality. 

A.  Quality  is  a  name  which  is  given  to  different 
things,  and  also  to  all  the  categories  of  accidents ; 
but,  taken  as  a  special  category,  it  is  defined  :  that 
accident  which  modifies  and  affects  the  substance  in 
itself.  Upon  which  definition  we  observe  that  it  is 
called  accident  to  distinguish  it  from  the  specific 
difference  which  also  qualifies  the  substance ;  but 
spirituality,  for  instance,  qualifies  the  substance  of 
the  soul,  yet  it  belongs  to  its  essence,  and  is  not 
an  accident.  We  have  added  which  modifies  and 
affects  the  substance,  to  distinguish  it  from  other  acci- 
dents. Because,  though  all  accidents  are  affections 
of  the  substance,  and  are  added  to  it  to  supply  some 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosopky.       2  2 1 

defect  or  imperfection,  yet  the  quality  properly  and 
intrinsically  is  that  which  modifies  the  substance. 
Quantity,  for  instance,  is  given  to  the  substance  to 
give  it  extension  and  impenetrability  of  parts ;  re- 
lations are  effects,  as  it  were,  of  substances.  Other 
accidents  might  more  properly  be  called  adjacent, 
rather  than  intrinsic,  perfections  of  the  substance ; 
but  quality  alone  is  intrinsic  to  it,  as  healthy  food, 
fresh  air,  strong  man,  charming  sky — all  qualities 
inherent  to  these  various  substances. 

Q.  How  many  kinds  of  qualities  are  there? 

A.  Four:  those  which  modify  the  substance  in  it- 
self— as  to  be  well,  to  be  healthy ;  those  which  affect 
it  in  its  operation  by  adding  or  diminishing  efficacy — 
as  the  power  of  vision  in  a  young  person,  the  weak- 
ness of  the  same  in  an  aged  man  ;  those  which  affect 
it  according  to  physical  movement,  inducing  some 
sensible  transformation — as  hot  air,  cold  air,  moist 
air,  etc. ;  those  which  affect  the  form  or  figure  of  the 
substance — as  a  square  table,  an  oval  face,  a  hooked 
nose.  The  first  qualities  arc  called  disposition  or 
habits;  the  second,  power  or  impotence ;  the  third, 
alterations  ;  the  fourth, /(?r;«  and^^//r^. 

The  following  lines  may  be  taken  as  an  example  of 
the  different  kinds  of  qualities: 

**  Queen  of  fragrance*  lovely  \  Rose, 
The  beauties  of  thy  leaves  disclose  ! 
The  winter 's  past,  the  tempests  fly, 
SoftX  gales  breathe  gently  through  the  sky  ; 
The  lark,  sweet  warbling  on  the  wing, 
Salutes  the  gay  return  of  spring  ; 
^  The  silver  dews,  the  vernal  showers, 

Call  forth  a  bloomy  waste  of  flowers  ; 
1\i^joyotis  fields,  the  shady  woods, 
Are  clothed  with  green  or  swell  with  buds  ; 

*  Quality  of  power.  t  Of  disposition.  :(  Of  power,  etc. 


2  2  2      Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy. 

Then  haste  thy  beauties  to  disclose, 
Queen  of  fragrance,  lovely  Rose  ! " 

— Broome,  The  Rosebud. 


ARTICLE  THIRD. 

Action  mid  Passion. 

Q.  What  is  action,  and  how  many  kinds  of  action 

are  there  ? 

A.  In  another  chapter  we  have  spoken  of  causes,  and 

especially  of  the  efficient  cause,  or  of  the  agent,  and  of 
the  effects  which  emanate  from  it.  This  emanation 
from  the  cause  producing  the  effect  is  called  action. 
From  this  we  can  understand  how,  in  order  to  have 
action,  three  things  are  required :  i,  a  principle  which 
acts — that  is,  the  substance  ;  2,  a  principle  accord- 
ing to  which  the  action  is  performed  to  determine  its 
kind — that  is,  the  essence,  which  is  the  interior  prin- 
ciple of  every  action  ;  3,  a  principle  through  which 
the  substances  may  act — that  is,  the  faculties,  which, 
as  we  shall  show,  in  creatures  are  the  proximate 
principle  of  operations  distinct  from  the  essence. 
Action  is  of  two  kinds — immanent  and  transient.  The 
first  is  that  which  terminates  in  the  subject,  acting 
in  such  a  manner  that  it  is  itself  both  the  principle 
and  the  term  of  the  action.  The  second  is  that  which 
terminates  outside  the  subject — that  is,  the  action 
begins  in  the  subject  and  terminates  outside  of  it. 

Q.  What  are  the  opinions  of  philosophers  as  to  both 
kinds  of  action  ? 

A.  As  to  immanent  actions,  some  have  said  that 
they  are  not  true  actions,  inasmuch  as  they  have  no 
real  term.  Against  transjent  actions,  Leibnitz  has 
said  that  they  are  impossible,  on  the  plea  that  in  order 
to  have  a  transient  action  something  must  pass  from 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy.       223 

the  agent  to  the  subject  acted  upon,  but  this  is  im- 
possible ;  therefore,  etc.  Now,  both  these  opinions 
are  false.  i.  As  to  immanent  actions.  When  I 
study,  for  instance,  I  perform  an  immanent  action, 
because  the  term  of  the  action  remains  in  me.  But  is 
the  result  of  mv  action  less  real  because  it  takes  place 
in  myself?  Certainly  not,  since  the  perfection  of 
my  intellect,  the  consequence  of  my  study,  is  surely 
something  real — as  real  as  the  distinction  which  exists 
between  a  learned  and  an  ignorant  man,  between  a 
cultivated  man  and  a  boor. 

"  Base-minded  they  that  want  intelligence  ; 
For  God  himself  for  wisdom  most  is  praised, 
And  men  to  God  thereby  are  nighest  raised." 

—Spenser, 

With  regard  to  the  possibility  of  transient  actions, 
we  deny  that  it  is  necessary  that  an  accident  should 
travel  from  the  agent  to  the  subject  acted  upon  to 
render  possible  such  actions  ;  because  all  that  is  ne- 
cessary in  this  case  is  that  the  agent  should  apply  its 
efficacy  and  force  upon  the  subject  to  produce  in  it  a 
new  state.  Secondly,  if  this  possibility  were  denied, 
many  absurd  consequences  Vv'ould  follow  ;  for  if  all 
those  actions  which  do  not  terminate  in  the  agent  did 
not  exist,  man  would  no  longer  be  responsible  for  all 
those  actions  which  pass  from  him,  such  as  theft, 
murder,  etc.  ;  he  would  no  longer  be  liable  either  to 
reward  or  punishment ;  all  the  order  and  harmony  of 
the  universe,  which  is  kept  by  one  series  of  beings 
acting  upon  another,  would  be  a  mere  optical  delu- 
sion. 

Q.  What  is  the  term  of  both  actions? 

A.  The  direct  term  must  always  be  something  posi- 
tive, but  as  to  the  indirect  term  it  may  be  negative. 
In   fact,  every  agent  acts  always  for  an  end;  but  the 


224       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

end  is  equivalent  to  good  ;  therefore  every  agent  in 
acting  intends  some  good.  But  good  is  convertible 
with  being,  and  being  is  something  positive ;  there- 
fore every  agent  in  acting  intends  something  positive. 
But  that  which  the  agent  intends  is  the  term  of  his 
action  ;  therefore  the  direct  term  of  every  action  is 
something  positive.  The  negative,  therefore,  can 
only  be  an  indirect  term,  since  to  destroy  can  never 
be  meant  by  any  agent  positively  acting,  but  only 
indirectly. 

Q.  What  is  passion? 

A.  To  receive  in  one's  self  the  term  of  the  action  of 
the  agent  is  called  passion^  and  the  subject  patient. 
Now,  though  action  and  passion  agree  in  one  act  and 
one  movement,  the  principle  of  which  is  the  action, 
the  term  the  passio'i,  yet  they  are  distinguished  from 
each  other;  betnuse,  certainly,  it  is  not  the  same 
thing  to  give  and  to  receive,  to  do  and  to  suffer,  to 
perfect  and  to  be  perfected,  to  be  principle  and  end. 
But  action  implies  to  give,  to  do,  to  perfect,  to  be 
principle;  passion  means  to  receive,  to  suffer,  to  be 
perfected,  to  be  the  term  ;  therefore  action  and  passion 
are  not  the  same  thing.  This  truth  is  more  evident 
in  transient  actions.  In  them  the  action  is  in  the 
agent,  the  passion  in  the  subject  outside  the  agent. 
But  the  same  universal  accident  cannot  be  in  two 
subjects  at  the  same  time ;  therefore  action  and  pas- 
sion are  in  reality  distinct  from  each  other — two  acci- 
dents really  and  specifically  distinct,  hence  two  cate- 


gories. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       225 

ARTICLE   FOURTH. 

Of  the  Categories  Where,  When,  Site,  and  Habit. 

Q.  Give  the  definition  of  the  category  Where. 

A.  Bodies  are  circumscribed  by  place.  Now,  this 
circumscription  of  tlie  body  proceeding  from  the  de- 
termination of  place  constitutes  the  category  ivJiere, 
to  understand  which  we  must  first  speak  of  place. 
This  is  defined  by  Aristotle  the  surface  of  body 
which  first  and  immovably  surrounds  and  circum- 
scribes another  body.  We  say  which  first  surrounds 
and  circumscribes,  because  place  is  that  surface  which 
immediately  surrounds  and  touches  the  body.  For 
instance,  suppose  I  lay  a  book  on  a  table,  the  table 
is  the  place  with  regard  to  the  book  ;  but  the  table 
serves  as  a  place  to  the  book,  not  as  a  whole,  but  in 
part  ;  that  is,  that  part  of  its  surface  which  imme- 
diately touches  the  book.  We  say  immovably  be- 
cause, though  that  surface  could  be  moved  and 
changed,  yet  it  could  not  have  the  name  of  place  if 
it  is  not  considered  as  immovable  in  respect  to  the 
body  which  it  circumscribes  and  contains. 

This  circumscription  coming  to  a  body  from  its  be- 
ing in  a  place  constitutes  the  category  where.  But 
here  we  must  make  a  most  important  observation.  The 
determination  proceeding  from  place  is  twofold.  The 
determination  or  boundary  which  a  body  receives 
from  a  place  is  called  being  circumscribed  by  a  place. 
But,  besides  the  body,  a  spirit  may  be  in  a  certain 
place,  and  the  spirit  may  not  be  infinite  or  immense 
like  God,  who  is  everywhere,  but  limited  and  finite. 
Now,  when  a  spirit  is  present  in  a  certain  place  it  can- 
not be  said  to  occupy  that  place  or  to  be  bounded  by 
such  a  place,  because  this  would  require  juxtaposition 
of  parts,  and  the  spirit  has  none;    it  can  only  be  said 


226       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

to  be  destined  to,  (  to  bo  designated  by,  that  place. 
Now,  this  determination  which  a  created  spirit  re- 
ceives from  place  is  called  to  be  in  a  definitive  place ^ 
because  place  merely  defines  or  designates  where  the 
spirit  is,  but  neither  contains  nor  surrounds  it.* 

Q.   What  is  space  ? 

A.  It  is  very  difficult  to  define  space,  and  philoso- 
phers have  broached  all  sorts  of  opinions  about  it. 
On  the  one  hand,  space  cannot  be  what  our  fancy 
imagines — something  really  existing  as  containing 
an  immense  number  of  bodies — because  extension  can- 
not exist  as  something  separate  from  bodies.  What 
could  it  be  but  a  body?  And  where  could  the  body 
be  contained?  In  another?  And  where  would  this 
third  one  be  ?     In  a  fourth,  and  so  on  ad  infinitmn  ? 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  contradictory  to  sup- 
pose that  that  which  contains  all  bodies  is  the  same 
thing  with  that  which  it  contains.  If,  therefore,  space 
must  not  be  something  separate,  and  at  the  same  time 
it  must  be  something  distinct,  from  bodies,  what  else 
can  it  be  to  satisfy  both  requirements  except  what 
St.  Thomas  defines  it  to  be,  tJic  extension  of  bodies,  in- 
asimicJi  OS  it  is  considered  to  contain  either  the  same 
body  to  which  it  belongs  or  other  bodies  ? 

Having  thus  explained  the  idea  of  space,  it  is  hardly 
necessary  to  prove  it,  because  if  the  capacity  to  con- 
tain must  be  found  in  a  body,  what  else  can  it  be  but 
its  extension  and  dimension?  Therefore  it  is  clear  that 
the  nature  of  space  lies  in  extension.  Hence  it  is  that 
whenever  we  want  to  measure  space  we  only  measure 
extension.  From  this  it  appears  that  that  space  which 
we  imagine  to  exist  outside  the  limits  of  the  universe, 

*'  The,  schoolmen  called  the  manner  in  which  a  material  object  is  in  a  place  esse 
in  loco  circumscriptive.  The  manner  in  which  a  spirit  is  in  a  place  esse  in  loco  de/I- 
nitivt.  We  have  rendered  in  the  text  the  idea  of  the  schoolmen  as  accurately  as  we 
could. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       227 

and  in  which  we  fancy  the  world  to  have  been  created, 
is  not  a  reahty  but  a  fiction,  which  St.  Augustine  jest- 
ingly calls  spacious  nothing. 

But  it  may  be  asked  :  Where  is  the  world  ?  What 
vast  body  contains  it?  The  world  is  nowhere  but  in 
itself.  It  is  not  contained  in  any  other  space  or 
body,  but  God's  infinite  power  upholds  it. 

Q.  Give  the  idea  of  the  category  When. 

A.  Things  may  be  bounded  not  only  by  place, 
but  also  by  time.  Now,  as  the  boundary  of  bodies 
proceeding  from  place  gives  the  category  where,  so 
also  the  determination  of  things  arising  from  time 
gives  the  category  when. 

To  understand  this  we  must  give  the  idea  of  time. 
Time  is  a  kind  of  duration  by  which  we  mean,  the 
permanence  of  a  thing  in  its  existence.  Hence  dura- 
tion may  be  of  as  many  kinds  as  there  are  modes  of 
existence.  The  first  is  that  of  the  Being  absolutely 
immutable,  which  is  God.  The  second  is  that  of 
beings  immutable  as  to  their  being,  but  chJingeable  as 
to  their  operations.  The  last  is  that  of  being  change- 
able as  to  both  being  and  operations.  According  to 
these  three  modes  of  being  we  may  distinguish  three 
kinds  of  duration.  The  first  is  called  eternity,  the 
perfect  possession  of  interminable  life  all  in  one — that 
is,  having  neither  beginning  nor  end  nor  succession. 
The  second  is  called  csvnni,  which  is  an  interminable 
life  of  a  being  created  but  naturally  imperishabl'\  and 
belongs  to  immortal  spirits.  The  third  is  that  of 
beings  mutable  as  to  being  and  operations.  Time, 
therefore,  is  nothing  more  than  the  duration  of  beings 
mutable  as  to  being  and  operations.  And  because  by 
time  we  measure  the  changes  and  movements  of 
such  mutable  beings,  determining  the  beginning  and 
the   end  of  such  movements,   Aristotle   has  defined 


228      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

time  to  be  the  measure  of  movement   by  marking  its 
before  and  its  after. 

"  Time  past  and  time  to  come  are  not, 
Time  present  is  our  only  lot." 

— Montgomery. 

O.  What  is  the  idea  of  site  ? 

A.  The  disposition  or  location  of  the  parts  of  a 
body  with  regard  to  a  place  is  called  site.  From 
this  it  might  appear  that  the  category  site  is  con- 
founded with  that  of  where  ;  but  if  we  consider  both 
accurately  we  shall  find  a  great  difference  between 
them  ;  because  where  implies  merely  that  a  body  is 
found  in  such  a  place,  whereas  site  implies  the  manner 
and  the  how  it  is  found — perpendicularly,  horizontally, 
leaning,  or  lying,  etc.  Site,  therefore,  is  the  how  a  body 
is  found  in  a  place.  Here  we  may  remark  that  we  are 
accustomed  to  apply  the  idea  of  site  to  spiritual 
things ;  but  this  we  do  metaphorically.  Hence  God, 
says  St.  Tht)mas,  is  said  to  be  sitting  in  consequence 
of  His  immutability,  to  be  standing  in  cortsequence 
of  His  power  to  repel  His  enemies. 

Q.  What  is  habit  ? 

A.  That  determination  or  distinctiot.  which  ac- 
crues to  bodies  from  that  which  clothes  them.  From 
this  definition  we  can  see  that,  in  order  to  have  this 
category,  two  or  more  substances  are  required — one 
which  is  clothed,  the  other  which  clothes  ;  that  this 
accident  consists  in  neither  of  these  two  substances, 
but  in  the  contact  of  both  or  in  the  clothing. 

Q.  Give  a  r6sum6  of  the  whole  of  ontology. 

A.  We  can  see  now  as  in  a  picture  the  whole  series 
of  truths  explained  in  ontology,  and  how  they  descend 
one  from  another  in  beautiful  order  from  the  idea  of 
being.     Setting  out  from  the  idea  of  being,  we  have 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy,       229 

investigated  its  nature  universally  considered,  then  wc 
have  studied  its  elements  and  Jioiv  they  constitute 
being,  then  we  have  studied  its  properties  of  unity, 
truth,  goodness,  and  beauty.  We  have  enquired  after- 
wards into  the  causes  of  being,  and  have  acquired  a  clear 
and  distinct  conception  of  them.  Finally,  we  have 
proceeded  to  study  the  divisions  of  being,  and  have 
seen  that  it  is  divided  into  ten  classes — first,  substance 
in  its  complete  and  incomplete  state,  and  then  the 
accidents  of  quantity,  quality,  relation,  action,  passion, 
space,  time,  site,  and  habit,  and  thus  we  acquired  the 
most  general  idea  applicable  to  all  things.  We  con- 
clude with  the  words  of  the  poet,  which  recapitulate 
the  whole  ontology,  and  especially  the  two  supreme 
categories — substance  and  accident. 

The  poet  introduces  a  sibyl  foretelling  the  fate  of 
the  eldest  son  of  Being,  which  is  Substance: 

"  Your  son,  said  she,  nor  can  you  prevent  it, 
Shall  subject  be  to  many  an  accident. 
O'er  all  his  brethren  he  shall  reign  as  king, 
Yet  every  one  shall  make  him  underling  ; 
And  those  that  cannot  live  from  him  asunder 
Ungratefully  shall  strive  to  keep  him  under. 
In  worth  and  excellence  he  shall  outgo  them  ; 
Yet,  being  above  them,  he  shall  be  below  them. 
From  others  he  shall  stand  in  need  of  nothing, 
Yet  on  his  brothers  shall  depend  for  clothing. 
To  find  a  foe  it  shall  not  be  his  hap, 
And  Peace  shall  lull  him  in  her  flowery  lap  ; 
Yet  shall  he  live  in  strife,  and  at  his  door 
De. ouripj?  War  shall  nev3r  cease  to  roar  ; 
Yet  it  shall  be  his  natural  property 
To  harbor  those  that  are  at  enmity. 
What  power,  what  force,  what  mighty  spell,  if  not 
Your  learned  hands,  can  loose  this  Gordian  knot  ? " 

—Milton. 


■v''-  ■ 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF'  THE  USE  OF  ONTOLOGY. 

Q.  What  do  young  people  think  of  ontology? 

A.  That  it  is  a  hard,  dry  study,  of  no  practical  use 
whatever. 

Q.  Is  that  so? 

A.  It  is  certainly  a  little  dry  and  hard  to  under- 
stand ;  but  as  to  its  use,  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
to  understand  anything  scientifically,  and  every  science 
and  art  is  founded  upon  ontology. 

Q.  Can  you  give  any  example  in  art  and  science 
showing  how  they  are  founded  on  ontology  ? 

A.  In  art  we  will  take  as  an  example  grammar, 
which  is  the  art  of  speaking  and  writing  correctly. 
In  the  first  place,  the  foundation  of  the  whole  gram- 
mar is  the  substantive  verb  to  be,  which  implies  real 
existence.  Without  it  language  would  not  express  a 
reality,  but  would  be  merely  a  construction  and  ar- 
rangement of  words  having  no  real  meaning  what- 
ever. The  substantive  verb  to  be,  therefore,  makes 
our  grammar  and  our  speech  real  and  objective.  But 
this  substantive  verb  corresponds  to  the  universal 
idea  of  being  as  described  in  ontology. 

Next  come  the  nouns,  which  are  divided  into  sub- 
stantive and  adjective.  These  correspond  to  the 
great  division  of  being  into  substance  and  accident. 
The  pronouns,  personal  or  indicative,  are  founded  upon 
the  idea  of  the  person  or  the  individual ;  /  express- 
ing always  a  personality,  this  or  that  expressing  an 

individuality. 

330 


Elements  of  hitellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       2  3  t 

Next  follow  the  numbers,  which  are  singular,  plural — 
collective  and  universal.  These  are  founded  upon 
the  property  of  being  nnity^  which  gives  rise  to  dis- 
tinction and  plurality. 

As  to  the  verbs,  they  are  active,  passive,  and  neuter. 
The  active  verb,  which  means  to  do  or  to  act,  is 
founded  upon  the  idea  of  cause  and  action.  When 
the  verb  expresses  an  immanent  action  it  is  called 
active  intransitive,  as  I  sleep,  I  think  ;  when  it  ex- 
presses a  transient  action  it  is  called  active  transitive, 
as  I  strike  ;  the  two  grand  divisions  of  action. 

The  passive  verb,  which  means  to  be  acted  upon,  to 
suffer,  is  founded  on  the  idea  of  passion,  the  neuter 
on  both. 

As  to  the  moods  of  verbs,  they  are  the  infinitive, 
the  indicative,  the  subjunctive,  the  potential,  and  the 
imperative.  For  this  division  there  is  no  real  ground, 
at  least  so  far  as  the  potential  and  subjunctive  are 
concerned.  The  subjunctiv^e  is  merely  an  elliptical 
mode  of  expression,  and  the  potential  is  made  up  of 
two  or  more  verbs,  and  therefore  it  canno:,  with  any 
propriety,  be  called  an  inflection  of  any  of  them. 
This  leaves  us  the  indicative,  by  which  simple  assertions 
are  made  ;  the  imperative,  by  which  commands  are 
given;  and  the  infinitive,  which  expresses  the  meaning 
of  the  verb  in  the  abstract,  as  to  love,  to  do,  to  think. 
The  indicative  is  founded  on  the  idea  of  being  as  as- 
serting something,  the  imperative  on  the  idea  of 
cause,  the  infinitive  on  the  idea  of  action  or  passion. 
The  tenses,  present,  past,  and  future,  are  founded  upon 
the  idea  of  time. 

The  adverb  is  a  qualification  added  to  a  verb,  such 
as  to  do  well,  to  do  quickly ;  and  is  founded  on  the 
ideas  of  quality — as  to  do  ill,  justly,  wisely ;  on  the 
idea  of  quantity — as  v;o  work  so  much,  considerably ; 


232       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

of  time — as  to  do  it  now,  then,  soon,  when  ;    of  place 
— as  to  write  here,  hence,  there,  where. 

The  preposition  is  a  word  connecting  two  words 
together  so  as  to  indicate  the  relation  which  the  things 
or  ideas  signified  by  them  bear  to  each  other,  and,  as 
it  is  evident,  is  founded  on  the  idea  of  relation — as  the 
heavens  above  us,  the  enemies  of  our  salvation  about 
us,  the  regret  after  sin,  friendships  among  equals, 
love  between  brothers,  etc. 

F'inally,  the  conjunction,  which  joins  words  together, 
is  founded  also  on  the  idea  of  relation. 

The  syntax,  which  is  that  part  of  grammar  which 
teaches  how  words  are  to  be  arranged  and  connected 
together,  is  also  founded  pre-eminently  on  ontology, 
because  its  fundamental  rule  is  to  arrange  and  con- 
nect words  in  such  a  manner  as  to  maintain  the  proper 
relations  of  being.  For  instance,  if  I  should  in  speak- 
ing break  that  first  rule  of  syntax  that  a  verb  agrees 
with  its  nominative  in  number  and  person,  and  'w\- 
stGa.d  o(  ssiylng,  *' I  read,  PeUr /cams,"  I  should  say, 
**  I  reads,  Peter  learn,''  I  would  break  the  proper  rela- 
tions of  being;  for  if  it  is  I  who  read  I  cannot 
express  that  relation  of  being  in  the  nominative  and 
then  deny  it  in  the  verb  ;  if  it  is  Peter  who  learns,  one 
person,  I  cannot  contradict  that  and  express  in  the 
verb  that  they  are  many  who  learn.  , 

Grammar,  therefore,  which  takes  its  objective  reality 
from  the  idea  of  real  being ;  which  finds  its  ideas  of  the 
substantive  and  adjective  nouns  in  the  conception  of 
substance  and  accidents  ;  which  forms  its  verbs,  active, 
passive,  and  neuter,  on  the  ideas  of  cause,  action,  and 
passion ;  its  tenses  from  the  idea  of  time ;  which 
takes  its  ideas  of  adverbs,  prepositions,  and  conjunc- 
tions from  the  various  kinds  of  accident ;  which  give§ 
rules  of  syntax  from  the  natural  and  essential  relations 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,      233 

of  being — is  altogether  founded  on  ontology,  and  can- 
not be  known  scientifically  without  it. 

Q.  Show  by  the  example  of  the  natural  sciences 
how  they  are  founded  on  the  ideas  we  acquire  in  on- 
tology. 

A.  The  first  natural  science  is  physics,  the  object 
of  which  is  to  study  the  causes  of  the  phenomena 
which  h.ini»eii  in  matter  and  which  do  not  cause  any 
change  in  the  composition  of  bodies.  A  physical 
phenomenon  is  any  fact  which  is  accomplished  or 
takes  place  in  matter  \  ithout  altering  its  composition. 
A  body  which  falls,  a  sound  which  is  produced,  a  cer- 
tain quantity  of  water  which  is  frozen,  are  so  many 
phenomena.  Now,  to  enquire  into  such  facts  which 
do  not  alter  the  composition  of  bodies  is  the  object 
of  physics.  We  say  of  phenomena  which  do  not  alter 
ths  composition  of  bodies,  because  to  enquire  into 
those  facts  which  modify  more  or  less  the  nature  of 
bodies  is  the  object  of  chemistry. 

it  is  evident  that  physics  is  an  application  of  on- 
tology to  a  particular  object,  for  the  first  question 
which  this  science  puts  is.  What  is  matter,  or  a  body? 
— that  is,  it  studies  the  nature  of  the  object  it  works 
upon,  and  finds  out  that  any  limited  quantity  of  mat- 
ter is  a  body ;  that  a  body  is  not  formed  by  a  con- 
tinual quantity  of  matter,  but  of  elements  infinitely 
small,  which  cannot  be  physically  divided,  and  are" 
placed  in  juxtaposition  with  each  other  without 
touching  each  other,  being  designedly  maintained  at 
a  distance  by  mutual  attraction  and  repulsion,  which 
elements  are  called  atoms,  and  a  group  of  them  mole- 
cules. It  finds  out  also  that  a  body  may  be  in  dif- 
ferent states:  the  solid  state,  as  stone,  metal;  the 
liquid  state,  as  water,  oil;  the  gaseous  state,  as 
steam ;  that  the  difference  of  these  three  states  con- 


234      Elements  of  httelLctual  Philosophy. 

sists  in  the  cohesion  of  the  parts  or  molecules;  in 
solids  the  cohesion  being  so  strong  as  to  require  a 
great  effort  to  separate  them;  in  liquids  much  less 
effort,  as  the  cohesion  is  weaker ;  in  gases  much  less, 
as  the  cohesion  is  the  weakest. 

Having  enquired  into  the  essence  and  nature  of 
bodies,  it  passes  on  to  investigate  their  properties, 
some  of  which,  because  found  constantly  in  all  bodies, 
it  calls  essential,  such  as  extension,  divisibility,  im- 
penetrability, elasticity,  mobility,  inertia;  others  it 
finds  only  in  some  bodies,  and  it  concludes  to  be  acci- 
dental to  bodies,  such  as  solidity,  fluidity,  ductility, 
porosity,  compressibility. 

Physics  proceeds  next  to  enquire  into  the  causes  of 
t\vQSQ  phenoituna,  in  order  to  understand  them  scientifi- 
cally. We  say  phenomena  and  not  bodies,  because  to 
enquire  into  the  cause  of  bodies  belongs  to  cosmology. 
It  discovers  that  the  followincr  are  the  causes  for  the 
phenomena  of  bodies:  attraction,  heat,  light,  mag- 
netism, and  electricity.  These  are  called  physical  agents 
or  forces.  After  studying  these  causes  the  natural 
philosopher,  by  observing  the  constant  relations  be- 
tween the  phenomenon  of  a  body  and  its  cause,  dis- 
covers and  assigns  what  are  called  physical  laws,  and 
attains  the  object  and  use  of  this  science.  For  in- 
stance, after  studying  attraction  and  finding  it  to  be  a 
force  inherent  in  matter  by  which  particles  and  masses 
of  matter  are  drawn  towards  each' other,  and  carefully 
observing  that  this  force  increases  in  proportion  to  the 
quantity  of  matter  which  the  attracting  body  contains 
and  in  proportion  to  the  diminishing  of  the  distance  be- 
tween the  bodies,  it  establishes  the  law  that  the  force  of 
attraction  in  bodies  is  in  proportion  to  the  mass  and  to 
the  greater  or  less  distance,  the  attraction  increasing 
as  the  mass  increases  and  as  the  distance  diminishes. 


Elanetits  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       235 

The  student  will  here  carefully  remark  how  ontology,  or 
the  general  science  of  being,  has  guided' the  natural 
philosopher  to  his  science  ;  for  as  ontology  enquires 
into  the  nature  and  essence  of  beings  so  the  natural 
philosopher  enquires  into  the  essence  and  nature 
of  bodies ;  as  the  first  enquires  into  the  proper- 
ties of  being,  so  does  the  second  enquire  into  the 
properties  of  bodies ;  as  the  first  enquires  into  the 
causes  of  being,  so  does  the  latter  seek  into  the 
causes  of  the  phenomena  of  bodies;  as  the  first 
investigates  the  most  general  division  of  being,  so 
does  the  second  enquire  into  the  most  general  di- 
vision of  bodies,  which  division  gives  rise  to  all 
natural  sciences. 

Q.  Give  a  brief  idea  of  the  different  natural  sci- 
ences. 

A.  The  body  may  be  inorganic,  living,  and  animal. 
This  supreme  division  of  general  physics  gives  rise 
to  a  host  of  natural  sciences.  When  natural  science 
analyzes  the  inorganic  body  into  its  elements  and  its 
constituent  principles  it  is  called  chemistry,,  which  is 
the  science  of  whatever  has  relation  to  the  simple  or 
elementary — that  is,  bodies  which  invariably  present 
the  same  characteristics  however  they  may  be  divided. 
On  the  contrary,  those  bodies  which  are  composite 
are  aggregations  of  several  elements  combined  in 
a  different  way  and  united  by  their  natural  affinities. 
Now,  these  bodies  present  themselves  to  our  observa- 
tion in  different  states — the  gaseous,  the  liquid,  and 
the  solid.  The  science  which  investigates  the  nature, 
properties,  causes,  and  action  of  gases,  together  with 
the  laws  which  govern  them,  is  called  gasology. 
That  which  studies  liquids  is  called  hydrology.  The 
science  which  studies  the  nature,  properties,  causes, 
action,  laws  of  the  solids  is  called  mineralogy.     With 


•J 


236      Elements  0/ Intellectual  Philosophy. 

regard  to  organic  bodies,  the  science  which  studies  the 
first  organic  bodies—  that  is,  the  plant — is  botany. 
That  which  studies  the  organic  life  of  animal  bodies  is 
called  zoology,  which  is  divided  into  two  sciences — 
anatomy  and  physiology;  the  first  is  the  study  of  the 
nature,  properties,  causes,  functions,  and  use  of  the 
elementary  parts  of  the  animal  body  or  of  the  skele- 
ton ;  the  second  is  the  science  of  the  nature,  proper- 
ties, causes,  functions,  and  uses  of  th.e  organs  of  the 
animal  body.  Medicine,  with  all  its  subordinate  sci- 
ences, is  the  science  of  the  causes  of  the  alterations 
produced  in  the  animal  organism  and  of  the  means  of 
repairing  them. 

The  next  grand  division  of  bodies  is  that  which 
separates  them  into  celestial  and  terrestrial.  The 
celestial  bodies  are  the  object  of  a  particular  science 
called  astronomy^  the  object  of  which  is  to  ex- 
plain the  phenomena  and  to  account  for  the  move- 
ments of  those  huge  bodies  which  gravitate  in  Bpace. 
To  this  another  science  is  allied,  called  cosmo- 
graphy, which  teaches  the  structure,  the  form,  the 
location,  and  the  relations  of  the  parts  which  com- 
pose the  universe. 

The  terrestrial  body  is  the  object  of  two  other 
sciences,  geography  and  geology.  The  first  gives  the 
description  of  the  earth,  its  exterior  figure,  its  division, 
and  all  those  particulars  presented  by  its  surface.  The 
second  penetrates  into  the  very  bowels  of  the  earth, 
aNd  seeks  to  know  its  interior  structure,  the  different 
materials  of  which  it  is  composed,  their  formation, 
their  relative  location,  and  the  different  revolutions  to 
which  it  has  been  subject. 

These  divisions  arise  from  considering  bodies  in  their 
concreteness,  but  there  is  another  branch  of  physical 
science  which  di  cs  not  consider  them  in  themselves 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy,      237 

and  in  their  elements,  but  in  tlic  abstract  as  to  their 
quantity,  number,  or  extension. 

Arithmetic  -d^wd  ali^cbra  consider  quantity  in  itshit^h- 
est  abstraction,  and  treat  of  the  combinations  of 
quantities  which  can  be  expressed  by  simple  relations 
of  number.  ]hit  every  specified  quantity  may  be  re- 
garded from  a  twofold  relation — that  of  time  and  of 
space,  because  time  and  space  are  the  necessary  con- 
ditions of  all  reality  which  is  capable  of  measure.  The 
relation  of  a  particular  quantity  to  space  exi)ressed  by 
a  figure  is  the  object  oi  geometry — a  Science  which  has 
received  such  a  name  from  the  use  to  which  it  was 
formerly  destined,  that  of  measuring  the  earth,  and 
which  has  retained  its  primitive  name,  though  it  has 
made  such  immense  progress. 

The  relation  which  a  dcfmitc  quantity  bears  to  time 
is  exjiressed  by  movement,  because  we  may  say  that 
it  is  through  movement  that  time  is  rendered  visible 
in  space.  Now,  movement  cannot  be  conceived  ex- 
cept as  the  product  of  a  force.  The  science  of  the 
forces  which  cause  movement  is  called  mechanics. 
These  forces  may  l)c  considered  under  two  aspects,  in- 
asmuch as  they  neutralize  each  ether,  and  under  this 
aspect  they  are  the  object  o(  staties  ;  inasmuch  as  they 
produce  the  movement,  and  then  they  are  the  object 
of  dyiuimics.  Of  co-irse  the  science  of  mechanics  is 
subdivided  into  several  branches,  according  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  bodies  to  which  the  moving  forces  arc 
applied,  such  as  hydraulics,  which  considers  the  move- 
ment of  fluids;  hydrometry,  which  h,  s  for  its  object 
the  weight,  the  force,  the  intensity  of  fluids,  etc. 

The  student  will  sec  by  this  brief  sketch  of  natural 
sciences  how  they  are  nothing  else  than  an  application 
of  ontology;  how  each  studies  first  the  nature  of  its 
object,  its  properties,  its  causes,  and  its  laws.     Onto- 


238       Elements  of  Ijitelkctual  Philosophy, 

logy,  therefore,  which  teaches  the  native  properties, 
causes,  divisions,  laws  of  being,  is  of  the  utmost  im-. 
portance  to  all  sciences  which  treat  of  a  particular 
being. 


ANTHROPOLOGY 


••  Know  then  thyself;        .... 
The  proper  study  of  mankind  is  man." — Pope. 
839 


ANTHROPOLOGY. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Q.  What  is  anthropology  ? 

A.  The  science  which  has  for  its  object  man.  The 
science  which  treats  of  the  human  soul  is  called  psy- 
chology ;  but  as  in  philosophy  we  cannot  speak  of  the 
human  soul  without  mentioning  its  union  with  the 
body,  so  we  must  treat  of  the  whole  man,  and  there- 
fore study  anthropology,  which  means  the  science  of 
man  ;  yet  we  shall  principally  occupy  ourselves  about 
the  soul. 

Q.  What  method  shall  we  follow  in  speaking  of 
man,  and  principally  of  his  soul? 

A.  We  shall  follow  the  method  of  St.  Thomas,  who 

says:  "In  every  spiritual  substance  three  things  are 

to  be  remarked — the  essence,  the  faculties,  and  the 

operations."     Hence  he  concludes,  with  regard  to  the 

soul,  that  three  things   are  to  be  remarked  in  it — its 

essence,  its  faculties,  and  its  operations.     W^e  shall 

follow  this  method,  and  shall  enquire  into  these  three 

things:  What  is  the  nature  of  the  human  soul?  what 

are  its  faculties  ?  and  what  are  its  operations  ?     This 

method  and  order  will  render  the  things  to  be  treated 

clearer  and  more  easy  of  comprehension. 

941 


CHAPTER  I. 

ON  THE  NATURE  OF  MAN  IN  GENERAL. 
ARTICLE   FIRhl', 

That  Man  is  not  Body  alojie,  but  is  made  up  of  ancthc? 
Principle  called  the  Soul. 

O.   What  is  the  definition  of  man  ? 

A.  Man  is  defined  to  be  a  reasonable  animal^  be- 
cause lie  not  only  lives  and  feels  but  reasons.  In  call- 
ing him  an  animal  vio.  determine  his  proximate  genus, 
in  which  he  agrees  with  all  those  beings  which  have 
souls.  In  calling  him  reasonable  we  define  the  specific 
difference  of  man  which  distinguishes  him  from  all 
other  animals.  Hence  man  must  result  from  two 
elements — a  body  and  a  reasonable  soul — both  of 
which  make  one  substantial  whole. 

Q.  Is  this  admitted  by  all  ? 

A.  No.  In  Germany,  in  England,  France,  and  our 
own  country  some  would-be  philosophers  have  held 
that  man  is  nothing  more  than  a  well-organized  body. 
But,  because  there  are  certain  operations  in  man 
which  seem  to  suppose  another  principle  in  him  be- 
sides the  body,  these  philosophors,  in  order  to  ac- 
count for  such  operations,  and  unwilling  to  admit  a 
reasonable  soul  in  man,  have  been  forced  to  invent 
different  systems.  Some  have  said  that  these  opera- 
tions— such  as  the  act  of  judgment,  of  reasoning,  and 
so  forth — can  be  easily  accounted  for  by  means  of 
chemical  forces  and  laws.  .Others,  following  the  prin- 
ciple of  Descartes,  that  whatever  happens  in  the  body 


242 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       243 

is  the  result  of  mechanical  laws,  have  held  that  all 
the  operations  of  man  can  be  easily  explained  by 
means  of  the  laws  of  movement.  Others,  finally,  see- 
ing that  these  operations  of  man  cannot  be  accounted 
for  by  means  either  of  chemical  or  mechanical  laws, 
have  invented  certain  forces  which  they  call  vital^ 
different  from  physical  properties,  but,  like  these,  in- 
herent in  the  very  matter  of  the  organs.  To  these 
vital  forces  they  attribute  all  the  distinctive  opera- 
tions of  man.  The  first  system  has  been  called  cJienii- 
calisin,  the  other  mechanicism,  and  the  last  organicism. 

We  shall  prove  first  in  general  that  in  man,  besides 
the  body,  there  is  another  principle  distinct  from  the 
body;  that  the  simplest  operations  of  the  mind  can^ 
not  be  explained  without  this  principle.  Next  we 
shall  say  a  word  on  each  system  in  particular. 

Proof  I.  The  human  body  holds  the  first  and  mosf. 
perfect  rank  among  living  bodies.  But  such  a  body 
cannot  exist  by  itself  alone,  but  must  have  another 
principle  ;  therefore  there  must  be  another  principle 
in  man  besides  his  body.  The  minor  is  proved  :  if  a 
body  is  living,  there  must  necessarily  be  some  princi- 
ple which  gives  it  life.  Now,  this  principle  must  be 
either  the  body  itself  or  something  distinct  from  the 
body.  But  it  cannot  be  the  body  itself,  because,  as 
St.  Thomas  remarks,  it  is  evident  that  to  be  the 
principle  of  life  does  not  become  the  body  as  body, 
otherwise  all  bodies  would  be  living,  which  is  contrary 
to  experience  ;  therefore  in  living  bodies  life  must 
arise  from  a  principle  other  than  the  body. 

2.  It  is  evident  that  we  have  ideas  or  forms  of  many 
things  in  our  mind.  We  have  the  forms  or  ideas  of 
the  firmament,  of  the  sun,  the  stars,  the  sky,  the 
forms  of  mountains,  of  the  boundless  ocean,  and  so 
forth.     But  this  would  be  utterly  impossible  if  in  man 


2 44      Elements  of  Inieliectual  Ph ilosopJiy. 

there  were  nothing  more  than  the  body  ;  therefore, 
etc. 

The  minor  is  proved  from  the  principle  and  the  ex- 
perience that  it  is  impossible  for  a  body  to  have  more 
tiian  one  form  at  a  time.  No  mechanical  or  chemical 
process  can  make  a  body  take  two  different  forms  at  the 
same  time.  A  sculptor,  for  instance,  cannot  by  any 
mechanical  skill  make  a  block  of  wood  take  the  form  of 
a  man  and  a  serpent  at  the  same  time  ;  a  chemist  by 
no  chemical  skill  can  make  a  body  take  the  solid,  the 
liquid,  and  gaseous  forms  at  the  same  time.  Conse- 
quently, if  man  were  nothing  more  than  a  body,  he 
could  only  have  the  form  of  one  thing  at  a  time  ;  but 
man  has  the  ideas  or  forms  of  different  things  at  the 
same  time  ;  therefore  there  must  be  in  him  another 
principle  besides  the  body. 

"  No  body  can  at  once  two  forms  admit 
Except  the  one  the  other  do  deface  ; 
But  in  the  soul  ten  thousand  forms  do  sit, 

And  none  intrudes  into  her  neighbor's  place."* 

3.  It  is  a  principle  of  reason  as  well  as  experience 
that  a  thing  which  is  received  into  another  must  take 
the  shape  and  the  form  of  the  recipient.  This  princi- 
ple was  expressed  by  the  schoolmen  as  follows : 
Omne  quod  rccipitur  ad  inoduvi  rccipientis  rccipitiir  ; 
and  by  the  poet : 

"  All  things  received  do  such  proportions  take 
As  those  things  wherein  they  are  received  ; 
So  little  glasses  little  faces  make, 
And  narrow  webs  on  narrow  frames  are  weaved."  f 

Now,  in  consequence  of  this  principle,  if  man  were 
only  a  body  the  forms  of  things  which  he  apprehends 

*  Davies's  Poems.  t  Ibid. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      245 

should  take  the  form,  shape,  and  size  of  the  body. 
But  this  is  contrary  to  experience,  because  we  have 
ideas  of  all  things  conformable  to  their  actual  reality; 
for  we  are  those 

"  Wherein  are  men,  beasts,  trees,  seas,  and  lands, 
And  yet  oach  thing  a  proper  place  doth  find, 
And  each  thing  in  the  due  proportion  stands."* 

Q.   Say  something  of  each  system  in  particular. 

A.  Having  proved  that  man  could  not  perform  the 
simplest  operation  of  the  mind,  which  is  apprehension, 
if  he  were  only  a  body,  we  proceed  to  make  some  re- 
marks on  each  system,  and  first  against  those  who  ex- 
plain the  operations  of  man  by  means  of  chemical  forces 
and  the  laws  of  movement,  i.  We  know  by  experience 
that  oftentimes  we  are  undecided  which  operation  to 
choose ;  we  discuss  the  question  with  ourselves  to  see 
which  we  should  choose  ;  and  finally,  we  know  that  we 
choose  that  which  seems  to  us  best,  or,  in  fact,  which 
we  wish  to  choose. 

But  the  freedom  of  doubting,  consulting,  and  choos- 
ing cannot  possibly  belong  to  chemical  forces,  or  be 
done  by  mechanical  laws,  for  all  these  acts  are  done 
necessarily  ;  therefore  all  these  operations  of  man  can- 
not be  explained  by  those  forces. 

2.  We  know  also  by  experience  that  after  having 
commenced  a  certain  action  we  can  upon  the  instant 
stop  it  and  begin  another,  and  drop  it  again  to  under- 
take a  new  one.  But  this  would  be  impossible  under 
the  laws  of  movement  and  mechanical  forces.  How 
often,  for  instance,  would  the  engineer  wish  to  possess 
this  power  of  instantly  stopping  the  engine  he  is  guid- 
ing, and  cannot  under  the  laws  of  movement,  but 
must  let  it  go  on  to  carry  death  and  desolation  to 
hundreds ! 

*  Davies. 


246      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Finally,  we  remark  against  the  third  system  that 
to  have  recourse  to  vital  properties  to  explain  the 
operations  of  man  is  only  confoundirig  the  question 
more  and  more,  because  a  property  is  not  a  principle, 
but  the  consequence  of  some  vital  principle  ;  therefore 
that  from  which  property  originates,  and  not  property 
itself,  must  be  th'^^'principle  of  life.  But  these  philoso- 
phers contend  that  these  properties  are  properties  of 
organic  bodies  ;  they  come  to  admit,  then,  that,  after 
all,  the  body  is  the  principle  of  life.  But  we  have 
shown,  with  the  clearest  evidence,  that  a  body  cannot 
be  the  principle  of  life;  tbTefore  we  must  admit  an- 
other principle  in  man  besides  the  body.  This  is 
called  the  soul,  which,  as  far  as  we  have  described  it, 
may  be  defined  as  the  first  principle  of  life  in  things  to 
which  we  attribute  life. 

ARTICLE   SECOND. 

This  Principle  called  the  Soul  is  One,  but  does  not  Form 

the  Whole  Man. 

Q.  Is  the  soul  a  single  principle  or  multiple  ? 

A.  Some  philosophers,  having  admitted  in  man, 
besides  the  body,  another  principle  which  causes 
him  to  move  and  to  act,  and  having  examined  these 
operations  and  found  them  different  in  nature,  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  principle  which 
causes  man  to  perform  all  these  operations  must 
be  more  than  one.  Some  have  admitted  a  dou- 
ble principle — one  which  performs  intellectual  ope- 
rations, another  which  feels  and  vegetates.  Others 
have  admitted  three — one  the  principle  of  intel- 
lectual operations,  another  the  principle  of  sensa- 
tion, the  last  the  principle  of  vegetation.  But  these 
opinions    are    false,  and   we    must    admit   only  one 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,      247 

principle  of  all  these  operations  and  prove  it  as  fol- 
lows : 

I.  Because  we  know  by  experience  that  an  opera- 
tion of  the  soul,  when  it  is  too  intensely  attended  to, 
hinders  other  operations.  For  instance,  when  a  man 
is  absorbed  in  an  intense  intellectual  work  the  opera- 
tions of  the  sensitive  and  vegetative  life  are  either 
suspended  or  imperfectly  carried  on  ;  and,  contrariwise, 
when  a  man  is  plunged  into  some  sensible  operation 
he  is  unfit  for  intellectual  work.  This  principle  ex- 
plains all  those  anecdotes  of  absent-minded  persons, 
of  which  we  have  so  many  examples.*  Now,  this 
would  be  impossible  if  the  principles  of  action  in  man 
were  multiple,  because  in  that  case  each  one  would 
attend  to  its  own  department  without  any  trouble  or 
hindrance — one  could  attend  to  thought,  another  to 
sensation,  and  another  to  vegetation  and  locomotion  ; 
therefore  there  must  be  one  principle  in  man. 

The  common  sense  of  mankind  rejects  such  an 
opinion  of  more  than  one  principle,  because  all  men  in 
sp'iaking  not  only  say,  I  understand,  but  also,  I  feel,  I 
live,  I  move,  I  grow,  and  such  like  expressions,  attri- 
buting all  these  different  operations  to  one  subject,  the 
me.  Now,  this  they  could  not  do  if  they  were  not  con- 
scious that  the  principle  of  all  these  operations  is  the 
same  and  identical ;  therefore  we  must  admit  one  prin- 
ciple in  man. 

"  And  these  three  powers  f  three  sorts  of  men  do  make  ; 
For  some,  like  plants,  their  veins  do  only  fill  : 
And  some,  like  beasts,  their  senses'  pleasure  takj  ; 
And  some,  like  angels,  do  contemplate  still. 

*  That,  for  instance,  of  the  man  who,  passing  by  a  toll-gate,  cried  out  to  the 
keeper,  "  What's  to  pay?"  The  man  at  the  gate  replied,  "  Kor  what  ?"  "'  How  for 
what  ?"  replied  the  traveller ;  "  for  my  horse."  "  What  horse  ?"  rejoined  the  keeper. 
Whereupon  the  traveller,  looking  at  his  legp,  exclaimed  :  "  Excuse  me,  I  thought  I 
was  on  horseback." 

t  Intellectual,  sensitive,  and  vegetative. 


248      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

Tlicrcfurc  the  fables  turned  some  men  to  flowers, 

And  others  did  with  brutish  forms  invest, 
And  did  ot  others  make  celestial  powers, 

Like  angels,  which  still  travel,  yet  still  rest. 
Yet  these  three  powers  are  not  three  souls  but  one. 

As  one  and  two  are  both  contained  in  three, 
Three  being  one  number  by  itself  alone 

A  shadow  of  the  blessed  Trinity." 

— Davies. 

But  as  some  of  the  operations  which  man  performs 
cannot  be  accounted  for  by  tlie  soul  alone,  but  require 
the  body  also,  such  as  sensation,  so  we  must  admit 
that  man  consists  of  a  body  and  a  soul  united  to- 
gether. 

ARTICLE  THIRD. 

Man  results  from  the  Substantial  Union  of  Body  and 

Soul. 

Q.  Is  this  union  between  the  body  and  soul  of  man 
accidental  or  substantial  ? 

A.  Plato,  who  held  that  the  soul  is  the  whole  man, 
and  who  could  not  deny  that  there  is  a  certain  union 
between  the  soul  and  the  body,  contended  that  this 
union  was  merely  accidental  and  exterior — the  same 
union,  for  instance,  which  exists  between  our  bodies 
and  the  clothes  we  put  on,  between  the  engineer  and 
the  locomotive  which  he  runs,  or  between  the  pilot 
and  his  ship. 

The  true  opinion  is  that  the  union  between  the  soul 
and  the  body  is  intrinsic  and  substantial. 

Q,   What  do  you  mean  by  substantial  union  ? 

A.  To  explain  this  we  *^nust  recall  some  points  of 
ontology.  I.  Subsistence  is  that  last  complement 
of  a  substance  by  which  it  obtains  the  mastery  over 
itself  and  its  own   acts,  becomes  responsible  for  its 


Elements  of  hiiellectual  Philosophy,       249 

actions,  and  is  incommunicable  to  all  others.     This  is 
called  a  complete  substance  or  suppositum. 

2.  Every  substance  existing  in  nature  is  a  supposi- 
tum. 

3.  The  subsistence  of  a  created  substance  is  neces- 
sary only  in  thi.j  sense  :  that  no  substance  can  possibly 
exist  without  a  subsistence.  But  it  is  not  necessary 
in  the  sense  that  every  substance  should  have  a  sub- 
sistence of  its  own  nature  and  species,  because  it  may 
happen  to  subsist  of  the  subsistence  of  another. 

4.  This  happens  when  a  substance  is  intended  to 
form  such  an  intimate  union  with  another  substance 
of  a  superior  nature  as  both  to  form  a  complete  subject 
and  individual.  Because  in  this  case,  as  nature  in- 
tends to  form  of  two  substances  one  complete  indi- 
vidual, it  is  evident  that  both  substances  cannot  be 
each  one  an  entity  perfectly  complete,  havinj^  the 
mastery  and  attribution  of  its  own  acts,  and  exclusive 
and  incommunicable  ;  because  in  that  case  there  would 
be  two  perfect  individuals,  which  is  a^c^ainst  the  sup- 
position, as  we  are  speaking  of  a  case  where  nature 
intends  to  form  one  individual  of  two  substances. 

5.  We  understand  also  in  this  case  which  of  the  two 
substances  would  have  to  yield, its  own  subsistence. 
It  must  be  the  substance  of  the  auporier  nature — that 
is,  the  inferior  nature  must  have  no  last  complement 
of  its  own,  but  must  be  completed  by  the  last  comple- 
ment of  the  superior  nature  ;  so  that  the  superior  na- 
ture's subsistence  is  that  which  completes  both  and 
forms  the  individual.  This  is  called  substantial  union, 
which  may  be  defined  :  the  union  of  two  substances 
both  made  to  subsist  by  a  single  subsistence,  that  of 
one  of  the  substances  united. 

The  substantial  union  of  the  body  and  the  soul  in 
man  means  that,  so  long  as  the  body  is  actually  united 


250      ElemetUs  of  Intellectual  Philosophy 

to  the  soul,  it  has  no  subsistence  of  its  own,  but  sub- 
sists on  the  substance  of  the  soul ;  that  the  soul  gives 
its  own  coinplcment  to  the  body,  and  has  the  owner- 
ship of  both,  and  of  the  acts  of  both,  is  responsible  for 
them,  and  is  exclusive  and  incommunicable  to  all 
others. 

The  proof  of  this  truth  lies  in  the  fact  that  man  is 
considered  by  all  as  one  individual.  We  do  not  say 
the  hand  of  Raphael  painted  that  Madonna,  the  hand 
of  Apelles  made  that  statue,  the  hand  of  Homer 
wrote  the  Iliad  and  the  hand  of  Pope  translated  it, 
but  Raphael  made  that  Madonna,  Apelles  made  that 
statue.  Homer  wrote  the  Iliad  and  Pope  translated 
it ;  because,  although  these  actions  were  done  im- 
mediately by  their  hands,  guided  by  their  mind,  which 
conceived  their  masterpieces,  yet  the  actions  of  either 
are  and  must  be  attributed  to  one  individuality,  be- 
cause both  the  body  and  the  soul  of  those  geniuf  s 
subsisted  in  one  subsistence,  that  of  the  highest  prin- 
ciple in  them — the  soul. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  with  the  poet : 

"Then  dwelleth  she  not  therein  as  in  a  tent, 
Nor  as  a  pilot  in  his  ship  doth  sit, 
Nor  as  the  spider  in  his  web  is  pent. 
Nor  as  the  wax  retains  the  print  in  it," 

but  is  substantially  united  to  the  body,  inasmuch  as 
it  causes  it  to  subsist  of  its  own  subsistence,  so  that 
both  form  one  individuality  and  one  person. 

ARTICLE    FOURTH. 

Of  MatCs  Essence, 

Q.  What  is  man's  essence  ? 

A.  The  essence  of  man  consists  in  those  elements 
which  are  absolutely  necessary  actually  to  constitute 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       251 

man.  Ikit  for  this  three  things  are  necessary  :  an  in- 
telhgent  soul,  a  body,  and  a  substantial  union  between 
them  in  the  sense  just  explained.  By  these  three 
constituents  of  his  essence  is  man  distinguished  from 
all  other  animals,  to  which  he  seems  to  bear  a  certain 
likeness.  Inasmuch  as  he  has  a  body  he  is  like  to 
animals,  but  is  distinguished  from  them  inasmuch  as 
he  is  endowed  with  a  rational  soul.  Again,  inasmuch 
as  he  is  a  rational  substance  he  agrees  with  all  intelli- 
gent substances,  and  differs  from  them  in  consequence 
of  his  possessing  a  body  ;  hence  by  his  essence  man  is 
placed  as  a  link  between  the  pure,  intelligent  sub- 
stances and  the  sensitive  substances,  thus  binding  to- 
gether the  chain  of  beings  which  the  Creator  has 
mode. 

*'  How  poor,  how  rich,  how  abject,  how  august. 

Mow  complicate,  how  wonderful  is  man  ! 

How  passint>;  wonder  He  who  made  him  such  ! 

Who  centred  in  our  make  such  strin\^c  extremes^ 

From  dilFcrent  natures  niaivellously  mixt, 

Conne  tion  exquisite  of  distant  worlds  ! 

Distinguished  link  in  being's  endless  chain  1 

Midvsay  from  nothing  to  the  Deity  ! 

A  beam  ethereal,  sully 'd,  and  absorpt  f 

'1  ho'  sullj-'d  and  dishonored,  still  divine! 

Dim  miniature  of  greatness  absolute  ! 

An  heir  of  gl  jry  !  a  frail  cliild  of  dust ! 

lleli)lcss  immortal  !  insect  infinite! 

A  worm  !  a  god  !  " 

— Young. 

It  is  clear  from  all  we  have  said  that  the  genetic 
definition  of  man  may  be  the  following:  An  indi- 
viduality rr'^ulting  from  tivo  substances,  a  body  and  a 
rational  soul. 

We  say  genetic,  because  this  definition  gives  the 
genesis  ..rcording  to  which  man  is  formed,  yet  we 
shall  retain  the  more  conmion  definition,  that  of 
rational  animal. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ON  Tim  PRINCIPLES  FROM  WHICH   THE  NATURE  OF  MAN 
RESULTS—SOUL  AND  BODY— AND,  FIRST,  OF  THE  SOUL. 

ARTICLE   FIRST. 

The  Sold  is  not  a  Material  but  a  Simple  Being, 

Q.  How  shall  vvc  proceed  in  the  knowledge  of  the 
soul? 

A.  Havinij  seen  that  there  are  two  principles  which 
form  man,  and  beginning  to  treat  of  the  soul  as  the 
principal  part  of  man,  we  must  remark  that  we  are  so 
made  by  nature  that,  when  we  cannot  perceive  things 
directly  in  themselves,  we  endeavor  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  them  by  removing  things  from  them 
and  by  comparing  them  with  other  objects — that  is  to 
say,  by  investigating  which  things  agree  with  thosj 
we  want  to  know  and  which  things  do  not.  Now;  it 
is  certain  that  the  soul  is  in  the  body,  and  that  it  is 
distinct  from  it,  and  yet  we  cannot  perceive  it  directly 
in  itself  and  know  that  it  is  there,  in  consequence  of 
observing  certain  operations  which  the  body  could 
not  perform  ;  therefore  the  most  natural  method  of 
coming  to  the  knowledge  of  the  soul,  as  we  cannot 
perceive  it  in  itself,  is  to  remove  from  it  certain  things 
which  cannot  possibly  agree  with  its  operations. 

The  first  of  these  things  which  cannot  agree  with 
the  operations  of  the  soul  is  mnleriality;  hence  we 
must  say  that  it  is  simple. 

Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  material,  simple,  and 
spiritual? 

A.  Material  is   that   which    is   composed   of  parts 

3sa 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       253 

which  are  divisible,  as  bodies.  Simple  is  that  which 
has  no  parts,  and  which  is  incapable  of  separation, 
division,  increase,  or  diminution.  If  a  being  not  only 
does  not  result  from  pc.rts,  but  is  independent  of  the 
body  for  its  specific  and  distinctive  operations,  then 
it  is  called  spiritual. 

Before  proving  that  the  soul  is  not  material,  we 
must  remark  that  although  we  have  proved  it  to  be 
distinct  from  the  body,  yet  this  question  must  not  be 
confounded  with  the  present,  which  enquires  whether 
this  principle  is  of  the  same  nature  as  the  body, 
since  some  philosophers  have  admitted  that  the  soul, 
though  a  distinct  principle  from  the  body,  is  yet 
of  the  same  nature  as  the  body.  Democritus  and 
Leucippus  contended  that  it  is  a  little  globe  of  fire. 
The  Pythagoreans  held  that  it  is  formed  from  atoms 
floating  in  the  air,  and  which,  differently  united,  take 
different  shapes.  The  materialists  are  those  who 
maintain  that  the  soul  is  composed  of  parts. 

Q.  Show  the  simplicity  of  the  soul. 

A.  The  soul  perceives,  judges,  reasons,  and  has  the 
consciousness  of  itself  and  of  its  acts.  But  these 
operations  would  be  impossible  if  the  soul  were  ma- 
terial. 

Therefore  the  soul  is  not  material  but  simple.  The 
major  is  admitted  by  al! ;  the  minor  must  be  proved. 
And,  first,  the  soul  could  not  perceive  if  it  were  ma- 
terial. Because  all  things  which  may  be  perceived 
are  either  corporal  or  simple  substances.  But  if  the 
soul  were  material  it  could  perceive  neither;  tliere- 
fore  if  the  soul  were  material  it  could  not  perceive  at 
all.  It  could  not  perceive  material  substances  ;  be- 
cause if  it  could  perceive  them,  being  itself  material, 
two  suppositions  could  be  made,  either  that  each  part 
of  the  soul  perceives  each  part  of  the  object  appre- 


254      Elements  of  In  tellectua  I  Ph  ilosophy. 

hended,  or  that  each  part  of  the  soul  perceives  it  whole 
and  entire.  If  the  first  supposition  is  admitted  we 
could  never  have  an  entire  perception  of  the  object. 
But  we  do  have  entire  perceptions  of  objects  ;  there- 
fore the  first  supposition  is  inadmissible.  The  second 
supposition  cannot  be  made,  because  in  that  case  we 
would  have  as  many  entire  perceptions  of  the  object 
as  there  would  be  parts  of  the  soul,  the  same  as  a 
glass  broken  in  a  hundred  fragments  ;  each  fragment 
represents  the  same  object  whole  and  entire.  But 
this  is  contrary  to  experience,  as  we  are  conscious 
that  we  have  only  one  entire  perception  of  each  object 
we  apprehend.  Therefore,  if  the  soul  were  material, 
it  could  not  perceive  material  substances. 

It  could  not  perceive  simple  substances,  because  a 
material  thing,  being  composed  of  parts,  could  not  per- 
ceive that  which  is  indivisible,  except  the  latter  could 
be  cut  up  into  parts.  But  this  is  impossible,  as  that 
which  is  naturally  indivisible  cannot  be  divided  with- 
out changing  its  nature  ;  therefore,  if  the  soul  were 
material,  it  could  not  apprehend  simple  substances. 

2.  If  the  soul  were  material  it  could  not  form  judg- 
ments. I.  Because  judgment  is  made  up  of  percep- 
tions and  ideas.  But  we  have  shown  that  if  the  soul 
were  material  it  could  not  perceive  at  all ;  therefore 
it  could  not  form  judgments. 

2.  Judgment  requires  that  two  ideas,  that  of  the 
subject  and  the  predicate,  should  be  compared  to- 
gether, put  face  to  face,  to  discover  whether  they 
agree  or  disagree. 

But  this  comparison  would  be  impossible  if  the  soul 
were  material. 

Therefore,  if  the  soul  were  material,  it  could  not 
judge. 

The  minor  is  proved  from  the  principle  that  a  com- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosopliy.      255 

parisoti  between  two  thin^js  cannot  be  made  unless 
both  tilings  exist  simultaneously  in  the  same  subject, 
else  how  could  the  subject  compare  the  two  together, 
put  them  face  to  face,  if  both  did  not  exist  in  it  at  the 
same  time  ?  But  if  the  substance  forming  the  subject 
were  material  and  composed  of  parts,  the  idea  of  the 
subject  and  the  predicate  could  not  be  found  in  the 
same  subject,  but  one  part  would  perceive  one  term, 
the  other  the  second  term.  Therefore,  if  the  soul 
were  material,  it  could  not  judge, 

3.  It  could  not  reason,  because  in  reasoning  it  is 
necessary  that  the  same  subject  which  perceives  the 
premises  should  draw  the  conclusion.  But  the  same 
subject  could  not  be  had  in  a  material  substance,  as 
we  have  proved  ;  therefore,  if  the  soul  were  material,  it 
could  not  reason. 

4.  It  could  not  have  consciousness  of  itself  and  its 
acts,  because  consciousness  is  a  reflex  operation  and 
takes  place  when  the  soul  turns  in  upon  itself  to  in- 
vestigate its  own  actions.  But  matter,  which  has  one 
part  outside  the  other,  could  not  return  upon  itself; 
therefore,  if  the  soul  were  material,  it  could  not  have 
the  consciousness  of  itself  and  its  actions. 

Second  Dcuionstration. 

If  the  soul  were  corporal,  all  its  operations  would 
be  so  many  movements,  because  all  the  operations  of 
bodies  can  be  reduced  to  movement.  But  the  ope- 
rations of  the  soul  cannot  be  explained  by  means  of 
movement ;  therefore  the  soul  is  not  material. 

That  the  operations  of  the  soul  cannot  be  explained 
by  means  of  movement  is  clear:  i.  Because  no  body 
by  means  of  motion  moves  itself,  but  must  be  moved 
by  another  ;  but  the  soul  moves  and  determines  itself, 
as  we  know  by  experience.     2.   Because  the  acts  of 


256       Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy 

thinking  and  of  knowing  arc  immanent  and  terminate 
in  tile  soul,  whereas  movement  is  a  transient  act,  pass- 
ing from  one  body  into  another  ;  therefore  the  act  of 
knowing  is  not  movement. 

3.  The  power  of  movement  in  material  substances 
becomes  by  use  weaker  and  weaker  until  it  ceases  al- 
together ;  whereas  the  intellective  faculties  are  per- 
fected more  and  more  by  exercise. 

"  If  rJie  the  body's  nature  did  partake, 

Her  strength  would  with  tlie  body's  strength  decay; 
But  when  the  body's  strong  sinews  shxke 
The  soul  is  most  active,  quick,  and  gay." 

— Davies. 

4.  The  soul  can  perceive  contrary  things  at  the  same 
time,  so  much  so  that  by  means  of  the  knowledge  of 
one  it  comes  to  know  the  other.  For  instance,  we  ac- 
quire the  idea  of  eternity  by  the  ideas  of  time  and  of 
succession,  the  idea  of  the  most  perfect  by  that  which 
is  imperfect,  the  idea  of  the  absolute  by  the  idea  of 
the  contingent,  etc. 

Kut  the  same  parts  of  the  body  cannot  receive  con- 
trary movements  ;  therefore  the  operations  of  the  soul 
cannot  be  explained  by  movement. 

Q.  What  answer  would  you  give  to  a  materialist 
who  should  object  to  this  doctrine  thus :  The  soul  is 
in  the  body,  but  there  can  be  nothing  in  the  body  ex- 
cept a  material  thing  ;  therefore  the  soul  is  material  ? 

A.  The  soul  is  in  the  body  as  a  body,  each  part  of 
which  touches  the  corresponding  parts  of  the  body, 
just  as  putting  one  hand  against  the  other,  or  as  fill- 
ing a  pitcher  with  water,  we  deny  ;  because  if  the 
soul  were  in  the  body  in  this  manner  it  would  be  ma* 
teriafl.  The  soul  is  in  the  body  inasmuch  as  it  acts  in 
and  upon  it,  we  grant ;  and  this  is  the  manner  accord- 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy.       257 

ing   to   which    immaterial    things    are   in    space   and 
matter. 


Second  Objection. 

The  soul  is  subject  to  the  same  vicissitudes  as  the 
body,  and  the  faculty  of  intelligence  is  developed  in 
man  according  to  the  age,  sex,  temperament,  and  dis- 
position of  the  individual;  therefore  it  is  clear  that 
the  soul  must  be  of  the  same  nature  as  tlie  body. 

A.  As  we  shall  see  by  and  by,  in  consequence  of 
the  union  between  the  body  and  the  soul  the  hitter 
must  depend  upon  the  body  as  the  instrument  which 
furnishes  the  materials  for  its  operations.  Therefore. 
it  the  body  is  tiny  and  weak,  old  and  '"lulty,  the 
instrument  also  which  furnishes  the  materials  for  the 
soul's  operation  is  tiny,  weak,  old,  and  faulty;  and 
hence  the  operations  of  tlie  soul  cannot  be  performed 
at  all,  or  performed  imperfectly,  not  because  the 
soul  is  the  same  as  the  body  or  of  the  same  nature, 
but  because  the  body  in  those  conditions  cannot  fur- 
nish the  proi)er  materials  to  the  soul.  Deprive 
Raphael,  for  instance,  of  canvas  and  pencil  and  col- 
ors, or  give  him  the  worst  canvas  and  pencil  and 
colors  you  could  find,  and,  no  matter  how  granci 
his  conceptions  might  be  in  his  mind,  he  cotdd 
not  carry  them  out  or  express  them.  Likewise, 
great  as  the  native  power  of  intelligence  may  be,  yet, 
if  to  come  from  the  power  to  the  act,  it  needs  ma- 
terials administered  to  it  by  the  body  ;  if  the  body  is 
in  such  a  state  as  to  be  unable  to  furnish  tiiose  ma- 
terials, the  power  will  remain  power  and  never  come 
to  the  act,  not  for  want  of  native  force  (jr  because  it  is 
of  a  material  nature,  but  because  the  material  is  want- 
ing in  conse([uence  of  the  want  in  the  instrument. 


258       Elcme7its  of  hitcllechial  Philosophy. 

"Tlicsc  imperfections,  then,  we  must  impute 

Not  to  the  ajjent  but  to  the  instrument  ; 
Wc  must  not  blame  Apollo,  but  his  lute, 

If  false  accords  Irom  false  strings  be  sent. 
The  soul  in  all  hath  one  intelligence, 

Though  too  much  moisture  in  an  infant's  brain, 
And  too  much  dryness  in  an  old  man's  sense, 

Cannot  the  prints  of  outward  thiii,ns  retain. 
Then  doth  the  soul  want  work  and  idle  sit  : 

And  this  wc  childness  and  dotage  call  , 
Yet  hath  she  then  a  quiet  and  active  wit, 

If  she  had  stulFand  tools  to  work  withal." 

— Davies. 


ARTICLE    THIRD. 
On  the  Spirituality  of  the  Soul. 

Q.  If  the  soul  is  not  material,  can  you  say,  r.t  least, 
that  it  depends  on  the  body  for  its  being  and  ts  spe- 
cific operations  ? 

A.  No  ;  but  we  must  hold  that  the  human  soul  has 
a  subsistence  of  its  own  independent  of  the  body, 
and,  therefore,  is  spiritual.      Proof: 

I.  That  which  acts  by  itself  subsists  by  itself.  But 
the  soul  has  operations  which  it  performs  independent- 
ly of  the  body — the  operation  of  intelligence  ;  there- 
fore the  soul  subsists  by  itself..  The  minor  is  proven, 
because,  from  the  objects  perceived,  it  is  certain  that 
the  soul  can  understand  the  nature  of  all  bodies.  But 
if  the  soul  were  a  body,  and  used  bodily  orphans,  it 
could  not  perform  such  operations ;  therefore  in 
these  operations  the  soul  does  not  depend  upon  the 
body.  In  fact,  as  St.  Thomas  remarks,  that  subject 
which  can  know  something  must  not  contain  in  its 
nature  any  element  of  those  things  it  wants  to  know, 
otherwise  that  element  which  would  naturally  be 
found    in    it  would  hinder  the   knowledge    of  other 


V  1 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      259 

things,  as  we  see  in  the  tongues  of  sick  people,  covered 
witli  bitter  coating:  they  cannot  taste  anything 
sweet,  but  everything  tastes  bitter.  If,  therefore,  the 
intellectual  principle  had  the  nature  of  a  body  it  could 
not  know  the  nature  of  all  bodies. 

Again,  how  can  she  several  bodies  know 

If  in  herself  a  body's  form  she  bear? 
How  can  a  mirror  sundry  faces  show, 

If  from  all  shapes  and  forms  it  be  not  clear? 
Nor  could  wc  by  our  eyes  all  colors  learn, 

Except  our  eyes  were  of  all  colors  void  ; 
Nor  sundry  tastes  can  any  tongue  discern 

Which  is  with  gross  and  bitter  humors  cloy'd." 

— Davies. 

2.  If  our  souls  were  not  independent  of  the  body  in 
their  operations  tlicy  could  not  have  universal  per- 
ceptions. But  they  do  have  universal  perceptions ; 
therefore  they  do  not  depend  upon  the  body  for 
their  operations.  The  major  is  proven  :  That  which 
is  received  into  any  recipient  must  take  the  form  of 
the  recipient.  But  matter  is  contracted  and  particu- 
lar; therefore  whatever  is  receivxid  in  it  must  take  a 
contracted  and  particular  form.  If,  therefore,  the 
soul  depended  upon  matter  for  its  operation,  all  the 
forms  it  could  take  would  be  contracted  and  particular. 

3.  The  will  has  a  tendency  after  intellectual  and  in- 
corporeal good,  and  is  not  confined  to  this  or  that  par- 
ticular good,  but  is  drawn  towards  good  in  general  or 
to  whatever  object  in  which  it  can  see  an  element  or 
feature  of  goodness.  But  if  the  soul  depended  upon 
the  organs  of  the  body  for  its  operations,  this  would  be 
impossible,  because  bodily  organs  always  tend  toward 
some  individual  object,  and  never  toward  general  and 
abstract  objects ;  therefore  the  soul  is  independent  of 
the  bodily  organs  in  its  operations. 


26o      Ele7iients  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

4.  Wc  oftentimes  are  conscious  of  a  hard  struggle 
going  on  between  the  body  i?.nd  the  soul,  and  observe 
thdt  when  it  wishes  the  soul  can  repress,  and  does  in 
fact  repress,  tlie  movements  of  the  body.  Now,  this 
is  a  clear  sign  that  the  soul  can  act  independently  of 
the  body;  therefore  the  soul  is  spiritual. 

Q.  What  remarks  are  to  be  made  upon  what  has 
been  said  ? 

A.  I.  That  opinion  of  Locke,  Hume,  Condillac, 
which  holdj  that  a  soul  is  not  a  substance  by  itself, 
but  an  aggregate  of  modifications,  is  false  ;  because 
we  have  proved  that  the  soul  is  a  substance,  as  it  has  a 
subsistence  of  its  own  independent  of  the  body. 

2.  That  the  opinion  of  Locke,  who  doubted  whether 
it  would  not  be  possible  for  matter  to  think,  is  absurd, 
because  to  know  and  to  understand  is  the  act  of  an. 
immaterial  subject  exclusively  ;  consequently,  not  even 
God  Almighty,  as  Locke  thought,  can  cause  matter  to 
think,  because  God  cannot  effect  a  contradiction. 

3.  The  human  soul  has  an  existence  independent 
of  the  body;  but  it  has  also  sensitive  faculties.  Now, 
as  these  stand  in  nedd  of  the  body  to  perform  their 
functions,  it  follows  that  the  soul  in  man,  inasmuch  as 
it  is  sensitive,  is  dependent  upon  the  body  in  the 
sense  that  it  must  be  united  to  corporal  organs  and 
stands  in"need  of  them  to  experience  sensibility. 

"Mysterious  thought,  swift  angel  of  the  mind  ! 
By  space  unbounded,  though  to  space  coniin'd, 
I  low  dost  thou  glow  with  just  disdain,  how  scora     • 
That  thought  could  ever  think  thee  earthly  born  I 
Thou  who  canst  distance  motion  in  thy  flight, 
Wing  with  aspiring  plume  the  wondrous  height, 
Swifter  than  light  outspeed  the  flame  of  day, 
Pierce  tlirough  dark  profound  and  shame  the  darting  ray  , 
Throughout  the  universal  systems  range, 
New  form  old  systems,  and  new  systems  change  ; 


Elements  of  Intellechial  Pli ilosophy,      2  6 1 

Through  nature  traffic  on,  from  pole  to  pole, 
And  stamj)  new  worlds  on  thy  dilated  soul ; 
(By  time  unlimited,  unbounded  by  space,) 
Sure  demonstration  of  thy  heavenly  lacc  ; 
periv'd  from  that  which  is  derived  from  none. 
Which  ever  is  but  of  Himself  alone." 

— Brooke,  Universal Beatity, 

ARTICLE   TIIIKI). 

Hoiv  the  Human  Soul  Originates. 

Q.  How  docs  man's  soul  originate  ? 

A.  The  soul  being  a  spiritual  substance,  entirely 
different  from  the  body,  we  may  ask,  How  does  it  ori- 
ginate? Is  it  produced  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
body,  and  by  the  same  principles? 

There  have  been  several  answers  to  this  question. 
Omitting  that  of  the  Emanatists,  who  held  that  the 
soul  emanated  from  the  divine  substance,  as  we  shall 
refute  this  opinion  when  speaking  against  pantheism, 
we  mention  the  opinion  of  the  Traducians  and  that  of 
some  Catholic  philosophers.  The  Traducians  main- 
tained that  the  soul  of  a  chihl  is  transmitted  to  him 
from  the  body  of  the  parents;  and  others,  from  the 
soul.  Rosmini  holds  that  the  soul  of  a  child,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  a  sensitive  substance,  is  transmitted  by  genera- 
tion, and  that  it  becomes  afterward  rational  and  intel- 
lective by  the  apparition  of  the  idea  of  being  which 
God  exhibits  before  it.  Now,  all  these  opinions  are 
false. 

The  first  is  false  because  bodies  cannot  give  that 
which  they  have  not — a  thing  transcending  their  na- 
ture. But  such  would  be  the  case  if  souls  were  trans- 
mitted from  the  parents*  bodies,  because  souls  are 
spiritual,  the  body  is  material.  The  body,  therefore, 
would  give  that  which  it  has  not — that  which  trans- 
cends its  own  nature  and  power.     It  would  produce 


262      Elements  of  Intellectual  P/i  ilosophy, 

an  c fleet  mk-'riiM*  to  its  cause  ;  therefore  it  is  absurd  to 
hold  that  souls  could  be  transmitted  from  the  body. 

The  second  opinion,  which  holds  that  souls  are 
transmitted  from  the  parents'  soul,  is  also  false. 
I.  Because  the  parents'  souls  are  spiritual ;  but  a  i.pir- 
itual  substance  cannot  generate — that  is,  be  divided 
and  corru[)ted — as  it  has  no  parts;  therefore,  etc. 

2.  If  we  do  not  admit  that  they  are  generated  from 
the  parents'  souls  as  parts  detached  from  them,  we 
can  make  two  suppositions:  They  must  either  be  cre- 
ated from  nothing  by  the  parents'  soul  (an  opinion 
which  has  been  recently  broached  by  Dr.  Frohscam- 
mer),  or  we  must  say  that  the  soul  of  the  parent  must 
draw  them  out  from  some  existing  matter.  Hut  nei- 
ther supposition  is  possible.  Not  the  first,  because 
creation  from  nothing  belongs  to  God  alone: 

"  For  all  (liiiifjcs  made  are  cither  made  of  naught 
Or  nade  of  stiifTthat  ready-inaJc  doth  stand  ; 
Of  i.;ui.;;ht  nn  crcr.furo  ever  forme  1  ai;;;ht, 
For  th.it  is  ijropcr  to  ihc  Almighty  hand." 

The  second  suppc  sition  cannot  be  admitted,  because 
forms  drawn  out  from  matter  are  always  depending 
upon  it  and  accidental,  not  self-subsisting,  as  the  srul. 
The  opinion  of  Rosmini  is  also  false,  because,  I.  It 
is  impossible  that  the  sensitive  soul  should  be  derived 
from  the  parents'  by  way  of  generation.  The  nature 
of  the  human  soul  is  one  intcHcctual,  sensitive,  and 
vegetative.  But  it  is  proper  to  every  being  to  be  pro- 
duced in  the  same  manner  as  its  being  becomes  it ; 
therefore  for  one  being  it  is  becoming  to  be  produced 
by  one  agent,  especially  when  this  one  being  is  simple 
and  cannot  be  divided  into  parts  nor  produced  suc- 
cessively— that  is,  first  one  part  and  then  another; 
therefore  the  same  principle  which  produces  the  intel- 
ligent must  produce  the  sensitive  and  vegetative  soul. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,       263 

2.  Eitlicr  the  sensitive  soul,  which  becomes  rational 
by  tlie  apparition  of  bein^,  is  destroyed  when  it  be- 
comes rational  or  it  is  not  destroyed.  If  it  is  de- 
stroyed, then  God  creates  a  new  soul ;  if  it  is  not 
destroyed,  then  we  may  encpiire  Mow  is  it  that  it  be- 
comes, alonjj  with  the  rational  soul,  one  simple  and 
spiritual  being?  Doer  it  change  its  essence?  In 
fact,  it  changes  and  it  does  not  change  its  essence.  It 
changes,  inasmuch  as  the  sensitive  soul  in  the  suppo- 
sition would  have  another  essence  and  would  belong 
to  another  species  ;  it  does  not  change  it,  inasmuch 
as  the  sensitive  soul  would  not  be  destroyed.  In  that 
case  it  would  and  would  not  be.  But  this  is  a  con- 
tradiction ;  therefore  the  opinion  of  Rosmini  is  false. 

Having  excluded  all  possible  suppositions  which 
might  be  supposed  to  account  for  the  origin  of  the 
soul,  we  must  conclude  that  it  is  created  by  God. 

"  Tlicn  if  her  heavenly  form  do  not  agree 

With  ;iny  matter  which  the  world  contains, 
Then  she  of  nothin^tj  must  created  be  ; 
And  10  create  to  God  alone  pertains." 

— Da.'IES. 

Objection  :  If  the  parent  were  not  the  originator  of 
both  body  and  soul,  he  could  not  be  said  to  be  the 
father  of  the  child,  but  only  the  father  of  the  body  of 
the  child. 

In  answering  wc  distinguish:  If  the  soul  wore  not 
united  to  the  body  at  the  moment  of  generation — a 
union  which  causes  the  action  of  the  father  to  ter- 
minate in  a  human  person — it  is  granted  ;  otherwise  it 
is  denied.  If  the  father  generated  the  body  of  the 
chilli  first,  and  this  existed  by  itself  as  a  distinct  indi- 
viduality for  some  time,  then  the  objection  would 
stand  ;  but  the  case  is  otherwise.  At  the  same  mo- 
ment that  the  father  generates,  at  that  very  same  in- 


2  64      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

stant  what  is  being  generated  is  united  substantially 
to  a  si)iritual  soul  created  by  God,  so  that  what  the 
father  generates  is  not  an  individuality  apart  from 
the  soul,  but  is  an  individuality,  because  the  soul 
makes  it  subsist  of  its  own  subsistence.  Therefore 
Wvi  objection  does  not  stand,  because  the  father's  ac- 
tion terminates  in  one  individuality  and  personality 
by  the  union  with  the  soul,  and  therefore  must  he  be 
called  the  father  of  the  child  and  not  of  his  body. 

ARTICLE  FOURTH. 
When  docs  the  Soul  Begin  to  be  ? 

Q.  What  arc  the  opinions  of  philosophers  as  to  the 
time  when  the  soul  takes  its  origin  ? 

A.  Pythagoras  and  i^lato  maintained  that  Immaa 
souls,  before  they  were  united  to  a  body,  lived  a  bet- 
ter life  in  the  stars,  and  that  they  would  be  there  still 
were  it  not  that  some  of  them  became  guilty  of  a 
grave  crime,  and  were  in  consequence  cast  away  from 
heaven  and  condemned  to  be  enclosed  in  the  body  as 
in  a  dark  dungeon,  with  the  additional  penalty  of 
losing  all  remembrance  of  their  former  state. 

Leibnitz  held  that  all  the  souls  of  men  who  were  to 
be  born  were  created  by  God  since  the  beginning  of  the 
world  and  were  ci. closed  in  so  many  tiny  bodies,  which 
were  the  germs  of  their  own  bodies  contained  in 
Adam,  which  germs,  evolving  in  the  course  of  time 
and  actpilring  the  proper  size,  constitute  men's  bodies. 

Q.  What  are  we  to  think  of  these  opinions? 

A.  That  both  are  false.  As  to  the  fust,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  according  to  this  opinion  the  union  of  the 
soul  and  body  would  be  against  nature.  Now,  this 
is  false,  because  the  union  of  the  soul  and  body  is 
intended  by  nature  as  the  object  of  generation.      But 


Elements  of  Intcllcciiial  Ph ilosophy.       265 

what  is  intcncled  as  the  object  of  a  natural  action  can- 
not be  unnatural;  therefore  the  union  of  the  soul  and 
bodv  nuist  be  natural. 

2.  It  follows  from  this  opinion  that  the  union  of 
the  soul  and  body  is  accidental ;  but  we  have  shown 
that  it  is  a  substantial  union. 

3.  As  there  are  no  proofs  allejjed  in  confirmation  of 
this  opinion  as  to  the  pre-existencc  of  soul,  since, 
according  to  these  philosophers,  Ave  have  lost  all 
memory  of  such  a  state,  we  have  reason  to  reject  it 
as  a  fiction  or  dream. 

Against  the  second  opinion  we  observe  : 

1.  The  animal  is  said  to  be  engendered  when  the 
soul  is  united  to  the  body,  but,  according  to  the 
opinion  of  Leibnitz,  this  could  not  be  in  the  case  of 
man,  because  the  animal  in  his  case  would  already 
exist ;  therefore  in  this  case  we  cannot  say  that  the 
animal  is  generated. 

2.  The  principle  of  sufTicient  reason  has  a  great 
weight  with  Leibnitz,  but  no  sufficient  reason  can  be 
produced  why  the  soul  of  men  should  be  created  be- 
fore man's  generation — there  is  no  sufficient  reason 
why  the  soul  should  exist  without  action  for  so  long  a 
time;  therefore  the  opinion  of  Leibnitz  is  false. 

3.  We  observe  also  that  it  is  a  mere  hypothesis, 
without  any  foundation  in  reality. 

Q.  What  is  the  true  opinion? 

A.  That  the  soul  is  created  by  God  at  the  moment 
when  the  matter  which  is  to  form  the  body  is  fit  to 
receive  it.  IJut  there  are  two  opinions  about  this  pre- 
cise moment.  Some,  like  the  ancients,  liave  said  that 
that  moment  means  when  the  body  is  fully  organized, 
which  they  suppose  to  be  forty  days  after  the  concep- 
tion for  males  and  eighty  days  for  females. 

Others — and  this  opinion  is  held  by  all  modern  phy- 


266      Elements  of  Inkllectnal  Philosophy, 

sioloj^ists  and  metaphysicians — say  that  that  moment 
is  when  tlic  germ  administered  by  the  female  is  fecun- 
dated by  the  male. 

The  reasons  for  this  opinion  arc  most  convincing: 
I.  It  is  impossible  that  the  matter  administered  by 
the  female  and  fecundated  by  the  male  could  begin  to 
be  organized  without  an  interior  living  principle. 
•*  Opera  enim  vitai  non  possuntesse  a  principio  extrin- 
sic© sicut  sentiri,  nutriri  et  augeri  "  (St.  Thomas,  qu. 
cxviii.  art.  2).  The  acts  of  life,  such  as  to  feel,  to  be 
nourished,  and  to  grow,  cannot  originate  in  an  extrinsic 
principle.  Therefore,  in  order  to  obtain  the  process 
of  organization,  we  may  admit  a  twofold  hypothesis, 
either  that  the  soul  is  there  at  the  moment  of  the 
conception  to  begin  as  the  interior  principle  the  pro- 
cess of  organization,  or  that  another  internal  principle 
effects  this  process  and  makes  way  for  the  soul  when 
the  organization  is  completed.  But  the  second  hypo- 
thesis is  absurd  ;  therefore  the  soul  is  there  at  the 
moment  of  the  conception.  2.  If  the  soul  were  united 
to  the  body  at  any  other  moment  than  that  of  the  fecun- 
dation, then  the  parents  could  not  be  called  the  gene- 
rators of  a  human  person,  but  only  of  a  body  destined 
to  be  united  to  a  soul  and  to  form  a  person  after  the 
union,  because  it  is  evident  that  the  generative  action 
of  the  parents  would  not  terminate  in  a  human  person 
so  long  as  the  soul  is  not  there  contemporaneously  with 
the  action.  Ikit  this  is  against  the  common  sense  of 
mankind,  who  feel  and  hold  firmly  that  the  parents  of 
a  man  are  the  parents  of  his  personality  and  not  of  his 
body  only  ;  therefore,  etc. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       267 

ARTICLE   FIFTH. 
On  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul. 

Q.  What  remarks  ought  to  be  made  before  proving 
the  immortality  of  the  soul? 

A.  The  following:  i.  That  a  living  being  which 
has  no  end  to  its  duration  is  called  immortal^  and  this 
property  immortality. 

2.  ImnMjrtality  may  become  a  living  being  either 
essentially  or  naturally  or  by  grace.  It  becomes  es- 
sentially only  that  being  who  exists  by  necessity  of 
his  nature,  and  whose  existence  is  identical  with  his 
essence,  so  that  his  non-existence  would  be  a  contra- 
diction. This  being  is  God.  It  becomes  naturally 
that  being  which,  though  not  existing  by  necessity 
of  nature,  is  yet  so  constituted  that  it  cannot  cease  to 
be  except  by  annihilation  effected  by  almighty  power. 
It  becomes  by  grace  that  being  which  God  by  His 
own  grace  maintains  in  existence,  though  naturally 
prone  to  dissolution. 

The  second  manner  of  immortality  becomes  the 
soul.  To  demonstrate,  therefore,  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  we  have  to  show  three  things:  i,  that  it  is 
naturally  indestructible  ;  2,  that  it  continues  to  act 
even  after  its  separation  from  the  body;  3,  that  it 
cannot  be  annihilated  by  any  external  cause. 

As  to  the  first,  a  thing  may  be  intrinsically  de- 
stroyed for  two  reasons — either  because  it  is  composed 
of  parts  distinct  from  each  other,  which,  once  discon- 
nected and  separated,  the  thing  perishes;  or  because, 
though  not  composed  of  parts,  it  may  depend  like  the 
accident  on  something  else,  which  being  destroyed, 
it  is  itsflf  destroyed. 

But  the  human  r.oul  is  neither  of  these  things* 
therefore  it  is  intrinsically  indestructible. 


268      Elements  of  Intellectual  1  'hilosophy. 

The  minor  has  to  prove  that  the  human  soul  is  not 
composed  of  parts  and'-that  it  is  not  an  accident. 

1.  Tiuit  which  is  simple  is  not  composed  of  parts  ; 
but  the  soul  is  simple,  therefore  it  is  not  composed  of 
parts. 

2.  That  which  subsists  of  itself  is  not  an  accident 
dependent  upon  any  other  object  in  order  to  exist. 
lUit  the  soul  subsists  in  itself. 

The  jfore  it  is  not  an  accident  dependent  upon  the 
body  in  order  to  exist. 

As' to  the  second,  that  the  soul  separated  from  the 
body  continues  to  act : 

Operation  is  the  action  of  a  substance. 

But  the  soul  is  a  substance,  and  continues  to  exist 
after  the  body  has  been  destroyed. 

Therefore  the  soul,  after  the  dissolution  of  the 
body,  continues  to  act. 

But  action  follows  the  nature  of  a  being.* 

Therefore  the  soul  continues  the  actions,  after  the 
dissolution  of  the  body,  agreeably  to  its  nature  as  a 
rational  substance,  which  are  acts  of  intelligence  and 
will. 

"  But  (as  the  body  h'ving)  wit  and  will 

Can  judge  and  choose  without  the  body's  aid, 

Though  on  sucli  objects  they  are  working  still 
As  through  tlie  body's  organs  are  convey 'd, 

So  wlicn  the  body  serves  her  turn  no  more. 
And  all  her  senses  are  extinct  and  gone, 

She  can  discourse  of  what  she  learned  before, 

In  heavenly  contemplation  all  alone." 

—Davif.s. 

Thirdly,  we  have  to  prove  that  the  soul  is  extrin- 
sically  immortal — that  there  is  no  exterior  cause  which 
may  destroy  it. 

•  Oferaiio  stquiiur  «tse. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy,      269 

The  extrinsical  cause  which  might  annihilate  the 
soul  may  be  either  a  creature  or  God. 

But  the  creature  cannot,  and  God  will  not,  annihi- 
late the  soul. 

Therefore  no  exterior  cause  can  destroy  the  soul. 

The  first  part  of  the  minor  is  clear. 
.  The  destructive  force  of  a  creature  is  of  a  piece  with 
its  productive  force. 

But  the  creature  cannot  produce  anything  out  of 
nothing;  therefore  it  cannot  reduce  anything  to  no- 
thing. 

That  God  will  not  annihilate  the  soul  is  also  evi- 
dent ;  for  if  we  regard  the  power  of  God  in  itself, 
without  reference  to  His  other  attributes,  God  could 
annihilate  souls  as  well  as  other  creatures,  because  a 
finite  being  is  in  itself  indifferent  to  be  and  not  to  be, 
and  that  which  fixes  it  in  being  is  the  creative  act  of 
God,  and  it  continues  to  exist  as  long  as  the  creative 
act  continues  to  determine  it  to  existence.  If  that 
act  were  withdrawn  the  creature  would  immediately 
cease  to  exist. 

]Jut  looking  at  the  power  of  God  in  relation  to  His 
other  attributes,  we  deny  that  He  could  annihilate  the 
soul. 

Proof:  To  annihilate  the  soul  would  be  contrary  to 
His  providence,  wisdom,  goodness,  and  justice  ;  but 
God  cannot  do  anything  contrary  to  these  attributes, 
therefore  God  cannot  annihilate  the  soul. 

Proofs  of  the  major  :  i.  It  is  contrary  to  providence 
and  wisdom.  It  behooves  the  providence  and  wisdom 
of  God  not  to  destroy  those  natural  qualities  which  He 
Himself  has  given  to  beings,  nor  deprive  essences  of 
those  properties  which  become  them.  But  immortal- 
ity becomes  the  soul  and  all  other  spiritual  substances ; 


2  yo       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy, 

therefore  to  annihilate  the  soul  would  be  against  the 
wisdom  and  providence  of  God. 

It  would  be  contrary  to  His  goodness. 

We  have  an  imperative,  ardent,  continual  desire 
after  happiness — a  desire  which  cannot  be  said  to  be 
found  only  in  this  or  that  man,  at  this  or  that  time, 
in  this  or  that  place,  but  is  found  in  all  men,  at 
all  times,  and  in  all  places.  This  desire,  therefore, 
being  so  universal  in  time  and  space,  must  be  said  to 
have  been  implanted  in  man's  nature  by  the  Creator's 
hand,  because  whatever  is  universal  in  all  times  and 
places  is  natural  and  must  come  from  nature's  Author. 

But  this  craving  after  happiness  could  not  be  satis- 
fied without  the  soul's  immortality ;  it  behooves, 
therefore,  God's  goodness  to  keep  the  soul  immortal. 

That  the  craving  after  happiness  could  not  be  satis- 
fied without  immortality  is  proved  from  two  reasons  : 
I.  Because  happiness  is  the  perfect  fulness  of  inter- 
minable life,  and  if  one  could  entertain  the  thought 
for  a  moment  that  this  .ulncss  of  life  could  after  cer- 
tain time  cease  even  for  a  day,  the  joy  resulting  from 
that  exuberant  overflow  and  fulness  of  life  would  be 
marred  and  be  overcome  by  the  unutterable  pain  of 
having  to  lose  it,  and  thus  it  would  cease  to  be  hap- 
piness. 

2.  We  have  an  imperative,  insatiable  craving  after 
truth  and  perfection. 

"  Dive  into  the  l)ottom  of  the  soul,  the  base 

Sustaining  all ;  what  find  wc  ?     Knowledge  and  love. 

As  light  and  heat  essential  to  the  sun, 

These  to  the  soul  ;  and  why,  if  souls  expire  ?  " 

—Young. 

But  if  the  soul  is  not  immortal  this  craving  could 
not  be  satisfied,  as  nothing  in  this  world  can  appease 


Ele7Hen(s  of  hitellcctual  Ph ilosophy.       271 

it.  One  thing  can  fill  up  that  void,  and  one  thing 
only:  it  is  the  contemplation  of  infinite  truth,  of  im- 
mense beauty,  and  the  possession  of  infinite  and  most 
enticing  loveliness — that  is,  the  vision  and  the  posses- 
sion of  God. 

"  How  littio  lovely  here  !     IIow  little  known  ! 
JSinall  knowledge  we  tlig  up  with  endless  toil, 
And  love  unfeigned  may  purchase  perieci  hate  ; 
Why  starved  on  eariii  our  angel  appetites 
While  brutal  are  indulged  their  fulsome  fill  ? 
Were  their  capacities  divine  conferred, 
As  mock  diadem  in  savage  sport? 
Rank  insult  of  our  pompous /^^rr;//, 
Which  reaps  but  pain  fioin  set  ming  claims  so  fair? 
In  future  ages  lies  no  redress  ?     And  shuts 
Eternity  tiie  door  on  our  complaint  ? 
This  cannot  be.     To  love  and  kno-u>  in  man 
Is  boundless  appetite  and  boundless  power, 
And  these  demonsiiate  boundless  powers,  too. 
Objects,  power,  appetites— Heaven  suits  all." 

— Young. 

It  is  contrary  to  justice. 

It  IS  an  established  fact  that  on  earth  there  are 
good  and  wicked  men  ;  it  is  also  certain  that  Divine 
justice  must  give  a  fitting  reward  to  virtue  and  due 
punishment  to  vice.  But  we  do  not  observe  this  just 
and  equitable  distribution  of  rewards  and  punish- 
me:its,  because  too  often  we  see  the  wicked  prosper  and 
enjoy  the  fruits  of  their  iniquities,  whilst  frequently 
we  see  the  just  oppressed  and  down-trodden  by  the 
wicked.  There  must  be,  therefore,  another  life  after 
the  body  is  dissolved,  where  the  accounts  will  be 
balanced,  where  the  rewards  and  punishments  will  be 
distributed  equitably  according  to  the  good  and  t*vil 
which  men  have  done.  But  if  the  sotd  were  not  im- 
mortal this  future  life  would  be  impossible;  there- 
fore it  behooves  tlie  justice  of  God  to  keep  the  soul 
immortal. 


272      Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph  ilosophy. 

It  will  not  do  to  say  that  a  fitting  reward  of  the  just 
is  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  conscience  and  the 
satisfaction  and  pleasure  which  accompany  the  doing 
of  good,  and,  on  the  contniry,  that  the  fitting  punish- 
ment of  vice  is  the  remruse  of  conscience  wliich  follows 
crime;  because  this  reward  and  punishment  would  be 
reduced  to  very  small  proportions.  IJesidcs,  we  know 
by  cxpcrienro  that  the  more  the  wicked  man  plunges 
into  vice  the  less  lie  feels  the  pangs  of  conscience,  and 
we  know  also  that  it  is  not  always  true  that  the  just 
feels  peace  and  tranquillity;  he  is  too  often  agitated 
by  doubts,  perplexities,  and  scruples  suggested  to  his 
n^ind  by  his  over-delicate  conscience,  and  is  tossed  to 
and  fro  by  a  variety  of  conflicting  emotions,  so  as  to 
feel  very  little  peace.  In  this  case  Avhere  would  his 
reward  be?  And  when  the  just  has  to  suffer  death 
for  the  sake  of  his  principles,  what  would  then  be  his 
reward  ?  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  pleasure  of 
doing  good  is  not  a  fitting  reward  of  virtue,  nor  the 
remorse  of  conscience  a  proportionate  doom  for  vice. 

"  The  soul,  of  origin  divine, 

God's  glorious  image  freed  from  clay, 
In  heaven's  eternal  sphere  shall  shine, 
A  star  of  day. 

"  The  sun  is  but  a  spark  of  fire, 
A  transient  meteor  in  the  sky  ; 
The  soul,  immortal  as  its  sire, 
Shall  never  die." 

— MoNTnOMRRY. 

Q.  Give  the  definition  of  the  soul. 

A.  We  may  define  the  soul  in  general  to  be  that  first 
principle  of  life  in  those  things  which  by  experience  we 
know  to  be  living.  To  illustrate  this  definition  we  must 
remark  first  that  of  bodies  some  are  living  and  some 
are  not  living.     Those  are  called  living  which  move 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       273 

themselves  in  force  of  an  interior  princii)lc  ;  not  living 
are  those  whicii  are  moved  by  an  exterior  principle. 
Now,  this  principle  of  life  interior  to  livin,c;  bod'cs  is 
calleil  by  a  general  name,  soul.  Jiut  not  every  princi- 
ple of  life  may  b<  called  soul,  because,  thou<jh  some 
other  part  of  tlie  body  may  be  a  [jrinciple  of  life,  such 
as  the  heart  in  nvm,  yet  that  part  would  not  be  called 
soul.  The  soul  must  be  the  first  i)rinciple  of  life.  We 
have  said,  finally,  in  those  tliiiii^s  lohicli  we  know  by  ex- 
perience to  live^  because  (lod  also  lives ;  spiritual  sub- 
stances entirely  separated  from  matter  live,  yet  they 
arc  not  called  souls,  because  we  do  not  know  them 
by  experience.  From  the  definition  of  soul  in 
general  we  may  frame  the  definition  of  the  human 
soul.  If  the  soul  be  the  first  principle  of  life,  it  is 
clear  that  this  life  is  different  in  different  animals  in 
proportion  as  life  is  manifested  in  them.  IJut  in 
man  all  kinds  of  life  arc  manifested,  vegetative,  sen- 
sitive, and  intellectual  ;  therefore  the  human  soul 
must  be  the  principle  of  these  three  kinds  of  life,  and 
may  be  defined  that  first  principle  by  ivhieJi  man  vege- 
tates, feels,  and  reasons.  Or  it  maybe  defined  in  the 
words  of  St.  Augustine,  which  amount  to  the  same: 
"  A  certain  substance  endowed  with  reason  and  fit  to 
govern  a  body."  *  It  is  called  substance  to  show  that 
it  is  not  an  aggregate  of  qualities  or  modifications; 
endowed  with  reason,  by  whicli  it  is  to  he  understood 
that  it  is  simple,  spiritual,  ingenerable,  incorruptible, 
and  immortal ;  fit  to  govern  a  body,  because  the 
human  soul  is  destined  to  form  a  whole  with  the  body 
which  it  animates. 


*  "  Sulmtantia    quxdnm  ratinnif  particeps   rcgcndo   corpori   accommoda.a." — Dt 
Quantilalt  Animct,  q\\,  iii,  n.  22. 


CHAPTER   III. 

OF  I IJI-:  HUMAN  noDY. 

Q.  How  must  \vc>  treat  of  the  body  in  i)hiIosopliy? 

A.  Various  sciences  treat  of  tlje  liunian  botly,  sucli 
as  analouiy,  pliysioioi^y,  etc.  ;  but  in  philosoijliy  \vc 
must  treat  of  the  human  body  in  rehition  to  that 
wiiich  is  first  and  sujireme  in  it,  because  philosophy 
treats  of  things  accordin;^  to  their  supreme  causes. 
Now,  tiiat  which  is  sui)reme  in  tiie  body  is  its  relation 
to  the  soul  witii  whicli  it  is  united  and  which  it  serves; 
lience  wc  shall  say  a  few  tlun^^s  respcctinij  this  rela- 
tion and  aptitude.  i.  I'lic  liuinan  body  is  the  most  per- 
fect of  all  liviiii^  bodies  in  couseqiience  of  tins  relation  to 
the  soul.  \\\  the  univi-rse  there  is  a  woiuhrrful  con- 
nection nmotif^  bei»v.js.  We  find  always  that  that  whicli 
is  the  least  and  most  inferior  element  of  a  supreme 
j^enus  touches  the  boundaries  of  that  whicli  is  the  su- 
preme part  of  an  inferior  '^<rnus.  This  is  clearly  seen  in 
the  ^^cnus  animal.  The  least  of  this  f^enus,  likcr  the 
moUusks,  which  liave  barely  the  sense  of  touch  and  are 
affixed  to  the  earth  like  plants,  touch  the  cf)nfines  of 
the  supreme  one  of  the  inferior  ^enus,  livinij^  or  plant, 
such  as  the  polypsjs  and  the  corals.  Accordiii'^  to  this 
theory,  therefore,  we  must  admit,  in  the  pjenus  of  cor- 
poral thin<4s,  bodies  snp(;rior  to  all  others  and  more 
noble,  such  as  touch  on  the  boundaries  of  the  least 
amonjf  spiritual  things,  and  that  is  the  human  body; 
therefore  the  human  body  is  the  most  perfect  and 
noble  of  all  living  bodies. 

'74 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Pk  ilosophy.       275 

•'  Look  nature  tliroii;(h  ;  'lis  neat  gradation  all. 
Hy  wliat  iiiinuti;  d(Krci;s  her  scale  ascends! 
Kacli  middle  naiure  joined  at  each  exirouie, 
'i'u  that  alcove  joined,  to  tliat  beneath  : 
Parts  into  parts  reciprcically  siiot 
Abhor  divorce  ;  wiiat  love  of  union  rcijjns  I 
Here  dormant  matter  waits  u  call  to  life  ; 
Half  life,  half  death,  joined  there.   I!er«:  life  and  sense  ; 
'Iherc  sense  frum  reason  steals  a  giitnmerinK  rn)  • 
Reason  shines  in  man." 

—  YouNd. 

Q.  In  wliat  (Iocs  this  perfection  consist  ? 

A.  In  the  j^reatest  possible  variety  of  or^^ans.  Be- 
cause the  body  is  made  for  the  soul.  Now,  the  soul 
stands  in  need  of  the  body  for  this  reason,  tlfat,  not 
possessinp^  truth  in  itself,  it  must  acquire  it  from  sensi- 
ble objects;  hence  the  necessity  of  the  senses  and  of 
the  faculty  of  feeling.  But  the  operation  of  fcelinj^ 
cannot  be  performed  without  corporal  organs;  hence 
the  need  of  corporal  organs ;  and  as  the  faculty  of 
feelinj^  is  manifold,  various,  therefore  must  be  the 
orfjans  (jf  feeling.  Hut  all  these  or^^-lns  nmst  be  sub- 
ject to  ii  j,'eneral  organ  mf)st  excpn'sitely  made,  in 
order  that  it:  may  feel  •  ""erent  and  contrary  sensa- 
tions and  brine;  them  to  .nity.  This  common  and 
general  sense  is  the  touch.  Of  these  senses,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  touch,  we  shall  speak  in  the  second  part  of 
Anthropology.  Wc  conclude  for  the  present  that  the 
human  body  is  sitperior  to  all  living  bodies,  because 
no  other  can  feel  so  exquisitely  and  so  delicately  as 
the  human  body,  and  because  of  the  variety  of  its 
organs,  superior  in  their  nature,  structure,  uses,  and 
functions  to  those  of  all  other  living  bodies. 


•  -:.)'- CHAPTER  IV.  .^' 

OF  r/r^  MANNER  ACCORDING  TO  WHICH  THE  SOUL  AND 
THE  BODY  ARE  UNITED  TOGETHER  AND  CONSPIRE  TO 
FORM  MAN.  ,,,.... 

ARTICLE  FIRST. 

Ufiion  of  the  Body  and  Soul  as  to  Being — Seat  of  the 

Soul.  .       ,  ■ 

Q.  Under  how  many  aspects  may  we  consider  the 
union  of  the  soul  and  the  body?     '  '■■■'  ""': 

A.  Under  two  aspects:  the  soul  is  united  to  the 
body  as  to  being  and  as  to  action.  As  to  being,  we 
have  seen  that  both  soul  and  body  form  one  complete 
substance,  that  both  substances,  the  body  and  the 
soul,  meet  together  in  one  single  subsistence — that 
of  the  soul — so  that  the  soul  causes  the  body  to  have 
actual  reality  and  existence.  Hence  the  soul  has 
been  called  the  living  and  substantial  form,  or  the 
actuality  of  the  body.  Of  this  we  have  spoken  before, 
but  closely  connected  with  the  present  topic  is  the 
question  of  the  seat  of  the  soul.  Since  the  soul  is  the 
living  form  of  the  body,  it  must  be  somewhere  in  the 
body.  But  where?  Philosophers  have  answered  this 
question  in  different  ways.  Descartes  held  that  the 
seat  of  the  soul  was  in  the  pineal  gland,  whence,  as 
upon  a  throne,  it  gives  direction  and  movement  to  the 
whole  machine.  A  poet  has  wittily  expressed  this 
opinion  as  follows : 

**  Alma,  they  strenuously  maintain, 

Sits  cock-horse  on  her  throne,  the  brain, 
376 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      277 


(T 


And  from  that  seat  of  thought  dispenses     '';  ' 

Her  sovereign  pleasure  to  the  senses. 

Two  optic  nerves  they  say  she  ties 

Like  spectacles  across  the  eyes, 

By  which  the  spirits  bring  her  word 

Whene'er  the  balls  are  fixed  or  stirred.    .    . 

Wise  nature  likewise,  they  suppose, 

Has  drawn  two  conduits  down  our  nose  ; 

Could  Alma  else  with  judgment  tell 

When  cabbage  stinks  or  roses  smell? 

By  nerves  about  our  palate  placed 

She  likewise  judges  of  the  taste  ; 

Else  (dismal  thought !)  our  warlike  men 

Might  drink  thick  port  for  fine  champagne. 

Hence,  too,  that  she  might  better  hear, 

She  sets  a  drum  at  either  ear, 

And  loud  or  gentle,  harsh  or  sweet, 

Are  but  th' a/a;-?/;;/j  which  they  beat.  ' 

Last,  to  enjoy  her  sense  of  feeling 

(A  thing  she  most  delights  to  deal  in), 

A  thousand  little  nerves  she  sends 

Quite  to  our  toes  and  fingers'  ends ; 

And  these  in  gratitude  again 

Return  their  spirits  to  the  brain, 

In  which  their  figure  being  printed 

(As  just  before  I  think  I  hinted). 

Alma  informed  can  try  the  case,        ' 

As  she  had  been  upon  the  place." 

— Prior,  Alma, 


Others  maintain  that  the  soul  is  in   tlie  heart,  and 
others  in  some  other  part  of  the  body. 

Now,  all  these  opinions  which  locate  the  soul  in  a 
particular  part  of  the  body  are  necessarily  false,  be- 
cause you  can  locate,  enclose,  surround,  circumscribe, 
bound  off  only  that  which  is  extended,  as  that  which 
is  extended,  having  parts,  can  be  surrounded  by  cor- 
responding parts  of  another  body.  That  which  is  , 
simple  cannot  be  surrounded,  not  having  parts  which 
can  be  circumscribed  by  parts  of  a  body.  Hence 
those  who  locate  the  soul  in  a  particular  part  of  the 


278      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

body  and  enclose  it  therein  have  been  rightly  accused 
of  making  the  soul  material.         ^  ■■,  ■-:'.■'■■'■  :,         , 

The  true  opinion  is  that  the  soul  is  whole  and  en- 
tire in  the  whole  body,  and  whole  and  entire  in  each 
part  of  the  body.  This  doctrine  of  the  Christian 
schools  of  the  Middle  Ages  has  been  cried  down  by 
modern  wiseacres ;  but  reason  is  on  the  side  of  the 
Christian  schools.  In  order  to  illustrate  and  prove 
the  scholastic  doctrine  we  must  recall  a  few  princi- 
ples: 

1.  That  the  soul  is  simple  and  cannot  be  divided 
into  parts. 

2.  That  simple  things  abide  in  a  place  not  by  con- 
tact of  extension  but  contact  of  action.*  We  say 
that  a  thing  is  in  space  by  contact  of  extension  when 
the  parts  of  this  thing  are  located  in,  and  put  in  jux- 
taposition with,  the  corresponding  part  of  space.  If  I 
lay  a  book  on  the  table,  the  different  parts  forming 
the  extension  of  the  book  touch  the  corresponding 
parts  of  the  table.  The  book,  therefore,  is  on  the 
table  by  contact  of  extension.  Now,  when  a  thing 
is  simple  and  has  no  parts,  it  is  evident  that  it  can- 
not be  in  a  place  by  contact  of  extension,  when  this 
very  extension  is  wanting  to  it ;  it  can  only  be  in  a 
place  by  acting  upon  or  in  it.  Having  recalled  these 
principles,  it  is  easy  to  demonstrate  our  thesis. 

1.  Incorporal  things  are  said  to  be  in  space  not  by 
contact  of  extension  but  by  contact  of  action.  But 
the  soul  acts  in  the  whole  body ;  therefore  the  soul  is 
in  the  whole  body.  v' ,  .^    . 

2.  The  soul  is  the  substantial  form  of  the  body,  in- 
asmuch as  it  makes  it  real  and  living ;  therefore  the 
soul  is  in  the  whole  body. 

'I'  "  Incorporalia  non  sunt  in  loco  per  contactum  quantitatis,  sed  per  contactum  vir^ 
tutis."— St.  Thomas. 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Phibsophy.       2  79 

3.  Demonstration  that  the  soul  is  whole  and  entire 
in  each  part  of  the  body. 

The  soul  acts  not  only  in  the  whole  body  but  also 
in  each  part  of  the  body.  Now,  if  it  were  not  whole 
and  entire  in  each  part  of  the  body,  it  would  have  to 
divide  itself  and  be  part  in  one  part  of  the  body  and 
part  in  another.  But  this  is  impossible,  because  the 
soul  is  simple  ;  therefore  the  soul  is  whole  and  entire 
in  each  part  of  the  body.         '        ■  '" 

Q.  Please  to  illustrate  this  point  by  analogy. 

A.  Great  opposition  has  been  raised  against  this 
doctrine  because  persons  want  to  see  this  truth  by 
imagination  ;  by  figuring  to  themselves  how  can  it  be 
that  a  being  is  whole  and  entire  in  the  whole  and  in 
each  part  of  the  body,  forgetting  that  we  cannot  form 
any  sensible  image  of  a  spiritual  fact.  Yet,  to  en- 
able the  student  to  perceive  this  truth,  we  shall  make 
use  of  some  comparisons.  Take,  for  instance,  light. 
Light,  apparently,  is  in  the  air  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  soul  is  in  the  body.  First,  it  penetrites  the 
whole  air  through  and  impregnates  it  with  its  beams; 
secondly,  it  seems  to  be  whole  and  entire  in  each  par- 
ticle of  air.  This  is  gathered  from  two  facts :  first, 
when  air  is  divided  light  remains  whole  and  entire,  aS 
in  each  particle  of  air  the  same  amount  of  light  is 
seen  ;  secondly,  when  air  becomes  foul  and  corrupted 
light  continues  always  pure. 

"  But  as  the  fair  and  cheerful  morning  light 

Doth  here  and  there  her  silver  beams  impart, 
And  in  an  instant  doth  herself  unite     f  ?>;;,-  t 

To  the  transparent  air  in  all  and  every  part — 
Still  resting  whole  when  blows  the  air  divide, 

Abiding  pure  when  th'  air  is  most  corrupted  ; 
Throughout  the  air  her  beams  dispersing  wide, 

And  when  the  air  is  tossed  not  interrupted — 


.-(■.. 


2  8o      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

>  So  doth  the  piercing  soul  the  body  fill, 

Being  all  in  all,  and  all  in  part  diifus'd  ; 
Indivisible,  incorruptible  still, 
Nor  forc'd,  encounter'd,  troubled,  or  confused." 

— Davies. 

Take  another  instance.  An  orator  is  speaking  be- 
fore a  large  audience  ;  he  develops  his  subject  with 
the  greatest  force  and  earnestness,  and  his  audience 
are  enlightened  and  carried  away  with  enthusiasm.  His 
voice,  which  is  but  a  sound,  is  divided,  each  one  of  the 
audience  receiving  more  or  less  ;  those  who  are  nearest 
to  the  orator  receiving  a  stronger  sound,  those  furi:hest 
from  him  the  least  sound — each,  in  one  word,  receiving 
a  varied  quantity  of  sound.  But  thought  is  indivisible, 
and  each  one  of  the  hearers  receives  it  whole  and 
entire,  all  equally,  those  who  sit  near  as  well  as  those 
who  are  afar.  Because  thought — that  is,  that  which  is 
spiritual — is  indivisible  ;  wherever  it  penetrates  it  must 
penetrate  whole  and  entire  ;  wherever  a  spirit  exists  it 
must  exist  whole  and  entire.  It  is  the  same  of  the  soul, 
which  is  a  spirit.  It  communicates  itself  to  all  the 
parts  of  the.  body,  it  lives  in  each  of  them,  and 
wherever  it  is  it  must  be  whole  and  entire.         .;       o,i 

Take  another  example.  My  mind  develops  a 
thought,  and  after  this  one  another  thought,  and  then 
another,  and  so  on,  a  great  number  of  thoughts  follow- 
ing one  another,  agreeing  with  one  another  or  clashing 
with  one  another.  In  each  of  these  thoughts,  in  each 
of  these  intellecLual  acts,  my  rr'iid  is  whole  and 
entire;  and  yet  it  differs  in  each  one  of  them,  being 
sometimes  right,  sometimes  wrong,  sometimes  false, 
other  times  true;  in  other  words,  my  intelligence 
manifests  itself  in  different  ways,  though  it  is  whole 
and  entire  in  each.  Now,  the  same  must  be  said  of  the 
soul.     It  acts  in  one  way  in  one  organ,  and  in  another 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Pk  ilosophy.      2  8 1 

organ  in  another  way,  but  in  every  act  and  in  every 
mode  of  acting  it  is  itself  which  acts,  and  itself  whole 
and  entire  ;  it  is  its  activity  which  appears  in  all  these 

different  modes. 

■  '.'.■•'..' 

>.         -.'      '  '  ARTICLE    SECOND.  .        ,  ,       , 

Of  the  Union  of  the  Soul  and  Body  as  to  Action. 

Q.  Is  there  a  union  of  the  body  and  soul  as  to 
action  ?  ....  ,^   .,  .,  ;  , 

A.  That  there  should  be  a  union  and  a  mutual  cor- 
respondence of  action  between  two  beings,  one  of 
which  subsists  on  the  subsistence  of  the  other,  is  evi- 
dent from  reason  and  is  confirmed  by  experience. 
For  we  know  by  experience  that,  given  certain 
thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  soul,  certain  correspond- 
ing movements  result  in  the  body;  and,  vice  versdy 
given  a  certain  state  of  the  body,  a  corresponding  state 
manifests  itself  in  the  soul.  This  mutual  correspon- 
dence between  the  soul  and  the  body  as  to  their 
action  has  been  called  communication  or  commercium. 

Q.  How  *j  this  communication  between  the  soul 
and  the  body  explained? 

A.  Various  systems  have  been  invented  to  explain 
this  mutual  influence  of  the  soul  over  the  body,  and 
vice  versd,  but  they  may  be  reduced  to  five :  occa- 
sionalism^ pre-established  harmony,  plastic  mediator  ship, 
physical  influx,  and  substantial  union.  '■■'        -i   ::-. 

Q.   Explain  and  give  your  opinion  of  the  first  system. 

A.  It  was  taught  by  Malebranche,  who  started  from 
a  principle  of  his  own,  that  in  the  universe  there  are 
no  efficient  causes  and  that  God  alone  does  every- 
thing. From  this  principle  he  concluded  that  neither 
the  soul  can  really  act  upon  the  body  nor  the  latter 
on  the  soul,  as  neither  of  them   can  be   real  agents. 


282       Elements  of  Intellectual  Ph ilosophy. 

Against  this  doctrine  the  opponents  of  Malebranche 
said  :  If  what  you  say  is  true,  if  God  alone  acts  in 
every  being,  and  consequently  neither  the  soul  can 
act  upon  the  body  nor  the  body  upon  the  soul,  how 
do  you  explain  that  harmony  and  correspondence 
which  exists  between  the  soul  and  the  body  ? — for  when 
certain  thoughts  and  feelings  arise  in  the  soul,  a  cor- 
responding movement  succeeds  in  the  body,  and  vice 
versd.  Suppose  a  man  has  received  an  insult,  which 
just  at  this  moment  has  come  to  his  knowledge,  and 
which  has  put  his  soul  in  a  fierce  rage  ;  do  we  not  see 
corresponding  movements  in  the  body,  the  eye  shoot- 
ing fire,  the  face  becoming  first  blanched  and  then 
crimson,  the  lips  compressed,  the. hand  clenched,  and 
the  utterance  interrupted?  How  do  you  explain  this? 
How  do  I  explain  it  ?  says  our  philosopher.  Nothing 
easier.  I  have  said  that  God  is  the  sole  agent,  and  I 
cling  to  that,  and  explain  that  correspondence  of 
thoughts  and  movements  by  saying  that  God  takes 
occasion  from  that  modification  of  the  soul  to  ex- 
cite a  corresponding  movement  in  the  body.  Hence 
the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  soul  are  mere  occa- 
sions which  God  takes  to  act  upon  the  body,  and  vice 
versd.  This  system  is  therefore  called  occasionalism^ 
or  the  system  of  occasional  causes.      :    ?.,, 

Now,  we  may  remark  upon  this  system  :  i.  That  it 
is  founded  on  the  assumption  that  there  can  be  no  real 
efficient  causes  in  the  universe  besides  God,  from 
which  principle  Malebranche  deduces  that  whatever 
happens  either  in  the  soul  or  in  the  body  must  be 
effected  by  God.  But  we  have  shown  in  Ontology 
that  this  principle  is  false.  Therefore  the  system 
raised  upon  it  is  false. 

2.  This  system  destroys  the  substantial  union  be- 
tween the  soul  and  the  body.     Because  what  kind  of 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       283 

union  can  there  exist  between  two  machines,  if  the  en- 
gineer alone  is  the  agent  who  produces  similar  move- 
ments in  both  independently  of  either,  and  without 
the  least  communication  between  them  ? 

Q.   Explain  the  second  system. 

A.  Leibnitz  admitted  that  finite  beings  can  be  real 
agents,  but  denied  that  the  action  can  pass  from  one  to 
another,  and  therefore  arrived  by  another  road  at  the 
same  conclusion  as  Malebranche.  The  latter  denied 
that  the  soul  and  the  body  could  act  upon  each  other, 
on  the  principle  that  they  are  not  real  agents.  Leib- 
nitz denied  that  they  can  act  upon  each  other,  be- 
cause the  action  of  one  cannot  pass  over  to  the  other. 
Hence  the  same  objection  was  made  against  Leibnitz: 
How  do  you  account  for  the  harmony  between  the 
actions  of  the  soul  and  the  movements  of  the  body, 
and  vice  versd  ?  How  do  I  account  for  it  ?  Thus : 
All  you  have  to  do  is  to  suppose  that  each  being  of 
the  universe  is  a  simple  substance  called  a  ino?iad,  and 
that  each  of  these  monads  is  a  representative  force  and 
can  represent  all  that  which  happens  in  the  universe; 
that  God  has  established  among  all  these  monads  a 
parallelism  of  perceptions,  of  wishes,  of  actions,  and 
motions  in  such  a  manner  that  without  communicating 
anything  to  each  other  they  all  move  in  a  most  per- 
fect harmony,  each  one  representing  what  the  other 
does  and  suffers.  So  that  in  our  case,  the  soul  being  a 
representative  force,  and  the  body  being  also  a  repre- 
sentative force,  God  has  established  such  a  parallel- 
ism between  them  that  in  proportion  as  perceptions, 
wishes,  and  actions  are  developed  in  the  soul  they 
are  immediately  represented  by  corresponding  move- 
ments in  the  body,  and  vice  versu.  This  system  is 
called  pre-established  harmony.  #*;n^t^r  .e/jn  /  -^ 

Now,  we  observe  that  this  system,  though  eminently 


284      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

ingenious,  is  false  for  the  following  reasons:  i.  Be- 
cause it  is  founded  on  the  principle  that  transient 
actions  are  impossible.  For  this  is  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  whole  system  of  Leibnitz :  as  the 
action  of  one  agent  cannot  be  communicated  to  an- 
other, it  follows  that  the  interchange  of  modifications 
between  the  body  and  the  soul  are  effected  by  a  pre- 
established  harmony  of  affections  and  movements. 
Now,  we  have  shown  this  principle  to  be  false ;  false, 
therefore,  is  the  system  which  rests  upon  it. 

2.  This  system  destroys  altogether  the  substantial 
union  which  we  have  proved  to  exist  between  the 
body  and  the  soul.  But  this  substantial  union  is  ad- 
mitted even  by  Leibnitz ;  therefore  his  system  is  false. 
That  Leibnitz  admits  a  substantial  union  between  the 
body  and  the  soul  is  evident  from  these  words  of  his 
Theodicea :  "There  exists  between  the  soul  and  the 
body  a  true  union,  from  which  results  the  suppositum." 
On  the  other  hand,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
system  of  Leibnitz  destroys  the  substantial  union  be- 
tween the  body  and  the  soul.  Because  whence  would 
this  union  result,  if  the  soul  cannot  act  upon  the  body, 
nor  the  body  upon  the  soul  ?  Nay,  instead  of  finding 
any  substantial  union  between  the  soul  and  the  body 
in  the  system  we  are  refuting,  we  could  not  even  dis- 
cover between  these  two  terms  a  collective  union 
such  as  would  exist  between  the  different  parts  of 
a  machine.  The  system  of  Leibnitz,  therefore,  is 
false. 

Finally,  in  this  system  and  in  the  other  God  would 
be  the  author  of  all  the  errors,  crimes,  and  disorders 
which  occur  and  are  perpetrated  among  men. 

Q.  What  is  the  third  system  ? 

A.  To  obviate  the  difficulties  which  are  brought 
forward  against  occasionalism  and  pre-established  bar- 


Elemejtts  of  Intelledua I  Ph ilosophy.       285 

mony,  John  Clerc  hit  upon  a  new  expedient :  You 
say  the  body  cannot  act  upon  the  soul ;  I  grant  that. 
You  insist  that  the  soul  cannot  have  any  influence 
upon  the  body;  I  admit  that  also.  Therefore  to 
render  possible  this  apparent  mutual  communication 
and  interchange  of  actions  between  the  soul  and  the 
body,  all  you  have  to  do  is  to  suppose  a  third  sub- 
stance intermediate  between  the  soul  and  the  body. 
The  soul  gives  its  commands  to  this  intermediate 
substance,  and  this  transmits  them  to  the  body ;  the 
body  communicates  its  sensations  to  this  medium,  and 
it  humbly  transfers  them  to  the  soul.  This  interme- 
diate substance  between  the  soul  and  the  body  was 
called  the  plastic  mediator, 

Q.  What  do  you  think  of  this  system  ? 

A.  That  it  is  even  more  absurd  than  the  two  former 
ones.  I.  What  is  this  third  substance  ?  Is  it  a  spirit 
or  a  body?  If  it  be  said  that  it  is  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other,  but  something  partaking  of  both  natures — 
something  between  the  spiritual  and  the  corporal — we 
say  that  such  a  thing  is  a  contradiction. 

2,  This  system  destroys  also  the  substantial  union 
between  the  body  and  the  soul ;  for  in  what  does  this 
union  consist  ?  It  does  not  consist  in  two  things 
being  brought  together  by  means  of  a  third,  but  its 
nature  lies  exactly  in  the  fact  that  two  substances 
meet  together  directly,  touching  each  other,  so  to 
speak,  by  means  of  the  subsistence  of  one  of  those 
substances.  Now,  if  we  explained  the  communication 
of  the  body  and  the  soul  by  means  of  a  third  sub- 
stance, partaking  of  the  nature  of  both,  we  should 
have  to  suppose  that  the  body  and  soul  do  not  meet 
directly  together,  that  the  two  substances  do  not 
touch  each  other;  therefore,  by  admitting  a  plastic 
mediator  to  explain  the  communication  between  the 


286      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

soul  and  the  body,  we  would  destroy  their  substantial 
union. 

Q.  What  is  the  next  system  ? 

A.  Physical  influx,  invented  by  Eulerus  and  held 
by  all  the  followers  of  Locke.  This  system  explains 
the  union  between  the  soul  and  the  body  by  means  of 
the  mutual  action  of  one  upon  the  other.  The  body 
incites  and  induces  the  soul  to  choose  those  percep- 
tions and  those  acts  which  correspond  to  its  organic 
movements,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  soul  moves  and 
induces  the  body  to  make  such  movements  as  are 
agreeable  and  befitting  to  the  soul's  perceptions  and 
acts.  In  this  real  and  mutual  influence  of  the  soul 
upon  the  body,  and  of  the  body  upon  the  soul,  lie 
the  union  and  communication  between  the  two;  hence 
the  system  is  called //y/j/c^/ iVi/?^^. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  of  such  a  system  ? 

A.  Though  this  system  avoids  the  error  of  Male- 
branche  that  there  are  no  efficient  causes  besides  God, 
and  that  of  Leibnitz  that  an  action  cannot  pass  from 
an  agent  to  an  object  acted  upon,  and  though  it  rejects 
the  plastic  mediator,  yet  we  cannot  admit  it  for  the 
following  reasons : 

I.  Because  it  destroys  the  substantial  union  be- 
tween the  soul  and  the  body.  For,  according  to  this 
system,  the  union  between  the  soul  and  the  body  is 
explained  as  follows :  the  body  acts  upon  the  soul  and 
incites  it  to  have  perceptions  and  to  elicit  acts,  and 
the  soul,  in  its  turn,  incites  the  body  to  movement ; 
therefore  in  this  system  the  body  and  the  soul  are 
two  separate  beings,  and  do  not  form  one  complete 
substance,  but  are  two  complete  substances  accident- 
ally united  in  order  that  one  may  act  upon  the  other. 
But  this  implies  that  there  is  no  substantial  union  be- 
tween the  soul  and  the  body ;  therefore  this  system 


Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.      287 

destroys  the  substantial  union  between  the  soul  and 
the  body. 

2.  In  this  system  it  is  said  that  the  body  acts  upon 
the  soul.  Then  it  acts  without  the  soul ;  because  how 
could  it  otherwise  be  said  that  it  acts  upon  the  soul? 
But  if  it  acts  without  the  soul,  then  what  gives  it 
movement,  since  no  body  can  produce  movement  ex- 
cept it  be  moved  by  some  other  agent  ?  Therefore 
this  system  leads  to  absurdities. 

In  one  word,  in  the  examination  of  all  these  sys- 
tems we  ought  to  keep  carefully  in  view  the  theories 
already  established.  Man's  nature  results  from  the 
substantial  union  between  the  body  and  the  soul.  If 
we  deny  this  union,  or  do  not  carefully  describe  its 
exact  nature,  we  destroy  man's  nature  and  necessarily 
fall  into  absurdities.  Now,  in  all  the  aforesaid  systems 
we  fail  to  observe  that  this  substantial  union  between 
the  soul  and  the  body  is  maintained.  Therefore  they 
destroy  man's  nature  and  lead  to  many  errors. 

Q.  What  is  the  true  system  about  the  union  be- 
tween the  soul  and  the  body? 

A.  The  system  of  the  schoolmen,  which  may  be 
formulated  in  a  few  words,  as  follows:  If  the  soul  be 
the  subsisting  principle  of  the  body,  as  we  have  de- 
monstrated, or,  in  other  words,  if  the  soul  be  the 
living,  substantial  form  of  the  body,  it  follows  that 
the  soul  must  necessarily  act  upon  the  body,  and  that 
the  movements  of  the  body  should  be  felt  in  the 
soul. 

We  prove  this  system  as  follows : 

The  operation  of  anything  emanates  from  its  sub- 
sistence. But  the  body  receives  its  subsistence  from 
the  soul ;  therefore  it  must  receive  from  the  soul  the 
power  of  acting.  Now,  if  the  soul  be  the  principle 
from  which  the  body  derives  the  power  of  acting,  it 


288      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy. 

is  necessary  also  that  the  soul,  along  with  the  body, 
should  be  the  subject  of  those  powers  by  means  of 
which  the  body  acts.  And  if  not  the  body  alone,  but 
the  whole  composite — that  is,  the  body  and  the  soul — 
is  the  subject  of  all  the  bodily  powers,  it  follows 
necessarily  that  not  only  the  soul  should  be  able  to 
incite  the  members  of  the  body  to  operation,  but  also 
that  the  operations  of  the  body  should  be  felt  in  the 
soul. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  we  shall  put  the  same 
argument  in  another  form.  We  have  proved  that  the 
body  subsists  on  the  subsistence  of  the  soul.  Now, 
what  does  this  imply  ?  Does  it  imply  that  the  body 
has  no  radical  power  to  act  without  the  soul  ?  Cer- 
tainly not ;  the  body  is  a  substance,  and,  as  such,  has 
a  natural  radical  power  of  acting.  But,  admitting  this 
radical  natural  power  of  acting,  does  it  follow  that 
the  body  can  actually  and  really  act  without  the  soul? 
Certainly  not ;  because  actiones  sunt  siippositorwn. 
Action  implies  subsistence,  which  is  that  last  comple- 
ment of  a  being  which  causes  it  to  be  distinct  from 
others,  independent  of  and  incommunicable  to  others. 
Without  that  a  substance  is  an  abstract  thing  and 
not  a  reality — a  potentiality,  but  not  an  actual  exist- 
ence. Now,  the  body  has  no  subsistence  of  its  own, 
but  subsists  on  the  subsistence  of  the  soul ;  therefore 
it  really  receives  the  power  of  acting  from  the  soul. 
The  soul,  then,  is  the  principle  from  which  the  body 
derives  the  power  to  act.  Now,  the  consequence  which 
results  from  this  truth  is  that  the  soul,  along  with  the 
body,  must  be  the  subject  of  those  powers  by  means 
of  which  the  body  acts,  because  originally  the  power 
emanates  from  the  soul ;  those  powers,  therefore,  by 
which  the  body  acts  must  be  in  both.  But  if  the 
whole  composite — that  is,  the  body  and  the  soul — is 


EUments  of  Intellectual  Philosophy.       289 

the  subject  of  those  powers  by  which  the  body  acts, 
who  can  fail  to  see  the  consequence  that  not  only  the 
soul  must  be  able  to  move  the  body  to  act,  but  that 
the  movements  of  the  body  should  be  felt  in  the  soul  ? 
In  one  word,  the  body  subsists  on  the  subsistence  of 
the  soul ;  therefore  it  receives  the  power  to  act  from 
the  soul.  If  this  power  of  the  body  is  received  from 
the  soul,  it  follows  that  it  must  be  found  in  both  con- 
jointly, and  that,  consequently,  not  only  the  soul 
must  be  able  to  move  the  body,  but  it  must  feel 
somewhat  the  movements  of  the  body. 

Q.  Give  a  resume  of  all  we  have  said  in  this  first 
part  of  Anthropology. 

A.  We  have  treated  of  man's  nature,  and  to  treat 
of  it  accurately  we  have  considered  it  first  in  general, 
and  then  we  have  distinguished  those  elements  from 
which  it  results — soul  and  body ;  then  we  have  con- 
sidered each  element  in  particular ;  and,  finally,  we 
have  investigated  the  manner  in  which  these  elements 
are  united  together.  In  other  words  :  Two  things  are 
necessary  to  constitute  man — i,  body  and  soul;  2,  a 
substantial  union  between  the  two;  therefore,  to 
speak  of  man  properly,  it  was  necessary  to  consider 
two  things— his  body  and  soul,  and  the  substantial 
union  of  both.  This  we  have  done  in  two  ways,  first 
in  general,  and  then  in  particular.  And  with  this  we 
end  the  first  part  of  Anthropology. 

"  O  ignorant  man  !  what  dost  thou  bear 

Lock'd  up  within  the  casket  of  thy  breast? 
What  jewels  and  what  riches  hast  thou  there, 

What  heavenly  treasures  in  so  weak  a  chest? 
Look  in  thy  soul,  and  thou  shalt  benuties  find 

Like  those  which  drown'd  Narcissus  in  the  flood  : 
Honor  and  pleasure  both  are  in  the  mind, 

And  all  that  in  the  world  i?  counted  good. 


290      Elements  of  Intellectual  Philosophy, 

Think  of  her  worth,  and  think  that  God  did  mean 

This  worthy  mind  should  worthy  things  embrace. 
Blot  not  her  beauties  with  thy  thoughts  unclean, 

Nor  her  dishonor  with  thy  passions  base. 
And  when  thou  thinkest  of  her  eternity, 

Think  not  that  death  against  her  nature  is, 
Think  it  a  birth  ;  and,  when  thou  go'st  to  die. 

Sing  like  a  man  as  if  thou  went'st  to  bliss." 

—Davies., 


Jt 


